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The Survival of the Bronze-Age Demon

DAVID SANSONE

There exist numerous representations on Minoan and Mycenaean objects of creatures that have generally come to be known as "demons" or "*genii*." The material has been conveniently collected and surveyed in an article entitled "The Minoan 'Genius'" by M. A. V. Gill.¹ In what follows, the objects will be referred to according to the numeration of Gill's catalogue, which contains 59 items and which can now be supplemented as follows:

60. Seal impression of a fragmentary haematite cylinder from Enkomi, Cyprus. A demon holds a libation vessel in a religious context.²
61. Cypriot haematite cylinder in a private collection. Two demons holding libation vessels face each other in a religious context.³
62. Steatite lentoid from Medeon, Phocis. Two demons face each other; between them are three dots and stylized vegetation (?).⁴
63. Agate amygdaloid from Nichoria, Messenia. A demon holding a libation vessel stands facing a low column or altar.⁵

¹ M. A. V. Gill, "The Minoan 'Genius'," *AthMitt* 79 (1964) 1-21, with a catalogue (15-21) containing 54 items, extended to 59 items in Gill, "Apropos the Minoan 'Genius'," *AJA* 74 (1970) 404-06. See also G. E. Mylonas, *Mycenae and the Mycenaean Age* (Princeton 1966) 166-68; S. Marinatos, "ΠΟΛΥΔΙΨΙΟΝ ΑΡΓΟΣ" in L. R. Palmer and J. Chadwick (eds.), *Proceedings of the Cambridge Colloquium on Mycenaean Studies* (Cambridge 1966) 265-74; F. T. van Straten, "The Minoan 'Genius' in Mycenaean Greece," *BABesch* 44 (1969) 110-21; J. H. Crouwel, "The Minoan Genius in Mycenaean Greece: a review," *Talanta* 2 (1970) 23-31 (with a reply by van Straten, pp. 33-35); R. Hampe and E. Simon, *The Birth of Greek Art* (New York 1981) 191-95; C. Baurain, "Pour une autre interprétation des génies minoens," *BCH Suppl.* 11 (1985) 95-118. The reader should be alerted to the following abbreviations, which will be used below:

AGDS = *Antike Gemmen in deutschen Sammlungen* (Munich 1968-75)

CMS = *Corpus der minoischen und mykenischen Siegel* (Berlin 1964-)

I should like to thank my colleague James Dengage for his generous assistance and encouragement.

² V. Karageorghis, *Mycenaean Art from Cyprus* (Nicosia 1968) 42, Pl. 38. 4; Crouwel (*supra* n. 1) 24, no. 3.

³ J. Boardman, *Greek Gems and Finger Rings* (New York 1970) 106, Pl. 206.

⁴ CMS V.2 no. 367.

⁵ CMS V.2 no. 440.

64. Steatite cylinder from Palaikastro, Crete. A demon stands facing two females (wearing animal masks?) and two aniconic goddesses.⁶
65. Glass paste plaque from Mycenae. No further details are available.⁷
66. Stone rhyton in the form of a conch from Malia. Part of the decoration consists of two demons facing each other; one holds a libation vessel.⁸
67. Haematite lentoid from Cyprus. A demon with a dog on either side runs.⁹

While the vast majority of these representations are engraved, we also find these creatures occasionally on ivory reliefs, on the handles of bronze urns and, once or twice, in fragments of fresco paintings. It is difficult, if not impossible, to assign precise dates to many of the objects; still, it is clear that the demons continued to be represented over a fairly long period, from the time of the First Palace at Phaistos¹⁰ to the very end of the Bronze Age.¹¹ On these objects the demons appear singly, in pairs antithetically disposed or, rarely, in larger groups. They are depicted as engaged in a variety of activities of apparently ritual character. Most often they are holding ewers, but they are also shown leading, carrying or, in one instance, slaying large animals. In appearance these demons are quite striking: they are quadrupeds standing upright on their hind legs and their most conspicuous feature is a "dorsal appendage" that reaches from the top of the head to about the middle of the calf or to the ankle.

So much can be said without fear of provoking controversy and disagreement. Beyond this there is little consensus among experts regarding the nature of these demons, their sex, their origin, the significance of the dorsal appendage or even the species of animal that they are intended to resemble. Concerning the nature of these creatures the most sensible remarks are those of Martin Nilsson, which it is worth while to quote here:

The daemons . . . are intimately associated with the cult. They appear as ministrants of the cult and . . . as guardians and attributes of a deity, or rather as his servants and subjects over whom he exerts his power. But a daemon appears also as the central figure exerting his power over lions and in another case with a man on each side of him. That he occupies the place usually set apart for the deity, or his symbol or shrine, can hardly be explained except on the assumption that he is of the same divine, or at least

⁶ V. E. G. Kenna, *AJA* 72 (1968) 331-32, Pl. 108, fig. 22; Crouwel (*supra* n. 1) 24, no. 5 (with Addenda, p. 31).

⁷ G. E. Mylonas, *Praktika* (1963) 101; cf. van Straten ([*supra* n. 1] 111, n. 10), who adds two further possible examples. But these are so fragmentary that it is not even certain that it is the demon that is represented.

⁸ C. Baurain and P. Darque, "Un triton en pierre à Malia," *BCH* 107 (1983) 3-58.

⁹ *CMS* VII no. 126.

¹⁰ No. 8 (= *CMS* II.5 no. 322); cf. D. Levi, *ASAtene* 35-36 (1957-58) 124-25.

¹¹ Nos. 17 and 18; cf. H. W. Catling, *Cypriot Bronzework in the Mycenaean World* (Oxford 1964) 156-61 (who strangely refers to "winged Genii"); Karageorghis (*supra* n. 2) 29-30. Crouwel ([*supra* n. 1] 29-30) however would assign these to the fourteenth or fifteenth century.

semi-divine, nature. The nature of these demons is consequently in a certain respect ambiguous, but seems easily intelligible. They are not gods themselves, but the stuff of which gods are made, daemons or beings of popular belief.¹²

Nilsson's use of masculine pronouns to refer to the demons is indicative of his belief that they are of indifferent gender.¹³ In this regard Nilsson is at odds with the majority of scholars, who consider the demons to be definitely female. The reason for this is that, in most instances, scholars' views of the sex of the demons have been linked with the consideration of the demons' origin. As early as 1890 it was suggested that the Minoan artists modeled these creatures on representations of the Egyptian goddess Ta-wrt, familiar in Crete from Egyptian imports.¹⁴ General (but not universal¹⁵) acceptance of this explanation for the origin of the demons has tended to influence the view that they are female. It will be best, however, to separate the issues of sex and origin in the discussion below.

If we regard, for the time being, the derivation from Ta-wrt as irrelevant to the question of gender, we find that there is very little in the iconography of the demons that helps us determine whether the artists regarded these creatures as male or female. That they hunt in the wild is not decisive, for females as well as males are so depicted in Minoan art.¹⁶ Their dress may suggest that they are male since (disregarding the mysterious dorsal appendage) they are naked apart from the belt that adorns the slender waist of some of the demons. But the same belt is found worn by women¹⁷ and, as far as the nakedness (which is uncharacteristic of the representation of Minoan women) is concerned, we are here dealing with creatures that are near, or indeed on the other side of, the borderline between the human and the animal. As is the case with Minoan griffins and sphinxes, even though they are female they need not be clothed. That the demons are in fact female is strongly suggested by the fact that, on the fresco fragment from Mycenae,

¹² M. P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*² (Lund 1950) 381; cf. C. Picard, *Les religions préhelléniques* (Paris 1948) 89–92.

¹³ "The Nature daemons . . . are both male and female, their sex being a matter of slight importance" (Nilsson [previous note] 383).

¹⁴ F. Winter, *ArchAnz* (1890) 108, followed by A. Evans, *JHS* 21 (1901) 169 and *The Palace of Minos at Knossos* (London 1921–36) IV 431–41; S. Marinatos and M. Hirmer, *Crete and Mycenae* (New York 1960) 176; E. Zwiernlein-Diehl, *AGDS* II 31–32; Boardman (*supra* n. 3) 53; Hampe and Simon (*supra* n. 1) 191.

¹⁵ Rejected already by A. Milchhoefer, *Die Anfänge der Kunst in Griechenland* (Leipzig 1883) 56 note. See also C. Tsountas, *ArchEph* (1891) 35–37; A. B. Cook, *JHS* 14 (1894) 82; A. Furtwängler, *Die antiken Gemmen* III (Leipzig 1900) 41; R. Dussaud, *Les civilisations préhelléniques*² (Paris 1914) 382; D. Levi, *ASAtene* 8–9 (1925–26) 192; E. Herkenrath, *AJA* 41 (1937) 421–22; D. Isaac, *RHR* 118 (1938) 67–68; R. Dussaud, *Iraq* 6 (1939) 61.

¹⁶ Cf. the comelian lentoid from Crete, *AGDS* II no. 20; Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 366.

¹⁷ E.g. the sardonx lentoid from Elis, *AGDS* II no. 21; the gold ring from Vaphio, *CMS* I no. 219; the sardonx amygdaloid from Vaphio, *CMS* I no. 226.

they are painted white.¹⁸ Still, it must be admitted that the same argument that allowed for the possibility of naked females may be permitted to allow for the possibility of white males. But there is, in the end, no positive evidence that requires, or even encourages, us to regard the demons as male. Thus, while we cannot claim that the case is proved, it seems that, even disregarding the possible derivation of these demons from the goddess Ta-wrt, on balance the evidence inclines us toward the view that they are indeed female.

But it is impossible to disregard the connection between the Minoan demons and the Egyptian goddess, as it has been emphasized by the majority of scholars who have concerned themselves with the question of the nature of the demons. Indeed Margaret Gill, in the most comprehensive discussion of the question, has shown that it is unreasonable to deny the connection. But we are not compelled to agree with her when she says, "Once derivation from Ta-wrt is accepted the physical characteristics of the 'genius' are no longer a problem."¹⁹ On the contrary, acceptance of the derivation from Ta-wrt generates more problems (and not about the physical characteristics of the demons alone) than it resolves. For, while there are arresting similarities between the appearance of the hippopotamus-headed goddess and that of the mysterious demons, there are also numerous and significant differences, and these differences must be accounted for. Now, some of the differences can be readily explained. For example, the elimination of hippopotamus-features is explicable on the grounds of the absence of that animal from the territory and consciousness of Minoan and Mycenaean Greece, and the reduction of the potbelly is understandable in terms of the conventions of Minoan artistic representation. But how can we account for the fact that, while Ta-wrt is a single deity with an identity of her own, the demons are multiplied like the satyrs or nymphs of later Greek art? And, more importantly, how can we account for the iconography of the demons, who are regularly represented as engaged in activities that have no associations with the Egyptian goddess? Even from its earliest appearance in Crete the demon leads a life of its own. The sealing from Phaestos, for example, already depicts the demon with the characteristic ewer and vegetation and, perhaps, also the heap of stones that is found elsewhere in Minoan art.²⁰ We would have to make the assumption (which, I think,

¹⁸ No. 25. (For color illustrations see *ArchEph* [1887] Pl. 10. 1; Marinatos and Himer [*supra* n. 14] Pl. 43; Hampe and Simon [*supra* n. 1] Pl. 33.) Likewise on the fresco fragment from Pylos (no. 55), if indeed it is a demon that is represented.

¹⁹ Gill (*supra* n. 1) 4.

²⁰ No. 8. For the ewer, see nos. 2-9, 13, 18, 20-23, 26, 46, 47, 52, 58-61, 63, 66; for the vegetation, nos. 10, 11, 14, 19, 23, 26, 47, 54, 59. On one of the Zakro sealings (no. 27) a demon spears a bull over a heap of stones. On a glass plaque from Mycenae (no. 20) two demons hold ewers over a heap of stones. More commonly, demons are depicted holding ewers over an object described as an altar or a pillar (nos. 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 56, 58, 63). There may be no practical difference between these latter objects and the heap of stones, as there is

cannot easily be paralleled) that Minoan artists adopted a distinctive Egyptian deity, multiplied her, modified some details of her appearance and associated her with the conventions of Minoan cult. Artists, particularly those whose medium is the "minor arts," simply do not have the authority to make the kinds of innovations that we are here asked to assume. It is much more likely that these demons correspond to something already existing in Minoan cult and belief. If, as seems likely to be the case, Tawrt has exercised some influence, it is not a matter of the demons owing their existence to artists' acquaintance with representations of the Egyptian deity. Rather she has contributed some details to the iconography of a native divinity.²¹

If this is the case, we cannot simply dismiss the details of iconography as arising from misunderstandings on the part of artists.²² The artists were not copying, at several removes, a foreign original which they were unable to comprehend. Rather they were attempting to depict a being that had an objective reality in the context of the local cult. When the Cretans spoke of these creatures, even worshipped them, they referred to them with a specific name (not the vague "demons" or "*genii*" which we are forced to use), applied to them pronouns and epithets that were either masculine or feminine in gender, used vocabulary that was appropriate to creatures of leonine or asinine (or some other) character, and surely did not employ the Minoan equivalent of the expression "dorsal appendage" in reference to the demons' most distinctive feature. Our task, then, is to attempt to determine, in the first place, the kind of animal that the Minoan artists were attempting to represent and, in the second, the nature of the material of which the "dorsal appendage" was thought to be composed.

It has been variously suggested that the demons' appearance is that of a horse, an ass or a lion. And indeed some of the representations are strikingly equine, asinine or leonine. But the features that make one identification attractive would seem to rule out the others. The clear representations of paws, for example, on the demons of the famous gold ring from Tiryns²³ render impossible the supposition that we are dealing with a hooved creature, while the long, pointed ears in the fresco from

later no practical difference between a herm and a heap of stones; cf. W. Burkert, *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (Berkeley 1979) 39–43; van Straten (*supra* n. 1) 114; Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 256; Evans, *Palace of Minos* (*supra* n. 14) IV 455. Thus the activities of the demons have several points of contact with the ritual (described in detail at Plut. *Arist.* 21) in honor of those who died at Plataea, with its branches of myrtle, sacrifice of a bull and washing of stelae with water from a ewer.

²¹ Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 381; Baurain (*supra* n. 1) 98–102.

²² So Gill (*supra* n. 1) 4.

²³ No. 26 (= CMS I no. 179).

Mycenae are obviously not those of lions.²⁴ Either, therefore, we are dealing with a creature that is sometimes represented with the attributes of one species and sometimes with those of another, or we need to find some other species which possesses all the various attributes with which the demons are endowed. But first a word must be said about the significance of these attributes. Minoan and Mycenaean artists (or, at least, some Minoan and Mycenaean artists) were quite capable of representing convincingly a hoof or a lion's head. The lentoid from the tholos tomb at Vaphio, for example, which depicts a two-horse chariot,²⁵ illustrates well the care that the Mycenaean engraver takes in portraying a horse's hoof. And the lions on the famous inlaid dagger blade from Grave Circle A in Mycenae are gloriously and realistically leonine. But it is unnecessary to deal in generalities when we can compare directly two representations by the same artist in the same work. Several seals show the demon carrying, leading or subduing a stag or a bull, and in every instance the artist has been careful to distinguish the paws of the demon from the hooves of its victim.²⁶ In similar fashion we can compare lions and demons on the same engraving. A cornelian lentoid in Berlin has a demon carrying a pole with the body of a lion suspended from each end.²⁷ Unfortunately, while the demon is represented in profile, the lions are shown from above, so that the comparison is not exact. Still, comparison is instructive: the paws are similar (though not identical) but, of even greater interest, while the lions have the lunate ears that are characteristic not only of lions but, more importantly, of Minoan and Mycenaean representations of lions, the demon has the long, pointed ears that these demons often display.²⁸ Not only are

²⁴ No. 25 (see n. 18). Also against the identification of the demons with lions is the fact that there is never a trace on the visible part of the demons' neck of a lion's mane. For, to the Minoan artists the mane was such a distinctively leonine feature that they regularly furnished even lionesses with it: e.g. conglomerate lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 106; cornelian lentoid in Boston, *CMS* XIII no. 26; cornelian lentoid in Oxford, V. E. G. Kenna, *Cretan Seals* (Oxford 1960) no. 314; two cornelian amygdaloids in Munich, *AGDS* I nos. 41 and 42; marble lentoid in Munich, *AGDS* I no. 43; agate lentoid in London, H. B. Walters, *Catalogue of the Engraved Gems . . . in the British Museum* (London 1926) no. 48. Compare Anacreon's antlered doe (fr. 408 Page); H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (Oxford 1975) 295.

²⁵ *CMS* I no. 229; color illustration in Hampe and Simon (*supra* n. 1) Pl. 264. It is instructive to compare also the heads of these horses with those of the demons. It will be seen that there is no resemblance. In any case, the demons cannot be modeled on horses, as these demons appear earlier in Minoan art than does the horse; cf. Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 19.

²⁶ Nos. 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 54. For no. 54, see now S. Symeonoglou, *Kadmeia* I (Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology 35 [Göteborg 1973]) 48–52, Pls. 70–73.

²⁷ No. 41 (= *AGDS* II no. 28).

²⁸ Furtwängler (*supra* n. 15) III 39) recognizes that the demons regularly do not have lions' ears, but he is clearly mistaken in regarding the ears as belonging with the dorsal appendage. The fresco from Mycenae as well as other representations make it clear that the appendage is entirely separate from the ears.

Minoan and Mycenaean artists generally capable of depicting a convincing lion's ear,²⁹ but this particular artist is capable of so doing. Yet he has chosen not to. He does not conceive of his demon in leonine terms.³⁰ Rather it is an animal with paws and with long, pointed ears. Nor is this artist alone; the paws and long ears are plainly visible in a number of other representations of the demon, including the gold ring from Tiryns.

An animal which has paws and which can have long, pointed ears is the dog.³¹ But of greater relevance than the actual appearance of dogs is, of course, the practice of Bronze-Age artists when dealing with canine representation. To be sure, there is great variety in the depiction of dogs in Minoan and Mycenaean art. Nor is this surprising considering the diversity of breeds. Indeed, this diversity may account for the variation in the appearance of the demons. But the long, pointed ears are very much in evidence, sometimes pricked up, sometimes laid back along the head.³² And the faces, some short and square, others long and pointed, bear close resemblances to the faces of many of the demons.³³ These resemblances,

²⁹ E.g. the gold rhyton in Athens, from Shaft Grave IV at Mycenae; rock crystal lentoid from Knossos, Kenna (*supra* n. 24) no. 315; jasper lentoid from Athens, Kenna, no. 318; agate lentoid from Vaphio, *CMS* I no. 243; onyx lentoid from Vaphio, *CMS* I no. 248; jasper prism bead in the British Museum, *CMS* VII no. 115c; cornelian lentoid in the British Museum, *CMS* VII no. 118; cornelian lentoid from Athens, *AGDS* II no. 34; sardonxy lentoid from Pylos, *CMS* I no. 277. Unfortunately Hanns Gabelmann (*Studien zum frühgriechischen Löwenbild* [Berlin 1965]) does not concern himself with Bronze-Age art.

³⁰ Similarly the other artists who depict lions and demons side by side: no. 43 (= *CMS* I no. 172); no. 44 (= *CMS* I no. 161); no. 46 (= H.-G. Buchholz and V. Karageorghis, *Altägäis und Altkypros* [Tübingen 1971] no. 1753); no. 50; no. 61.

³¹ It seems not to have been previously suggested that the demons are dogs, although Hampe and Simon correctly observe, "Scholars have generally regarded the head and paws as those of a lion, though the ears are often elongated and more like those of a dog" (*[supra* n. 1] 191), and Walter Burkert notes their "dog-like snouts, pointed ears, and paws" (*Greek Religion* [Oxford 1985] 35). In later antiquity demons often have the appearance of dogs: *JHS* 100 (1980) 161, with n. 23.

³² Onyx lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 81; lapis lazuli lentoid from Vaphio, *CMS* I no. 255; seal impression from Vaphio, *CMS* I no. 256; conglomerate lentoid from Pylos, *CMS* I no. 294; sardonxy amygdaloid from Crete, *CMS* I no. 480; cornelian lentoid in London, *CMS* VII no. 66; steatite prism bead from Zakro, *CMS* VII no. 216b; steatite prism in Paris, *CMS* IX no. 14c; jasper lentoid in Paris, *CMS* IX no. 195; steatite prism bead in New York, *CMS* XII no. 50a; jasper lentoid from Crete, Kenna (*supra* n. 24) no. 240; seal impression from Knossos, Kenna, no. 40S; ivory half cylinder from Crete, Evans, *Palace of Minos* (*supra* n. 14) I 197, fig. 145; haematite lentoid from Crete, Evans IV 581, fig. 586; seal impression from the "Little Palace" deposit, Evans IV 608, fig. 597A g; frescoes from Pylos, M. L. Lang, *The Palace of Nestor* II (Princeton 1969) Pls. 64 and 116.

³³ Compare the face of the demon on the agate amygdaloid from Vaphio (no. 2) with the dog's-head seal impression from Phaestos, *CMS* II.5 no. 300; the face of the demon on the cornelian lentoid from Crete (no. 41) with that of the hound on a cornelian amygdaloid in Munich, *AGDS* I no. 37; the face of the demon on the haematite cylinder from Crete (no. 13) with that of the dog on a haematite lentoid from Knossos, Boardman (*supra* n. 3) Pl. 115; the face of the taller of the two demons on the steatite lentoid from Crete (no. 16) with the faces of the dogs on an agate lentoid in Athens, *CMS* I Suppl. no. 109; the faces of the demons on the

along with the pointed ears, paws and variation in the depiction of the face, make it quite likely that the appearance of the demons is intended to be canine. This identification is securely confirmed by two observations. In the first place, on a number of occasions the demon is represented with what appears to be a collar around its neck,³⁴ and collars are a regular feature of the portrayal of dogs in Minoan and Mycenaean art.³⁵ In the second place, the rôle that the demon frequently assumes is that of the hunter, and in art (as in life) the dog is the companion of its master on the hunt.

Unfortunately, recognizing the canine character of the demons does not help with the identification of the dorsal appendage, for there is nothing that is commonly associated with dogs—the same is true, of course, of lions, horses and asses—that can plausibly be related to this particular appurtenance. Clearly the demon is, like the sphinx and the hippogriff, a composite creature, having the shape of a dog, the posture of a human³⁶ and an additional element derived from elsewhere. Various attempts have been made to explain and identify this element³⁷ but, according to Margaret Gill, who considers the demons to be descended from Ta-wrt, “there is no need to try to explain the dorsal appendage as part of the costume assumed by a human worshipper masquerading as an animal nor attempt to account for it by comparison with a variety of animal forms. . . . That no single explanation based on comparison with natural objects could be found to fit

fresco from Mycenae (no. 25) with the face of the dog on a fresco from Pylos, Lang (previous note) Pl. 116; the face of the demon on the serpentine lentoid from Crete (no. 35 = *AGDS* II no. 29) with the faces of the dogs on an onyx lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 81. (These Mycenaean dogs look somewhat horse-like and may help explain the occasional equine identification of the demons.) Finally, the faces of the demon and the dogs on no. 67 are strikingly similar.

³⁴ Nos. 3 (= *AGDS* II no. 26), 8 (= *CMS* II. 5 no. 322), 23 (= *CMS* I no. 231), 25 (see n. 18), 58, 61, 63 and 66.

³⁵ Frescoes from Pylos (Lang [*supra* n. 32] Pl. 116) and Tiryns (G. Rodenwaldt, *Tiryns* II [Athens 1912] Pls. 13 and 14.6). Frequently on seals: *CMS* I nos. 81, 255, 256, 294, 480; V.2 no. 677a; VII nos. 66 and 115; IX no. 135; XIII no. 71; *AGDS* I no. 37; Kenna (*supra* n. 24) nos. 237, 238, 239, 240, 40S; Evans, *Palace of Minos* (*supra* n. 14) II 766, fig. 496.

³⁶ Another element that is possibly human is the forelock (clearly visible in nos. 2, 25, 26, 49 and 59), which can be compared with, e.g. those of the figures on the Hagia Triada sarcophagus; of “la Parisienne” from Knossos; of the woman on the fresco from the cult center at Mycenae; of the women on the fresco from Tiryns; of the bearded man on the amethyst disc from Mycenae (*CMS* I no. 5). Cf. Crouwel (*supra* n. 1) 24–25.

³⁷ “On the back of each lion is, apparently, a hide, possibly covered with a net,” A. W. Persson (*The Religion of Greece in Prehistoric Times* [Berkeley 1942] 78, of the demons on the ring from Tiryns, no. 26); “a beetle-like covering. . . . It seems . . . to be taken from the insect world, specifically from butterflies and their larvae,” Hampe and Simon (*supra* n. 1) 191; “der Rücken ist mit einem anscheinend losen, borstigen Fell bekleidet, das in eine Wespentaille endet,” M. P. Nilsson (*Geschichte der griechischen Religion*³ I [Munich 1967] 296); “the crocodile hide and tail is [*sic*] quite unmistakable,” Catling (*supra* n. 11) 158, of the demons on the bronze urn handles, no. 18). According to Baurain (*supra* n. 1) 103–10) the dorsal appendage is a figure-eight shield.

all examples is not surprising since the Minoan craftsman was copying not from nature but from a picture, and that in a foreign artistic style and possibly in a different medium."³⁸ But, as indicated above, the demons undoubtedly possessed an independent identity apart from their appearances on works of art, and the artists were attempting to depict—granted in a stylized manner—a feature to which they could most likely apply a name and which they no doubt thought had a purpose. Still, it is not surprising that scholars have either produced wholly unsatisfactory identifications or have despaired altogether of identifying the appendage. For, while its general shape is fairly consistent in the various representations, its decoration varies considerably. Occasionally it is without decoration entirely,³⁹ but more commonly it is decorated either on its surface or with protrusions on the outer edge, or both. The protrusions sometimes have a spiky appearance,⁴⁰ sometimes are spherical in shape,⁴¹ and sometimes appear to be spikes terminating in balls.⁴² The surface decoration sometimes consists of striations,⁴³ sometimes of a combination of stripes and circles,⁴⁴ and sometimes of a crosshatching or scaly effect.⁴⁵ The protrusions belong to the repertory of contemporary glyptic⁴⁶ and are reminiscent of the purely decorative elements with which Minoan and Mycenaean engravers like to adorn, for example, goats' horns and griffins' wings.⁴⁷ If they serve any purpose at all, it is a conceptual one rather than a pictorial: they indicate that the dorsal appendage, whatever its actual shape and nature, serves as the demon's mane.⁴⁸ Indeed, in some representations the appendage looks shaggy or bristly. But this need not mean that the

³⁸ Gill (*supra* n. 1) 4.

³⁹ Nos. 13, 20, 31, 40, 41, 50, 52, 53, 58.

⁴⁰ Nos. 2, 5, 6, 11 (?), 16, 19, 20, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 51, 60, 61, 63.

⁴¹ Nos. 3, 8, 14, 21, 22, 23, 27, 46.

⁴² Nos. 26, 29, 30, 32. For the aberrant and problematic no. 38, see Gill (*supra* n. 1) 3.

⁴³ Nos. 2, 8 (?), 11, 12 (?), 14, 15, 16, 18, 25, 29, 30, 42, 45, 49.

⁴⁴ No. 23.

⁴⁵ Nos. 4, 17, 26, 27, 39 (?), 54.

⁴⁶ It is therefore perhaps significant that they are missing from the representations on the frescoes from Mycenae and Pylos (nos. 25 and 55).

⁴⁷ E.g. agate lentoid from Megalopolis, *AGDS* II no. 54; agate lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 74; conglomerate lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 115; two gold rings from Mycenae, *CMS* I nos. 119 and 155; jasper lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 168; agate prism from Midea, *CMS* I no. 193; jasper lentoid from Pylos, *CMS* I no. 266; two agate lentoids from Crete, Kenna (*supra* n. 24) nos. 286 and 320; sardonyx lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 73; agate lentoid from Mycenae, *CMS* I no. 98; haematite lentoid from Crete, Kenna, no. 342; serpentine lentoid from Crete, *CMS* IV no. 287; steatite lentoid in New York, *CMS* XII no. 301.

⁴⁸ I am thinking not so much of lions' or horses' manes, but of those of wild boars and goats, which extend the length of the animal's body, e.g. *AGDS* I no. 58; II nos. 23 and 56; *CMS* I nos. 158, 184, 192, 227, 276; IX nos. 136, 139, 140, 141; XII nos. 215, 261. We may also compare the spherical protrusions on the dorsal appendages with the series of dots that represent the flowing locks of some of the human figures on the gold rings depicting the vegetation cult, e.g. *CMS* I nos. 17, 126, 127, 191, 219, 514.

artist considered the appendage to have the appearance of a boar's or a goat's mane—the shape of the appendage and the fact that in many instances it lacks these protrusions indicate otherwise—but merely that it takes the place of a mane.

But the shape of the dorsal appendage indicates that the artists had something specific in mind which was transferred from elsewhere to serve as a mane. The shape and, I think, even the surface decoration show that it is intended as a snake-skin. It will be readily conceded that the shape of the dorsal appendage has more in common with that of a snake-skin than with that of anything from the insect-world. And the surface decoration, even by its very variety, proclaims its serpentine, or at least reptilian, origin. We can classify the method of decorating the surface of the dorsal appendage in three general categories, none of which is inconsistent with the representation of a snake. Some demons have appendages that are without surface decoration entirely, indicative either of the smoothness of a snake's skin or of the artist's inability or unwillingness to adorn so small a detail.⁴⁹ Others have appendages with a crosshatching very similar to the appearance of scales.⁵⁰ The rest have appendages that are decorated in such a way as to imitate the various patterns of stripes, spots, etc. that so colorfully embellish the skins of many snakes.⁵¹ The most striking example of this last category is the fresco from Mycenae, which shows the dorsal appendage decorated with wavy chevrons of red and blue.

If we summarize here what we now know about these demons it will become apparent what we are dealing with. They are divinities of a somewhat lesser status than the purely anthropomorphic deities in whose company they are occasionally found; they are concerned both with hunting and with the propagation of vegetation; they appear singly or in groups; they are apparently female; they are basically canine in appearance, although their upright posture anthropomorphizes them to some degree; they have a

⁴⁹ We must bear in mind that the majority of demons appear on surfaces the largest dimension of which is less than an inch. Not surprisingly, when snakes are seen on Bronze-Age seals (as they occasionally are: *CMS* II.1 no. 453c; IV no. 54; IX no. 86; *AGDS* I no. 24) they are typically without any sort of decoration. The same is usually the case with later engravings (see, for example, Boardman [*supra* n. 3] Pls. 219, 289, 372, 494, 509), but we do on occasion see the artist attempting to suggest the texture or pattern of the snake's skin. When he does this, he frequently employs a technique similar to that used by the Bronze-Age artists to decorate the demons' dorsal appendage (see Boardman, Pls. 257, 378, 486, 503, 699). Of perhaps greatest interest in this connection is the sea-serpent (Scylla [?]; note what appears to be a collar on its neck) on an island gem of the seventh century: J. Boardman, *Island Gems* (SocPromHellStud, Supplementary Papers 10 [London 1963]) no. 293. The artist has represented the serpent's scales with a pattern of lines and dots that resemble the protrusions on some of the demons' dorsal appendages.

⁵⁰ See n. 45.

⁵¹ For snakes in Minoan art see especially Evans, *Palace of Minos* (*supra* n. 14) IV 138–99, although it is not necessary to accept Evans' derivation (178–92) of the "wave and dot" motif from the pattern on the skin of *tarbophis vivax*.

mane (if that is the right word) consisting of a snake-skin. They are, to give them the name by which we must now refer to them, Erinyes.⁵²

That the Greeks worshipped the Erinyes (or, at least, an Eriny) in the Bronze Age is proved by the appearance of *E-ri-nu* in the Mycenaean tablets.⁵³ That they are to be identified with the demons that we have been concerned with is shown by the remarkable coincidence of attributes and associations. To begin with, the demons have the appearance of dogs, and the Erinyes are frequently referred to in canine terms.⁵⁴ To be sure, it has been asserted that the canine aspect of the Erinyes is a late invention⁵⁵ and even that the original character of the Erinyes was equine rather than canine.⁵⁶ But neither of these assertions is provable. Indeed, both are unlikely. The association of the Erinyes with horses is very tenuous and is supported by such "evidence" as the fact that Sophocles applies the same epithet (χαλκόπους) to the Erinyes that Homer applies to horses⁵⁷ and the

⁵² The demons were earlier identified as Erinyes by Milchhoefer ([*supra* n. 15] 58–64), but only because he considered the demons to be horse-headed. For the alleged equine character of the Erinyes see below. I have not seen M. Visser, *The Erinyes* (Diss. Toronto 1980).

⁵³ M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*² (Cambridge 1973) 306–07, 411, 476; M. Gérard-Rousseau, *Les mentions religieuses dans les tablettes mycéniennes* (Incunabula Graeca 29 [Rome 1968]) 103–04; G. Neumann, "Wortbildung und Etymologie von 'Ἐρινύς,'" *Die Sprache* 32 (1986) 43–51; A. Heubeck, "Ἐρινύς in der archaischen Epik," *Glotta* 64 (1986) 143–65. Reference to the deity on the tablets from Knossos is in the singular but, since the usual procedure is for an individual divinity to be separated out from a collective group rather than for a group to come into being from the multiplication of an individual (Wilamowitz, *Kl. Schr.* V.2 34; M. P. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion* [Oxford 1925] 111–13; Burkert [*supra* n. 31] 173), we must assume that, even in the Mycenaean Period, the Erinyes are now plural, now singular, just as they are in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 9.454 and 571; for the number of the Erinyes see Jane Harrison, *JHS* 19 [1899] 207–08; E. Wüst, *RE* Suppl. VIII [1956] 122–23). Similarly our demons are sometimes shown as an undifferentiated collectivity and sometimes as a single divinity.

⁵⁴ Aesch. *Cho.* 924, 1054, *Eum.* 132, 246; Soph. *El.* 1388; Eur. *El.* 1252, 1342, *Or.* 260; Hesychius s. v. κύων; Eustathius on Homer *Il.* 9.454 (763.40); Horace *Serm.* 1. 8. 35; Lucan 6. 733; Servius *Aen.* 3. 209; W. H. Roscher, *Das von der "Kynanthropie" handelnde Fragment des Marcellus von Side* (AbhLeipz 17. 3 [Leipzig 1896]) 46–50. In the visual arts the Erinyes are not depicted as dogs (or, indeed, with any other theriomorphic appearance, apart from their snaky locks) but they are often portrayed as huntresses; cf. A. Rosenberg, *Die Erinyen* (Berlin 1874) 85.

⁵⁵ "As soon as the Erinyes develop out of ghosts into avengers the element of pursuit comes in, they . . . become all vindictive; they are no longer δράκαινας but κύνες," Jane Harrison (*JHS* 19 [1899] 220). But we now see that the element of pursuit and the chase is as old as the Minoan Period.

⁵⁶ S. Eitrem, *Die göttlichen Zwillinge bei den Griechen* (Christiania 1902) 61–63; Wilamowitz, *Kl. Schr.* VI 224 and *Griechische Tragödien*⁵ II (Berlin 1907) 225–31; E. Hedén, *Homeric Götterstudien* (Uppsala 1912) 135–38; L. Malten, *JDAI* 29 (1914) 200–02; A. H. Krappe, *RhMus* 81 (1932) 305–20.

⁵⁷ *El.* 491; *Il.* 8. 41, 13. 23. See B. C. Dietrich, *Hermes* 90 (1962) 141–42. (That brazen foot and canine attributes are not incompatible is shown by Ar. *Ran.* 292–95.) Eitrem ([previous note] 62) even considers the possibility that the goad, which is an occasional attribute of the Erinyes, can be explained with reference to their equine origins. If the archaeologist of the

fact that the grove of the Eumenides (!) in Attica was at Colonus Hippius. A somewhat more direct connection is provided by a myth recounted by Pausanias, in the course of which Poseidon mates with Demeter Erinys and the product of their union is the horse Areion (Erion). Whatever the significance of this myth may be,⁵⁸ it is surely not evidence that the Erinyes were originally equine in character, or even that there was any particular connection between the Erinyes and horses. In fact, the mating of Poseidon and Demeter appears to be a late element in the myth, as there is a strikingly similar Hittite myth from which horses are absent.⁵⁹ In addition, the ritual which Pausanias describes in connection with the myth is a form of sacrifice characteristic of the Bronze Age and is appropriate to the myth in its earlier (i.e. horseless) state. The focus of this ritual at Phigalia, where the goddess is called not Demeter Erinys but Black Demeter, is a wooden cult statue which had been destroyed by fire long before Pausanias' day. Nevertheless, Pausanias records what he had been told of its appearance: "She was seated upon a rock and had the appearance of a woman except for the head. She had the head and mane of a horse, and snakes and other creatures were represented as growing from her head. She was dressed in a *chiton* which reached to her feet and she held a dolphin in one hand and a dove in the other."⁶⁰ The rock, the snakes and the dove are all elements that are familiar from Bronze-Age iconography and they, in conjunction with the evidence of the ritual, indicate that the statue was itself very old.⁶¹ It is interesting that one parallel that Frazer produces for this horse-headed female divinity is precisely a representation of the Bronze-Age demon on a lentoid seal which was supposed to have come from Phigalia.⁶² Just as the seal misled Frazer, Cook and others, so the venerable *xoanon* misled the

future follows this reasoning, when confronted with a picture of Wilhelm Tell he will identify it as one of St. Sebastian.

⁵⁸ Paus. 8. 25. 4-10. For the enormous bibliography concerned with this myth, see E. Wüst (*supra* n. 53) 94-101; B. C. Dietrich, "Demeter, Erinys, Artemis," *Hermes* 90 (1962) 129-48 and *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London 1965) 118-38; R. Stiglitz, *Die grossen Göttinnen Arkadiens* (Vienna 1967) 110-34.

⁵⁹ Burkert (*supra* n. 20) 123-29. According to Burkert (126) the ritual "is strangely reminiscent of Bronze Age religious practice." Cf. also Burkert (*supra* n. 31) 68. It is unclear to me whether A. Schachter (*Cults of Boeotia* I [BICS Suppl. 38. 1 (London 1981)] 164) agrees that the horses are secondary.

⁶⁰ Paus. 8. 42. 4.

⁶¹ The demons are sometimes shown in conjunction with birds (nos. 13, 24, 26, 30, 46, 53, 58) and once (no. 46) in conjunction with a dolphin. For the survival of Mycenaean *xoana* into the archaic period and later, see Marinatos (*supra* n. 1) 270, with n. 1. It is perhaps also significant of the antiquity of the cult of Black Demeter that she is worshipped in a cave (Paus. 8. 42. 1); Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 53-76; R. F. Willets, *Cretan Cults and Festivals* (London 1962) 141-47.

⁶² No. 48. J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece* IV (London 1898) 407; cf. A. B. Cook, *JHS* 14 (1894) 138 ff. Above (n. 33) I noted the similarity of some Mycenaean representations of dogs to horses.

Phigalians, who interpreted the features of their Demeter as equine and concocted, or adopted from another context, a myth to explain her appearance.

The connection, on the other hand, between the Erinyes and dogs, although it cannot be proved to be of very long standing, is more widespread and is more directly attested. It is explicit first in Aeschylus, but it makes its appearance in such a way as to indicate that Aeschylus expected his audience to be familiar with it. At *Cho.* 924 Clytaimestra warns Orestes to "beware a mother's angry hounds" (μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας) should he kill her, and Orestes replies that, if he does not kill her, he will be unable to escape his father's (hounds). Orestes and the audience know what she means. She means the Erinyes, as is confirmed by the fact that later Orestes uses precisely the same expression to refer to the Erinyes, whom he sees before him.⁶³ As is well known, Aeschylus will develop further in the *Eumenides* the image of the Erinyes as hounds tracking their quarry.⁶⁴ But it is important to note that at *this* point in the trilogy (*Cho.* 924) that development has not yet taken place. Furthermore, when the Erinyes are actually seen on stage they do not have the appearance of hounds.⁶⁵ If Aeschylus had himself been responsible for the identification of the Erinyes with hounds, he could not have referred to them with no explanation as hounds in *Cho.* and then produced them on stage as women in the following play. Aeschylus and his audience were accustomed to the identification of the Erinyes with hounds but, for reasons of propriety connected with the conventions of the stage,⁶⁶ he and they had to be content with an anthropomorphic chorus. How long before the time of Aeschylus this identification existed we cannot be certain⁶⁷ but, if we are right in equating the Minoan demon with the Erinyes, it goes back to the Bronze Age.

The most common association of the Erinys with an animal is with the snake,⁶⁸ and the iconography of the Bronze-Age demon enables us to

⁶³ *Cho.* 1054 μητρὸς ἐγκοτοι κύνας. With this phrase compare μητρὸς Ἐρινύας *Homer Il.* 21. 412 and *Od.* 11. 280, Ἐρινύς πατρὸς *Hesiod Th.* 472, Ἐρινύς πατρὸς *Aesch. Sept.* 70 (cf. 723, 886-87; *Soph. OC* 1299, 1434; *Hdt.* 4. 149. 2). Cf. E. Rohde, *Kl. Schr.* II 233-35.

⁶⁴ Cf. G. Thomson, *The Oresteia of Aeschylus*² II (Amsterdam 1966) 195 (on *Eum.* 130-39) and add ὧν (*Eum.* 94) which, to judge from *Xen. Cyn.* 6.19, is part of the vocabulary of hunting with hounds.

⁶⁵ The priestess' description: *Eum.* 46-54.

⁶⁶ Compare Griffith on *PV* 588 (bovine Io).

⁶⁷ It is perhaps significant that, according to *Homer*, the daughters of Pandareus are given to the *Erinyes* to act as their servants (*Od.* 20. 78). For, according to later accounts, their punishment is occasioned by their father's theft of Zeus' dog and takes the form of an affliction called κύων (see *Roscher [supra n. 54]*).

⁶⁸ *Aesch. Cho.* 1049-50, *Eum.* 128; *Eur. IT* 286-87, *Or.* 256; *Jane Harrison, JHS* 19 (1899) 213-25; E. Wüst (*supra n. 53*) 124-25; E. Mitropoulou, *Deities and Heroes in the Form of Snakes* (Athens 1975) 46-47. If K. Schefold (*Götter- und Heldensagen der Griechen in der spätarchaischen Kunst* [Munich 1978] 261-62) is right to identify one of the metopes from the Heraion on the Sele as Orestes and the Erinys, we have evidence of the Erinys in serpentine form from the middle of the sixth century.

understand how the Erinyes can be at once canine and serpentine. The association with snakes has been readily accepted by scholars primarily because the Erinyes has been felt to represent the spirit of the dead, which in turn is often represented in serpentine form. But the Mycenaean evidence shows that it is incorrect to regard the Erinyes as the hypostatization of the spirit of the dead: *E-ri-nu* was worshipped as a goddess in her own right already in Mycenaean Crete. Also, if our identification of the demon is correct, it is clear that the character of the Erinyes as individual avenger is a later development.⁶⁹ In fact, we can now follow that development with some confidence. The demon wears the snake-skin as an emblem of death and renewal. She is (originally) a satellite of the great Cretan nature goddess and it is her function to see to it that the processes of nature are carried out. These processes include the termination of life as well as the continuation of growth. And so the demon is portrayed as the hunter, serving notice to the lion, the stag and the bull that the inexorable law of nature is to take effect. She is depicted either as doing this by violent means or simply as carrying off or leading the victim whose appointed time has come or, in one instance, as binding the victim with a rope.⁷⁰ This last may remind us of the *desmios hymnos* of Aeschylus' Erinyes and of the bonds that are so frequently associated with those deities who are concerned with the workings of fate.⁷¹ But "fate" is perhaps too abstract a concept to use in this connection; better to speak here of "the inviolable order of nature," an expression that Werner Jaeger uses⁷² to characterize the Dike of Heraclitus, whose ministers, the Erinyes, will find out if the Sun should overstep his

⁶⁹ Cf. also E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 7-8; Dietrich (*supra* n. 58) "Demeter" 142 and *Death* 139.

⁷⁰ Violence: nos. 27, 50 (?). Carrying: nos. 31-35, 38, 40, 41, 54. Leading: nos. 30, 42. Binding: no. 29. (The similarity of nos. 29 and 30 [= Kenna (*supra* n. 24) nos. 306 and 307] may indicate that the artist of no. 30 also intends to depict the bull as bound.) It is difficult to tell whether the object over the shoulders of the demons on the fresco from Mycenae (no. 25) is a pole or a rope. In view of its helical striation and in view of the evidence of no. 29, perhaps rope is more likely; cf. Crouwel (*supra* n. 1) 26. According to Gill, "It is interesting to note the realistic distinction made between the domestic animal, cow or bull, that could be led to the slaughter guided by a stick or rope or controlled by its horns, and the wild animals slain or wounded in capture that had therefore to be carried to the offering table" (*supra* n. 1) 10). But this distinction does not hold (cf. the lion being led in no. 42) and, in any case, there is no question here of sacrifice. (There is, after all, no evidence of Minoan lion-sacrifice.) Rather the action depicted testifies to the power that the demon is capable of exercising over the beasts. The same power is wielded by the *Potnia theron*, whose satellites the demons are: Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 356-60. The Erinyes are themselves *πόντιαι*: Aesch. *Sept.* 887, 987, *Eum.* 951; *Soph. OC* 84; *Eur. Or.* 318.

⁷¹ Aesch. *Eum.* 306, 331-32; cf. D. L. 8. 31; R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*² (Cambridge 1954) 331-33, 368, *et passim*.

⁷² *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1947) 116; cf. 229, n. 31: "The Erinyes avenge every violation of what we should call the natural laws of life." Jaeger aptly compares Homer *Il.* 19. 418, where the Erinyes prevent Achilles' horse from continuing to speak.

measures (fr. 94 D-K = 52 Marcovich). Thus the original function of the Erinyes is to serve as the overseers and executors of the laws of nature in a general sense.⁷³ As a specific application of that function, they become the deities who are responsible for avenging human crimes that are perceived to be contrary to nature. In this capacity their composite nature is particularly appropriate. Their character as hounds enables them to track down and pursue their victim, while their serpentine nature associates them with the chthonic world in two respects. The snake-skin, which they had originally worn as a symbol of regeneration, becomes a wreath of snaky locks,⁷⁴ which enhances the hideousness of their appearance and forecasts their victim's imminent demise. And at the same time this aspect associates them with the angry spirit of the dead, calling out for vengeance.⁷⁵

But, in addition to their connection with death, they have a beneficent side as well. For their most characteristic pose on Minoan and Mycenaean seals is holding a beaked ewer of peculiar shape. What the function and contents of this ewer are is not clear, but scholars are generally agreed that it has ritual associations.⁷⁶ A vessel of similar shape is found in a clearly ritual context on the sarcophagus from Hagia Triada and the demons themselves are sometimes portrayed as using it in a way that suggests a ritual character. On the lentoid from Vaphio, for example, a pair of antithetic demons hold these ewers over the "horns of consecration."⁷⁷ And on the gold ring from Tiryns four demons with ewers are standing before a seated female, presumably a divinity. The nature of this ritual (or these rituals) is revealed by the vegetation that springs up between the "horns of consecration" on the seal and that stands behind each of the demons on the ring.⁷⁸ Similar vegetation is elsewhere associated with this type of ewer

⁷³ E. Peterich (*Die Theologie der Hellenen* [Leipzig 1938] 224), whom Jaeger (previous note) appears to be following, refers to Achilles' horse and to the Erinyes who is sent in response to the complaint of the vultures at Aesch. *Ag.* 59. But these vultures explicitly represent the (human) Atreidae. Likewise in the fable that was (according to Martin West, *CQ* 29 [1979] 1-6; cf. also *CQ* 30 [1980] 291-93, *Hermes* 109 [1981] 248-51) Aeschylus' inspiration, the animals allegorically represent humans. Cf. rather the proverb εἰσὶ καὶ κυῶν Ἐρινύες, E. L. von Leutsch and F. G. Schneidewin, *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum* (Göttingen 1839-51) I 397 and II 161.

⁷⁴ First in Aeschylus, according to Pausanias (1. 28. 6). This had been a feature of the Gorgons (to whom Aeschylus assimilates the Erinyes, *Cho.* 1048, *Eum.* 48-49) at least by the seventh century: K. Schefold, *Myth and Legend in Early Greek Art* (New York 1966) 34-35.

⁷⁵ E. Rohde, *Psyche* (London 1925) 179; Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1908) 214-15.

⁷⁶ Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 147-52; Gill (*supra* n. 1) 6-7; C. R. Long, *The Ayia Triadha Sarcophagus* (Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology 41 [Göteborg 1974]) 65-66; V. Stürmer, "Schnabelkannen: Eine Studie zur darstellenden Kunst in der minoisch-mykenischen Kultur," *BCH Suppl.* 11 (1985) 119-34; A. Onassoglou, *Die "Talismanischen" Siegel* (CMS Suppl. 2 [Berlin 1985]) 12-22.

⁷⁷ No. 23; cf. no. 52 (= CMS V.1 no. 201) which, however, may be a forgery.

⁷⁸ No. 26; cf. nos. 8, 10, 12 (?), 14, 17 (?), 19, 24, 35, 47, 54, 62, 63.

even when not held by the demons.⁷⁹ Obviously the ewer has a connection with a ritual that is concerned with the growth of vegetation and, since the ewer is so common an attribute of the demons, they are themselves to be seen as divinities that ensure the fecundity of the earth. That the Erinyes too are fertility spirits is clear from their chthonic character, from the identification of Demeter and Erinys at Arcadian Thelpusa and from the blessings on the land that Aeschylus' Erinyes confer at the end of the *Eumenides*.⁸⁰ It is this dual nature of the Erinyes, concerned alike with destruction and with propagation, that makes their identification with the Bronze-Age demon especially attractive.⁸¹

If the Erinyes are not the demons, we are presented with a peculiar and complex situation which we will have difficulty accounting for. We know that the Greeks of the Mycenaean Age worshipped a divinity called *E-ri-nu* and that they made images of a divinity with the following characteristics: capable of being conceived of as a plurality; apparently female; responsible for bringing death as well as for promoting fertility; portrayed as a hunter; having characteristics of dogs and snakes. We know that the Greeks of the fifth century recognized divinities called Erinyes, who could be referred to in the singular, were female, were regarded as bringers of destruction and as promoters of fertility and could be portrayed by contemporary poets as hounds, as hunters and as serpents. We can account for this situation either by assuming a degree of continuity between the Bronze Age and the Classical Period—let us not forget that Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Hermes and Athena were worshipped in Mycenaean Crete and by the emperor Julian

⁷⁹ Evans, *Palace of Minos* (*supra* n. 14) IV 446–50; Nilsson (*supra* n. 12) 262–64; Kenna (*supra* n. 24) 68–69; S. Hood, *The Arts in Prehistoric Greece* (Harmondsworth 1978) 220; Stürmer (*supra* n. 76) 128–31.

⁸⁰ Aesch. *Eum.* 938–48. When the chorus say *δενδροπήμων δὲ μὴ πνέοι βλάββα, / τὰν ἐμὴν χάριν λέγω* (938–39), they are alluding to the name Ἀβλαβίαι, under which name the Erinyes were worshipped at Erythrae in Ionia: *RE* VI.1 (1907) 588; Rohde, *Kl.Schr.* II 243; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* II (Munich 1906) 763.

⁸¹ The dual nature cannot have been purely the invention of Aeschylus. It is difficult to imagine how the Athenian audience was duped into conferring first prize in the tragic competition on a poet who, utterly without precedent, included as the climax of his trilogy a bizarre and unpalatable identification between two sets of deities that were felt to have absolutely nothing in common. Either Aeschylus was not the first to identify the Erinyes with the Semnai Theai (not the Eumenides, as A. L. Brown has now convincingly shown: *CQ* 34 [1984] 260–81), or the two groups of divinities have a great deal more in common than we are usually led to believe. There is, in fact, no evidence for the identification before Aeschylus, so it is reasonable to believe that the Erinyes were enough like the Semnai Theai that the mature dramatist did not feel that he was risking ridicule and defeat by asking his audience to believe that they were one and the same. Why, then, do we assume that the Erinyes were loathsome and malignant while the Semnai Theai were benevolent and gentle? Surely the reason is that our conception is determined to a great extent by our knowledge of Aeschylus' drama, and Aeschylus has himself engaged in considerable exaggeration (see especially F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* [Ithaca 1949] 178–91) in order to lend dramatic force to a transformation that was, if not familiar, at least not surprising.

1,700 years later—or we can posit a remarkable series of coincidences, whereby the attributes and associations of a defunct Mycenaean divinity later individually and by separate routes clustered about another divinity whose name (but not attributes) had happened to survive from the Bronze Age.

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An [Hesiodic] *danse macabre*: *The Shield of Heracles*

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When discussing the pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles* it is customary to stress how poor a poem we are dealing with.¹ The poet of the *Aspis* may be no Homer; but he has composed an intriguing,² if bizarre poem.³ Value judgments, so often involving anachronistic comparison, have greatly hindered the pursuit of the meaning of the *Shield*.⁴ In this paper I will argue that the *Shield* is, thematically speaking, typical of its era. The argument is a convoluted one; it might be best at the outset to provide a summary. I believe that the *Aspis* is a reflexive and unintellectual response to the problem of death.⁵ The theme of the poem is death (rather than, say, the horror of war and mortal combat, or violence and the hero).⁶ To demonstrate the presence of this theme it is necessary to analyze the structure of the *Aspis* and above all the structure of the shield depiction. The shield

¹ Amongst the detractors are H. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod* (London, New York 1914) xxiv; R. M. Cook, "The Date of the Hesiodic Shield," *CQ* 31 (1937) 204–14, 212; P. Mazon, *Hésiode* (Paris 1944) 128; A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern and Munich³ 1971) 128; O. Taplin, "The Shield of Achilles within the *Iliad*," *G & R* 27 (1980) 1–21, 18 n. 4; W. G. Thalmann, *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry* (Baltimore, London, 1984) 64; P. Levi, *A History of Greek Literature* (London 1985) 57.

² Amongst those interested in the poem there is M. van der Valk, "Le Bouclier du Pseudo-Hésiode," *REG* 79 (1966) 450–81, and "A Defence of Some Suspected Passages in the *Scutum Hesiodi*," *Mnem.* 6 (1953) 265–82, and B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Amsterdam 1958) 109–23.

³ Bizarre because of its fascination with the macabre. See the comments of C. F. Russo, *Hesiodi Scutum* (Firenze 1950) 7 ff. (and the criticisms by J. A. Davidson, *CR* 2 [1952] 153–54). See also van der Valk (above, note 2: *Mnem.* 6 [1953]) 266. Note also H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, trans. M. Hadas and J. Willis (Oxford 1975) 108–12.

⁴ Lesky (above, note 1) 128 feels that the *Aspis* is a pale imitation of Homer. Compare also Evelyn-White (above, note 1).

⁵ By "reflexive" I mean spontaneous, unlaboured, unelaborated—the "reflexive," presumably produced with speed rather than care, responds in a straightforward, immediate, in an *unanalytical* manner to a single issue. The "reflexive" may highlight a problem rather than attempting its solution. "Relective" art analyses, attempts solutions, shows all of the signs of revision. The "Shield of Achilles" (especially on Taplin's convincing reading) is a good example of the latter. Sappho, I dare say, typifies the former.

⁶ Thus Fränkel (above, note 3) 108–12 and Thalmann (above, note 1) 62–64.

depiction, as Fränkel demonstrates, creates a metaphorical commentary on the duel between Heracles and his opponents.⁷ It will be suggested that Perseus, acting as a doublet for Heracles, is the focal point of both the shield depiction and of the poem as a whole. This "doublet" relationship provides an approximate though recognisable structure for the poem. There are, however, dissimilarities between Heracles and Perseus, most notably that one became immortal, the other remained mortal. The crucial dissimilarity directs attention towards the theme of death. But the poem as a reflexive work—posing problems without offering answers—opens a window into the poet's own and his age's preconceptions. It will also be suggested that the macabre imagery of this thanatological text is symptomatic of the attitude to death of the era in which it was composed. Deracination, burgeoning prosperity, individualism, led to an heightened, sometimes macabre fear of death. The attitude to death of the seventh and sixth centuries spawned the pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles*.

I

That Perseus and Heracles act as doublets has been stated recently and without qualification by Janko (citing in support van der Valk's observations concerning the penchant of the *Aspis* for doublets).⁸ Perhaps the most important link between the two heroes concerns their roles as *alexikakoi*. Let us consider Perseus. The two *tableaux* following the Perseus interlude (depicting two cities, one at war, one at peace) are especially instructive.⁹ In the first (v. 237b–270a) an horrifying picture of the circumstances of the sacking of a city is drawn: men fight, women scream, old men pray while the fates and death stand by. In the second city (v. 270b–313), peacetime is seen with its feasting, dancing and revelling, its sowing, harvesting, hunting and sports playing. The two pictures illustrate Perseus' capacity as *alexikakos*. In the city at peace the order which he should be capable of protecting is shown; in the city being sacked the fate his protection may avert. The latter is double-edged, for although suggesting Perseus can avert evil, it must also hint at the destruction he is capable of towards wrong doers. There may well be an unstated parallel between Seriphus and the city being sacked, since it comes immediately after the description of Perseus with Medusa's head. (Perseus' intention,

⁷ See Fränkel (above, note 3) 108–12. But contrast van Groningen (above, note 2) 117 and 121, who finds no logic behind the descriptive sequence of the poem, and van der Valk (above, note 2: *REG* 79 [1966]) 453, who believes the shield description was inserted to compensate for the brevity of the battle scenes.

⁸ See R. Janko, "The Shield of Heracles and the Legend of Cycnus," *CQ* 36 (1986) 38–59, 40 and 40 n. 12 (on van der Valk).

⁹ That the Perseus description dovetails with the description of the city at war and that this dovetails with the description of the city at peace is significant. The enjambment creates an artificial "sense block."

known from Pindar *Pyth.* 10 and 12, was to free his mother held captive in Seriphus by Polydectes. Perseus, utilising Medusa's head, turned Polydectes and the Seripheans to stone. Though these subsequent events are not mentioned there is a strong possibility that the poet intends the listener to fill out the details.) Through the juxtaposition of the two cities with the Perseus digression the poet has carefully outlined what was missing in the actual description of Perseus. Perseus, it is implied, is a protector of the weak (his mother who has a parallel in the image of the city at peace) and a punisher of evil (the Seripheans and Medusa who have a parallel in the image of the city at war). In this manner the poet emphasises the function of Perseus as *alexikakos*. Heracles too is an *alexikakos* (*fidei defensor* as Janko terms him). (For some the purpose of the poem is to describe Heracles in this well known role.)¹⁰ The point need not be laboured: Cynus (and his conspirator father) is not just a brigand, he is also impious for he has desecrated the temple of Apollo.¹¹ Heracles has done the world a good job by ridding it of this sinful villain.

There are other similarities between Heracles and Perseus.¹² They were related (Eur. *Alc.* 509): Heracles was the great grandson of Perseus. Both had an immortal father and a mortal mother. In this poem both heroes triumph over seemingly indomitable opponents. Both are assisted by the goddess Athena. Other parallels, but this time extraliterary, between the two heroes are offered by the late Protoattic Nessus vase. In this amphora, according to Cook, "intended like the big Geometric pots as a marker for a grave," there is on its neck a depiction of Heracles killing Nessus. "Below, two Gorgons take off in pursuit of Perseus (wisely out of sight), while their sister Medusa collapses behind them."¹³ The parallel between the *Aspis*,

¹⁰ So G. K. Galinski, *The Heracles Theme* (Oxford 1974) 17–19. The historical study of P. Guillon, *Le Bouclier d'Héraclès et l'histoire de la Grèce centrale dans la période de la première guerre sacrée* (Aix-en-Provence 1963) e.g. 49–51, seems to presume an unblemished Heracles (see W. G. Forest's review, *JHS* 86 [1966] 173).

¹¹ The scholiast on Pindar *Olympian* 10. 15 judges Cynus an even bigger villain. See further Janko (above, note 8). Worth consulting for information on artistic depictions of the Heracles-Cynus battle is F. Vian, "Le combat d'Héraklès et de Kyknos d'après les documents figurés du VI^e et Ve siècle," *REA* 47 (1945) 5–32 and note also C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford² 1961) 122. On the relation of the *Aspis* to contemporary art see Cook (above, note 1), and J. L. Myres "Hesiod's 'Shield of Heracles': Its Structure and Workmanship," *JHS* 61 (1941) 17–38.

¹² The relationship between the two heroes may bear resemblance to that between epic heroes such as Achilles and Patroclus (on which see N. van Brock, "Substitution rituelle," *Revue Hittite et Asiatique* 65 [1959] 117–46; C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* [New York 1965] 199–203, and G. Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* [Baltimore 1979] 292–97). The doublet relationship here, however, seems rather too simple to profit by such comparison.

¹³ See J. M. Cook, *Greek Pottery* (London 1960) 68–70. See too J. Hurwit, *The Art and Culture of Early Greece* (Ithaca 1985) 165 ff. Another possible link between Heracles and Perseus may be offered by Pindar, *Pythian* 10. The myth of this poem refers to Perseus' visit to the land of the Hyperboreans and his slaying of Medusa; significantly at the very outset of this ode (v. 2–3) Heracles is indirectly invoked.

Gorgons and this picture is obvious. The Nessus amphora "may perhaps be dated about 625 B.C.," to within, at the best, 25 years of the *Aspis*. Thus, within at least one artistic mind there was a similarity between the exploits of Heracles and Perseus. Enough, at any rate, to place them on the one vase. The similarity may be even more deep. In the final section of the poem Heracles is described as utilising the advice of Athena and not only managing to repulse the attack of Ares but even to wound him in the leg (v. 458 ff., note also v. 359 ff.). The ability to defeat an immortal in battle implies that the victor has himself a "share" of immortality. To a limited extent, that is, the victor conquers death. (It is worth remembering that Heracles in other contexts—the labours involving Geryon, Cerberus, and the Apples of the Hesperides—"conquers" death). Heracles' action may parallel that of Perseus when he conquers those *kêres* of death, the three Gorgons. Both heroes "conquer" death and this capacity may be further emphasised by the depictions on the previously mentioned Nessus amphora. The vase was intended as a grave marker and the inclusion of both heroes must in some way suggest the triumph of the dead person over normal human limitations, a triumph as it were over death. The dead person presumably was wished the capacities of Heracles and Perseus.

The structure of the poem also assists in the comparison of the two heroes.¹⁴ The "doublet" relationship provides a rough shape for the poem. Heracles at either end provides a frame, while Perseus, more or less in the centre, provides a focus. Over the next few paragraphs I hope to demonstrate this point and, further, to emphasise some of the contrasts between Perseus and Heracles.

The description of the shield begins, more or less, at v. 139 and concludes at v. 320. The centre of the shield description, therefore, is approximately at v. 228. The combat section—the core of the poem—is v. 57–480. The centre of this section, numerically speaking, is v. 228. (If one were to include v. 1–56 then the numerical centre of the poem is v. 240).¹⁵ It should be apparent that the centre, say v. 230, is in the middle of the Perseus interlude. Needless to say, one ought not place too much faith in figures, especially in as imprecise and interpolated a poem as this. Even

¹⁴ For observations on the structure of the poem see the introduction to Russo's edition (above, note 3); Thalmann (above, note 1) 62–64; van der Valk (above, note 2: *REG* 79 [1966]) 454, 459, 460; his earlier article (above, note 2: *Mnem.* 6 [1953]) 268–69; van Groningen (above, note 2) 117; and José Vara Donado, "Contribución al conocimiento del *Escudo de Heracles*: Hesíodo, autor del poema," *CFC* 4 (1972) 315–65, 323 ff.

¹⁵ On the authenticity of v. 1–56 see Wilamowitz, "Lesefrüchte," *Hermes* 40 (1905) 116–25, 122, who believes v. 1–56 belong to the rest of the poem. So too Russo (above, note 3) 33 n. 34. See also L. Anderson "The Shield of Heracles — Problems of Genesis," *C & M* 30 (1969) 10–26, *passim*; J. Schwartz, *Pseudo-Hesiodica* (Leiden 1960) 458–66; and van Groningen (above, note 2) 107 and 120, who treats the poem, including v. 1–56, as a whole. M. L. West, *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women* (Oxford 1985) 136 (and 136 n. 9), believes the lines are inauthentic. Their authenticity will not affect the conclusions of this paper; what matters is the relationship of Heracles with the depictions (especially Perseus) upon the Shield.

so, the force of the sums may suggest a poem which is shaped about the Perseus interlude. (Thus v. 139–215 and v. 237b–320 balance about Perseus in v. 216–237a).

The texture and content of shield description may justify this contention. Outline of the physical construction of the shield begins at v. 141, but of its actual subjects at v. 144. Each of the subjects described up to and including Perseus begins with the formula *en* or *en de* (v. 144, 154—but note v. 155 and 156–, 161, 168, 178, 191, 197, 201—but note v. 204–, 207, and finally v. 216). Each new subject for description begins a line. The *en/en de* formula provides the poet with a simple means of “paragraphing” his narrative. It deserves note, furthermore, that the descriptions within each of these paragraphs are brief and often undetailed. The subjects depicted are supernatural creatures—hostile or beneficent gods—, immortal monsters, mythological prodigies such as the Centaurs or the Lapiths, animals such as boars, lions, or fish, but significantly there is only one human. This is a fisherman whose presence, partly obscured by Apollo's regal fish the dolphins, doubtless acts as a transition to the mortal Perseus. Observe especially that there is no real individuation in this section of the poem. There are only personified symbols or groups.

Compare the texture and content of v. 237b–320. Where in v. 139–215 the narrative is paragraphed, imprecise, almost staccato, the narrative of v. 237b–320 dovetails or enjambs. The description of the city at war “enjambs” unexpectedly with the description of Perseus in v. 237. Similarly the description of the city at peace “enjambs” by beginning unexpectedly in mid-line in v. 270b. Within these sections the same tendency for “enjambed” narrative is evident. Inside the section on the city at war descriptions enjambed one with another—note v. 242, and especially v. 248. Within the section on the city at peace, this is more pronounced. There the description of wedding festivities dovetails with a description of agricultural pursuits (v. 286), as agricultural pursuits dovetail with a description of hunting and athletic activities (v. 301). The content of these lines may also be distinguished from v. 139–215. In that section there were a series of ostensibly unrelated tableaux which depicted, primarily, the non-human. In v. 237b–320 attention is directed relentlessly towards the human, even in the long section where the *kêres*, the fates and *achlus* are limned—their function is to heighten concentration upon the misfortunes of the city at war. The narrative of v. 139–215 was episodic. In v. 237b–320 it is “organic”: that is to say, the individual elements unequivocally contribute to the linked portraits of war and peace.

There are more than contrasts. One important similarity between v. 139–215 and v. 237b–320 is that in both there is no real individuation of subjects. Attention is given primarily either to horrendous personifications of abstract forces or to *groups* of individuals. V. 216–237a distinguish themselves from both v. 139–215 and v. 237b–320 through the strong *individuation* of a single creature, Perseus. He is the only character (and the

only mortal character) to be singled out within the shield depiction for extended description. The point is crucial. The individuation of Perseus is that which makes him stand out from what precedes and from what follows. It is this individuation, coupled with the textual and content dissimilarities between v. 129–215 and v. 237b–320, which provides the shield depiction with its characteristic shape.

If the points made above can be accepted, the structure of the poem is as follows:

	A	1–56	Introduction: Alcmena and Heracles (56 vv.)
	B	57–139	Cycnus and Ares versus Heracles and Iolaos (81 vv.)
139–320: Shield	{	C	139–215 Immortals, animals, etc. (76 vv.)
		D	216–237a Perseus (21 vv.)
		E	237b–320 Mortals: the two cities, etc. (83 vv.)
		F	320–480 Cycnus and Ares versus Heracles (160 vv.)

The exactness of the numeration is of no great significance. (The *Aspis* is a heavily interpolated poem). Of more significance is the ring structure within and without the shield depiction, which results from this tabulation. Such a tabulation, by isolating Perseus and consequently contrasting him with the framing Heracles, helps to elucidate the thematic concerns of the poem. Perseus, it has been implied, is the key to the *Aspis*. The key to an interpretation of the role of Perseus is offered by comparing and contrasting him with Heracles. The structure forces the comparison. As is often the case, it is the dissimilarities rather than the similarities which are crucial.

Within the poem itself Heracles is shown unequivocally as the victor. In spite of the ferocity of Cycnus and his divine assistant there is never any doubt as to the outcome of the conflict. Although the outcome of Perseus' flight is known, the poet has chosen to represent the hero in a most vulnerable and unheroic light; that of the fugitive. In v. 216–237a Perseus seems to have little chance of escape: the Gorgons' pursuit is ferocious, their description with snake and fear emblazoned vestments is terrifying. The Gorgons had a traditional association with death; sometimes they are described as death *kêres*.¹⁶ While Perseus' ability to defeat Medusa and to wield the Gorgon's head suggests an extraordinary ability, the frightening depiction of Sthenno and Euryale suggests that he is not wholly in control. A further indication of the role of Perseus for this poem is his proximity to the brief description of the dance of the immortals in v. 201–206. Thalmann has emphasised this.¹⁷ To paraphrase crudely his argument: the depiction of the peace of the dance of the immortals is the yard stick against

¹⁶ See E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley 1979) 139–41.

¹⁷ Thalmann (above, note 1) 62–64.

which the actors of the rest of the poem are found sadly wanting. The absence of violence and death in v. 201–206 highlights the presence of violence and death in all of the other contexts of the poem. Without agreeing or disagreeing with Thalmann's other conclusions, it could be stressed that v. 201–206 is one of the few sections of repose in the frenetic poem. It is difficult not to contrast this with the description of Perseus. The near juxtaposition of Perseus with the "dance of the immortals" tells against an easy comparison of Perseus and Heracles. The contrast underscores Perseus' mortality and the vulnerability alluded to above.

The similarities between Heracles and Perseus insist that account is taken of their dissimilarities. The most urgent of the latter is the subjection of Perseus to mortality. Theme and structure, therefore, conspire. By highlighting Heracles and Perseus—structurally and thematically—the poet insists upon the listener's contemplation of his theme. But is this theme of death, an important implication of the contrast between Heracles and Perseus, important for the poem as a whole? Attention now must be turned to the deployment of this theme elsewhere in the *Aspis*.

II

The two most persuasive readings of the *Aspis* are those of Fränkel and Thalmann. Both scholars maintain that war and violence rather than death are the real themes of the poem. For the sake of clarity, it might be best to summarise their views. Fränkel interprets the poem thus: "The defeat of a violent robber, who is a son of War (Ares), by the greater warrior Heracles, who achieves peace and security for men and gods, serves as a framework within which the full horror of war and mortal combat is represented. This is the real theme. For this purpose the poet employs a form which he borrowed from Homeric epic [sc. the description of the warrior's shield]."¹⁸ Thalmann builds upon this: "The images on the shield, then, reflect the encounter that is about to take place. Heracles will face Ares' son Cynus and the war god himself, carrying a shield that exposes the grotesque ugliness of war But the case is not that simple. If Heracles' shield comments on war in general, it comments on its owner's particular actions within this poem, and its message rigorously excludes the notion of heroic glory."¹⁹ How does the shield depiction make this comment? "The pictures on the shield make an implicit statement about war. It is monstrous, irrational, an activity proper to beasts in which man also engages."²⁰

¹⁸ Fränkel (above, note 3) 110.

¹⁹ Thalmann (above, note 1) 64.

²⁰ Thalmann (above, note 1) 63. He also states: "at the centre of the poetic account lie three scenes of gods (v. 191–206), which stand out from the five scenes that precede and the five that follow them. In these flanking parts there is a general progression from monstrous personifications of war and violence through strife in the animal world to warfare among

An alternative to this view, however, might take the function of the essentially artistic representations of the shield at their face value. The representations on the actual shield of Heracles are of a familiar type. "Terror symbols" as they are termed in other contexts, their function seems to have been apotropaic.²¹ Parallels for most of these symbols may be found in contemporary art. They appear to have been especially common on *stelae*, on various types of weaponry and upon temples.²² Their function as apotropaic symbols, while not entirely agreed upon,²³ must have entailed a threat of death against the sacrilegious, or the opponent, or the polluter. The Gorgon head upon a shield or pair of greaves threatens the assailant with the fate of the Seripheans. The function of the terror symbol (a Gorgon, say, or a Griffin) atop a *stèle* or on a funeral urn must have been similar: the threat of destruction for the tomb disturber. The function of the terror symbol upon a temple gable threatens a like punishment upon any person rash enough to cause pollution at the holy place. Death, we must conclude, is the threat intended by the various monsters on the *Aspis*. The link, therefore, between the terror symbols and the suggested functions of Perseus should be apparent. The contrast between Perseus and Heracles emphasised the theme of death. The use of "terror symbols" or, as it could be said, of death symbols complements what is already an apparent theme. To return to the reading proposed by Fränkel and Thalmann: the shield, rather than offering a series of images which display the grotesque ugliness of war, may offer a stylised series of images which starkly threaten death. But, we should be clear, the conscious parallel drawn between Perseus and Heracles raises the intent of the poem above the merely representational. The terror symbols hint at a larger poetic concern which is not war, but death.²⁴

The theme of death is apparent throughout the shield description. V. 178–190, describing the conflict between the Lapiths and the Centaurs provide an instance. The depiction is perhaps a type of terror symbol, hinting at the destruction awaiting an opponent. By the time this poem may have been composed, however, Centaurs had a precise association with Heracles. An audience in the sixth century would have been familiar with the myth describing Heracles' death by Nessus' cloak and doubtless have drawn a parallel between the Centaurs and Heracles.²⁵ The undercurrent of

mankind." van Groningen (above, note 2) 117 notes that v. 144–200 concern themselves primarily with war.

²¹ M. Robertson, *A History of Greek Art*, 2 vols. (London 1975) 48.

²² See Robertson (above, note 21).

²³ Contrast Robertson (above, note 21) 48 for example and Vermeule (above, note 16) 90–91.

²⁴ A brief reading of v. 264–70, of v. 248–57 or of the medieval (if genuine) v. 151–53 may emphasise the point.

²⁵ The story of his poisoning and self-immolation predates this poem. Fr. 25, 18–25 in Merkelbach's and West's edition of Hesiod's poems mention Deianeira, Lichas and the robe as

this myth, therefore, may be death. It deserves to be noticed, furthermore, that the appearance of Ares (v. 191–196) and Athena (v. 197–200) may link with this conflict. Van Groningen²⁶ speculates that the two gods may be placed here because they participated in the conflict between the Lapiths and the Centaurs. The appearance of the gods may link the shield depictions with the conflict of the outer myth where both gods appear on opposing sides.²⁷ In other words, they may reinforce the relevance of the Centaurs to Heracles, and so re-emphasise the undertone of the theme of death.

V. 168–177, which describe the conflict between the lions and boars, may create a similar effect. In funerary art and literature from the sixth century onwards the lion was depicted as a protector of the body of the dead. Vermeule quotes this epigram (a lion is speaking) as typical of the literary tradition:²⁸

θηρῶν μὲν κάρτιστος ἐγώ, θνατῶν δ' ὄν ἐγὼ νῦν
φρουρῶ τῷδε τάφῳ λαΐνῳ ἐμβεβαῶς.

Lions (always victorious) and boars are often depicted in combat in literary and artistic artefacts. Vermeule interprets one funerary example from the sixth century thus: "When the lion and the boar are shown together in the sphere of death, as on the Clazomenian sarcophagos . . . the lion should win and become guardian of the body."²⁹ Now Heracles was usually associated with lions and, although his lion-skin is not mentioned in this poem, he is twice compared to a lion (v. 402 and v. 426)—although he is once compared to a boar (c. 387). In the simplest sense the lion and boar conflict may be seen as a parallel to the Heracles and Cynus conflict. In the more complex sense Heracles, the metaphorical lion, acts as a protector against death. There is a seeming conflict between the roles of Heracles in these two sections of the poem; in one the hero is by implication the victim of death, in the other the conqueror of death. The conflict may be resolved, however, by thinking of the various sections of the poem as variations on a single theme of death. This "relexive" poem provides a series of versified *reactions* to a single pervasive notion. The poet has not been strict or laboriously logical in the manner by which he has strung together the reactions.

Another instance of the theme of death acting as a backdrop or undertone to these terror symbols is provided by v. 161–167 which refer to

part of Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women*. The Nessus amphora discussed above and note 13 may be significant. Compare Lefkowitz's usually accepted reading of Bacchylides 5 (*HSCP* 73 [1969] 45–96).

²⁶ van Groningen (above, note 2) 117, notwithstanding their presence in the Iliadic shield.

²⁷ Janko (above, note 8) 40.

²⁸ [Simonides] *Anth. Pal.* 7. 344a. I owe this reference to Vermeule, (above, note 16) 233, n. 7; on page 88 of the same work she cites Antipater, *Anth. Pal.* 7. 426. See also *RE* 13 (1927) 968–90, s.v. *Löwe*.

²⁹ Vermeule (above, note 16) 90–91. Compare Robertson's comments cited above, note 21.

the twelve snakes. The snake was a profoundly ambivalent emblem. Associated, on the one hand, with healing and longevity³⁰ snakes were, on the other hand, viewed with considerable fear (so Medusa). The ambiguity is present in this poem: the snake-haired head of Medusa in Perseus' hands brings death to the Seripheans and deliverance to Danaë. Snakes were also associated with Heracles (the tale of the Lernaean Hydra, or the snakes of Pindar's *Nem.* 1 are relevant) where they seem intended to emphasise his superhuman abilities. Snakes, especially associated with Perseus and Heracles, betoken life or death. There is, therefore, another variation on the theme of death.

I doubt that the *Aspis* has a simple meaning. It is at once about the saviour warrior, Heracles, the *alexikakos*, it is also about the intrusion of evil and violence into life, it is also about war. But none of these themes provides the poem with a real thematic unity. This is provided by the notion of death. The poem offers what is best described as a series of variations on the theme of death. The *Aspis*, a reflexive poem, takes the theme of death and unanalytically responds to this in verse. The response—and surely it is a puzzled response—is worked in a series of *tableaux* borrowed from Homer and from contemporary art. The structure of the poem, as its actors, is designed with a modicum of care to reflect a central preoccupation.

III

Critics often point out the taste of the poet of the *Aspis* for the macabre. This seems to reflect his conception of death. Death is violent, terrifying, and often as not painful. Indeed the martial ambience of so much of the poem may serve to emphasise the horror of death. But it is the macabre elements of the *Aspis* which have brought it into disrepute. For many readers the poem is so insistent in its striving for horror as to become strained and almost gratuitous. Why such strained insistence? The poet may indeed have been morbid. It seems more likely, however, that he is reflecting the attitudes of his society. To demonstrate this I would like to draw some parallels with the Middle Ages. These may suggest an alternative explanation for the presence in the *Aspis* of the macabre.

Philippe Ariès, in his long study analysing medieval and modern attitudes to death,³¹ maintains that in the later Middle Ages there was a shift

³⁰ See Aristophanes, *Plut.* 733 ff. C. Kerényi, *Asclepius* (London 1960) e.g. figs. 40 and 41 offers depictions pairing Asclepius and snakes. The goddess Hygieia was represented also with a snake—see figs. 33 and 34.

³¹ *The Hour of our Death*, trans H. Weaver (New York 1981). Ariès apparently bases his work upon that of A. Tenenti, *La vie de la mort à travers l'art du XVe siècle* (Paris 1952). Ariès repeats his views in *Images of Man and Death*, trans. J. Lloyd (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) 158. Also of interest on this topic is J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, trans F. Hopman (Hammondsworth 1968) 9–29. For a discussion (generally favourable of Ariès' views on this

in popular attitudes to death. Ariès states: "Individualism triumphed in an age of conversions, spectacular penitences, and prodigious patronage, but also of profitable businesses; an age of unprecedented and immediate pleasures and of immoderate love of life."³² Individualism, he suggests, was the product of burgeoning economic prosperity. Increased prosperity brought with it a greater sense of individual worth and with this a greater love of life. Death, the destruction of life and the individual, became a far greater threat. This is the explanation offered for the persistent fascination in funerary texts for the macabre. Death, personified, is represented in an increasingly macabre fashion because it is seen as such an unwarranted threat to life.

The intrusion of death is represented by a variety of macabre iconography. Three examples will suffice: the *transi*, the "triumph of death," and the *danse macabre*. The *transi*, or half-decomposed corpse, became one of the most important minor characters "in the macabre iconography of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries."³³ Ariès describes the depictions of the "triumph of death" in this manner: "Death, in the form of a mummy or skeleton, stands with his symbolic weapon in hand [the scythe], driving a huge slow chariot drawn by oxen. One recognises this vehicle as the heavy cart used for holiday processions, inspired by mythology and intended for the grand entry of princes into their loyal towns. Here it is driven by a prince whose emblems are skulls and bones . . . But whatever its appearance the chariot of Death is an engine of war, an implement of destruction that crushes beneath its wheels—and sometimes beneath its fatal shadow—a large number of people of all ages and conditions."³⁴ The *danse macabre* is described "as an eternal round in which the dead alternate with the living. The dead lead the dance; indeed they are the only ones dancing. Each couple consists of a naked mummy, rotting, sexless, and highly animated, and a man or woman dressed according to his or her social condition and paralyzed by fear and surprise. Death holds out its hand to the living person whom it will draw along with it, but who has not yet obeyed the summons."³⁵ As with the representations of the *transi* and of the "triumph of death," the *danse macabre* was extremely common in

period) see J. Whaley (ed.), *Mirrors of Mortality* (London 1981) 5–8, and the essay in the same volume by J. McManners, "Death and the French Historians," 117 ff. See too L. Stone, "Death and its History," *New York Review of Books*, 12 Oct. 1978, 22–32, and P. Robinson, "Five Models for Dying," *Psychology Today*, March 1981, 85–89. Most recently on medieval death there is J.H.M. Taylor (ed.), *Dies Illa: Death in the Middle Ages* (Liverpool 1984).

³² Ariès, *The Hour* (above, note 31) 606, and *Images* (above, note 31) 158.

³³ Ariès, *The Hour* (above, note 31) 113.

³⁴ Ariès, *The Hour* (above, note 31) 118.

³⁵ Ariès, *The Hour* (above, note 31) 118. See too in *Dies Illa* (above, note 31) 15–27 and 29–43: J. Batany, "Une image en négatif du fonctionnalisme social: Les danses macabres," and J.H.M. Taylor, "Un miroir salutaire."

the late Middle Ages. The three representations of the macabre iconography of the period, to repeat, have been taken not as the product of a sadistic or morbid psychology, but of one too little morbid, too much enamoured with its own individualism and life. The suggested parallel may be becoming obvious. The "macabre iconography" of the *Aspis* may be representative not of a morbid psychology but of a psychology not unlike that of the late Middle Ages. The depiction of death in the *Aspis*, commonly described as macabre, is the product of an individualistic temperament. The attitudes of this reflexive poem may be quite typical of their era.³⁶

It is usual to place the composition of the *Shield* somewhere between 590 and 570 B.C.³⁷ It is said not to be Boeotian, but to have been composed in one or another of the "centri progrediti di cultura e di arte, certamente fuori di Boezia."³⁸ Cook and Shapiro³⁹ demonstrate the similarities between scenes in the *Aspis* and those in Attic and Corinthian pottery. While Attica will not represent its compositional provenance, the conditions of Attica in this period may well be similar to those experienced by the poet of the *Aspis*. The improved conditions in Attica in the period 600–500 B.C. hardly need stressing. Amongst other things one might note that Solon won Salamis from Megara, gave the lead to the Amphictyons in the Sacred War, while in the Hellespont about 590 Athens had some success at Sigeum. In 566 state claims were strengthened by the institution of the Panathenaic festival, and about the same time by the institution of the games at Eleusis. By mid-century Attic pottery adopted a leading position in the Greek world, and thus encouraged the export of Athenian goods. The coinage maintained its strength.⁴⁰ If it is correct to see an upsurge in individualism in these centuries the improved economy and social standing of regions such as Attica are doubtless responsible. Also crucial was the widespread personal "deracination" brought on in these centuries of colonisation. The removal from home, family surrounds, often family itself placed the person more seriously "on his own." Isolation from the inherited

³⁶ The point has been observed independently of the admirable study by C. Sourvinou-Inwood, "To Die and Enter the House of Hades: Homer, Before and After" in *Mirrors of Mortality* (above, note 31) 15–39.

³⁷ Russo (above, note 3) 34. So too Myres (above, note 11) 178; Cook (above, note 1), *passim*; and J. Ducat, "La Ptoion et l'histoire de la Béotie à l'époque archaïque," *REG* 77 (1964) 283–89, attempting to correct Guillon (above, note 10), who places the poem in the second half of the seventh century; and J. A. Davidson, "Quotations and Illustrations in Early Greek Literature," *Eranos* 53 (1955) 124–40, 137. The most recent discussion to confirm these dates is that of Janko (above, note 8) 40–44.

³⁸ Russo (above, note 3) 34. Contra van der Valk (above, note 2: *REG* [1966]) 451.

³⁹ Cook (above, note 1) 204 ff., and H. A. Shapiro, "Heracles and Kyknos," *AJA* 88 (1984) 523–29.

⁴⁰ See, for example, N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford 1967) 165 f.

norms of family and community may have encouraged individual self-reliance and self-centredness.⁴¹

Symptomatic of these tendencies was the sudden efflorescence of "personal" lyric poetry in the previous century and the emergence of personal religion (Eleusinian religion and, possibly, Orphism). The emergence of seemingly altruistic reformers such as Solon points to a reformation of values, of a *mentalité* whose origins and whose concerns are insistently individualistic. The parallels between this period and the late Middle Ages, as Sourvinou-Inwood notes, are more than superficial.⁴² But this is not the place to suggest these parallels. The point is to demonstrate that the death-obsession of the *Aspis* may not be the result of morbid psychology, but the result of a sane psychology in an age of burgeoning prosperity and of individualism. There is ample evidence that the people of the late Middle Ages were obsessed with death. The seventh and sixth centuries in Greece have not left a great deal of evidence, archaeological or literary, by which we might be able to assess easily the contemporary attitude to death.⁴³ Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the *Aspis* is the result of a shift in the attitude to death, a shift which has been posited by Sourvinou-Inwood.⁴⁴

The changes cannot be examined here in detail.⁴⁵ Certain aspects, however, deserve mention. The aristocratic funerary ideal, perhaps typified by the Homeric funeral, seems to reflect the value system of its class. Prolonged *prothesis* —even to the point of putrefaction, the extravagant display of wealth at a funeral, an extravagant place of burial, may reflect the *aretê*, the *timê*, the social standing of the dead person. The extravagance of the funeral rites may be designed in part to guarantee the remembrance of the dead person and to reinforce his family's social standing within its own immediate community and within neighbouring communities. But note: such funerary customs presuppose that, at the very worst, the dead man's reputation may survive death. (Indeed, thanks to the survival of his *genos* it must.) Notice, furthermore, that death is a social, even communal

⁴¹ See A. R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (London 1960) 157 ff., and Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36) 17, 17n., 10, and 37, who cites A. M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment* (London 1980) 160–200.

⁴² By Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36) 39.

⁴³ Generally on death (compare note 31, above) there is Vermeule (above, note 16), G. Gnoli and J.-P. Vernant (edd.), *La mort, les morts dans les sociétés anciennes* (Cambridge and Paris 1982); S. C. Humphreys and H. King (edd.), *Mortality and Immortality: The Anthropology and Archaeology of Death* (London 1981) (including articles by Humphreys and Vernant); S. Humphreys, "Family Tombs and Tomb Cult in Ancient Athens: Tradition or Traditionalism?" *JHS* 100 (1980) 96–126; and R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (London 1985).

⁴⁴ See Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36). Some profit may be derived from the following articles: J. Hurwit, "Palm Trees and the Pathetic Fallacy in Archaic Greek Poetry and Art," *CJ* 77 (1982) 193–99, and the responses by R. Madden, *CJ* 78 (1983) 193–99, and J. Hurwit, *CJ* 78 (1982) 200–01.

⁴⁵ They are alluded to by Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36) 36 ff.

process.⁴⁶ Death is honoured by the family and in the preservation of the family the dead man is enabled to transcend death. That we witness the emergence (or rediscovery or re-emphasis) of individualist values (doubtless the product of the weakening of the family) in the Archaic period is frequently asserted.⁴⁷ One important way by which the deracinated individual assailed in poetry the aristocratic tradition was through a rejection of memoriality. Without the security of a strong *genos* in which to preserve his memory the possibility of remembrance after death is questioned.

As early as the seventh century Archilochus (133 West) questions memoriality:

οὔτις αἰδοῖος μετ' ἀστῶν οὐδὲ περίφημος θανὼν
γίνεται· χάριν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ζοοῦ διώκομεν
(οἱ) ζοοί, κάκιστα δ' αἰεὶ τῶι θανόντι γίνεται.

Steisichorus (245 Page), not too many years later, appears to echo the sentiment. (*Charis* here seems to mean "reputon.")

θανόντος ἀνδρὸς πᾶσα †πολιὰ† ποτ' ἀνθρώπων χάρις

Although a poet such as Simonides is responsible for many funerary epigrams (which in their very plea for remembrance of the dead person bespeak a fear of personal oblivion), he exhibits, at least once (fr. 581 Page), a profound scepticism in memoriality, or the *kleos apthiton* which for the aristocrat might be seen as a weapon against death:⁴⁸

τίς κεν αἰνήσειε νόωι πίσυνος Λίνδου ναέταν Κλεόβουλον,
ἀεναοῖς ποταμοῖς' ἄνθεσι τ' εἰαρινοῖς
ἀελίου τε φλογὶ χρυσέας τε σελάνας
καὶ θαλασσαῖαισι δίναισ' ἀντία θέντα μένος στάλας;
ἅπαντα γάρ ἐστι θεῶν ἥσσω· λίθον δὲ
καὶ βρότεοι παλάμαι θραύοντι· μωροῦ
φωτὸς ἄδε βούλα.

The suggested shift in the attitude to death reflected by these views on fame after death may well reflect some of the causes for Solon's supposed laws attempting to limit the extravagance of funerals and burial practices.⁴⁹ There were limitations on the size of the cortege in an *ecphora*, upon the size of grave monuments, upon their decorations, upon the ways in which the dead could be praised. It is customary to link the large scale or extravagant funeral with the aristocratic or strongly based family society:

⁴⁶ The section on the aristocratic mode of Homeric death in Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36) deserves consultation.

⁴⁷ See Burn (above, note 41), and Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36).

⁴⁸ In some quarters the attitude persisted. Compare Sophocles, *Ajax* 266–67, and the more comical Euripides, *Alcestis* 725–27.

⁴⁹ See Garland (above, note 43) 22 and 34. See also S. Humphreys, (above, note 43) 101. The ancient source is Cicero, *de Leg.* 2. 64.

funerals provided a good opportunity for a demonstration of kin solidarity and their display of wealth.⁵⁰ Significantly it is in the 590's that the ceramic funeral urn is replaced by *stèle*.⁵¹ *Stelae*, it could be argued, place the *individual* more firmly at odds with his immortality.⁵²

The new attitude may also be reflected in the many artistic representations of themes related to death in the sixth century.⁵³ But perhaps the new attitude may be seen most clearly in a poem roughly contemporary to the *Aspis*, the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (note especially v. 480–482). In an aetiological allegory the poem depicts the origins of the increasingly popular Eleusinian rites. The very existence of these individualistic rites indicates a fear of death which is alien to the Homeric and aristocratic mode.

It is sometimes stated that the fear of death is not something which is typical of Greek culture in any period.⁵⁴ Yet anxiety about death, however indirectly expressed, seems more typical of some eras than of others. The expression is indeed oblique—no Roman or Christian skeletons here: instead it was expressed by a distrust in memoriality, by a change in funeral rites and iconography, by an upsurge in religious cult addressing itself to the problems of the survival of the soul. The concern and anxiety which I contend the *Aspis* reflects on death, therefore, has ample parallels in several areas. Indeed a normal man of the period might be expected to express such a concern.⁵⁵ The securities of an older world had been broken down in the uprooted Archaic period.

Are there parallels for the macabre? They seem to exist not so much in the actual personifications of death, but in the depictions of deaths or figures associated with death. Terror symbols have already been mentioned. Their popularity was delimited by the Archaic period. In the sixth century there were, particularly on a grave *stèle*, examples of horrendous Gorgon heads.⁵⁶ The sphinx (herself one of the death *kêres* and often set atop grave *stelae*;⁵⁷) may be depicted ripping open the bellies of opponent men.⁵⁸ There are frightening representations of Hecate, half dog-bodied, eating corpses in the

⁵⁰ See Garland (above, note 43) 21.

⁵¹ See Garland (above, note 43) 10 f.

⁵² Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 36) 35 states: "The use of monumental painted pots as grave-markers signalling status in eighth-century Athens is another manifestation of the aristocratic self-definition and its symbolism." She cites J. V. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (London 1977) 137 in support. The change to the use of *stelae* doubtless may suggest the opposite of what is claimed for the pot.

⁵³ Compare Robertson (above, note 21) on "terror symbols."

⁵⁴ See Garland (above, note 43) 122.

⁵⁵ Fear of death (unpersonified) and regret at the brevity of life is also common. See, for example, Minnervus 1 West, and Anacreon 395 Page.

⁵⁶ Gorgons, as symbols of death, have been mentioned already. For some convincingly horrendous reproductions of Gorgons see J. Boardman, *Greek Art* (London 1964) 59 and 92. Compare also the depiction of Cerberus in Vermeule (above, note 16) 41.

⁵⁷ See J. Boardman, *Greek Sculpture* (London 1978) 162 f.

⁵⁸ See Vermeule (above, note 16) 173.

underworld.⁵⁹ Artistic representations of war—itsself a poetic symbol of death—may be sometimes so explicit as to be best labelled macabre.⁶⁰ Cerberus first appears on pottery at the beginning of the sixth century,⁶¹ as do the first references to Charon.⁶² The representation of Achilles about to plunge a spear into the lower neck of the Amazon Queen Penthesileia—seems in this period to have been popular in art and literature.⁶³ There is in the depiction an element of the macabre, with its linking of love, violence and death. Eros, strangely confused with Death and his brother, Sleep, seems to play a role in the iconography of the macabre.⁶⁴ Nor, in the cultic sphere, should one overlook the rites of Dionysus, whose waxing popularity may be dated to the sixth century.⁶⁵ The tales of Pentheus, of the daughters of Minyas, of Bacchantes rending live animals or even children limb from limb are potent emblems of the macabre. Van der Valk has pointed out that the most obvious literary parallels for the depiction of the macabre⁶⁶ are contained in Hesiod's *Theogony* (note the descriptions of the offsprings of Night, v. 211 ff. and 295 ff., of Cronus' eating of his own children, v. 466 ff., of the Gigantomachy, v. 687 ff., or the denizens of Hades, v. 767 ff.). The *Odyssey* itself is not without elements of the macabre. These few examples from iconography, cult, and literature ought to have demonstrated that the macabre does not go without parallel in the Archaic period—and indeed it may have been more popular than is usually allowed.⁶⁷

While in no sense intended to provide a justification in artistic terms for the *Aspis*, these examples do make the poem more credible. The *Aspis* is not the product of a morbid psychology or one out of tune with its age (a late debased product of a defunct oral epic tradition), rather it is the product of an individual firmly rooted within the *mentalité* of his time.

⁵⁹ See Vermeule (above, note 16) 109.

⁶⁰ See the reproductions of Vermeule (above, note 16) 103.

⁶¹ See Garland (above, note 43) 54.

⁶² See Garland (above, note 43) 55.

⁶³ Vermeule (above, note 16) 158–59, discusses the archaic artistic representation of this scene. In literature there is the *Aethiopis*. On which see G. H. Huxley, *Greek Epic Poetry from Eumelos to Panyassis* (London 1969) 147–49.

⁶⁴ According to Hesiod, *Theogony* 744 f. Sleep and Death were children of Night. Pausanias 5. 18. 1 describes a chest of Cypselus, dedicated at Olympia about 570 B.C., depicting more or less the same. Vermeule (above, note 16) 153 ff. outlines the link between Eros, Sleep and Death.

⁶⁵ See Bum (above, note 41) 345 ff., who associates the emergence of the Dionysiac rites with the mysteries of Eleusis, Orphism and Pythagoreanism.

⁶⁶ van der Valk (above, note 2: *Mnem.* 6 [1953]) 266.

⁶⁷ The extreme popularity of this poem in artistic circles may provide further evidence. See, *passim*, Shapiro (above, note 39), and F. Vian (above, note 11).

IV

In this reading of the pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles*, above all I have attempted to suggest that rather than being an analysis of the horror of war and of mortal combat, the poem is concerned with death. The *Aspis* offers a series of variations on this theme. While the poem may not be great art, it is of profound interest as an artefact. It represents a puzzled, at times disorganised, at times stolid attempt to represent the most fundamental of all problems. Above all, it may show us how Greeks of one period reacted to the paradox of their existence.⁶⁸

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⁶⁸ My thanks for assistance, at various places, to Mr. R. J. Baker, Prof. D. Boedeker, Prof. T. R. Bryce, Dr. T. W. Hillard, Prof. W. R. Nethercut, and Mr. A. Treloar. They would, I suspect, prefer to disclaim responsibility for the final product.

Ctesias and the Fall of Nineveh

J.D.A. MACGINNIS

The *Persica* of Ctesias are not extant but fragments are preserved in the works of many other ancient writers, notably Diodorus Siculus and Photius; König 1972 is an excellent edition of these excerpts.¹ The purpose of this article is to suggest that certain elements in Ctesias' description of the fall of Nineveh (best surviving in Diodorus II.xxiv-xxviii) go back to details actually derived from an earlier siege and fall of Babylon. This is not to deny that the narrative of Ctesias—insofar as it is historical—does preserve material genuinely traceable to the fall of Nineveh, only that it has further incorporated extraneous particulars. Thus the barest outline of a Babylonian and a Median king uniting to bring about the end of the Assyrian empire is correct (Smith, 126–31; Roux 1980, 343–47) though the exact chronology has been much disputed (see J. Oates in the forthcoming volume 3. 2 of the new Cambridge Ancient History). Furthermore, the names of the protagonists are confused: Belesys could just be a corruption of Nabu-apla-usur (Nabopolassar) but Arbaces cannot be Umakishtar / Cyaxares, and in fact the suggestion of Jacoby (col. 2049) that Ctesias has inserted the names of two leading Persian officials of the time known from Xenophon, namely the Arbaces who commanded at Cunaxa and the Belesys who was satrap of Syria, is convincing. Another mistake in the Greek accounts is making the last king of Assyria Sardanapallos, that is Ashurbanipal. In fact the last king was Sinshar-ishkun; among the writers of antiquity only Abydenus names him correctly in the form Sarakos (Gadd 1923, p. 18 & n. 8).

The other conflict of interest to us here is the revolt of Shamash-shum-ukin, the brother of Ashurbanipal. The background to this is as follows (cf. Smith 1925, Wiseman 1958, Roux 1980, 303–08, Grayson 1980): in 672 Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, convened ambassadors from all over his realm to swear cooperation with his plan for the succession by which one son, Ashurbanipal, was to be crowned king of Assyria and another, Shamash-

¹ I would like to thank Rupert Macey-Dare for his assistance in the writing of this article. The abbreviations used are those of the two modern Akkadian dictionaries: CAD (The Chicago Assyrian Dictionary) and AHW (the *akkadisches Handwörterbuch* of W. von Soden).

shum-ukin, king of Babylon. This arrangement was put into effect following the death of Esarhaddon in 669 B.C. and worked peacefully until Shamash-shum-ukin rebelled against Assyria in 652; after some initial success Babylon was placed under siege in 650 and fell in 648 B.C. The sources for this are the annals and royal correspondence of Ashurbanipal, the Babylonian Chronicle and contemporary legal and economic documents.

What interests us here is that there are correspondences between events in this rebellion and in Ctesias' account of the fall of Nineveh.

Firstly, the length of the siege is given as two years by Ctesias (Diod. II.xxvii.1): the siege of Nineveh in 612 lasted only two and one-half months (Gadd 1923, p. 17) whilst the siege of Babylon during the Shamash-shum-ukin rebellion lasted from April 11, 650 until at least February 29, 648 (when a legal document from Babylon records that "the enemy is encamped against the city"), if not in fact until April 15 of that year—the latest known date of Shamash-shum-ukin (Grayson 1980, p. 234–38). Gadd made the suggestion that the figure of two years in Diodorus might be traced back to the fact that the siege of Nineveh was begun in 614 B.C., abandoned and recommenced successfully in 612, so that the whole operation was of two years' duration (Gadd 1923, p. 9 & 12, followed by Wiseman 1956, p. 14); or that somehow "the three months occupied by the final siege had been expanded by tradition into three years" (Gadd 1923, p. 17). This is a clever suggestion, though there is no firm evidence to support it, but even if it is correct it remains true that the reason for the transposition could be memory of the 650–648 siege.

Secondly, the composition of the allies fits better the forces of Shamash-shum-ukin than those of Nabopolassar. They are given in Diodorus (II.xxiv.5) as the Medes, Persians, Babylonians and Arabs, and whilst it is true that Cyaxares and the Medes were at the forefront of the attacks on Assyria, there is nowhere in the cuneiform evidence any suggestion of the Arabs or Persians being involved in the fall of Nineveh. When on the other hand we look at the allies of Shamash-shum-ukin, we find that although the list includes Akkad (particularly Babylon, Borsippa and Sippar), the Chaldeans, the Arameans, the Sea-land, Elam, Gutium, Amurru and Meluhha (Luckenbill no. 789), it is clear that the Elamites and Arabs were the most important as it was they whose subjugation Ashurbanipal describes most conspicuously. In Elam the kings involved were, successively, Humban-nikash II, Tammartu, Indabigash and Humbanhattash II (Carter & Stolper, p. 51); in Arabia it was Uaite' who "like Elam listened to the rebellious words of Akkad" (Luckenbill no. 817) and gave troops to Abiyate' and Ayamu to help Shamash-shum-ukin (Eph'al, p. 143–44 & 155–56).

Now of course the Elamites were not the Persians, but it is not unlikely that Ctesias used this appellation for them since part of the area subsequently occupied by the Persians was the former Elam (viz. the region from Susa to Persepolis) where the two peoples lived in symbiosis (Carter

& Stolper, p. 54–59); since he will have realised that no Greek will have known where Elam was; and, not least, since he was writing at the Persian court and would have had an interest in playing up the role of the Persians. Finally, Diodorus claims that the revolt was started by the leaders of the army (Goosens, p. 39), which corresponds well with the epigraph on a sculpture of Ashurbanipal (Luckenbill no. 1076).

Thirdly, there is the celebrated story of Sardanapallos collecting together all his possessions and eunuchs into the palace, setting it alight and perishing in the flames (König, p. 127, 130 & 165; Diod. II.xxvii.2) which recalls Ashurbanipal telling how the Assyrian gods “cast Shamash-shum-ukin my hostile brother who had rebelled against me into the burning flames and destroyed him” (Luckenbill no. 794). This parallel has long been noted (e.g., Gadd, p. 19, Smith, p. 124, Goosens, p. 39) but not pursued. Gadd dismisses its importance in emphasising that “the end of Sin-shar-ishkun is expressly indicated” in the chronicle (p. 13) but in fact, as both his and Grayson’s (1975 no. 3) editions of the text agree, the relevant line 44 is broken and reads “At that time Sin-shar-ishkun king of Ass[yria . . .]” and whilst the death of that king may be inferred from the fact that a new king, Ashur-uballit, is installed in Harran (line 50), nothing is said of the manner of his death: our only other clue is the tradition in Nicolaus Damascenus and Athenaius that he was slain by Arbaces (Gadd, p. 18 & n. 9). This again could refer to Shamash-shum-ukin as a fragment of the annals of Ashurbanipal excavated at Nimrud talks of mdGISH.SHIR.MU.GI.NA / [sha ina MJE3 ina u2-si mah-su, that is “Shamash-shum-ukin [who in a battle was wounded by an arrow” (E. Knudsen *Iraq* 29 (1967), p. 53, l. 5–6). On the other hand, the detail of the story in which Sardanapallos gathers together his treasure and staff to destroy them cannot wholly apply to the case of Shamash-shum-ukin as we know that Ashurbanipal reviewed the goods, vehicles, horses, furniture and retainers of his brother after his death (Luckenbill nos. 795 & 1036). Accordingly, that part may well be pure fantasy. Nevertheless, the likelihood remains that the story of Greek tradition is an embellished version of the death of Shamash-shum-ukin.

There are a few minor points to consider in addition: both Ashurbanipal in his dealings with Shamash-shum-ukin (Luckenbill no. 790) and Greek tellings of the fall of Nineveh (Diod. II.xxv.8; Xenophon *Anab.* III.iv.8) recount an ominous eclipse; Diodorus (II.xxvi.6 & xxvii.1) places the besieged Ninos (Nineveh) not on the Tigris but on the Euphrates as would be true of Babylon; the story of Belesys transporting the rubble of Nineveh to Babylon (Diodorus II.xxviii) sounds like a folk-tale explaining the presence of the ziggurat, which still existed as a ruined mound at the

time of Ctesias, not yet having been cleared away by Alexander the Great.² Perhaps to note in this context is Ashurbanipal's claims to have collected earth from the cities of the conquered Elamites (Luckenbill no. 811), a symbolism also known from classical sources (e.g. Herodotus VI. 48).

In summary, it might then be that elements of Ctesias' story of the fall of Nineveh owe their origin to the siege of Babylon during the Shamash-shum-ukin rebellion. Ctesias was the court physician to Artaxerxes II in the early fourth century B.C. and would have been able to travel to Babylon. Indeed, on the basis of his description of the palace (excavated by the Germans in the early years of this century), Goosens (p. 29 f.) followed by Drews (1965, p. 140) is certain that he did. So, in addition to the Persian "royal leather recordbooks" that Ctesias himself says that he used (Drews 1965, p. 140: Diod. II.xxxii.4) he will have been able to consult the keepers of the Babylonian archives, and Goosens (p. 37) and Drews (1965, p. 138-40) have shown that he did just that.³ This was denied by Jacoby who held that "von Quellen kann man hier eigentlich nicht reden" (col. 2047), but as it is hardly likely that all of Ctesias' *Persica* is fictitious he must have had sources of some sort, and perhaps Jacoby is nearer the mark when he goes on to name Herodotus as one of the major ones (col. 2051).

As far as cuneiform sources go, we do not know whether or not any of the contents of the Assyrian libraries were taken to Babylon after the fall of Nineveh⁴ (though note that Goosens, (p. 38), thinks that Ctesias could only have used Babylonian, not Assyrian, material), but even if not, much of Ashurbanipal's siege of Babylon must have been preserved in popular memory if not in written Babylonian sources. It is transparent that much of the story of the fall of Nineveh of both Ctesias and other classical writers is fantasy, but it may well be that it was not invented by the authors but records the tale as current in Babylon at the time.⁵ At any rate there is no reason to doubt that a tradition that included much fantasy and may well be derived directly from the popular fabulary could have included in its handling of the fall of Nineveh memorable details from an earlier war.⁶ Specifically,

² Wiseman 1985, p. 71.

³ Similarly it is beyond doubt that Berossus made use of the Babylonian Chronicle (Drews 1975, 54).

⁴ The recent discovery by Iraqi archeologists at Sippar of an intact Babylonian library of the first millenium may eventually throw light on this matter.

⁵ A hint of this is given by Abydenus when he uses the phrase "an army like locusts" to describe the multitude of the host coming against Sarakos: this translates a common semitic idiom (cf. *erbu c2'* in CAD for Akkadian, *arbeh* on page 916 of Brown, Driver & Briggs' Lexicon for Hebrew) and the phrase must reflect the Akkadian wording, whether from a written text or oral narration.

⁶ Other examples of such telescoping of tradition in Mesopotamian folklore have been demonstrated in the cases of Semiramis (Eilers 1971), Cyrus (Drews 1974) and Nabonidus (Sack 1983).

the type of synthesis outlined above would suggest that—at any rate for his history of the end of the Assyrian empire—Ctesias relied mainly on oral tradition. Inasmuch, then, as he failed to correct this tradition through his use of the cuneiform sources, Sayce's judgement that Ctesias was “devoid of critical power” (p. 362) must be considered exact.

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Magic and the Songstress: Theocritus Idyll 2

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The Second Idyll of Theocritus takes the form of a spell which is intended to restore the affections of Simaetha's beloved. Failing in that purpose, it nevertheless succeeds in a way unintended by the speller herself; the mere performance of the spell makes the singer feel better in the end. The technique of the Second Idyll can therefore be compared with that of the Eleventh, where Polyphemus, after failing to win the object of his affections, has his song to thank for curing the pain of unrequited love. Both points have been well established.¹ What is distinctive about the Second Idyll, and neglected, is the spell itself as a form of *poiesis* and therefore as therapy. In myth and literature a woman anguished in love was much more likely than a man so anguished to turn to magic. Not only did magic claim to offer her one of the few solutions available to her to counter resistance in love, namely a chance to either restore the beloved or punish him; it also provided her, in the absence of some characteristically male alternatives, with an appropriate vehicle for therapeutic self-expression, *her* antidote to the miseries of unrequited love.

We begin with the claim that through song Simaetha and the Cyclops "come to master their turbulent and otherwise uncontrollable emotions."² Our conclusion will be that for these victims of unrequited love, neither the cure nor the song that engineers it is precisely identical. To what extent the

¹ See P. Henkel's summary of the scholarship, *Zu Theokrit*, in *Serta Philologica Aenipontana*, ed. R. Muth (1962) 191–214. More recent discussions include Gilbert Lawall, *Theocritus' Coan pastorals* (Harvard 1967) 7 f.; F. T. Griffiths, "Poetry as *Pharmakon* in Theocritus' Idyll 2," in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox* (New York 1979) 81–88. Charles Segal (I), *Poetry and Myth in Ancient Pastoral* (Cornell 1981) 73–84; (II) "Space, Time, and Imagination in Theocritus' Second Idyll," *Classical Antiquity*, vol. 4, 1 (1985) 103–19. On the influence of mime here, see A.S.F. Gow, *Theocritus*, vol. II (Cambridge 1950) 33–35; Pierre Monteil, *Théocrite* (Paris 1968) 50 f., sees mime converted in the Second Idyll into "vérité psychologique."

² Lawall (above, n. 1) 8. Among other relevant studies of Idyll 11, see: Ettore Bignone, *Teocrito* (Bari 1934) 201 f.; E. B. Holtsmark, "Poetry as Self-Enlightenment: Theocritus 11," *TAPA* 97 (1966) 253–59; Edward W. Spofford, "Theocritus and Polyphemus," *AJP* 90, 1 (1969) 22–35; R. Schmid, "Theocritus 11. The purblind poet," *CJ* 70, 4 (1975) 32–36.

experiences of singer and songstress here can be read as typically male and female is a question to be addressed in due course.

The Cyclops' cure is called a *pharmakon* (*Id.* 11, 1–3, 17). *Pharmakon* means “remedy” in general, “drug” in particular, whether literally as substance (cf. *Id.* 2. 161) or figuratively as intoxicating power. In the Eleventh Idyll *pharmakon* is explicitly defined as “the Muses.” As a charm it fails to beguile the beloved into reciprocal passion (63: “Come, Galatea . . .”), but it cures the singer himself of his “madness” (11, 71). In fact, the Idyll centres on a playful exchange between the ways of music and of medicine. Theocritus gently mocks the doctor's art for its inability to cure love-sickness, yet song apes medical procedure: both are means whereby the disease is allowed to run its course until it reaches its climax of pain, the fever breaks, and the patient returns to a normal condition of body and mind. The singer's cure is at once the healing of his diseased emotions and an act of self-discovery: Polyphemus finds out who he really is, and by the same token he is able to *poimainein* his passion (80) and so be healed. The literal meaning of *poimainein* is to “shepherd,” suggesting control, here, punningly, the mastering of emotions which is also the formal mastering that, according to such critics as Horace and Longinus, constitutes *poiesis*. We are reminded that *νομός* meaning “pasture” or habitable area, and *νόμος* meaning “custom,” “law,” “music” are essentially the same word. In the end the singer has found the way to order his unruly passion, containing it and shaping it into both sense and poetic resolution that are triumphs of clarity: “O Cyclops, Cyclops, where have you flown to in your wits?” (72). The singer then rehearses the truth he has newly discovered—that he is a somebody on land with ewes at his beck and call who has no business with a nymph of the sea. Thus did he find his remedy. Thus did he “shepherd his love” (17, 80). To turn the Eleventh Idyll into a Freudian case-study would be to butcher its distinctive qualities as a whimsical poem. I have drawn attention merely to its explicit language of cure as the work of song. The Muses are the Cyclops' *pharmakon*; they embody what we may call Apollonian form, that is the capacity shared by prophecy, law, medicine, music, and shepherding (we remember that Apollo was once a herdsman) in their most constructive guises to reduce disorder to order and madness to sense. Or at least to *claim* to do so—it is the assumption that matters.

The Thirtieth Idyll provides a parallel. Its love-sick minstrel finds relief only in endurance: “I must stretch out my neck its full length and drag the yoke” (28 f.). We compare Simaetha's “I will endure my longing as I have endured it” (164). But this male poet, like Polyphemus, arrives at his conclusion after a self-injunction to be sensible (*ὥρα τοι φρονέην*, 14) and a lengthy rational weighing of the evidence (14–27) which concludes with wise advice from his own soul. His distant ancestor is Archilochus, who

appealed to his downcast soul to think rationally about life's misfortunes: "learn the rhythm by which men are bound" (*fr.*128).³

Like Polyphemus Simaetha is the victim of unrequited love, like him she resorts to lyrical, that is, self-expressive poetry to do something about it, like him she seeks to change her beloved's response, and like him she finally changes her own state of mind. These similarities have been well explored but there are differences also; these have been less well explored. Simaetha's song takes the form of a demonic hymn, and in so doing reveals a significantly different structure, imagery, mood, and resolution. We look first at some of her song's hymnal and demonic properties. Like many another speller Simaetha fails in her conscious purpose, for reasons that could be properly explained only with reference to the psychology that creates and sustains belief in systems of magic. But our concern here is with Simaetha's success; that is, with the effect of the spell on the singer herself as self-expressive, self-healing therapy, and the extent to which the fantasies of myth and literature are likely to have mirrored in this regard the real experience of Greek women.

While it may be true that the typical Theocritean pastoral is not tightly structured, a chain of links leading to a conclusion,⁴ we do find in the Second Idyll, perhaps because it is not a typical pastoral, a careful and effective design that forces Simaetha's emotions into redemptive shape. The larger principle organising this design is hymnal form. After a brief introduction to her problem and her intentions (1–10), Simaetha invokes supportive deities—Selena, Hecate, and a divinized *iunx*; and she returns to hymnal invocation at the end of the Idyll (163) via a conventional *vûn* (159) and forms of *χαίρειν* (163, 165). Also, beginning and end are conventionally ringed: *καταδήσομαι* (3, 10, 159); *χαῖρ'* (14), *χαίροισα* (163), *χαῖρε, χαίρετε* (165), *Σελάνα* (10), *Σελαναία* (165). The first refrain (throughout 17–57), bidding the demonically potent bird-wheel to grant her request, extends the opening invocation. The second refrain, to Selana, introduces and punctuates the section of the hymn that falls between the opening and closing apostrophes, the narrative recollection (69–135), technically called the hypomnesis. (That the reminiscence is here a rehearsal not of the deity's manifested power in the past but of the singer's personal experience is a not unusual adaptation of the hypomnesis in secularized versions of hymnal form.)⁵ The hymnal arrangement of the Second Idyll is assertively clear, although the hymn is finally both demonic and lyrical, that is, both a spell and an outpouring of personal emotion.

³ Cf. Achilles' advice to Priam that humans must endure whatever sorrows the gods send, a measure of his own return to sanity and of the part that logic has played in that return (*II.* 24. 525–51).

⁴ Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, *The Green Cabinet* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969) 47.

⁵ See H. Parry, *The Lyric Poems of Greek Tragedy* (Toronto and Sarasota 1978) 26–28.

The deities Simaetha invokes and seeks to bind have magic as their province. The line between supplication and compulsion can be a fine one, especially when the invoked deity is an ambiguous Olympian like Hermes, Aphrodite, or Apollo.⁶ Simaetha's imperatives, to Hecate and Iunx (14, 17, etc.), smack of the *katadesmos*; binding the gods of magic, she will be able to bind Delphis too (3, 10). She raises her curtain on a stage of chilling presences: on Selana, who is no Olympian, on Hecate who makes hounds shiver as she crosses graves and dark blood, and on the demonic Iunx. The Artemis she turns to is another face of Hecate, a goddess of the crossroads (33–36). And when she mentions Aphrodite, it is with an eye to her support in turning the rhomb (3). She also lets us know early that this is the world of Circe and Medea and their *pharmaka* (15 f.). The details of her ritual actions speak to the magician's sombre intentions; her insistent refrains and the strict patterns of her verse, based on the magical number three and multiples,⁷ are the mesmerising rhythms of her art. If after the last appearance of the refrain at 135 we begin to forget that Simaetha is treating the dark art, she herself reminds us when she returns to binding threats, and worse, before the end (159–61). And her quiet farewell to Selana brings to mind the dismissal of spirits at the close of magical ceremony, especially necromancy.⁸

The Second Idyll is a spell in the form of a demonic hymn, but it is a demonic hymn serving the ends of self-expression. Like sorrowing Gilgamesh raising the dead Enkidu, or raging Medea calling on Hecate to fortify her drugs, Simaetha is in part at least a lyric poet plumbing the depths of her passionate feelings. If at times she seems less than *docta*,⁹ it is because her gaucherie is appealing and poetically effective. To select a few of the many points where the spell reveals the singer's mind, we begin with a number of images whose ambiguous effects seem to mirror the ambiguity of Simaetha's purposes. The love-philtre Simaetha resorts to to bend Delphis' will is an unsettling image; the *philtion* is a drug, and every drug inspires at once the hope of a cure and the fear of unpredictable effects. Most often turned to by the female and in its contents usually expressive of corruption and death,¹⁰ the philtre also embodies male fear of the female lover. Fire too, which figures prominently in Simaetha's ritual, provides a metaphor of the dangerous energy that lies at the heart of erotic experience and intent. Even deities lend themselves to possibilities of lyrically expressive focus. Iunx, as Detienne has shown, is an image able to mediate

⁶ These are often invoked in spells: see the examples in Karl Preisendanz, *Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri* (Leipzig 1928), *passim*.

⁷ See Gow (above, n. 1) 39.

⁸ See Gow (above, n. 1) 62 f.

⁹ See Griffiths (above, n. 1) 83 f. R. W. Johnson thinks that Simaetha is, appealingly, not very good at magic either: *The Idea of Lyric: Lyric Modes in Ancient and Modern Poetry* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1982) 168.

¹⁰ Cf. Horace, *Epod.* 5. 30–40; Apuleius, *Met.* 3. 17.

between contrary sides of *eros*.¹¹ She is therefore the handmaiden of Aphrodite, who brought the *iunx* to men,¹² who turns the rhomb, and who sits at the divide between *eros* as compulsion and *eros* as the confusions of the lover's mind, full of hope and full of menace.¹³ Once acknowledged, this goddess deepens the meaning of *Iunx*, casting her shadow over the entire poetic narrative and its revelation of the singer's passions.

So strict are the formal patterns of Simaetha's song that the few irregularities inevitably help concentrate the energy of the singer's emotions. The final appearance of the second refrain at line 135 is notably curious. The first refrain contributes to the formally monotonous rhythms of magical ceremony. The second refrain, an apostrophe to Selana, belongs to a pattern of rhythmical effects that is not only different but also less monotonous, since it does not consistently separate off discrete units of thought. It interrupts a single sentence at line 105. And, most peculiarly, the final rehearsal of the refrain at 135 cuts across Simaetha's recollection of her lover's words which continue to 140. One might have expected him to reach an end at 134 immediately before the refrain, or his appeal to be closed off by a thirteenth appearance of the refrain at 141. After the first series of refrains, to *Iunx*, which mark the compulsions of magic ritual and the emotional energy that feeds them, the second series that introduces and punctuates the hypomnesis both suggests formal continuity yet establishes a change of pace. The new set of line clusters suggests a continuation of the pulse beat of magic, but the fire of sorcery has now become the metaphorical fire of passion recollected. The descriptive, quieter tone in these clusters helps diminish the force of the beat, and so reduces our surprise when the narrative thrust of the sentence at 104 carries it across the refrain in the following line. This break occurs shortly after the midpoint of the second set of refrains; it therefore makes it all the easier to tolerate the dislocation with which the set concludes. Delphis' words sweep over the refrain, incorporating it into the flow of Simaetha's thoughts as she reaches the climax of her reminiscence, her confession that she was "easily persuadable" (ταχυπειθής, 138) to submit to her lover's embrace, indeed that finally she solicited it: "taking his hand I drew him down on the soft bed." No refrain breaks the final 22 lines of the hypomnesis, from Delphis' winning argument, that Eros "with terrible madness" scares the maiden from her chamber (136 f.), to Simaetha's concluding fear that she must now have been betrayed by her lover.

¹¹ Marcel Detienne, *Les jardins d'Adonis: la mythologie des aromates en Grèce* (Paris 1972); and see Segal I (above, n. 1) 73–83.

¹² Pind. *P.* 4, 214–17; on *iunx* and *rhombos*, see Gow (above n. 1) 41, 44.

¹³ On Simaetha's mixed motives, see Gow (above, n. 1) 40, 46; Griffiths (above, n. 1) 85. On the connexions between the setting of Idyll II and Simaetha's confused and violent emotions, see Lawall (above, n. 1), 16; also Monteil on Simaetha's "strange isolation" (above, n. 1, 51). The singer also becomes trapped by the formal correspondence between spell and curse, each a form of "binding."

And so the majestic formalities of the Second Idyll finally serve the self-expressive needs of a love-sick girl. But does Simaetha achieve roughly the kind of catharsis Polyphemus achieves through his song? Those who believe so¹⁴ point to Simaetha's words: "I will endure my passion as I have endured it" (164). The dismissal of spirits coincides with the singer's change of mood. Her ceremonial hail and farewell also perhaps recalls the ending of such impassioned songs as those of Odysseus: "All fell silent, held by the spell (κηληθμῶ)" . . . ¹⁵ The concluding silence is part of the performance itself, the moment when singer and audience alike absorb the import of the song before finally "the spell is broken."

And then there is Selana. Simaetha at first pairs her with the infernal goddess Hecate, next isolates her as a celestial witness in the first series of refrains, then links her with "rosy dawn" and the rhythms of the diurnal round (142-48). In her final appearance "with shining throne" Selana suggests beauty without menace, especially in the context of "quiet night" (166). It is an appropriate setting for Simaetha's own quiet mood. The spell reaches its conclusion, the song its form, the singer her catharsis.

But the differences between the Second and Eleventh Idylls are as informative as the similarities. Simaetha's song does not close on the imagery or language of cure. She does not, like the Cyclops, come to recognize the folly of her sentiments. Nor does she emerge from that folly into enlightenment, restored at last to a sense of the community to which she properly belongs and aware of her true interests. Instead, the fire of her conflicting emotions seems more subdued than extinguished. She expresses at the end no hope of winning Delphis. The only alternative to that hope has been, throughout, her desire to punish him. That wish receives its climactic expression in the image of the *kaka pharmaka* (161). We hear no apology for that turn of mind, indeed no departure from it. Only the note of resignation and the imagery of redeemed nature suggest some change of direction. But if her resignation reminds us of the male singer's response in the Thirtieth Idyll, yet it is not like his the product of considered analysis. It is therefore more fragile, a sigh that fails to recognize even the theoretical possibility of better alternatives. As for the beauty of the night sky, comforting though it is, it cannot entirely erase the very recent image of the murderous *kaka pharmaka* or the ringing technique of a hymn that opens with invocations of Moon and Hecate (10-12) and closes with farewells to "Mistress" (162) and Moon (165).

¹⁴ Among discussions of the Idyll's close, see Griffiths (above, n. 1) 87 f.; Segal (above, n. 1) I. 84; II. 112-19. Segal in particular makes an intriguing case for "some increase of understanding and control," for an "emerging self-understanding" on Simaetha's part. But the comparatively inexplicit, indirect, and ambivalent manner in which Simaetha finds her release, certainly any sense of "self-understanding," suggests a significantly different experience.

¹⁵ *Od.* 13. 1-2. In Homer it is the audience whose silence is explicitly referred to, in Vergil the singer's: *conticuit tandem factoque hic fine quievit* (*Aen.* 3. 718).

Simaetha the love-sick magician is the creation of a male imagination. Is her experience authentically female? Evidence is largely circumstantial, but we cannot overlook Sappho's *Hymn to Aphrodite*.¹⁶ The penultimate stanza of this ode (21–24) is among the controverted lines of ancient verse: "If she flees, soon shall she follow; if she accepts not gifts, she'll offer them; if she loves not, soon she'll love, even unwillingly." A number of points are relevant to the present investigation. The poem is a plea to the Goddess of Love for release from the cares of unrequited love: "Don't keep on oppressing my heart with pain and anguish, but come . . . (3–5); release me from harsh care (25 f.)." How the goddess will help is disputed. On a previous occasion recalled by the poet Aphrodite asked, "Whom yet again am I to persuade to restore you to her affection? (18 f.)." Most critics take this past event as a mirror of the present. Giacomelli, however, points out the absence of an object in the promises "she shall pursue, give, love", and suggests that they express the general law that the insouciant beloved will inexorably in time become the anguished lover "against her will." It is the recital of this law with its promise that the biter will be bit that comforts Sappho.¹⁷

Whether Sappho hopes for another reconciliation or expects that the tables will be turned, the climax of Aphrodite's words is, as Cameron long ago pointed out, "couched in a form which has magical associations paralleled in the *Magical Papyri*."¹⁸ In the mouth of a child, the words might be the jingling accompaniment to a skipping game. As the promise of Aphrodite, goddess of beguilement, they suggest a compulsive spell. The jingle itself, the inexorable future tenses, and the final reference to the victim's unwillingness all suggest compulsion. Whatever threat these words pose the victim, can their very form, rhythm, and pedigree, as well as their content, also be read as an example of how Sappho in her *erotika* "gives vent to the passions of her heart . . . so curing her *eros* with the

¹⁶ There are echoes in the Second Idyll "*étrangement près de Sappho*" Monteil (above, n. 1) 51; for an earlier discussion of Sapphic echoes, see Ph.-E. Legrand, *Études sur Théocrite* (Paris 1898) 121, 350. Simaetha's account of passion's assaults, leaving her now fevered, now pale, remembers Sappho's remarkable self-analysis (31). Griffiths finds bathos in the shift from the girl's Sapphic (and Medean) pose to her "abrupt descent to babies and dolls" (above, n. 1, 83).

¹⁷ Anne Giacomelli, "The Justice of Aphrodite in Sappho Fr. 1," *TAPA* 110 (1980) 135–41.

¹⁸ A. Cameron, "Sappho's prayer to Aphrodite," *HTR* 32 (1939) 1–7; see too C. Segal, "Eros and Incantation: Sappho and Oral Poetry," *Arethusa* 7. 2 (1974) 148–50. Sappho's goddess is Aphrodite *doloplokos*. The epithet means "wile-weaver"; it suggests love's "magical deceptions, but suggests too, perhaps, that *eros* can weave lyrical poems out of its own intense experiences. Johnson (above, n. 9) calls the poetess herself *doloplokos* (46 f.). There may be echoes too of "crafty" Hermes, a god of magic and of poetry: on *dolos* see N. O. Brown, *Hermes the Thief* (New York 1947) 6 f. There is a temptation to translate *koma* in 2. 8 as "sleep of enchantment" (D. A. Campbell, Loeb *Greek Lyric* 1, 57), because of the sense of hypnotic effect, but this is perhaps metaphorical magic. On the other hand, see Eva Stehle Stigers, "Sappho's Private World," in *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*, ed. H. Foley (New York 1981) 45–61: she refers to those who have emphasised "the atmosphere of magic and incantation in [Sappho's] poems" (45).

sweet-voiced Muses?"¹⁹ Her final appeal for "release from care" is both an injunction for future action and a mark of what the poem is already achieving as a therapeutic exercise.

To ask whether Greek women turned to spells for relief more often than men did, and whether the spell suggested itself as a form of *poiesis* more readily to the female poet than to her male counterpart, is to immerse oneself in conjecture. The more general one's answers, the more tentative and vulnerable they must be. Apart from what is left of Sappho and the even skimpier fragments of other female writers, the Greek and Roman poetess—that is, the woman who sings—is for us the creation of a male imagination. From the Choruses of tragedy to the *Heroides* of Ovid, most of our songstresses are, like Simaetha, the fictions of a male Muse. What we "know" about female poets and female magic is mostly what the male imagination conceived these to be. But, *faute de mieux*, we must listen to what myth and male poetry have to say, testing such evidence against the certain or probable conditions of ancient life.

Several points suggest themselves. First, the experience of women must have varied from rank to rank, from place to place, and from time to time. And so must the kind of poetry that reflected such variations.²⁰ Antigone and others in Greek tragedy, for example, might have counterparts in the real world in Queen Artemisia of Halicarnassus and Argive Telesilla, a poetess remembered for the initiative she took in resisting Spartan aggression. On the whole, however, Greek women were by the conditions of ancient life typically excluded from the world "out there" and so had available fewer opportunities to balance intense experiences against intellectual alternatives grounded in possibilities of social action. Where Polyphemus, shaggy shepherd that he is, thinks and acts like the most urbane of Greek males, Simaetha suggests the typical female reduced by social circumstance and realistic expectation to more limited alternatives.

Another assumption that persists in Greek myth and may well reflect real life is that the true magician is female. Male associations with effective magic are weak in the Archaic and Classical periods.²¹ Female associations

¹⁹ Philoxenos paraphrased by Plutarch (*Am.* 18).

²⁰ On varieties of female experience and possibilities in Greece and Rome, a good place to start is Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, *Women in Greece and Rome* (Toronto and Sarasota 1977). Also *Reflections of Women in Antiquity* (above, n. 18); *Women in the Ancient World*, ed. John Peradotto and J. P. Sullivan (Albany 1984); Elaine Fantham, "Women in Antiquity: A Selective (and Subjective) Survey (1979–84)," *Classical Views* 30, N.S.5 (1986) 1–24. J. Winkler well notes that "all social codes can be manipulated and subverted as well as obeyed" (*Reflections of Women in Antiquity*, 64); but, despite such examples of political initiative as those displayed by Artemisia and Telesilla, ancient social codes seem generally to have intensified whatever differences between male and female experience may be attributed to biology (on which see Stigers in *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*, 49 f.).

²¹ Practitioners like the *magi*, a "barbarian" import, are often denounced as mere tricksters (cf. *Eur. Or.* 1497–99; *Bacch.* 234) and remain well away from the centre of Greek thought and imagination. Hadrian had his own magician at court, but even now in Roman times, when

are correspondingly strong: the entire panoply of Thessalian witches, led by the daunting Erichtho, springs immediately to mind. Only in the area of song is male magic at all prominent. But in recorded Greek times at least male and female song charm in different ways. Magic and song, it is widely believed, were in most cultures at first inseparable;²² the Welsh bard Taliesin, son of a witch and himself a magician, is our paradigm. In the earliest Greek literature, however, musical magic has begun to divide into the literal and therefore menacing potency of certain kinds of spellbinding song, the province of females, and into the more figurative enchantments of male music. Homer's Phemius "beguiles" his audience with his sweet song (*Od.* 1. 337), but this is the largely metaphorical charm of persuasive and delectable entertainment. There is nothing even in Orpheus' magic comparable to the varied and sinister forces which surround the spells of Circe or Medea or Simaetha. Myth reflects the popular belief, maintained from Homer to Theocritus, that male "charms" are figurative—either sweet music or verbal trickery (well exemplified in the scorn heaped on sophistic rhetoric by critics like Hippolytus' father superior to its "charms"²³), while female charms are literal and dangerous magic in all the areas where magic operates, including that of musical beguilement.

More than one commentator on the Second Idyll has suggested that Delphis casts his own *epaoide* on Simaetha.²⁴ But the text, while attesting to the dominion of *eros* over Simaetha, nowhere colours the effect Delphis

popular beliefs in magic have risen closer to the surface of official life, the male magician is an obedient servant. In the imaginative world of ancient mythology, male sorcery is almost unknown, except in references, largely figurative, to musical beguilement. Vergil's Moeris, who dispenses magical drugs (*Ec.* 8. 95–99), is the counterpart of Simaetha's "Assyrian stranger" (*Id.* 2. 162) and is not heard of before or later (unless the harmless shepherd of the Ninth Eclogue is the same Moeris). Anyway, it is the female singers of both the Idyll and the Eclogue who imaginatively embody the mind of the magician. The Telchines, malignant magician smiths, are very shadowy figures, as are the Curetes and Dactyli. The latter have connexions with medical charms and with music; if the legends of Orpheus are any guide, such healing and musical powers are likely to have fallen under the tutelage of Apollo as god of harmony in its many forms.

²² Brown (above, n. 18) 31 f., finds the origin of song in the intoned formulae of magical incantations, related to heraldic function. And see Jacqueline de Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Harvard 1975) 4 f., 11–13; Northrop Frye, *Spiritus Mundi* (Indiana 1976), 123–47. On ceremonial magic as itself a form of art, see E. Butler, *Ritual Magic* (Cambridge 1949) 3 f., 295 f.

²³ *Hipp.* 1038–40. On magic and rhetoric, see de Romilly (above, n. 22) 26–32. We do find males occasionally associated with necromancy, for example Odysseus, but Homer's hero is here a poor poet compared with his eastern counterpart, Gilgamesh, doing no more than dutifully repeat the words and carry out the instructions given him by Circe (*Od.* 10. 516–29; 11. 24–36). The male singers who raise the dead Darius are highly lyrical performers, but of course they are exotic Persians; even so, Darius adds a touch of Greek rationalism when he says that he was able to defy the usual restrictions imposed on the dead because of his despotic authority in the underworld (*Aesch. Pers.* 623–80).

²⁴ Most recently, Griffiths (above, n. 1) 86.

has on her with magical terms, literal or figurative. Simaetha on the other hand seeks literally to enchant her beloved. Magic is female and for the most part malignant; the spell—the form resorted to by magicians like Circe and Medea, by seductive singers like the Sirens, and by ladies like Simaetha for whom song is at least partly a weapon—is one of its malignant forms. The male bard, from the Homeric court minstrel to Pindar, unites with his audience in a healing exercise, “magical” in its shamanic assumptions, yet implications of effective magic are always very weak. Phemius’ offerings are *thelkteria*, “beguilements” (*Od.* 1. 337), but again the figurative connotations are clear: where the spell is only one of the ways a female demonstrates her magical power, male “spellbinders”, even Orpheus, that most shamanic of singers, have no other connections with sorcery.

These contrary images of the singer and the songstress derive in large part from male values that underlie social structure and determine roles within that structure. From Homer on the poet’s task is to order his inspiration within the limits of social tolerance, to be *utilis urbi*. Inspired by divine Muses and possessing unusual powers of memory and insight, the poet must strike a difficult balance between the pain or awesome grandeur of remembered events and the poetic form that orders them into beautiful and so acceptable and useful experiences. Where the poet fails to achieve that balance he must accede to the authoritative voice of the society he serves. Penelope, distressed by the troubling exempla of Phemius’ song, bids him cease; Telemachus, assuming the weightier authority of the male, overrides her (*Od.* 1. 340 f.; 346 f.). And we recall the Athenians’ harsh reaction to Phrynichus when his *Milesians*, dwelling on the fate of the islanders in 494 B.C., caused the audience more pain than pleasure.

Where one kind of stereotype puts the male charmer as poet within the social order and makes him its servant, a Merlin who knows his place, another puts the female charmer as poet outside and makes her a threat. Our examples must once again be imaginative and so handled with caution. But there are no female poet laureates in the courts of Homeric kings. The songstresses of Homer are Circe (*Od.* 10. 221) and the Sirens. What the latter offer sounds at first blush precisely the same as what male singers offer. They “know everything”, in particular the events of the Trojan War, and they claim that their listeners will derive both pleasure and enlightenment from their song. Why, then, is their song so dangerous? One could say that it is not the performance itself but what the Sirens do afterwards, having once enticed their victims, that constitutes the peril. But Homer insists that it is precisely their “voices” and their “song” that are lethal (*Od.* 12. 41; 44). The Sirens’ song is not merely a ruse to entrap the unwary, it is itself a menace, the dangerous, beguiling side of *molpe*, song’s extraordinary power in its most nakedly disorienting form. If it is not to destroy, it must be mastered by the ordering power of Odysseus’ intelligence

or of Orpheus' lyre (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4. 909).²⁵ The Sirens' song suggests binding as *katadesmos*, a demonic counterpart of order and a purpose of the spell.

Of course, in real life the line between male and female sensibility and practice can never have been rigid. We are talking about typical emphasis. But one might find in Longinus' account of the poet's task an enduring male ideal from Homeric to much later times, at least in the Greek period, a reflection of male status, role, and opportunity in the community: "to reduce inspiration to order" (*De Sublim.* 33. 5).

It is an ideal that seems to inform not only the "socially useful" poem monitored by the Homeric court or the Attic theatre but also the poem that gives vent to the author's personal feelings. The Cyclops' cry, "Where have you flown to in your wits" (*Id.* 11. 72) is, I have argued, like Archilochus' self-injunction, a typical male attempt to impose order on his interior world. Magic is antithetical to the assumptions that underlie these attitudes, but not to those adopted by Simaetha. We might fortify the argument that essential gender differences are involved here by considering the broad range of alternatives available to unhappy male and female lovers.

For both the man and woman frustrated or disappointed in love the two larger options are aggressive countermeasures and forms of consolation. In the first group, the most peculiarly and disagreeably male response to frustrated desire is rape (exemplified in Archilochus' seduction-cum-rape in the *Cologne Epode* and throughout Ovid's *Metamorphoses*). The female equivalent is magic, intended to seduce, or punish, or both. Limited options must sometimes have encouraged a female to resort to the magic of drugs or spells; and drugs were always perilous, while spells, as Plato well noted,²⁶ could do psychological harm to a credulous recipient.

Either sex may turn violence against the self, in the form of suicide. However, few males actually go through with it. The singer of Theocritus' Third Idyll talks about it, but his thoughts smack more of self-pitying rhetoric than of desperate intent (25–27). Many more females actually commit suicide. Iocasta, for example, the mother-wife, takes her own life; Oedipus, her husband-son, does not. Often the woman reacts thus to the pressures of love. The Sappho of legend leaped to her death for love of Phaon, while in the grip of unendurable emotions. And whatever complex

²⁵ The lyre of Orpheus that once tamed the Sirens (Apollon. *Argon.* 4. 909) is finally overcome by the discordant song of the Maenads, as they themselves tear him to pieces (Ovid *Met.* 11. 3–22). Among other notable female singers who took root in the Greek imagination is the Sphinx, an *aoidos* (Soph. *O.T.* 36 etc.), who sits belligerently on the city walls, whose song takes the form of the riddle, whose power depends on the riddle's baffling properties, and whose victims are explicitly male (Eur. *Phoen.* 1027). She is mastered eventually by male intelligence.

²⁶ Plato *Laws* 933a–b. The strength of Plato's attack on magic suggests how misleading the extant, elitist, largely male literary tradition may be as evidence for contemporary practice, even in the fifth and fourth centuries.

reasons lie behind the deaths of Deianeira, Phaedra, and Dido, the source of their anguish is unrequited love and self-inflicted death is their desperate last resort. The subject is riddled with complexities²⁷ and the examples cited are, once again, imaginative and male-created. But myth seems here to embody at least psychological realities of ancient life, and probably more than that.

Our second kind of option, namely consolation, is again likely to have taken somewhat different forms for men and women. One form of consolation founds itself on the lessons of experience. The evidence we cited earlier suggests that men tended to appeal to a wider range of experience, to see alternatives more clearly, to be able to apply them more realistically to their own cases, and in particular to recognize the advantages of a more balanced state of the emotions which finds fulfilment in "useful" actions. Even where a man opts for resignation, he is more likely to think it through first. Sappho perhaps also appeals to a law that helps clarify one's thoughts—the biter will inevitably be bit. But this is one of *love's* laws; other kinds of rationalization might have been less accessible to women, or at least less implementable.

A second form of consolation founds itself on the therapeutic properties of song, the extent to which performance itself can be an act of self-ordering. Horace expresses an ideal of *poiesis* when he chides Empedocles for his act of irrational suicide, dismissing him as merely "mad" (*vesanus*, A.P. 296 f.; 464-66), a poet who failed to achieve mastery of himself and his craft. The poet can and should master the "manic" energies of his emotions, and his verse should embody rational control. That way salvation lies. One might read this injunction as founded on principles that social and political realities of ancient life offered more readily to the male than to the female. It is not surprising that according to myth and male prejudice the female, more vulnerable to the pressures of emotion and less likely to have to hand the means of philosophical reflection about realistic alternatives to deal with them, should, if she resists suicide, turn to magic and its hope of wholly automatic forms of control, including self-control. Even the outpourings of a Medea, best represented in Ovid and Seneca, are hardly necessary to the preparation of her poison, but they do reveal and accommodate the depths of the sorceress' passion—even if they do not in this instance exorcize it.

It has been noted that the references to magic ritual in Theocritus' Second Idyll have "every appearance of being true to contemporary practice."²⁸ It is also possible that the spell offered many a desperate woman, no less in real life than in the world of a largely male imagination, a useful resource as a version of therapeutic song. After all, belief in magic

²⁷ For example, the occasional male like Narcissus and Daphnis is destroyed by the power of unrequited love, without recourse to the antidote of sobre reflection.

²⁸ Gow (above, n. 1) 35. On Alexandrian magic, see also Monteil (above, n. 1) 52. On magic and the search for "lurid effects" in Hellenistic poetry, see Segal I (above, n. 1) 50.

is sustained by the psychological support such belief provides. As an outlet for women, magical ritual may perhaps be compared with other ecstatic rituals, especially those associated with Demeter and Dionysus. For the woman disappointed in love, the spell's images of binding, burning, and melting suggest the confusions of betrayed love, its energies promise to compel change, its inexorable patterns impose order and so provide their own kind of relief. If such relief has its dark overtones, we should not be surprised. Simaetha's kind of magic is the province of Hecate, whose "hounds tremble as she crosses the graves of corpses and black blood" (*Id.* 2. 12 f.). The aid she brings bears the marks of its origin.²⁹

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²⁹ The songstress of Vergil's Eighth Eclogue seems to fare better than Simaetha. Her magic draws her lover harmlessly to her door, and "may all be well: the dog barks at the doorway . . . Daphnis returns from the city!" (107-09). But Vergil's Eclogue is finally no more about magic than is the Idyll on which it is modelled, but about a certain kind of self-expression: "Is my confidence justified? Or do those who love merely fashion dreams?" Once again, a female singer turns to ritual imperatives that invoke and seek to exorcise spirits from a dark world, but finds only ambivalent solutions.

Aitia in the Second Book of Apollonius' *Argonautica*

T. M. PASKIEWICZ

One of the most unHomeric features of Apollonius' poem are its many *aitia*, a type of subject absent from the Homeric epics, though well-established elsewhere. In non-epic poetry *aitia* appear in the Homeric hymns (e.g. *h. Dem.* on the origin of the Eleusinian mysteries), Pindar (e.g. *O.* 10 on the institution of the Olympic Games), tragedy (Euripides' plays often end with the foundation of some Attic cult, e.g. in *Hipp.* 1425 ff.) and very often in Hellenistic poetry, above all in Apollonius' contemporary Callimachus, who devoted an entire work in elegiac verse to the subject.¹ *Aitia* are not lacking in earlier epic poetry, either, in Hesiod (e.g. *Aigimios* fr. 296, which explains the name Euboia, *Eoiai* fr. 233), Peisander of Cameirus (*Heracleia* fr. 7 Kinkel on the springs at Thermopylae) and Antimachus (*Thebais* fr. 35 on the cult of Demeter *Erinys*, frs. 44, 53).

Where Apollonius differs from such epic poets and reflects instead the interests of his contemporaries, especially Callimachus, is in the amount of space that he devotes to *aitia*. For he includes not only ones directly linked with the Argonauts (e.g. the hero-cults of crew-members who die at various stages of the voyage) but also a great many without any such link (e.g. some rather obscure Black Sea cults), which he manages to incorporate within the framework of a voyage to and from Colchis. The second book, which deals with part of the outward journey, contains more *aitia* and less narrative than the others, especially the more dramatic third book, to which it provides a contrast. Indeed at times, especially in the section 648–961, the lively, colourful *aitia*, combined with geographical and ethnographical details, seem more important than the heroes' rather dull, uneventful voyage.

Those *aitia* directly connected with the Argonauts generally concern cults founded by sailors or colonists but later given a more impressive and venerable origin and associated with the Argo's voyage to Colchis. They follow (with variations) a standard pattern—the heroes land, build an altar, offer sacrifices and thus institute a cult—except for one which is introduced in a speech and linked with a well-known episode on the outward voyage.

¹ On *aitia* in Hellenistic poetry see G. Zanker, *Realism in Alexandrian Poetry* (London 1987) 120 ff.

When the Mariandyni are welcoming the Argonauts as victors over their enemy Amycus, whose encounter with the heroes has been described in 1 ff., their king promises to found a cult of the Tyndaridae in order to honour Polydeuces for killing Amycus (806 ff.).

Many of the other aitia are also connected with the main narrative in some way. The Argonauts' construction of an altar to the Twelve Gods (531 f.) takes up an earlier motif, Phineus' admonition to honour the Gods before the passage of the Symplegades (336); and their institution of a cult of *Homonoia* (715 ff.) develops ideas important throughout the poem, concord among the crew and united efforts for a common goal (cf. 1. 336 f., 1344). Idmon's death (815 ff.) has been foretold in a prophecy (1. 443 f.); that of Tiphys (851 ff.) not only supplies an aition for another hero-cult but also introduces a scene exploring the Argonauts' state of mind and Jason's method of leadership when a new pilot must be chosen to replace Tiphys (859 ff.). Later this theme of the death of two heroes, one of whom is killed by a wild animal, is repeated in the deaths of Mopsus and Canthus (4. 1485 ff.).

These aitia vary greatly in length and tone. Apollonius' treatment ranges from a bare statement (e.g. the cult of Zeus *Phyxios* 1146–47) to an extended episode (e.g. the cult of Apollo *Eoios* 669–713). He tries to give each aition an individual colouring by elaborating and enlivening the dry facts offered by his sources, mainly local historians such as Herodorus of Heraclea (mentioned several times in the scholia, e.g. on 684–87). For the cults of Apollo *Eoios* and of Sthenelos he invents two striking epiphanies. The first presents the sun god as a handsome, radiant youth passing by at dawn on his own affairs (674 ff.). This motif leads into a joyful celebration of Apollo by the Argonauts, with, quite naturally, a hymn of praise by Orpheus (705 ff.); that gives Apollonius the chance to introduce other aitiological themes (also in Call. *h.* 2. 97 ff.), the god slaying a monstrous snake at Delphi and an explanation of the ritual cry *ἦ ἦ ἦ*. The second epiphany is another silent, fleeting vision, but of a very different nature—a lonely, feeble ghost who appears in all his old splendour as a warrior but must soon return to the gloom of Hades, from which Persephone has compassionately released him for a brief glimpse of his fellow-Greeks (915 ff.). Idmon's death is also presented in sombre tones, for it is decreed by fate (815, 817) and forms part of a dramatic sequence of events in which the hero is gored by a monstrous, terrifying boar (824 ff.). Apollonius may have invented this manner of death to allude to a less colourful Homeric boar hunt (*Od.* 19. 428 ff.), in the same way as he shapes the episode of Apollo *Eoios* to recall Odysseus' landing on another deserted island (*Od.* 9. 116 ff.).²

Elsewhere too he seems to have boldly reshaped earlier traditions, inventing details or carefully choosing between different versions (as far as we

²Parallels in F. Vian, *Argonautiques* I–II (Paris 1976), pp. 216, n. 1, 275–76. Note Complémentaire 698.

can tell, given that most of his sources are lost). The altar of the Twelve Gods was linked not only with the Argonauts but also with Phrixus' sons (in Timosthenes, according to schol. 531–32); and the cult of *Homonoia*, as founded from Heraclea, probably had a different emphasis, on political stability and concord within a city. In Promathidas, a local historian, Orpheus dedicated a lyre to Sthenelos (schol. 928–29) and thus gave a place the name of *Lyra*; but Apollonius feels that Apollo as patron of music and of the Argonauts' voyage is a more suitable recipient (928 f.). In one case his invention of a link between the heroes and a local cult has left certain inconsistencies. The Tyndaridae were actually honoured as protectors of sailors at a sanctuary some distance from Heraclea, at whose site Apollonius sets the cult's founder, a local king. When he connects the cult instead with Polydeuces' victory over Amycus, he cannot explain why Castor should share in the honours too, although he does take care to locate the sanctuary not at Heraclea but more vaguely along the "Acherousian coast" (806).³

The second group of *aitia*, those not directly connected with Argonauts, concern place-names or local cults and are generally introduced in a smooth relative clause of the pattern "the heroes sailed past (reached/saw) a place where . . ." (e.g. 652), with two exceptions. In order to include topics not linked with places on the way to Colchis, Apollonius has the voyage delayed by Etesian winds (498), which gives him a chance to speak of Aristaeus and Cyrene (590 ff.—cf. Call. *h.* 2. 90 ff., *Aitia* fr. 75. 33 ff.); and he mentions the cult of Priolas in a speech (780–82), probably inventing Priolas' position as the speaker's elder brother.⁴

He often gives these *aitia* some slight connection with the main narrative. The story of Aristaeus (506 ff.) repeats the themes of divine punishment and atonement from the Phineus episode (178 ff.). The peaceful life of Dipsacus, an obscure local divinity whose shrine the heroes pass (658), contrasts with their strenuous exertions at the oars (660 ff.). They sacrifice at Ares' altar (1169 ff.), a sanctuary built by Amazons (385 ff.), and they actually meet Deimachus' sons (955 ff.), the legendary founders of Sinope, who have been left behind after Heracles' expedition against the Amazons; this meeting anticipates their later encounter with other stranded travellers, Phrixus' sons (1093 ff.).

This group of *aitia* is also extremely varied. The lengthy Aristaeus episode is distinguished by learned allusions and evocative proper names, and by its unfamiliar portrait of Cyrene as a virgin shepherdess whose peaceful existence is rudely disrupted by Apollo (500 ff.). Dipsacus also leads a placid pastoral life (ἐθέλημός 656 recalls Hes. *Op.* 118 and the Golden Age), while Dionysus conducts mysterious nocturnal rituals in a cave (905 ff.) and Artemis bathes peacefully in the gently-flowing Parthenius (937 ff., cf. Call. fr. 75. 24 f.). In contrast, Ares' cult (385 ff.,

³ Vian pp. 162–63.

⁴ Vian p. 277. N. C. 782.

1169 ff.) is a primitive barbarian rite involving horse-sacrifices to a black stone. Priolas is presented as an epic warrior fallen in defence of his country (ὄντινα λαός / . . . ὀδύρεται 781 f. may recall the Trojans lamenting Hector καὶ μιν λαοὶ . . . ὀδύρονται *Il.* 24. 740), not in his original role as a vegetation deity, a youth like Hylas or Bormus, whose death is honoured by annual ritual mourning (although this aspect is evoked by οἰκτίστοις ἐλέγοισιν 782).⁵ Apollonius may have changed the legend in order to motivate neatly Heracles' campaigns against the enemies of Priolas' tribe (campaigns which anticipate the wars of the Greek colonists from Heraclea), for the hero can begin by taking revenge for this death (786).

Also innovatory may be his explanations of the place-names Sinope and Philyra. For the first he relates an amusing anecdote, probably a Hellenistic invention conflating earlier traditions (946 ff.).⁶ The eponymous nymph Sinope is duly carried off from Boeotia to the Euxine by Zeus, but then outwits the god with a folk-tale stratagem, exacting a promise of anything she desires in return for her favours and choosing virginity; and she similarly discomfarts Apollo, her seducer in another version. The island of Philyra, which probably derived its name from a local tribe, the Philyres, is linked instead with Philyra, Cheiron's mother, and her union with Cronus is located here (1232 ff.). Rhea's interruption of the guilty pair introduces a new, more subtle explanation of Cheiron's nature—in order to escape from his wife Cronus changes into a horse and conceives the centaur at the moment of transformation from human to equine shape (ἀμοιβαίη . . . εὐνῇ 1241); and it motivates Philyra's flight to Thessaly, where she can bear Cheiron at his traditional birth-place.

Two features of Apollonius' treatment of *aitia* deserve comment. In order to add more authority he often suggests that he is faithfully reporting ancient traditions, especially local ones, and hence uses expressions such as πεφάτισται (500), καὶ τὰ μὲν ὥς ὑδέονται (528), φάτις (854 ff.); although where two traditions disagree about which hero a tomb should be assigned to and he wishes to mention both while supporting one, he appeals for confirmation of the truth to the Muses, otherwise generally reserved for his epic narrative (844 ff.). This idiom is not new—φασί is used several times in Homer to introduce familiar traditions or beliefs (e.g. *Il.* 2. 783, 19. 416), while variations on "they say," "the story goes," appear in Pindar (e.g. *O.* 2. 28, *N.* 3. 52 f.) and in tragedy (e.g. Aesch. *Eum.* 4). But it is especially typical of Hellenistic poetry (it introduces *aitia* in e.g. Antim. fr. 35, Call. *h.* 3. 210) and was taken up by some Roman poets, especially Virgil (e.g. *A.* 7. 735—see Fordyce ad loc.).⁷

Apollonius also emphasises the continuity of traditions reaching back to the distant past and still observed in his own day—so Κέφ δ' ἔτι νῦν

⁵ Vian p. 278. N. C. 785.

⁶ Vian p. 280. N. C. 953.

⁷ C. J. Fordyce, *Aeneid* VII–III (Oxford 1977).

(526) priests sacrifice to Sirius, εἰσέτι νῦν (717) stands the shrine built by the Argonauts. This attitude, already present in Pindar and tragedy, is another characteristic of Hellenistic poetry (e.g. Call. fr. 59. 21 νῦν δ' ἔθ') and of Virgil (e.g. A. 7. 601-03 *Mos erat . . . , quem protinus urbes / Albanae coluere sacrum, nunc . . . / Roma colit*). Here too Apollonius is closer to contemporary non-epic poetry than to the Homeric epics, which stress instead the gulf between the Heroic age and men "as they now are."

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The Vertumnus Elegy and Propertius Book IV¹

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4. 2, on the surface, at least, is as smooth and well-behaved an elegy as ever Propertius wrote: the transitions, often a source of grave difficulty in understanding this author, are here clearly marked and logical; the text, reasonably easily construed. Moreover, the poem is emotionally satisfying as a discrete entity in a way in which the Cynthia elegies, for example, are not: the reader's curiosity is sated by these 64 lines—they presuppose no previous knowledge of the major character, and that major character has no history beyond these lines. Propertius has said all there is to say about Vertumnus. The framework of the poem reinforces this impression: the poem opens with a reference to the god's origin (birth) in line 3 and ends with the epitaph of his maker (death). It feels then as if we have covered the whole lifespan of a statue—a cunning conceit.

Paradoxically, however, the more the poet seeks to impress upon us the completeness, the oneness, of this particular poem, the more we should struggle against complacent acceptance of a single interpretation. For, if, as Dee puts it,² "the central theme of the elegy [is] unity of essence within multiplicity of appearances," it is as much "multiplicity of appearances" within "unity of essence." Observe how many times the poet invites us, in language which applies to poems as well as to statues, to look for the many beneath the one, as well as the one beneath the many: *meas tot in uno corpore formas* (1), *opportuna mea est cunctis natura figuris* (21), *quod formas unus uertebar in omnis* (47), *unum opus est, operi non datur unus honos* (64). If the god, described in rigid bronze, can assume different

¹ This is an abridgment of a chapter of my 1984 dissertation, completed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, under the direction of Prof. David F. Bright. These editions were used in its preparation: H. E. Butler and E. A. Barber, *The Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford 1933) = BB; all citations are from this edition unless otherwise indicated; C. Lachmann, *Sex. Aur. Propertii Carmina* (Leipzig 1816); P. J. Enk, *Ad Propertii Carmina Commentarius Criticus* (Zutphaniae 1911); G. Luck, *Properz und Tibull. Liebeselegien* (Zurich 1964); W. A. Camps, *Propertius Elegies Book IV* (Cambridge 1965); E. Pasoli, *Sesto Properzio, Il libro quarto delle elegie* (Bologna 1967).

² J. Dee, "Propertius 4. 2: Callimachus Romanus at Work" *AJPh* 95 (1974) 52.

guises, surely we are not to imagine he sports a single aspect in the more malleable medium of verse. There are others masquerading behind the "I" of the god, other answers to the riddle of the first line.

The delineation of the god's function and nature centers around the etymology of his name, in the manner of Callimachean aetiology.³ The first two etymologies, VERT-AMNIS (10) and VERT-ANNUS (11), have been proposed, I believe, to fix the location of the statue and date of the ritual in accordance with the published program of the book (*sacra diesque canam et cognomina prisca locorum* 4. 1. 69). The third etymology VERTO-MENOS (47), as the correct one, is given more play. Each etymology marks a transformation in the god: from Etruscan to Roman, from rustic fertility god to god of all the Romans.

Surely, however, in this context any form of *uerto* is suggestive; there may be another (implicit) etymology, another transformation which the poet intends us to mark: *uersus* in line 57.⁴ We may postulate, then, that this last etymology is to be accompanied by yet another transformation in the nature of the god. He has now become the god of poetry, probably, because of his Italic origin and vaunted affection for the city, of native Roman poetry, and possibly, because of his Etruscan roots,⁵ of Augustan poetry.

There are several indications of the validity of this hypothesis. Firstly, the statue of Vertumnus is located in the booksellers' district, and the name alone is direction enough for Horace (*Ep.* 1. 20. 1):

Vertumnnum Ianumque, liber, spectare uideris,
scilicet ut prostes Sosiorum pumice mundus.

Secondly, 4. 2 is replete with imitations and recastings in elegiac meter of lines of most of the Augustan poets.⁶ Thirdly, much of the language of the poem has its place in the world of the bookseller, as well as in other spheres: for example, *corpore* (1 = "compendium of literary writings"), *formas* (1 = *character*), *signa* (2 = "seal"), *index* (19), *figuris* (21), down to the mysterious mention of the original maple statue (maple is the most

³ Propertius is playing it straight here; as others have observed, this is the only pure aetiology of the book. For the relationship between this poem and the *Aitia* (fr. 114) and *Iambi* (7, 9) of Callimachus, see H. E. Pillinger's 1965 dissertation (120-24) and his "Some Callimachean Influences on Propertius, Book 4" *HSCPh* 73 (1969) 171-99.

⁴ T. Suits ("The Vertumnus Elegy of Propertius" *TAPhA* 100 [1969] 484 n.) hints at this.

⁵ Vertumnus has often been associated with Maecenas; cf. R. Lucot, "Vertumne et Mécène" *Pallas* 1 (1953) 65-80, for example.

⁶ For the correspondences, cf. Pasoli; A. La Penna "Properzio e i poeti latini dell'età aurea" *Maia* 3 (1950) 209-36; 4 (1951) 43-69. Line 13 is an excellent example, as a reminiscence of Horace (*Carm.* 2. 5. 9-12):

. . . tolle cupidinem
inmitis uvae: iam tibi lividos
distinguet autumnus racemos
purpureo variis colore.

common material for writing tablets).⁷ Fourthly, observe these two passages:

prima mihi uariat liuentibus uua racemis,
et coma lactenti spicea fruge tumet;
hic dulces cerasos, hic autumnalia pruna
cernis et aestiuo mora rubere die;
insitor hic soluit pomosa uota corona,
cum pirus inuito stipite mala tulit. (13-18)

nam quid ego adiciam, de quo mihi maxima fama est,
hortorum in manibus dona probata meis?
caeruleus cucumis tumidoque cucurbita uentre
me notat et iunco brassica uincta leui;
nec flos ullus hiat pratis, quin ille decenter
impositus fronti langueat ante meae. (41-46)

Here, Propertius, who has not previously evinced interest in the subjects and style of Roman didactic poetry, has crafted two close imitations of Vergil's *Georgics*.⁸ Lines 13-18 so suit their immediate context (Vertumnus speaks of his role as recipient of the first fruits) that it may seem perverse to attempt to force a broader interpretation. Lines 41-46, however, are often candidates for transposition (usually to a position after 18), since their inclusion seems gratuitous here.⁹ When one considers that the poet has interjected two unmistakable echoes of the most prominent of Augustan poets, two obvious examples of the most Roman of literary genres, and has, moreover, pointedly forced the reader's attention to them (18 is followed by the insistent *mendax fama, nocens: alius mihi nominis index*; the second passage is introduced by *de quo mihi maxima fama est* 41), then there would seem to be a literary-critical subtext here. Finally, Vertumnus himself encourages his identification as the god of Augustan poetry by coopting the attributes of both patron deities of Augustus's coterie:

cinge caput mitra, speciem furabor Iacchi;
furabor Phoebe, si modo plectra dabis. (31-32)

⁷ Cf. *Ov. Am.* 1. 11. 27-28.

⁸ There are echoes of other authors here as well (for a complete list, see Pasoli *ad loc.*), but the whole is unmistakably Vergilian, as J. Dee, *A Study of the Poetic Diction of Select Elegies of Propertius, Book IV* (diss. Austin 1972) 15 f., has noted: l. 13 = *G.* 2. 60; 14 = *G.* 1. 314 f.; 16 = *Ecl.* 6. 22; 17-18 = *G.* 2. 32-34; 43 = *G.* 4. 121-22; 46 = *A.* 11. 69, 9. 435-36. One of the few passages in the Propertian corpus which resemble these in subject and diction is the explicit evocation of the *Georgics* at 2. 34. 77-78.

⁹ Cf. G. P. Goold, "Noctes Propertianae" *HSCPh* 71 (1966) 99; Dee, diss. 11. Lachmann sees them as out of context, but does not approve this transposition. For opposing arguments, see Suits 478 n.; A. Otto, *Commentationes philologiae in honorem A. Reifferscheid* (1884) 10-21; Enk 301.

If Vertumnus is indeed the personification of Augustan verse, the elegy may be read as a paean to the "versatility" of native Roman poetry.¹⁰ There is, however, a second possibility: the very fact that Propertius has reworked in elegiacs some notable productions in other meters suggests that Vertumnus may also be regarded as an avatar of elegiac verse. The poet, in the process of extolling the variety of themes and forms exploited by his contemporaries, may mean to insinuate that elegy is the most versatile of all.

We might take the equation Vertumnus equals the god of verse, or of elegiac verse, a bit further and examine its immediate implications. It may be said that line 57 makes explicit something which the ancient reader suspected all along. That first line which poses a riddle

Quid¹¹ mirare meas tot in uno corpore formas

may momentarily misdirect the audience of a poet who has but once used the first person to refer to anyone but himself.¹² The reader may presume that *corpore* and *formas* have their literary connotations and that the subject of this poem is the same as the subject of the last—Propertius's Book IV. That hypothesis is apparently exploded by the next line

accipe Vertumni signa paterna dei,

but, if the reader returns to lines 2–56 after Vertumnus is unmasked in 57, he may well return to his original supposition; *signa paterna* may mean "his father's (= the poet's) tokens," i.e., "the signs by which you may identify this as a work of the author" or "the author's seal."¹³ The reader may then

¹⁰ This aspect of the poem may account for the cryptic references to the god's *patria* in lines 2 (*signa paterna*) and 48 (*nomen ab euentu patria lingua dedit*). If the poet intends Vertumnus to be understood as the tutelary deity of Latin poetry, then *patria lingua* serves some larger purpose which the poet was eager to promote, even at the risk of eliciting the complaint that Vertumnus's native tongue must be Etruscan (cf., for example, Suits 486, Marquis 496–97, Grimal 111, who discuss the apparent contradiction). The description of the *insitor* (17–18) may carry some metaphorical baggage also; if the poet means to glorify the diversity of verse-forms (*quod formas unus uertebar in omnes* 47) employed by poets writing in the native language (*patria lingua* 48), what better analogue for the Callimachus Romanus, busily and successfully (*corona* 17) grafting Greek forms and Latin language? Pliny (*Ep.* 4. 3. 5), I note, uses the metaphor of the Latin and Greek languages.

¹¹ Camps, BB print *qui*, but the parallel in 3. 11. 1 (*quid mirare, meam si versat femina vitam*), cited by Pasoli *et al.*, seems convincing evidence that we should read with O here, against the *deteriores*.

¹² And that in 4. 1, as Horos; note, however, Propertius appears as himself in the first half (always assuming, of course, that 4. 1 is a unity).

¹³ For the author as "father" of a book, cf., for example, Ov. *Tr.* 1. 1. 115, *Pont.* 4. 5. 29. *Signa paterna* is a troublesome expression and has been much discussed and emended. Cf. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge 1956) 227; F. H. Sandbach, "Some Problems in Propertius" *CQ* 56 (1962) 272; Rothstein 219; Suits 481, 486, *al.*

recognize this elegy as a new hat on a old friend, the author's apostrophe to his book.¹⁴

The reader passes through the first two (false) etymologies to arrive at the "title" or "summary" (*index* 19).¹⁵ What follows (23–40) is not only a list of the possible transformations of the statue¹⁶ or god, or of occupations of the *turba togata* which passes through the Vicus Tuscus;¹⁷ it is also a partial table of contents for this book. The first couplet hints at the pattern:

indue me Cois, fiam non dura puella:
meque uirum sumpta quis neget esse toga? (23–24)

Cois and *dura puella* carry the impress of the elegist, particularly of this elegist.¹⁸ *Dura puella* must suggest Cynthia; indeed, the expression appears in the poet's mock-epitaph in 2. 1. 78 (*huic misero fatum dura puella fuit*).¹⁹ We are, then, firmly in the realm of Propertian love-elegy, where we find the Cynthia poems of this book—4. 7 and 4. 8. Moreover, the couplet may owe its existence not only to its appropriateness as an illustration of the range of Vertumnus's gifts (he can become polar opposites), but also to its appropriateness as an illustration of the range of the poet's "voice" in this book.²⁰ Just as Vertumnus can convincingly play both male and female, so in this book, for the first time in the corpus, the poet will doff his masculine garb and speak in womanly guise (4. 3, 4. 4, 4. 5, 4. 7, 4. 11).

Note, however, the ambiguity inherent in this first transmogrification, an ambiguity which underlies the whole of the poem (as we have stated above, p. 1): the couplet appears to emphasize the polarization of the sexes as a paradigm for the limits of Vertumnus's powers, but the very fact that the shapes of both male and female coexist in the same single body makes the god also a metaphor for the confusion of the sexes. Thus, lines 23–24 anticipate not only the novel narrative technique of this book (see below, p. 70) and the poet's new interest in expressing the feminine perspective, but

¹⁴ E. g., Ov. *Tr.* 1. 1, 3. 1, *Pont.* 4. 5; Hor. *Ep.* 1. 20 where the personification is as complete and sustained as this one. In each case, the book is imagined as accosting passers-by; the whole of *Tr.* 3. 1 is a monologue by the book. Propertius has merely chosen completely (except for his *sphragis*; see below, p. 71) to efface himself.

¹⁵ There may be, I think, a pun here in the juxtaposition of *index* and *nominis*, as well as a clue to the riddle. Otherwise, this is a very peculiar expression, as others (e.g., Camps) have noted.

¹⁶ Cf. W. Eisenhut, "Vertumnus" *RE* 8, A2 (1958) 1669–87. The notion that the statue is somehow adjustable is unique to Propertius.

¹⁷ On Vicus Tuscus "types," cf. Hor. *S.* 2. 3. 226–30.

¹⁸ *Cous* many times, thrice in this book (4. 5. 23, 56, 57). Cynthia is wearing Coan silks in one of her earliest appearances (1. 2. 2).

¹⁹ Cf., from many examples, 1. 17. 16 *quamuis dura, tamen rara puella fuit*. *Non dura* is a pun on the statue's physical properties, as is *non leue pondus* (36; see below, p. 68 f.) and *curuare* (39), all noted by Dee (*AJPh* 51–52).

²⁰ P. Grimal ("Notes sur Properce I.—La composition de l'épigramme à Vertumne" *REL* 23 [1945] 118) emphasizes the feminine-masculine dichotomy in this first transformation, but to different ends.

also a major theme of the book—females in male guise (Tarpeia, Cynthia, Cleopatra), males in female guise (Hercules; Propertius *supinus*, in 4. 8).

The succeeding lines seem also to contain allusions to the elegies of Book IV:

da falcem et torto frontem mihi comprime faeno: iurabis nostra gramina secta manu.	
arma tuli quondam et, memini, laudabar in illis: corbis et imposito pondere messor eram.	
sobrius ad lites: at cum est imposta corona, clamabis capiti uina subisse meo.	30
cinge caput mitra, speciem furabor Iacchi; furabor Phoebi, si modo plectra dabis.	
cassibus impositis uenor: sed harundine sumpta fautor plumoso sum deus aucupio.	
est etiam aurigae species Vertumnus et eius, traicit alterno qui leue pondus equo.	35
sub petaso ²¹ pisces calamo praedabor, et ibo mundus demissis institor in tunicis.	
pastor me ad baculum possum curuare uel idem sirpiculis medio puluere ferre rosam.	(25-40)

The first and last couplets of the series evoke Propertius's stray into bucolic themes in 4. 9, where Hercules assumes the role of *pastor*, as well as the agricultural associations always to the fore in representations of Vertumnus. Line 27 looks forward to the martial themes of 4. 6 and, most particularly, 4. 10. *Sobrius ad lites* (29) succinctly summarizes the tone and setting of 4. 11, while the rest of the couplet salutes the elegist's customary posture, in which we find the poet in 4. 6 and 4. 8. Phoebus (32) is one of the poet's *personae* in Book IV (4. 6) and he is coupled in that poem with the god of wine and elegy

ingenium potis irritet Musa poetis: Bacche, soles Phoebo fertilis esse tuo,	(4. 6. 75-76)
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as he is here.

The catalogue of occupations outlined in 33-38 (*uenor* 33, *fautor* 34, *auriga* 35, *desultor* 36, *piscator* 37, *institor* 38) may possibly represent a mischievous double-meaning inventory of the love-poet's erotic repertoire: hunting, fishing and fowling are elsewhere metaphors for seduction techniques;²² Ovid's *non sum desultor amoris* (*Am.* 1. 3. 15) attests to the currency of the double entendre of line 36; the *institor* is regularly

²¹ *Sub petaso* was first proposed as a correction of the manuscripts' *suppetat hoc* by E. H. Alton in a marginal note, unearthed by W. Smyth, "Propertius IV 2, 37" *CQ* 62 (1948) 14. It has since been adopted by Luck and Camps in their editions.

²² The lovers appear as predator and prey in *Ov. Ars* 1. 45-48; the lover is a lured bird at *Ars* 1. 391, a hooked fish at 1. 393.

envisioned as a corruptor of lonely housewives.²³ That this may be a sly recreation of the elegist's *mise-en-scène* seems confirmed by the presence of the elegiac catchword *leue* (36), cast into prominence as a punning reference to the statue's bulk.²⁴ These allusions to the lover's stock-in-trade, however, may have a more specific application. Note that Cynthia appears as a charioteer (35) in 4. 8 and that the poet's position in that poem

quaeris concubitus? inter utramque fui (4. 8. 36)

qualifies him as a *desultor amoris*.

Another, subtler evocation of Book IV lies hidden in this poem. As the poet varies the appearance of the god (and thereby foreshadows the diversity of subjects contained in the succeeding elegies), he is at pains to vary his diction and form of expression.²⁵ It may be that the variation in vocabulary and phraseology is also intended to suggest an accompanying variation in generic style. Two striking passages have been discussed above (pp. 66 f.). One line in particular seems indicative to me:

arma tuli quondam et, memini, laudabar in illis. (27)

Lefèvre and Dee mark the wryness and cleverness of *memini* and *laudabar in illis*,²⁶ and certainly these elements are in character for Vertumnus. For me, however, the line has preemptively the feel of the epic prooemium. The conjunction of *arma tuli*, echoing the by-then celebrated first line of the *Aeneid*, and *memini*, recalling the prominence of verbs of the remembering-class in invocations of the Muses,²⁷ seems evidence enough. When, in addition, one considers the substance of the speaker's boast, this position seems not indefensible. Elsewhere, epic is invoked for a description of an

²³ Cf. Sen. fr. 52; Hor. *Carm.* 3. 6. 30, *Epod.* 17. 20; Ov. *Ars* 1. 421, *Rem.* 306; Liv. 22. 25. 19. Of *mundus*, Dee, after citing the TLL's gloss (this is the only *epitheton laudans* associated with *institor* in a classical work), says (diss. 26):

This is slightly ingenuous. Propertius actually conforms to the general opinion, since the *institor* here is the god himself, presumably the only *institor* who could merit such an adjective as *mundus*.

The elegist, however, is just as sophisticated and polished—and just as much a peddler—as his god.

²⁴ For *leuis* and its association with elegy, cf. Ov. *Am.* 2. 1. 21. Dee (diss. 24) has noted the joke. In this context, however, there may be a second pun: *leuis* has elsewhere the connotation "fickle," "unfaithful."

²⁵ For a close analysis of the diction and style of this passage, cf. Dee, *AJPh* 51, diss. 28; H. Tränkle, *Die Sprachkunst des Properz und die Tradition der lateinischen Dichtersprache*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 15 (Wiesbaden 1960).

²⁶ E. Lefèvre, *Propertius ludibundus* (Heidelberg 1966) 97; Dee, diss. 19, *AJPh* 49.

²⁷ E. g. (again, from Vergil) *A.* 1. 8–11; 7. 37–41, 641–46. As a god, of course, particularly as a god of poetry, Vertumnus needs no intermediary Muse.

episode from Roman history which will provide the setting for the epyllion 4. 4:²⁸

et tu, Roma, meis tribuisti praemia Tuscis
 (unde hodie Vicus nomina Tuscus habet),
 tempore quo sociis uenit Lycomedius armis
 atque Sabina feri contudit arma Tati.
 uidi ego labentes acies et tela caduca,
 atque hostes turpi terga dedisse fugae.
 sed facias, diuum Sator, ut Romana per aeuum
 transeat ante meos turba togata pedes. (4. 2. 49–56)

With all this emphasis on *poikilia*, Propertius is doubtless recalling the "Romanization of Callimachus" pledged in 4. 1. 64, as Dee has suggested.²⁹ However, if we are correct in regarding Vertumnus as a personification of Book IV, these echoes of other genres may have a broader application in prefiguring one of the structural principles of the book.

We began this discussion by using *uersus* in *sex superant uersus* (57) as a fourth etymology of "Vertumnus." Thus, *uersus* inspired a re-reading of the preceding 56 lines. Conversely, it seems reasonable, in consideration of a poem in which etymological meaning plays so large a part, to permit lines 1–56 to influence the meaning of *uersus*. In that case, *uersus* would carry its full etymological force, i.e., "turnings" or, the meaning of *uerto* which has had the most significance for the first part of the poem, "transformations." Now, as we have remarked above on line 1 of this poem, the Vertumnus elegy represents a departure from the poet's usual practice: the "I" of the poem is no longer the "I" of the poet. The poet intends to signal a change in point of view, a change from the *persona* "Propertius," a transformation. What better way could there be, after all, to indicate both the fact of a material change in one's work and the substance of that change than by personifying that change with the god of change himself? In that case, *sex superant uersus* would herald the variety of *personae* the poet assumes throughout the poems to come—and may give a waggish hint as to their number, as well. In this book, in fact, there are six major characters in whose favor the poet has resigned the personal for the dramatic "I"—Arethusa (4. 3), Tarpeia (4. 4), Acanthis (4. 5), Cynthia (4. 7), Hercules (4. 9), Cornelia (4. 11).³⁰

Those lines which follow *sex superant uersus*:

. . . te, qui ad uadimonia curris,
 non moror: haec spatiis ultima creta meis.
 stipes acernus eram, properanti falce dolatus,

²⁸ For a complete discussion of the epic reminiscences, see Tränkle 39, 174–75; Dee, *AJPh* 52–53.

²⁹ Dee, diss. 41.

³⁰ For the dramatic monologue and its place in this book, cf., for example, C. Becker, "Horos redselig? (Zu Properz IV 1)" *WS* 79 (1966) 442–51.

ante Numam grata pauper in urbe deus.
 at tibi, Mamurri, formae caelator aenae,
 tellus artifices ne terat Osca manus,
 qui me tam dociles potuisti fundere in usus.
 unum opus est, operi non datur unus honos (57–64)

also seem to have some bearing on the problem. Lines 61–64 refer to the artist who crafted the statue, but 59–60 may put a maker's mark on the poem. *Stipes acernus* accurately describes a tablet as well as a wooden effigy; *properanti* may be a pun on the poet's name. *Pauper* (60), a puzzling epithet of a god, can be applied with justice to the poet who has assumed the usual pose of starving artist (cf. 4. 1. 127–30).³¹ This couplet, then, may represent the author's *sphragis*, in accordance with the conventions of book dedication and Propertius's own practice.³² To preserve intact the dramatic monologue and the complete personification of this book in the form of Vertumnus, Propertius may not intrude here, hence the oblique reference.

The closing lines (60–64) are cast in the mold of a statue's tribute to its maker,³³ but line 62

tellus artifices ne terat Osca manus

suggests another antecedent for these lines: the funerary epigram.³⁴ We might see in this epitaph of Mamurrius an anticipation of the poems to follow; several poems (e. g., 5, 7, 11) are clearly derivatives of the "biographical" epitaph.³⁵ It is interesting that he should introduce such a theme in a poem concerning an inanimate object; he may be anxious to establish the importance of death-related themes in this book.

In sum, then, I propose to read 4. 2 as a riddle of sorts and suggest that the answer to the question "what am I?" is "Propertius's apostrophe to Book IV." Thus, it may be that we are to consider 4. 2 as amplifying (or, perhaps, slightly skewing) the program laid out in 4. 1.

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³¹ E. C. Marquis ("Vertumnus in Propertius 4. 2" *Hermes* 102 [1974] 500) and Dee (diss. 41) use the pun and the reference to the statue's poverty to support their contention that Propertius may have identified with Vertumnus and that the poor, foreign god represents the poet himself. I agree that this couplet probably refers to Propertius, but prefer to regard it as his "seal."

³² Cf., for example, Hor. *Ep.* 1. 20. 19–28; Prop. 1. 22.

³³ Cf. Hor. *S.* 1. 8. 1–3; Call. *Iamb.* 7; E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 121–23.

³⁴ Cf. Suits 483 f.; for the formula, see R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana 1962) 65–74.

³⁵ For the biographical form, see Lattimore 266–300.

Ovid's Poetics of Exile

MARTIN HELZLE

An evaluation of the *Tristia* and *ex Ponto* has to take into account the tradition of poetic theory in which Ovid places himself, especially how he develops the Callimachean *apologia* commonly known as *recusatio* with all its language, imagery, and commonplaces to suit his new situation in exile.

Ovid's poetic programme both in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* manifests itself in a number of apologies¹ and in occasional statements made throughout the corpus. The distinction made by Evans between *Tristia* I–IV and *Tristia* V, *ex Ponto* I–IV² seems artificial since the real break in Ovid's career is his relegation after which he presents himself as "dead."³ Although Ovid varies his programmatic pronouncements from one poem to another the only reasonable distinction within the exile-corpus is the one the poet makes himself by deciding to name his addressees (*Pont.* I 1. 15 ff.):

inuenies, quamuis non est miserabilis index,
non minus hoc illo triste, quod ante dedi;
rebus idem, titulo differt; et epistula, cui sit
non occultato nomine missa, docet.

If Ovid did not name the addressees in the *Tristia* the naming cannot have been essential. His appeal is therefore not only to certain addressees but also generally to the *candide lector*.⁴ Though some individuals may have known that they were addressed, the majority of readers in antiquity, as in modern times, does not. Ovid's intention must therefore have been to win

¹ *Trist.* I 11; II 313–56; III 14; IV 1; V 1; *Pont.* I 5, and III 9.

² H. B. Evans, *Publica Carmina—Ovid's Books from Exile* (London 1983) 151 calls the latter *publica carmina*.

³ On this metaphor see below on justification of one's poetry by means of one's circumstances ("Rechtfertigung im Bios") and B. R. Nagle, *The Poetics of Exile*, Coll. Lat. 170 (Bruxelles 1980) 139. Nagle *op. cit.*, 13 n. 67 also treats the *Tristia* and *ex Ponto* as a whole.

⁴ *Trist.* I 7. 32; I 11. 35; III 1. 2, 19; IV 1. 2; IV 10. 132; V 1. 66; *Pont.* II 4. 55; this was seen quite clearly by A. G. Lee, "An Appreciation of *Tristia* III 8," *G & R* 18 (1949) 114; L. P. Wilkinson, *Ovid Recalled* (Cambridge 1955) 318; W. Marg, "Zur Behandlung des Augustus in den 'Tristien,'" in *Ovid*, ed. v. Albrecht/Zinn (Darmstadt 1968) 503, and E. J. Kenney, "The Poetry of Ovid's Exile," *PCPS* n.s. 11 (1965) 39: "the *Tristia* were addressed to the public," J. Barsby, *Ovid, G & R new surveys in the Classics* 12 (Oxford 1978) 42 f.

the Roman reading-public's *benevolentia* by means of *publica carmina* (*Trist.* V 1. 23). By naming the addressees in *ex Ponto* Ovid's appeal becomes more specific and therefore more urgent. The indirect pressure⁵ on the addressees is increased. This does not mean that the poetic programme changes, but rather that the poet's cry for help and *amicitia* is intensified.

Throughout the *Tristia* and *ex Ponto* Ovid seems to develop motifs previously found in the poetic *recusationes* of Propertius and Horace.⁶ By Ovid's time, however, such refusals to write epic have become independent of the particular circumstances of the Augustan poet justifying his choice of genre vis à vis the emperor's pressure to write a panegyric epic of some sort. Ovid therefore uses motifs from this tradition freely to serve his particular purposes in exile. His poems might be grouped with the examples of the more liberal *excusatio* like Horace *Epist.* II 2.⁷

One therefore finds Ovid proceeding selectively in a way similar to Horace. The standard reference to predecessors,⁸ for instance, only occurs at *Trist.* II 361–470 in Ovid's longest *recusatio* (*Trist.* II 313 ff.) and at V 1. 17 f.:

aptior huic Gallus blandique Propertius oris,
aptior, ingenium come, Tibullus erit.

At *Pont.* IV 16. 5 ff., however, Ovid uses a variation on this element of poetic apologies by enumerating his contemporary poets rather than his predecessors. In this catalogue Ovid seems to reverse the standard situation of the *recusatio* in that he is the predecessor of the Tiberian poets named.

The poet's treatment of the enumeration of rejected "grand" subjects is equally rare.⁹ A few instances are found at *Trist.* II 317–24, 471–538 and IV 1. 4–18. It would appear, however, that Ovid plays on this topos when he rejects spending his time in a way other than writing poetry.¹⁰ In this case he takes the apologetic topos to its opposite extreme; the obvious inversion of the topos would be to refuse to write in a low genre like satire. Ovid, however, takes it one step further. The opposite of writing in the grand manner of epic for him consists of not writing at all. In response to his new situation, Ovid therefore uses the rejection-topos in a highly idiosyncratic manner.

⁵ Marg *op. cit.* 508 on Ovid's indirect pressure on Augustus and H. B. Evans, "Ovid's Apology for *ex Ponto* I–III," *Hermes* 104 (1976) 105 on this strategy in *ex Ponto*.

⁶ W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom* (Wiesbaden 1960), *passim*.

⁷ Wimmel, *op. cit.* 283 f., J. K. Newman, *Augustus and the New Poetry* (Bruxelles 1967) 400 has shown that Ovid draws on his Augustan predecessors rather than Callimachus himself.

⁸ Wimmel *op. cit.* 119.

⁹ Wimmel *op. cit.* 119.

¹⁰ e.g. *Pont.* I 5. 43–52; IV 2. 39 ff.

Trying to find any traces of Ovid defining his "Dichtungsideal"¹¹ in exile proves futile. Instead, the poet expresses the grim reality of his exile-poetry¹² and contrasts this with his earlier poetry:

laeta fere laetus cecini, cano tristia tristis:
conueniens operi tempus utrumque suo est.¹³

By implication, then, his idea of what good poetry should be like is found in his pre-exilic works. It is his amatory elegy, the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses* which represent Ovid's "Dichtungsideal," whereas the exile-poetry ostensibly is the very opposite.

In some apologies the poet justifies his choice of genre by arguing that he is unable to write in a grander vein.¹⁴ This motif frequently occurs in Ovid's exile-poetry,¹⁵ e.g. *uerba mihi desunt dididicique loqui* (*Trist.* III 14. 46), since the lack of powers fits the overall picture of the exile-poetry as the opposite of Ovid's previous writings.¹⁶ Ovid then takes this apologetic motif from its original setting and applies it within the new context of justifying his choice of genre in the exile-poetry.

Most important, however, in Callimachean and Augustan poetic apology are the image-clusters of the water and the path.¹⁷ In accordance with his predecessors, Ovid uses a great number of images related to water and the path. Spring imagery, for instance, is found at *Trist.* III 14. 33 ff., V 1. 37 ff., *Pont.* III 4. 55 f., and, above all, *Pont.* IV 2. 17 ff.:

scilicet ut limus uenas excaecat in undis
laesaeque suppresso fonte resistit aqua,
pectora sic mea sunt limo uitata malorum,
et carmen uena pauperiore fluit.

In this case, Ovid might be going back directly to Callimachus. At the end of his hymn to Apollo, Callimachus contrasted his own poetry with that of

¹¹ Wimmel *op. cit.* 119.

¹² *Trist.* V 1. 71, *Pont.* I 5. 55 f., III 9. 49 ff.

¹³ *Pont.* III 9. 35 f.; on *conueniens* and *τὸ πρέπον* see below.

¹⁴ Wimmel *op. cit.* 294 n. 2 mentions Lucil. *Frg.* 622 Marx, Hor. *Sat.* I 10. 46 f., II 1. 12 f.; *Epist.* II 1. 259; *Ars* 38 f.; *Prop.* II 1. 17 f., III 9. 5 (now with Fedeli's note) as examples of this development; see also M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt 1949) 147. 154. 167.

¹⁵ e.g. *Trist.* II 334; *Pont.* I 5. 51 f., III 3. 34, III 4. 79, III 7. 1, III 9. 18.

¹⁶ Ovid in exile seems to be particularly fond of inverting standard motifs, see J. A. Barsby, *op. cit.* 45.

¹⁷ R. Reitzenstein, "Zur Stiltheorie des Kallimachos," *Festschr. E. Reitzenstein* (Leipzig-Berlin 1931) 54 ff.; Puelma Piwonka *op. cit.* 164; Wimmel *op. cit.* 222 ff. A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik*, (Heidelberg 1965) 23 ff., 66 ff., 98 ff., 110 ff.; the image of the spring goes back to Hes. *Theog.* 5 f. καὶ τε λοεσσάμεναι τέρενα χροά Περμησσοῖο / ἢ Ἰππου κρήνης ἢ Ὀλμειοῦ ζαθέοιο via Call. *Hymn. Apoll.* 108 ff. with Williams' note on 105-13, and *Epigr.* 28. 3 f. = *Hellenistic Epigrams* 1043 Gow-Page.

writers of epic by means of the image of the great, muddy river (Apollo speaking at 108 ff.):

“Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ
λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἔφ’ ὕδατι συρφετὸν ἔλκει.
Δηοὶ δ’ οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ὕδωρ φορέουσι Μέλισσαι,
ἀλλ’ ἦτις καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράαντος ἀνέρπει
πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβὰς ἄκρον ἄωτον.”

The comparison shows how Ovid on the one hand takes up Callimachus' ὀλίγη (112) and outdoes the master at his own game. For Ovid's spring of poetry is not only small but blocked. This provides an extreme contrast to the Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος as well as a *reductio ad absurdum* of Callimachus' concept. On the other hand, at the same time as outdoing Callimachus¹⁸ Ovid presents himself as the opposite of the Callimachean ideal. For the term *limus* seems to recall Callimachus' συρφετός¹⁹ which is clearly a negative characteristic, the opposite of καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράαντος (111). The echo of Callimachus is also supported by the close parallel between ἐφ’ ὕδατι (109) and *in undis* (17). Ovid therefore presents himself as un-Callimachean on the surface, but at the same time also as more Callimachean than Callimachus. In the same image the poet therefore summarizes the dichotomy which is fundamental to the entire exile-poetry.²⁰ On the one hand the *Tristia* and *ex Ponto* purport to be the opposite of his earlier, poetically polished works, on the other hand Ovid keeps asserting clandestinely that he is still using the same standards of poetic perfection.

The other cluster of images is centered around the image of the path²¹ (Apollo speaking at Call. *Aetia* Frg. 1. 25 ff.²²):

πρὸς δέ σε] καὶ τόδ’ ἄνωγα, τὰ μὴ πατέουσιν ἅμαξαι
τὰ στεῖβειν, ἐτέρων δ’ ἵχνια μὴ καθ’ ὅμα
δίφρον ἐλ]ῶν μὴδ’ οἶμον ἀνὰ πλατύν, ἀλλὰ κελεύθους
ἀτρίπτο]υς, εἰ καὶ στεινότερην ἐλάσεις.

From this *locus classicus* it becomes clear that the images of the path and the poet as charioteer or horseman are closely linked. Ovid draws on this concept in *ex Ponto* IV 2. 23 *studiis (studii: Heinsius) quoque frena remisi* and *immensum gloria calcar habet* (36). The former may have to be

¹⁸ On this common Augustan hallmark of *imitatio* see I. M. le M. DuQuesnay, "From Polyphemus to Corydon: Virgil, Eclogue 2 and the Idylls of Theocritus," in *Creative Imitation in Latin Poetry*, ed. Woodman/West (Cambridge 1979) 38 with n. 13.

¹⁹ This motif also occurs at Hor. *Sat.* I 1. 59, I 4. 11, I 10. 62; see C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge 1963) 159, n. 3.

²⁰ Nagle *op. cit.* 141.

²¹ Wimmel *op. cit.* 104 ff.; O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges* (Berlin 1937) *passim*.

²² For the literary ancestry of this motif cf. Henderson and Lucke on Ov. *Rem.* 397 f. and add Cic. *De Orat.* III 36; *Brut.* 204; *Att.* VI 1. 12; Prop. III 9.57 f.; Manil. II 58 f. 158 f.; Juv. 1. 19 f. (with Courtney's note), Quint. *Inst.* X 1. 74, II 8. 11; Nemes. *Cyneg.* 9; see also Wimmel *op. cit.* 105.

contrasted with III 9. 26: *et cupidi cursus frena retentat equi*. At *Pont.* III 9. 23 he is clearly talking about polishing his poetry (*corrigere*). Tightening the reins therefore seems to be an image of applying *ars* whereas letting them go may imply surrendering to the forces of *ingenium*. On one level Ovid wants his reader to realize that the exile-poetry is completely different from everything he had written in Rome because of its lack of polish, on another level he asserts his persistent use of *ars*.²³

Similar contradictory statements are to be found in connection with the fame of Ovid's poetry.²⁴ On the one hand he claims that he does not write for fame any more:

da ueniam scriptis, quorum non gloria nobis
causa, sed utilitas officiumque fuit.²⁵

This, however, contrasts sharply with a few claims to future fame, such as *Pont.* IV 16. 3 *famaque post cineres maior uenit*²⁶ and with the poet's previous assertiveness in this field, e.g. *Am.* I 15. 41 f.

ergo etiam cum me supremus adederit ignis,
uiuam, parsque mei multa superstes erit

and *Met.* XV 878 f.:

perque omnia saecula fama,
siquid habent ueri uatum praesagia, uiuam.

²³ The concept of poetry as a voyage or poems as ships combines the water and path images. This notion goes back to Pindar (see C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* [Oxford 1964] 230), e.g. *Pyth.* 4. 3; 11. 39; *Nem.* 3. 26 f. θυμέ, τίνα πρὸς ἀλλοδαπὰν / ἄκραν ἐμόν πλόον παραμείβεται; 5. 51; 6. 28; Verg. *Georg.* II 41; Hor. *Carm.* IV 15. 3 f. (with Kiessling-Heinze's note); Prop. III 3. 22 (with Fedeli's note); Becker *op. cit.* 71 f.; Wimmel *op. cit.* 227 f. The motif occurs in the *Tristia* at II 329 f. (with Owen's and Luck's notes), where it may be consciously looking back to the *Ars* (I 722, II 429 f., III 26, 99 f.; Hollis on I 39 f.), and at *Trist.* II 548 where a reference to *Met.* XV 176 (with Bömer's note) seems possible. See also A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig 1890) 363; E. de Saint-Denis, *La mer dans la poésie latine* (Paris 1935) 319. 367; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge 1956) 205; Kambylis *op. cit.* 154; most judiciously J. C. Bramble, *Persius and the Programmatic Satire* (Cambridge 1974) 167 f.; Bömer on *Met.* IX 589; Lucke on *Rem.* 811 ff.

²⁴ This topos goes as far back as Alcman *Fr.* 118 Bergk; Enn. *Ann.* 3 f. Vahlen = 12 f. Skutsch; Verg. *Ecl.* 8. 9; Hor. *Carm.* II 20. 14 with Nisbet-Hubbard's note who give numerous further examples.

²⁵ *Pont.* III 9. 55 f.; similar examples of the reversal of this motif are found at Aratus, *A.P.* XI 437 and Hor. *Epist.* I 20. 13, 18 (Nisbet-Hubbard on Hor. *Carm.* II 20. 14). Further examples in Ovid are *Trist.* I 1. 49 f., IV 1. 3 f. (with de Jonge's note), V 1. 75 f. (all with Luck's notes), *Pont.* IV 2. 33 ff. Lack of fame is, of course, a characteristic of exile, e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 604.

²⁶ Further passages where Ovid asserts his fame are *Trist.* I 6. 35 f., IV 9. 17 (with de Jonge's note), IV 10. 2, 128, V 1.74, V 14. 5 f., 13 f., *Pont.* I 5. 63 f., II 6. 33 f., III 2. 29 ff. (with Staffhorst's note), III 4. 53 ff., IV 7. 53 f., IV 8. 45 ff.

Again, the conflicting statements about the exile-corpus both have to be taken seriously. One stresses the break with the past, the other the continuity which exists all the same.²⁷

Such contradictions and reversals of apologetic elements are ultimately the effect of a heavy emphasis on the justification of the poetic genre by means of the poet's personal circumstances in the exile-poetry.²⁸ Ovid's relegation to Tomi is the most fundamental element in his later poetry not only as regards subject matter, but also as regards his poetic programme. Since exile is visualized as death²⁹ Ovid in the role of the Roman *luser amorum* (*Trist.* IV 10. 1) or the *nequitiae poeta* (*Am.* II 1. 2) is dead as well. The exile-poetry therefore is the opposite of what a Roman reader might expect from a book of poems. Ovid makes this very clear at the very beginning of his exile in *Tristia* I 1. 3–16 where he describes the book as the very opposite of a standard edition³⁰ and at *Tristia* I 1. 39–44 where he contrasts the general requirements for writing poetry³¹ with his circumstances. Again, however, a hidden dichotomy can be detected in the case of the "programmatically charged lines"³² at *Trist.* I 1. 3 ff. This passage also contains a hidden claim to literary polish by virtue of the echoes of Catullus 22 where the *pauper poeta* contrasts his palimpsest with Stufenus' luxurious edition.³³ Although the state of Ovid's book, which is the result of the author's relegation, suggests that the content is anything but polished³⁴ the allusions to Catullus 22 imply that the content is just as polished as Catullus' work. Furthermore, the parallels suggest to the reader that he should not be intent on externals but on the content. On an ostensible level, then, the poems from exile are determined by circumstances, but at a deeper level Ovid has remained the same.

²⁷ The dichotomy between discontinuity and continuity has been pointed out by M. H. Thomson, *Detachment and Manipulation in the Exile Poems of Ovid* (diss. Berkeley 1979), 36 ff.

²⁸ This was seen clearly by Wimmel *op. cit.* 297: "ja dies Moment ist so sehr tragend, dass es sich nicht mehr auf bestimmte Abschnitte eingrenzen lässt"; see also Nagle *op. cit.* 109 ff.

²⁹ *Tristia* I 1. 27 (with Luck's note), 117 f., I 2. 42, 71 f., I 3 21 ff., 89, I 4. 27 f., I 7. 19, 38, I 8. 14, II 2. 23, III 3. 73, III 10. 1 ff., III 11. 25 f., III 13. 21 f., III 14. 19 f., IV 1. 23, IV 4. 37, IV 10. 82, V 1. 48; *ex Ponto* I 5. 85, I 9. 17, II 3. 3, II 7. 48, III 3. 46, III 5. 33 f., III 7. 40, IV 12. 43 f., IV 16. 3 f.; *Ibis* 6. 16. The notion is quite common before and after Ovid: Leonidas Tarentinus *AP* VII 711. 5 = *Hellenistic Epigrams* 2535 ff. Gow-Page; Cic. *Sen.* 27; *Att.* IV 1. 8; *Quint. Fr.* I 3. 1; *Stat. Silv.* I 5. 65 (with Vollmer's note); III 3. 154; Nagle *op. cit.* 22 ff., and E. Doblhofer, *Exil und Emigration, Impulse der Forschung* (Darmstadt 1987) 166 ff.

³⁰ S. E. Hinds, "Booking the Return Trip: Ovid and *Tristia* I," *PCPS* n.s. 31 (1985) 14.

³¹ Compare Catull. 50 with C. P. Segal, "Catullan *otiosi*: the Lover and the the Poet," *G & R* 17 (1970), 25 ff.

³² Hinds *op. cit.* 13.

³³ *Trist.* I 1. 5 cf. Catull. 22. 7; *Trist.* I 1.7 cf. Catull. 22. 6; *Trist.* I 1. 8 cf. Catull. 22. 7; *Trist.* I 1. 11 cf. Catull. 22. 8.

³⁴ One has to contrast Catull. 1, see Hinds *op. cit.* 14.

This ostensible contrast between Ovid's life before exile and circumstances in Tomi is reflected in the constant presentation of the latter as the opposite of Rome (*Pont.* I 3. 37):³⁵

quid melius Roma? Scythico quid frigore peius?

Furthermore, it is not only Tomi which is described as the opposite of Rome, but Scythia in general is as unlike Italy as possible. Ovid's general, cumulative picture of the region draws not only on Vergil's passage on Scythia in *Georgics* III³⁶ and the ethnographical and historiographical tradition behind Vergil;³⁷ rather, he presents the region on the lower Danube as an inversion of Italy as described at *Georgics* II 136 ff.³⁸ Vergil's *laus Italiae* is turned upside down and into Ovid's complaint about Scythia just as Libya and Scythia provided a contrast to Italy within the *Georgics*.³⁹ Vergil, for instance, dwells on the fact that no mythological horrors are reported to have taken place in Italy (*Georg.* III 139–42). This is clearly not true of the shores of the Black Sea where, as Ovid tells us in *Tristia* III 9, Medea lacerated her brother Apsyrtus thus giving Tomi its name (from Greek τέμνω).

Moreover, one of Italy's major characteristics, its fertility, (*Georg.* II 143–50),⁴⁰ is inverted by Ovid's statements that nothing grows in Tomi,

³⁵ This contrast is already present at *Trist.* I 2. 77 ff., I 3. 61 f. (with Luck's note): *denique 'quid propero? Scythia est, quo mittimur,' inquam, / 'Roma relinquenda est: utraque iusta mora est!'* I 5. 61 ff.

³⁶ Verg. *Georg.* III 349 ff.; R. F. Thomas, *Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry and the Ethnographical Tradition* (Cambridge 1982) 1 ff.

³⁷ Cf. Richter on Verg. *Georg.* III 349 ff.

³⁸ This description in turn draws on a tradition of encomia of countries and cities which is theoretically dealt with e.g. by Menander Rhetor 382. 10 ff. Thus there are similarities between Vergil and other writers of *laudes Italiae*, e.g. Varro *Rust.* I 2. 3–6. The central importance of the Vergilian passage for the time in which Ovid wrote is underlined by the close resemblances between *Georgics* II 136–76 and accounts by Ovid's contemporaries Strabo (who praises Italy at VI 4. 1; on the uncertain date see *Kl. Pauly* V 382. 33 ff.; in any case after Vergil) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* I 36. 2–I 37. 5); further examples at Thomas (1982) 39.

³⁹ L. P. Wilkinson, *The Georgics of Virgil* (Cambridge 1969) 98. Since Vergil's praise of Italy also incorporates elements of the Golden Age (F. Klingner, *Vergils Georgica*, [Zürich-Stuttgart 1963] 80; Thomas *op. cit.* 41; Italy's fertility at *Georg.* II 143–50, for instance, recalls Hes. *Op.* 101 f. Perpetual spring is also a feature of the Golden Age at *Ov. Met.* I 107) Ovid's Tomi also implicitly inverts these elements. If the Golden Age provided the best circumstances for man to live in, Tomi by contrast has the worst.

⁴⁰ For this standard characteristic of *laudes Italiae* cf. also Varro *Rust.* I 2. 6–7; Strabo VI 4. 1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 36. 3–I 37. 3; in general it is recommended as an encomiastic topos by Men. Rhet. 384. 9 ff. φυντὰ γὰρ καὶ ποταμούς καὶ ὀρῶν ὑπεροχὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ τῆς φύσεως παρέχει λόγος. It also occurs in descriptions of the Golden Age, e.g. Hes. *Op.* 117 f. καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα / αὐτομάτῃ πολλὸν τε καὶ ἄφρονον, Plato *Rep.* 272a; Verg. *Ecl.* 4. 39 f.; *Ov. Met.* I 101 ff. with Bömer's note; Thomas *op. cit.* 3. 39 f.

neither vine nor trees.⁴¹ The eternal summer or spring⁴² which generates Italy's fertility is therefore juxtaposed by Ovid's perpetual Tomitan winter (*Pont.* I 2, 24):⁴³

et quod iners hiemi continuatur hiems.

Winter is so omnipresent in Ovid's picture of Tomi that even spring—on the one occasion when it is mentioned other than in an *exemplum* or a simile—is presented as a lack of winter (*Trist.* III 12, 27 ff.)

at⁴⁴ mihi sentitur nix uerno sole soluta,
quaeque lacu durae non fodiantur aquae,
nec mare conrescit glacie, nec, ut ante, per Histrum
stridula Sauromates plaustra bubulcus agit.

Scythian barbarism and deprivation also manifest themselves in the lack of cities. Where Italy has *tot egregias urbes* (Verg. *Georg.* II 155) human habitation on the lower Danube usually takes the form of carts, e.g. *onerata . . . / . . . plaustra* (*Pont.* IV 7, 9 f.). The existence of towns other than Tomi (*proxima . . . oppida* [*Pont.* IV 9, 104]) is mentioned only once. Furthermore, whereas Italy is praised for its seas, lakes, and metal-bearing rivers (*Georg.* II 158–65)⁴⁵ the lower Danube is characterized by its brackish water⁴⁶ and its complete lack of metals (*Pont.* III 8, 5):⁴⁷

nec tamen haec loca sunt ullo pretiosa metallo.

⁴¹ *Trist.* III 12.11 ff., V 13, 21; *Pont.* I 2, 25, I 3, 51 f., I 7, 13, III 1, 13, 19 f., III 8, 13 ff., IV 10, 31.

⁴² The beneficial climate is a commonplace in this context, cf. Varro *Rust.* I 2.4; Strabo VI 4, 1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 37.5; in general Men. Rhet. 383, 17 f. ἐν δὲ τῷ κατὰ τοὺς ἀέρας, ὅτι ὑγραινῶς ἔχει; Thomas *op. cit.* 3, 40. The motif also occurs in Ovid's account of the Golden Age *Met.* I 107 *uer erat aeternum* (with Bömer's note).

⁴³ E.g. *Trist.* III 10, 9 ff.; *Pont.* IV 7, 7 ff.; H. M. R. Leopold, *Exulum Trias* (diss. Utrecht 1904) 99 ff.; A. D. Fitton Brown, "The Unreality of Ovid's Tomitan Exile," *LCM* 10 (1985) 18, with his temperature chart is just as rhetorically biassed as Ovid's account. Which other scholar feels inclined to trust the Rumanian National Tourist Office's 1979 brochure to supply representative data?

⁴⁴ Together with Luck and some of the older manuscripts (AK) I read *at*, rather than *et* (GT) because it provides the required contrast between the preceding *urbe frui* (26) and Ovid's present situation.

⁴⁵ All three elements are also mentioned in Strabo's version (VI 4, 1) and in Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 37, 4 f. (rivers, metal, and seas); Thomas *op. cit.* 42 f.

⁴⁶ *Pont.* II 7, 74, III 1, 17 f., IV 10, 61 f.

⁴⁷ This feature is also a standard element of geographical descriptions, see Thomas *op. cit.* 44 f.

The Italian people, finally, are brave and hardy (*Georg.* II 167–72),⁴⁸ but the Getae and Scythians are wild and barbaric.⁴⁹ Almost all elements of Vergil's praise of Italy are constantly inverted by Ovid in order to stress the polarity between Rome and Tomi. The *uitium* in Ovid's surroundings becomes the cause of the *uitia* in his poetry. This may be the point of the verbal echo at *Pont.* III 9. 5 *o, quam de multis uitium reprehenditur unum* and *quid nisi de uitio scribam regionis amarae* (37). The *uitia* of Tomi affect the poet to such an extent that they intrude into his poems.

It may also be profitable to look at Ovid's account of having written a poem in Getic (*Pont.* IV 13. 19 ff.) in this light. Whether this information is true or not is only of secondary interest. Ovid's point surely is to stress the change brought about by relegation since *Ille ego qui fuerim tenerorum lusor amorum* (*Trist.* IV 10. 1) and *paene poeta Getes* (*Pont.* IV 13. 18) are worlds apart. Life among the Getae has affected him so much that he is now *paene poeta Getes*.⁵⁰ Closely linked with this motif are his complaints about linguistic isolation.⁵¹ E. Lozovan has shown that Ovid exaggerates in this respect.⁵² His point must therefore be a rhetorical one. Linguistic isolation provides another explanation of the "flaws" in his exile-poetry.⁵³ On the other hand, the same statements can be read in a completely different way. One might argue that this very difficulty of writing Latin poetry among the Getae enhances the value of the exile-poetry.

The effect of circumstances on Ovid's poetry may also be reflected in the use of *durus* and *hirsutus* as recurring epithets of the Getae,⁵⁴ for both are also used as epithets of poetry, most prominently in Horace.⁵⁵ "H. . . uses *durus* for (archaic) harshness."⁵⁶ Thus, if the people in Tomi are *duri* Ovid's poetry necessarily becomes *dura* as well by implication. This also follows from the repeated use of the phrase *durum tempus* to describe exile⁵⁷ and the key phrase *conueniens operi tempus utrumque suo est* (*Pont.* III 9. 36). This characterization in turn provides a neat contrast to Ovid's elegy written

⁴⁸ The peoples of Italy are similarly mentioned by Strabo VI 4. 1 s. f., τῶ μὲν κρατιστεύειν ἐν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ μεγέθει τὰ περιεστῶτα αὐτὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν εὐφυῶς ἔχει; cf. in general Men. Rhet. 384. 18 ff., ἐπαίνεσον τὰ ἔθνη, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

⁴⁹ *Trist.* III 10. 5, 55 ff., IV 4. 59, V 2. 69 f., V 7. 45 ff., V 10. 27 ff.; *Pont.* I 3. 57 ff.; Leopold *op. cit.* 95 f.

⁵⁰ Nagle *op. cit.* 133 ff.

⁵¹ *Trist.* III 1. 17 f. with Luck's note, III 11. 9, III 14. 47 f., V 7. 55 ff., V 10. 35 f., V 12. 57 f.

⁵² "Realités Pontiques et nécessités littéraires," *Atti del convegno internazionale Sulmoniano*, vol. II (Roma 1959) 364.

⁵³ Nagle *op. cit.* 133.

⁵⁴ *durus*: *Pont.* I 5. 12, III 2. 102, *hirsutus*: *Pont.* I 5. 74, II 5. 6.

⁵⁵ Hor. *Sat.* I 4. 8; *Epist.* II 1. 66 f. with Brink's note; *Ars* 446 with Brink's note; Fedeli on Prop. I 7. 19; *Thes.* V 1. 2310. 58 ff., 2314. 66 ff.

⁵⁶ Brink on Hor. *Ars* 446.

⁵⁷ *Trist.* I 5. 26, III 4. 1, V 10. 12; *Pont.* II 6. 29, and IV 9. 88.

before the exile which is described as *mollis*,⁵⁸ a standard epithet for amatory verse or elegy.⁵⁹

Hirsutus and the conceptually related *intonsus* (*Pont.* IV 2. 2) provide a similar link between reality and poetry. Both epithets are used of the Getae. They seem, however, to be also related to stylistic criticism as expressed by Horace and Vergil.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Ovid uses *hirsutus* himself to describe his first book of the *Tristia* in the programmatic passage already mentioned: *hirsutus sparsis ut uideare comis* (*Trist.* I 1. 12). It is also used in a stylistic context of Ennius at *Trist.* II 259: *Annales*, —*nihil est hirsutius illis!*,⁶¹ and at *Prop.* IV 1. 61 *Ennius hirsuta cingat sua dicta corona*. If, then, the people in Tomi are *hirsuti* Ovid's poetry, by implication, becomes *hirsuta* because it reflects its surroundings.

The ostensible change in Ovid's poetry is presented by him as caused by the principle of τὸ πρέπον⁶² *qualem decet exulis esse* (*Trist.* I 1. 3), *non est conueniens luctibus ille color* (6) and the essential (*Pont.* III 9. 35 f.):

laeta fere laetus cecini, cano tristia tristis:
conueniens operi tempus utrumque suo est.

Further examples are found at *Trist.* III 1. 10 and V 1. 5 f. The characteristically Ovidian trait about the use of τὸ πρέπον, however, is the shift in its application from the purely stylistic sphere⁶³ to the area of choice of subject. If it was a commonplace to postulate that the style be appropriate to the subject, Ovid now goes one step further by stating that his subject is appropriate to his personal circumstances, and the subject, of course, needs and appropriate style.⁶⁴

As in the case of the *Ars Poetica* scholars might object that it is "always convenient to fall back on τὸ πρέπον when everything else fails."⁶⁵ Considering, however the weight given to this concept by Ovid (see above and add *Am.* I 1. 2), Horace, and their predecessors,⁶⁶ the reservations of modern critics seem to be outweighed by the evidence found in the primary sources.

⁵⁸ *Trist.* II 307, 349.

⁵⁹ *Prop.* I 7. 19, III 1. 19 both with Fedeli's note, Bömer on *Fast.* II 3, Puelma Piwonka *op. cit.* 220 n. 1.

⁶⁰ *incomptis* [*sc. uersibus*] (*Ars* 446 with Brink's note), *uersibus incomptis ludunt* (*Georg.* II 386).

⁶¹ See Luck's note: "*hirsutius*: bezieht sich auf Stil und Sprache," rather than Owen's: "hard in subject, unsentimental."

⁶² M. Pohlenz, "Τὸ πρέπον: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Geistes," *NGG* 11. 16 (1933) 53 ff.; Brink *op. cit.* 228–30, Brink on *Hor. Ars.* 157, 308; Nagle *op. cit.* 117 ff.

⁶³ Style has to be appropriate to subject and character, Brink *op. cit.* 229.

⁶⁴ The importance of the justification of one's poetry by means of personal circumstances or "Rechtfertigung im Bios" (Wimmel *op. cit.* 119) becomes even more obvious now.

⁶⁵ Thus Tate in his review of W. Steidle, *Studien zur Ars Poetica des Horaz*, *CR* 53 (1939) 192.

⁶⁶ *Hor. Ars* 226, *Arist. Rhet.* 1408a10 and presumably Neoptolemus; see Brink *op. cit.* 96.

The principle of τὸ πρέπον finally explains the monotony of Ovid's subject-matter in the *Tristia* and *ex Ponto* which has often been criticised.⁶⁷ If life in Tomi is monotonous the exile-poetry necessarily has to reflect this monotony (*Trist.* III 1. 10).⁶⁸

carmine temporibus conueniente suis.

It seems, then, that Ovid when dealing with the poetics of his exile, adapts some motifs of the Callimachean tradition in Augustan poetry. He uses the familiar themes and images of Augustan theorizing about poetry in the new context of his exile-poems where they have to fit in with the overall picture of Tomi as the opposite of Rome and Scythia as the opposite of Italy. The mere fact that he is still using and re-applying the same motifs and symbols as his predecessors for his own needs show that he still defines his poetic stance in those very terms. So even when he draws attention to ostensible changes in his poetics his standards remain the same. If his poetry falls short of these principles it is the effect of the change in his "bios." The point of this is rhetorical: if Ovid is to write polished verse again all one has to do is recall him from exile.

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⁶⁷ E.g. E. Norden, *Die Römische Literatur* (Leipzig 1954) 75; A. L. Wheeler, *Ovid: Tristia, ex Ponto* (London-Cambr. Mass. 1924) XXXIII; L. P. Wilkinson, *Ovid Recalled* 360 (Cambridge 1955).

⁶⁸ Ovid argues this point in *Pont.* III 9; see Nagle *op. cit.* 132.

Notes on Ovid's poems from exile*

W. S. WATT

The following modern editions are referred to: A. Riese (Leipzig 1874); S. G. Owen (*Tristia*, Oxford 1889); R. Ehwald (Leipzig 1889); A. L. Wheeler (Loeb edition, London 1924); G. Luck (*Tristia*, Heidelberg 1967-77). Reference is also made to S.B. = D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982), 390-98.

Tristia

1. 2. 81:

quod faciles opto uentos, (quis credere possit?)
 Sarmatis est tellus quam mea uela petunt.
 obligor ut tangam laeui fera litora Ponti,
 quodque sit a patria tam fuga tarda queror.
 nescioquo uideam positos ut in orbe Tomitas
exilem facio per mea uota uiam.

Ovid prays for an easy and swift journey—to his place of exile.

"I am trying to shorten the road by prayer" (Wheeler). This is certainly the sort of sense we expect, and *exilem* has traditionally been taken "pro breui et compendiosa" (Heinsius); under this rubric our passage stands by itself in *TLL* 5. 2. 1482. 25 ff. But J. Delz, in his discussion of it in *Mus. Helv.* 28 (1971), 54 ff., is justified in doubting whether *exilis* could have this meaning, for which there is no parallel. Delz even doubts whether *facio* combined with any predicative adjective would be acceptable, because it is the gods, and not Ovid, who would make the journey easy or short; but this objection ignores the common usage by which "qui facit per alium facit per se." As an acceptable phrase I suggest *en celerem facio*, comparing *Her.* 16. 332, "iam facient celeres remus et unda uias." I would explain the corruption by the omission of the *er* syllable; similarly at Cicero, *Fam.* 10. 24. 3 I believe that *celeris* has been corrupted in our manuscripts to *talis*.

*I am very grateful to Professors J. B. Hall and J. A. Richmond for commenting on an earlier version of these notes.

2. 211:

altera pars superest, qua turpi carmine *factus*
arguor obsceni doctor adulterii.

Ovid's second offense was the composition of the *Ars*.

From the evidence presented by Luck it seems safe to conclude that the *paradosis* is *factus*, and that the variants *dictus*, *laesus*, and *lectus* are mere conjectures. Most editors have in fact been content with *factus*, but the resulting sense ("I am accused of having become the teacher") is impossibly feeble; none of the manuscript variants is worthy of consideration, and the same may be said of modern conjectures like Luck's *lecto* and Axelson's *luso*. What I should expect is an indication of the recipients of Ovid's "teaching," as at 244, where he says that his *scripta* do not "Romanas erudiunt nurus." I suggest *castis*, which makes an excellent contrast with *turpi*, as at *Pont.* 1. 1. 7 f. (Ovid addresses his poems), "certe nil turpe docetis: / ite, patet castis uersibus ille locus." The dative, instead of the genitive, with *doctor* is no more surprising than the dative (*elapsis*, sc. *dis*) with *cultor* at *Her.* 7. 131; cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lat. Synt. u. Stil.* 91.

2. 331:

forsan (*et hoc dubitem*) numeris leuioribus aptus
sim satis, in paruos sufficiamque modos.

The fullest discussion of this passage is that of J. Diggle in *CQ* 30 (1980) 416; he objects to the subjunctive *dubitem* and supports the variant *dubito*. But then *et hoc dubito* is scarcely necessary after *forsan*, which is itself an "aduerbium dubitandi" (*TLL* 6. 1136. 69 f.). The proper relationship between *forsan* and the verb *dubitare* can be restored by retaining the *paradosis dubitem* and merely changing *et* to *ut*; then *ut dubitem* is a parenthetic final clause like *ut omittam*, *ut redeam*, etc.

3. 4. 49 (=4b.3):

Bosporus et Tanais superant Scythiaeque paludes
uixque satis noti nomina *pauca* loci.

Beyond Tomis lie the Bosporus, etc.

Luck comments: "50 ist noch nicht befriedigend hergestellt; vielleicht liegt ein ähnlicher Gedanke vor wie Pompon. Mela 3. 30 *montium altissimi Taurus et Retico, nisi quorum nomina uix est eloqui ore Romano*." Heinsius long ago solved the problem by emending *pauca* to *rauca* ("harsh-sounding"), but apparently no editor since Owen (1889) has mentioned this solution. Even Owen did not report that Heinsius wanted (I think rightly) to take *nomina rauca* in apposition to *loci* (plural), comparing *Trist.* 3. 10. 5 f., "Sauromatae . . . Bessique Getaeque, / quam non ingenio nomina digna meo!" Similarly at Val. Flacc. 1. 330 *raucos* has been corrupted to *paucos* in our oldest manuscript (V).

3. 8. 35:

haeret et ante oculos ueluti spectabile corpus
adstat fortunae forma *legenda* meae.

In his text Luck adopts *legenda* (a conjecture first proposed by Riese), "die ich verhüllen sollte," but a reference to Ovid's determination not to reveal the nature of the "error" which had caused his exile seems here out of place. In his commentary, on the other hand, Luck is inclined to defend *legenda*, taken in the sense of "oculis legenda" (cf. *TLL* 7. 2. 1128. 19 ff.); this is quite otiose after the preceding line. The conjectures *uerenda* and *querenda* are scarcely convincing palaeographically, although the latter yields good sense. More satisfactory, I suggest, would be *gemenda* (the form occurs at *Met.* 13. 464); if this were reduced to *genda* by the omission (for an obvious reason) of *me*, the metre would have to be repaired by the addition of a syllable. With *fortunae forma gemenda* I compare 3. 11. 37, "fortuna potest mea flenda uideri."

3. 11. 49:

"pro quibus inuentis, ut munus munere penses,
da, precor, ingenio praemia digna meo."
dixerat; at Phalaris "poenae mirande repertor,
ipse tuum *praesens* imbue" dixit "opus."

Phalaris gives Perillus his due reward for inventing the brazen bull.

Praesens is not adequately rendered by "in person" (Wheeler); Luck's rendering, "du bist ja eben hier," certainly is adequate but merely shows how otiose the word is. This was realized by Heinsius and Bentley, who agreed on emending to *princeps* (*primus* is already found as a humanist conjecture). Luck favours this, but I do not think that it is the answer: apart from palaeographical considerations, *princeps* is not required with *imbue*, which by itself can mean "do something for the first time" (*OLD* sense 3); cf. *Ars* 1. 654 (likewise of Perillus), "infelix imbuit auctor opus." Burman, I think, was right in suggesting *praestans* (apparently mentioned by no editor later than Owen 1889); this would qualify *opus* just as *mirande* qualifies *repertor*. For the confusion of the two words cf. Cicero, *Fam.* 1. 9. 1 *praestantiores* (*praesentiores* codd.) *fructus*.

4. 8. 5:

nunc erat ut posito deberem fine laborum
uiuere *me nullo* sollicitante metu.

The manuscripts vary between *me* and *cum*; modern conjectures are *nunc* (Withof), *iam* (Riese), and *cor* (Luck). Perhaps the simplest solution is to suppose that an original *non ullo* was changed to *nullo* and the resulting gap filled by conjecture.

4. 9. 1:

si licet et pateris, nomen facinusque tacebo
 et tua Lethaeis acta dabuntur aquis
 nostraque *uincetur* lacrimis *clementia* seris,
 fac modo te pateat paenituisse tui.

"I shall forget what you have done provided that you have clearly repented."

There is no reason to question the soundness of *clementia* (of which the variant *dementia* is merely a slight miswriting). It has been proposed to substitute *uementia* (Postgate), *sententia* (Alton, followed by Luck), or *constantia* (S. B., p. 398) on the ground that *clementia uincetur lacrimis* cannot mean "my mercy shall be won by tears" (Wheeler); that is true, but the conclusion which I draw is that *uincetur*, not *clementia*, is corrupt. Nor need we look far for a satisfactory replacement which involves the minimum of change: *iungetur*, "my mercy shall follow closely on your tears." This sense of *iungere* is numbered 10 in *OLD*: "to cause (events, etc.) to succeed without a break"; examples are listed both there and in *TLL* 7. 2. 655. 66 ff. The supposed corruption, easy enough in itself, may have been helped by the recollection of a line (39) towards the end of the previous poem, "ipsaque delictis uicta est clementia nostris."

4. 9. 27:

iam *feror* in pugnas *et* nondum cornua sumpsit,
 nec mihi sumendi causa sit ulla uelim.
 Circus adhuc cessat, spargit iam toruus harenam
 taurus et infesto iam pede pulsat humum.

Ovid threatens to attack his enemy if he does not repent.

In *Euphrosyne* 16 (1988) 137, J. B. Hall points out that *iam feror in pugnas*, "already I am rushing into battle," cannot be right because what follows (*Circus adhuc cessat* and the image of the bull pawing the sand) proves that battle has not yet been joined; he therefore proposes *moror* for *feror*. It would be easier (a) to alter *feror* to the future *ferar*; (b) to adopt, instead of *et*, the less well attested variant *sed*, which, even if it is only an emendation, is a very easy change after the last letter of *pugnas*; battle will commence "soon" but has not yet done so. The fact that *iam* in lines 29 and 30 means "already" does not prove that *iam* in line 27 must likewise have that sense.

5. 6. 35:

elige nostrorum *minimum minimumque* malorum,
 isto, quo reris, gradus illud erit.

The least of Ovid's woes will be greater than his correspondent imagines.

For the gemination of *minimum* the editors quote *Her.* 1. 41, *nimum nimumque oblite tuorum*, but the adverb *nimum* lends itself much more

naturally to gemination than does the adjective *minimus*; indeed, "bei Adj. ist die rein intensive Gemination kaum zu belegen," Hofmann-Szantyr 809. I suggest that the comma should be placed after *minimum*, not after *malorum*, and that *malorum* should be supplied with the first *minimum*; such ἀπὸ κοινοῦ constructions are frequent in Ovid (a collection of examples is given by E. J. Kenney in *CQ* 8 [1958] 55). This punctuation guarantees *malorum* against the variant *laborum* (the other manuscript variations in the couplet do not affect the construction).

Ibis

23:

di melius, quorum longe mihi maximus ille est
qui nostras inopes noluit esse *uias*.

In banishing Ovid, Augustus had refrained from confiscating his property.

If *uias* is sound it must mean Ovid's journey into exile (so *TLL* 7. 1. 1755. 70): he had enough money to pay his travelling expenses. But is it credible that he should mention this, and nothing else, as the consequence of being allowed to retain his property? I suggest that *uias* should be *uices*, "my changed circumstances"; *uices* has either certainly or probably been corrupted to *uias* at Seneca, *Med.* 307 and *Phaed.* 965, Silius 15. 809.

Epistulae ex Ponto

1. 2. 63:

nec tamen ulterius quicquam sperare precor
quam male *mutato* posse carere loco.

Mutato arouses justified suspicion, whether interpreted as "given in exchange" (so Wheeler . . . "even by a wretched change to be rid of this place," but "even" is not in the Latin) or as "taken in exchange" (*sc.* for Rome; so the word is generally understood nowadays, although *male* is very feeble). Only one suggested emendation is worthy of consideration, that of T. Faber, *male me tuto*. This, I think, is on the right lines, but I should prefer *male munito*. Time and again Ovid complains about the inadequate defences of Tomis; so just above (22), "portaque uix firma submouet arma sera"; *Trist.* 5. 2. 70, "uixque brevis tutos murus ab hoste facit"; *ib.* 5. 10. 27, "uix ope castelli defendimur"; *ib.* 4. 1. 69 f.; *Pont.* 1. 8. 61 f. The same corruption, of *munit-* to *mutat-*, has occurred at *Ciris* 105; also, in some manuscripts of Cicero, *Att.* 4. 16. 7, *munitos* has become *muratos*, a late-Latin word which editors have no business to foist on Cicero.

2. 3. 15:

nil nisi quod prodest carum est, sed detrahe menti
spem fructus auidae, nemo *petendus* erit.

Friendships are valued according to the profit which they bring.

Madvig (*Adv.* 2. 102), objecting to the use of *petere* in the sense of *appetere* or *colere*, conjectured *uerendus*. Why not the *mot juste*, which is *colendus*? The confusion of *p* and *c* is quite common (see note on 4. 1. 23 below).

2. 3. 33:

te, nihil *exacto* nisi nos peccasse fatentem,
sponte sua probitas officiumque iuuat.

No one has succeeded in emending the meaningless *exacto* or *ex acto*; the favourite modern reading, Ehwald's *exactos* ("I, the exiled one," Wheeler), is quite unconvincing. I suggest *ex toto* (*toto* reduced to *to* by haplography, then wrongly expanded); the meaning would be "te, fatentem nihil ex toto nos fecisse nisi peccasse," "acknowledging as you do that I was guilty of nothing whatever but an error of judgment, you stand by your duty to me." This supposes an ellipse of *facere* with *nihil nisi* akin to the prose idiom with *nihil aliud quam* (less often, *nisi*), for which see Kühner-Stegmann, *Ausf. Gramm.* 2. 564. For *ex toto* preceded by a negative cf. *Pont.* 1. 6. 28 and 4. 8. 72; *Her.* 16. 160; *TLL* 5. 2. 1125. 12 ff.

2. 5. 57:

huic tu cum placeas et uertice sidera tangas,
scripta tamen profugi uatis *habenda* putas.

The addressee is Salanus, the tutor (in rhetoric) of Germanicus (*huic*).

What does *habenda* mean? Wheeler says "worthy of consideration," but this cannot be got from the Latin. It could mean "kept" in the sense of "given house-room," but that is intolerably feeble. I suggest that it should be emended to *alenda*, "worthy of being fostered"; for *alere* used of fostering the poet's inspiration cf. *Trist.* 3. 14. 37 f., "non hic librorum per quos inuiter alarque / copia." The encouragement which Ovid owes to Silanus is expressed at 21 f., "ingenioque meo . . . / plaudis et e riuo flumina magna facis." The corruption of *alere* to the colourless *habere* is not always recognized where some sort of sense can be extracted from the latter; e.g. at Statius, *Silu.* 1. 3. 23, *habentes carmina somnos*, apparently only Baehrens has adopted Heinsius's *alentes*; at Gellius 11. 2. 2 (= Cato, *Carmen de moribus* frag. 1, p. 82. 10 Jordan), *auaritiā omnia uitia habere*, I have emended *habere* to *alere* in *Glott.* 62 (1984), 249.

2. 7. 43:

nec magis assiduo uomer tenuatur ab usu
nec magis est curuis Appia trita rotis
pectora quam mea sunt serie *caecata* malorum.

The main manuscripts vary between *caecata* and *calcata*. The latter seems impossible, because a heart cannot be "trampled upon" or "spurned" by an uninterrupted chain of misfortunes (the company which this passage

keeps in *TLL* 3. 138. 25 does not inspire confidence). In support of *caecata* (a word not elsewhere used by Ovid) editors adduce *Culex* 199, *timor occaecauerat artus*, of fear "benumbing" a man's limbs. If this is not accepted my solution would be *cumulata*, reduced to *culata* by the omission (for an obvious reason) of *mu* and thereafter variously "emended." I compare *Trist.* 4. 1. 55 f., "meque tot aduersis cumulant [*sc. di*] quot litus harenas / . . . habet."

2. 7. 77:

sustineas ut onus, nitendum uertice pleno est;
aut, flecti neruos si patiere, *cedes*.

S. B. (p. 397) finds it difficult to believe that *pleno* can mean "stiff" and emends to *prono*, thus shifting the load from the head to the back of the carrier. But it is on the shoulders that a load is most naturally carried (cf. *Trist.* 2. 222; *OLD* s. v. *umerus*, sense 1 d); and he who carries a load on his shoulders must keep the muscles at the back of his neck taut. The proper word, I suggest, is *tenso* (or *tento*); and there are stranger corruptions in these epistles than that of *tenso* to <p>len[s]o. This solution was proposed in 1895 (in a Leiden dissertation) by C. Schreuders, but it is never mentioned nowadays.

Wherever the load is carried, when the carrier relaxes his muscles it is much more likely that the load will fall off than that he himself will fall. Like Heinsius, therefore, I should adopt the less well attested variant *cadet*, and explain *cedes* as being due to assimilation to *patiere*.

3. 2. 23:

sint hi contenti uenia, †sientque† licebit
purgari factum me quoque teste suum.

Ovid forgives his timid friends who failed to help him in his hour of need.

Our oldest manuscript (A) reads *sientque*, the other *signentque* or *fugiantque*; all three words are meaningless. Conjectures are numerous: *iurentque*, *iactentque*, *scierintque* (wrong tense), *sperentue*, *fingantque*, *fidantque*, and others. I add, as closer to the reading of A, *si<mul>entque*.

3. 4. 88:

alter enim de te, Rhene, triumphus adest.
inrita uotorum non sunt praesagia uatum:
danda Ioui laurus, dum prior illa uiret.

Ovid confidently prophesies for Tiberius a triumph over Germany soon after his Pannonian triumph of 23 October A. D. 12 (cf. r. Syme, *History in Ovid*, Oxford 1978, 53 ff.).

It is futile for editors to support *inrita uotorum* by Statius, *Theb.* 7. 314, *manus inrita uoti*. No one would deny the Latinity of this phrase for "disappointed of one's wish," but whereas that sense fits the Statius passage

excellently it does not fit ours: how can "prophecies" be "disappointed of their wish?" What is required is an epithet of *uatum*, and the later manuscripts offer three, *notorum*, *magnorum*, and *uerorum*; of these the last is best, but hardly convincing palaeographically. Heinsius added *motorum*, which has been adopted by some modern editors, but no one has produced a parallel for the adjectival use of *motus* in the sense of "inspired." Yet that is the sort of sense which is required. I suggest *doctorum*, a standing epithet not only of poets (*TLL* 5. 1. 1757. 2 ff.) but also of prophets (ib. 1756. 76 ff.); and of these two meanings of *uates* it is the latter which here predominates. The confusion of *d* and *u* is not so common as some others, but it does occur; e.g. *dirus/uirus* (Seneca, *Med.* 718 and *Phoen.* 297), *ductor/uictor* (Lucan 3. 71, Silius 9. 600).

3. 7. 21:

spem iuuat amplecti quae non iuuat inrita semper
et, fieri cupias siqua, futura putes.
proximus huic gradus est bene desperare salutem,
seque semel uera scire perisse fide.

To W. A. Camps belongs the credit for having made the first couplet intelligible. In *CR* 4 (1954) 206, he writes: "The quatrain distinguishes, as best and second best respectively for an unhappy man, two states of mind. The second of these consists in not hoping when hope is vain. It follows therefore that the first . . . must consist in hoping with some ground for hope." Camps therefore proposes to replace *non iuuat* by *non uenit*, adducing *Her.* 2. 62, "quaecumque ex merito spes uenit, aequa uenit." It is true that *uenit* could easily have been corrupted to *iuuat*, but that is not a strong argument since the second *iuuat* looks like an erroneous repetition of the first, and the word which it has displaced need not have resembled it very closely. Much more suitable in our passage would be *cadit*, which is used of *spes* at *Pont.* 1. 2. 62 and 1. 6. 36; *Trist.* 2. 148; *Her.* 9. 42 and 13. 124; and other passages listed in *TLL* 3. 26. 47 ff.

Camps is also clearly right in changing *et* at the beginning of the following line to *ut*.

4. 1. 23:

numquam pigra fuit nostris tua gratia rebus,
nec mihi munificas arca negauit opes.
nunc quoque nil subitis clementia territa fatis
auxilium uitae fertque feretque meae.

Ovid acknowledges his indebtedness to Sextus Pompeius for financial help (so too at 4. 5. 37 f.), a context in which *clementia* is out of place. S. B. (p. 398) would substitute *constantia*, not an easy change. I miss a possessive adjective corresponding to *tua* in 23, and suggest *pia mens tua*; for the confusion of *p* and *c* see note on 2. 3. 15 above. Both *mens* and *pius* occur earlier on in the epistle (7 f.), where they are used of the other

side of the relationship (Ovid's loyal devotion to Pompeius): "non potuit mea mens quin esset grata teneri: / sit precor officio non grauis ira pio."

4. 7. 17:

sit licet hic titulus *plenus* tibi fructibus, *ingens*
ipsa tamen uirtus ordine maior erit.

plenus EO: plenis cett.

Addressed to Vestalis; the honour in question is his rank (*ordo*) of *primus pilus*.

The reading and punctuation given above is that of Ehwald, which with surprising unanimity all subsequent editors have followed, wrongly. One should return to the *paradosis plenis* and to the pre-Ehwald punctuation, which put the comma after, not before, *ingens*. Sense-pause at the end of the fifth foot is rare (Platnauer, *Latin Elegiac Verse*, Cambridge 1951, p. 25), and here spoils the obviously intended contrast between *ingens* and *maior*: "quamquam titulus est ingens, maior tamen est uirtus."

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Horace and Statius at Tibur: an Interpretation of *Silvae* 1. 3

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Silvae 1. 3, Statius's poem describing the villa of Manilius Vopiscus at Tibur, has been long regarded as a versified commonplace of minor topographical importance.¹ In this poem, and its companion-piece *Silvae* 2. 2,² Statius's approach to description is markedly unsystematic. Unlike Pliny the Younger, who in his descriptions of two of his villas³ shows a passion for methodical, exact detail,⁴ Statius makes it impossible for the reader to reconstruct his patrons' villas. He gives little in the way of explicit or technical detail. In *Silvae* 1. 3, for instance, he refers to only two types of rooms indoors, the *cubilia* (37) and the *aula* (40),⁵ and these are the most common components of any house.

With its unsystematic approach to description, *Silvae* 1. 3 may well seem to earn the label of mannerist. In the past, this term has been generally used of Statius's poetry to suggest that he is a poet of virtuosic display rather than serious depth.⁶ Recently, this generally negative view of

¹ This is the long-standing, influential opinion of P. Vollmer, ed., *P. Papinii Statii Silvarum Libri* (Leipzig 1898) 30.

² *Silvae* 2. 2 describes the Surrentine estate of Pollius Felix.

³ The Laurentine villa (*Epistles* 2. 17) and the Tuscan (*Epistles* 5. 6).

⁴ P. Friedländer, *Johannes von Gaza und Paulus Silentarius-Kunstbeschreibungen Justinianischer Zeit* (Leipzig and Berlin 1912) 70–71, comments on Pliny's intention *omnes angulos tecum epistula circumire* (*Ep.* 5. 6. 40) that "Plinius wählt die Form des Spazierganges. Aber er fügt nicht immer nur Stück an Stück, sondern knüpft gelegentlich das eine mit einem weiter vorher genannten zusammen, um so einen etwas grösseren Komplex zu gewinnen."

⁵ The meaning of *trichoris* (58) has been disputed. Vollmer (above, note 2) explains the word as a separate floor or story. More recent editors, A. Traglia and G. Arico, *Opere di Publio Papinio Stazio* (Turin 1980), argue for the meaning of alcoves, since in Medieval Latin the word refers to a dining room. The word in Greek means a building with three parts. By the phrase *partitis distantia tecta trichoris* Statius probably means buildings with three wings such as are depicted in Campanian paintings; he is not, then, naming a type of room.

⁶ E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. W. R. Trask (New York 1953) 273–92, defines mannerism as the counterpart and inevitable successor of classicism. His thorough discussion of the term has influenced critics of Statius, notably H. Bardon, "Le goût à l'époque des Flaviens," *Latomus* 21 (1962) 732–48; H. Cancik, *Untersuchungen zur lyrischen Kunst des P. Papinius Statius, Spudasmata* 13 (Hildesheim

Statius has been persuasively challenged by Ahl who, in his analysis of *Silvae* 1. 1—a political poem conventionally thought to flatter the emperor—shows that Statius in fact conveys powerful criticism of Domitian through his masterful and ambiguous use of figured speech.⁷

Silvae 1. 3, as far as we know, is not connected with Roman politics.⁸ Yet Szelest, Newmyer, and Hardie⁹ have done important work in showing that this private, descriptive poem is the result of more careful planning and original thought than had previously been supposed. In her formal reevaluation of the descriptive *Silvae* Szelest, for instance, points out that Statius is original in two ways. First, he makes ecphrasis the entire subject of an extended poem¹⁰—before Statius similar descriptions appeared only as digressions in epic poetry¹¹ or else formed the subject matter of epigrams¹²—and second, he uses the extended poem to fuse ecphrasis with encomium.¹³

Hardie suggests that Statius's unsystematic approach to description can be seen as a result of this fusion of encomium with ecphrasis. Despite the appearance of randomness, Statius is deliberately attempting to reproduce his initial impressions of almost overwhelming wonder and thus, through such

1965); D. Vessey, *Statius and the Thebaid* (Cambridge 1973). The term mannerism is generally given a negative value; Vessey (p. 8) calls it "a disease of classicism." More recently, D. Bright, "Elaborate Disarray: The Nature of Statius's 'Silvae,'" *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 108 (Meisenheim am Glan 1980), accepts the terms mannerist and baroque as appropriate to Statius's work, but claims that Statius's apparent randomness of organization and his dissonant style is in fact carefully planned and cultivated.

⁷ F. Ahl, "The Rider and the Horse: Politics and Power in Roman Poetry from Horace to Statius," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* (1984) 85–102. Cf. also Ahl, "The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome," *Am. J. Phil.* 105 (1984) 174–208, where he argues that "during the Roman Empire, the techniques of figured speech . . . became the most prudent mode of expression" (p. 204), allowing the poet to attack the emperor with safety.

⁸ A marble inscription found at Tibur refers to a Vopiscus who was consul in 114 A.D.; he is probably the son of Statius's Vopiscus. We know no more of Statius's Vopiscus than what the poet tells us. See A. Hardie, *Statius and the "Silvae"* (Liverpool 1983) 68.

⁹ H. Szelest, "Die Originalität der sog. beschreibenden *Silvae* des Statius," *Eos* 56 (1966 [1969]) 186–97; "Rolle und Bedeutung des P. Papinius Statius als des Verfassers der 'Silvae' in der Römischen Dichtung," *Eos* 60 (1972) 87–101; S. T. Newmyer, *The "Silvae" of Statius: Structure and Theme*, *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 53 (Leiden 1979); A. Hardie (above, note 8).

¹⁰ Szelest (above, note 9, 1972) 90: "Statius unterscheidet sich dagegen von seinen Vorgängern vor allem dadurch, dass er die Beschreibungen von Bauten, Villen oder Statuen zum Hauptthema längerer Gedichte machte." See also Z. Pavlovskis, *Man in an Artificial Landscape: The Marvels of Civilisation in Imperial Roman Literature*, *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 25 (1973) 1: "Statius . . . may well have been the first to devote whole poems to the praise of technological progress, as well as the delights of a life spent in a setting not natural but improved by man's skill."

¹¹ The archetype is the description of Achilles' shield, *Il.* 18. 482 ff.

¹² See Hardie, 128–36, for an overview of the epigrammatic tradition of ecphrasis.

¹³ Szelest (1966) 196.

hyperbolic praise, to please his patron.¹⁴ Statius's chief focus in his villa poems is not the house but its owner. Newmyer points out that Statius combines panegyric successfully with ecphrasis by making the beauties of the house correspond to the virtues of its owner.¹⁵ For instance, in the conclusion of *Silvae* 1. 3, Statius invokes a blessing upon Vopiscus's goods of the heart and mind, *bona animi* (106), a metaphor that stresses the link between material and spiritual well-being. The poet earlier had singled out for praise Vopiscus's most outstanding qualities of character in lines 91–93:¹⁶

hic premitur fecunda quies virtusque serena
fronte gravis sanusque nitor luxuque carentes
deliciae,

With the words *quies* and *serena* Statius emphasizes the tranquility of Vopiscus, just as he claims that the landscape possesses *aeterna quies* (29). Vopiscus's *nitor*, radiance of soul, corresponds to the radiance of his house's interior with its *nitidum . . . solum* (54–55). This parallelism breaks down with the last attribute, *luxuque carentes / deliciae*, however, for Statius's previous description of Vopiscus's villa with its precious gold and ivory (35–36), its modern amenities such as hot baths (43–44), running water indoors (37), outdoor dining tables (64), and its elaborate mosaic floor (55–56), have created the impression of nothing but luxury. Newmyer's hypothesis seems in practice to work only partially in *Silvae* 1. 3.

As an encomium, the poem has other puzzling inconsistencies. When Statius goes on to praise Vopiscus as worthy of the wealth of Croesus and Midas (105), his statement casts doubts over the proper use of Vopiscus's wealth, for Midas made notoriously foolish use of his riches.¹⁷ Complicating the picture further is Statius's concluding reference to Vopiscus's Epicureanism.¹⁸ Statius claims that the Greek philosopher would gladly have preferred Vopiscus's *deliciae* to his own garden (93–94), but the Epicurean ideal of moderation is uneasily applied to a life of seemingly excessive wealth and ease. *Silvae* 1. 3 poses a problem of inner

¹⁴ Thus Hardie, 179: "Statius's personal entry makes us see the villa through the eyes of an excited visitor, recalling the highlights. The dominant emotion is expressed in the repeated *mirer* (37, 57). He is selective, impressionistic, and does not linger too long on individual detail . . . his real interest is in the villa as a physical foil to the character of its owner."

¹⁵ Newmyer (above, note 9) 40.

¹⁶ All quotations of Statius's *Silvae* are from the Oxford text of J. S. Phillimore, 2nd ed. (1967).

¹⁷ See Ovid., *Met.* 11. 92–193. Ovid's juxtaposition of the stories of Midas's golden touch and his asinine ears, along with his interplay between *aurum* and *auris*, emphasises the connection between love of wealth and stupidity.

¹⁸ Vopiscus's Epicurean beliefs are also suggested at the start of the poem through the supervision by Voluptas (v. 9) and Venus (v. 10) of the building of the house.

consistency.¹⁹ If the poem is to be regarded as a straightforward encomium, the description of the estate and the owner's character do not properly mesh.

Rather than return to the acceptance of Statius as a mannerist poet from whom we should not expect consistency, I propose to seek an understanding of the poem through a hitherto neglected aspect, its debt to Horace. According to Hardie, Statius's imitative practices in the *Silvae* show that "the work which Statius held in highest esteem was the *Odes* of Horace" (p. 170). Apart from his two lyrical poems modeled on the Horatian Ode, *Silvae* 4. 5 and *Silvae* 4. 7, Statius makes unstated but pervasive use of the Augustan poet. Although Statius never mentions Horace by name in *Silvae* 1. 3, he brings the Augustan poet immediately to mind with the first line, *cernere facundi Tibur glaciale Vopisci*. The chiasmic arrangement of nouns and adjectives that leads to the juxtaposition of Tibur with *facundi* reminds the reader of the association between Tibur and poetry that was first formulated by Horace in his *Odes*. Like Horace in *Odes* 4. 2. 27-32 and 4. 3. 10-12, Vopiscus is a poet living in Tibur, yet he follows a far more indulgent lifestyle than that of the Augustan poet. *Silvae* 1. 3 derives an inner coherence from its formulation as a deliberate response to Horace's philosophical and poetic beliefs. Its aims are more complex than has been generally allowed. Although at first glance the response to Horace seems critical of the Augustan poet, on another, deeper, level it is more truly critical of Vopiscus. At the same time as Statius expands the traditional nature of ecphrasis, he also undermines it.

Horace particularly cherished Tibur. In his last book of *Odes* he praises not the Sabine farm but Tibur alone as his source of poetic inspiration.²⁰ In *Odes* 2. 6 he names Tibur as his chosen resting-place in old age and describes Tibur as a *modus* (7) to his wanderings as *vates*.²¹ With his choice of the word *modus* Horace suggests that Tibur provides not simply a

¹⁹ Hardie notes the discrepancy between owner and villa and attempts to minimize it by claiming that a rather broad interpretation of Epicureanism can give the poem its coherence and avoid the embarrassing problem of excessive wealth. He thus claims, p. 178, that Statius accommodates "praise of Vopiscus' wealth to a philosophy which preached the simple life . . . by reference to the principle *φυσικῶς ζῆν*: we live according to nature, and nature determines our needs. Since nature has 'indulged herself' so expansively at the villa site (16 f.), Vopiscus must accommodate the house and its artifices to the splendour of its natural environment." This is a good point, but unfortunately the principle in question is one developed by the Stoics rather than by the Epicureans; it does not therefore help solve the problem of consistency. See further notes 29 and 30.

²⁰ I. Troxler-Keller, *Die Dichterlandschaft des Horaz* (Heidelberg 1964) shows how Horace develops the metaphor of poetic inspiration from an abstract, generalized landscape to one that is concrete and specifically Italian. C. Becker, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* (Göttingen 1963) 249, suggests that Horace chooses Tibur to represent the condition of poetic inspiration, since the Sabine farm, after the first three books of the *Odes*, was too closely connected with ethical beliefs.

²¹ All quotations of Horace's works are from the Oxford edition of E. C. Wickham and H. W. Garrod (1975).

physical limit to his travels, but also a moral limit; Tibur is a symbol of the life of moderation which is intimately connected with Horace's poetic credo.²² Tibur's value for him is chiefly ethical and spiritual. Although Tibur was a popular holiday resort for the Romans, Horace makes no mention of *villae* in any of his poems referring to the place,²³ for such a detail would introduce an inappropriate secular element. In *Odes* 4. 2 and 4. 3 he mentions only the water and trees of Tibur, general features that he associates with the symbolic landscape of poetic inspiration.²⁴ Unlike the Sabine farm, the Tibur of the fourth book of the *Odes* is a landscape devoid of all particularizing detail apart from the fact that it is rooted in the Italian soil. Thus it is a symbol of the simple yet inspired existence of an Italian poet.

Although Vopiscus, like Horace, chooses Tibur as his home, Statius suggests that he leads there a life of luxury rather than moderation. From the start of the poem Statius describes the estate in such a way as to make clear that the villa, rather than the natural environment, is the dominant feature. Thus the river Anio has been artificially channeled between the two halves of the villa, *inserto geminos Aniene penates* (2), the ablative absolute here suggesting that the river has been made to fit in with the design of the house rather than vice versa. The banks of the river have been domesticated and are associated with materialistic values, for their closeness to one another is described in terms of commercial exchange, *commercia . . . ripae* (3). The business metaphor suggests the accommodation of the rural retreat to urban modes of life. Having recalled Horace in the first line of the poem, Statius now proceeds to introduce values that were alien to Horace's thought. While his ostensible aim is to show that Horace's Tibur can be adapted to the grand style of living that Horace consistently eschewed, the demonstration contains the seeds of doubt within it.

Throughout his poetry, and particularly in his later works, Horace treats the country as definitively opposed to Rome, the city with its wealth and corrupt morals.²⁵ In *Odes* 4. 3. 1-9, for instance, he sets the simple

²² C. P. Segal, "Horace: *Odes* 2. 6," *Philologus* 113 (1969) 235-53, convincingly demonstrates how central to the poem is the concept of moderation. I therefore accept the case that he makes (p. 240) for retaining the reading *modus* instead of Peerlkamp's emendation *domus*.

²³ Apart from *Odes* 4. 2 and 4. 3, Horace describes Tibur in *Odes* 1. 7. 12-14 and 20-21, and refers briefly to it in *Odes* 1. 18. 2. Although in the latter poem he mentions the city walls of Catillus, the mythic founder of Tibur, he offsets *moenia* with its associations of human works by means of the preceding phrase in the line, *mite solum Tiburis*.

²⁴ Lines 5-8 of *Odes* 3. 4 provide an example of a generalized poetic landscape to which Horace imagines he is summoned by the Muses: *audire et videor pios / errare per lucos, amoena / quos et aquae subeunt et aerae*.

²⁵ J. Öberg, "Some Notes on the Marvels of Civilization in Imperial Roman Literature," *Eranos* 76 (1978) 146, sees as an important theme in Horace "the repudiation of all contemporary extravagance and artificiality as contrasted with the simplicity of the ancestors and even of primitive peoples . . . Horace's ideals obviously are in strict keeping with Augustus' program for moral rearmament and return to ancient customs." The country offered Horace a

Tiburtine landscape against the famous centers of power and worldly ambition of Greece and Rome and shows that it alone has true value. Tibur may be a quiet spiritual retreat, but it is no backwater, for like a skillful sculptor it fashions Horace into a noble poet (10-12):

sed quae Tibur aquae fertile praefluunt
et spissae nemorum comae
fingent Aeolio carmine nobilem.

The landscape of Vopiscus's Tibur likewise is not simply passive but has *ingenium* (15), creative power. Yet to this noun Statius adds the adjective *mite* (15): the landscape is gentle and therefore unthreatening to man. Nature's power, such as it is, is directed not towards the fashioning of a poet and his innermost being but towards the development of a landscape that will complement a grand house and provide a comfortable home for Vopiscus. Thus the landscape and the house have similar qualities. In keeping with the extravagance of the villa, nature has lavishly indulged herself (16-17). The groves are lofty, *alta* (17), like the house whose radiance floods down *ab alto* (53); and the illusive gleam of the river, *fallax* . . . *imago* (18), corresponds to the brilliance of the mosaic floors, aflood with light like water, *defluus* (54).

This correspondence between the house and its landscape is not one of equals. Nature's *ingenium* has limited scope, for the landscape serves as well as complements the house. Man, not nature, is the main fashioner here. The river, like an obedient slave, *veritus* (22), ceases its customary roar as it passes Vopiscus's villa. The Nymphs (a metonym for water pipes) are sent through all the bedrooms (37), and different rooms offer different views of the river or trees, according to the time of day and individual need (38-42). Like Horace Statius emphasizes trees and water as the main features of the Tiburtine landscape, but he turns them to different ends. They have become the providers of human comfort and pleasure rather than of poetic inspiration.

Statius shows that Vopiscus has attempted to adapt Horace's simple Tiburtine landscape to his personal needs for citified comforts and sophisticated pleasures. What Horace would see as a travesty of his Tiburtine ideal Statius presents, on the surface at least, as a positive improvement upon nature. In several places he recalls and tries to refute

convenient symbol for the life of *paupertas*, but he was not unaware of the ambiguities implicit in such a choice. Thus in *Satires* 2. 2 Horace puts the *laudatio ruris* into the mouth of a usurer. In *Epistles* 1. 10 he handles the dichotomy between city and country with a certain amount of ironic, humorous distance; his addressee, Aristius Fuscus, is an old friend with whom Horace had made lighthearted use of convention in *Odes* 1. 22. See also Pavlovskis (above, note 10) 1-5, particularly n. 9.

statements from Horace's *Epistles* that defend the simple life of the country against the decadent temptations of the city.

Epistles 1. 10 is worth close scrutiny, for it seems to have particularly influenced *Silvae* 1. 3.²⁶ Addressing a city dweller who is his old friend Aristius Fuscus, Horace argues somewhat lightheartedly for country as opposed to city life. By contrasting a series of urban luxuries with their natural equivalents, Horace shows how unnecessary the former are and how irrational therefore the desire for them is. First he asks his friend if grass shines or smells worse than a colored mosaic floor: *deterius Libycis olet aut nitet herba lapillis* (19)? The answer to this rhetorical question occurs in *Silvae* 1. 3. On Vopiscus's estate the mosaic floor represents a definite improvement over the untreated soil, for nature as well as for man, since the earth rejoices at its adornment, *varias ubi picta per artes gaudet humus* (55–56).

Horace uses a second rhetorical question in lines 20–21 to suggest that the confinement of water within pipes is unnecessary and unnatural:

purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere plumbum,
quam quae per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum?

Statius adopts Horace's unprecedented use of *plumbum* to mean pipe. But instead of opposing the piped water to the stream, Statius makes them complementary, with the natural stream subservient to the conduit. The Marcian aqueduct crosses the river Anio on Vopiscus's territory, bearing its piped water to Rome. It is a sight to be admired (66–67):

teque, per obliquum penitus quae laberis amnem,
Marcia, et audaci transcurris flumina plumbo.

Horace's imagery of violence—*tendit, rumpere*—is negative in intent. Statius's attachment of the epithet *audaci* to *plumbo* retains the violent note but places it within a positive context since the piped water, rather than struggling to break its bonds, glides as smoothly as Horace's unrestricted brook. *Audaci* therefore suggests the heroic, pioneering spirit of Roman technology; the piped water represents material advance rather than moral decadence. The natural stream, on the other hand, is reduced in value to an ornament of the estate that lacks independent life, for it can be swiftly crossed without difficulty. The dominating presence of the Marcian aqueduct symbolizes the close links between Vopiscus's Tibur and the city of Rome.

Horace's third cause for complaint is the urban taste for planting trees among the columns of a house's inner courtyard: *nempe inter varias nutritur*

²⁶ The poem is set not at Tibur but on the Sabine farm. Horace claims to have written the epistle behind the shrine of a local Sabine deity, *post fanum putre Vacunae* (49).

silva columnas (22).²⁷ Vopiscus has followed this fashion with his cultivation of one large tree within the atrium (59–63):

quid te, quae mediis servata penatibus arbor
 tecta per et postis liquidas emergis in auras,
 quo non sub domino saevas passura bipennis?
 et nunc ignaro forsā vel lubrica Nais
 vel non abruptos tibi debet Hamadryas annos.

Again Statius recasts in a positive light what was for Horace a sign of urban decadence. Statius justifies the tree's presence by making its preservation seem an act of benevolence on Vopiscus's part, as if nature were grateful for the incursions of "civilization." Yet he does so rather frivolously, by turning the reader's attention to the anthropomorphism of the tree and entering into the fanciful idea of a nymph, who is grateful to have been spared the axe. The motif of the tree within the house of course originates in the *Odyssey* (23. 190–204), where it symbolizes the strength of the royal household and of Odysseus' and Penelope's love. More importantly for our purposes, in *Aeneid* 2. 512–14, Vergil describes a huge, ancient laurel in the center of Priam's palace that overshadows the Penates. Vergil's tree has a protective, sacral function; it symbolizes the strength and antiquity of the Trojan household as well as its piety. Significantly, the collapse of this household, with the murder of Priam, takes place under this laurel (550–58). Although Statius's tree, like Vergil's, protects the Penates (59), the rather frivolous fancy about the nymph deprives the tree of its religious awe and gives it the type of ornamental, secular function that Horace derided.²⁸

In the same *Epistle* Horace tries to convince Aristius Fuscus that the Stoic ideal of living according to nature, *vivere naturae . . . convenienter* (12), by which the Stoics meant life according to the principles of right reason,²⁹ is identical with country life, for those who dwell in the city do not conduct their lives according to rational principles. Vopiscus's concept of *vivere naturae convenienter* is rather different from Horace's. True, he lives in the country, but he possesses luxurious accoutrements of the sort that Horace decries as unnecessary. His life therefore may seem to accord

²⁷ Cf. also *Odes* 3. 10. 5–6.

²⁸ Cf. Martial, *Epigrams* 9. 61, who gives the motif of the tree's invulnerability a biting political significance, for it was planted by Julius Caesar.

²⁹ A. A. Long, "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 6 (1971) 85–104, demonstrates how the Stoic goal of living in accordance with nature entails obedience to sound reason; such obedience is a moral principle. In Stoicism, then, "nature should be understood as first and foremost a normative, evaluative, or . . . moral principle" (p. 88). Cicero, *De Officiis* 3. 3. 13 defines the phrase *vivere convenienter naturae* as equivalent to *cum virtute congruere*. Horace, playing on the ambiguity of the word *natura*, equates this Stoic ideal with country life; in a playful spirit he tries to show Aristius Fuscus that the life of sound reason endorsed by the Stoics can be led only in the country, since city dwellers are possessed by unnatural and therefore unreasonable desires.

with neither Epicurean nor Stoic principles. It can be seen to have positive ethical value, nonetheless, if we accept Statius's fancy that the land welcomes its transformation. According to this conceit, Vopiscus's improvements do not bring him into conflict with nature. His desires are in accordance with right reason, for like the Stoic wise man he has not put self before the good of the whole.³⁰ Vopiscus may then seem to have the best of both worlds. He possesses the peace and the apparent harmony with nature that Horace sought after in the country, yet with some philosophical justification he enjoys all the comforts of the city. If we accept that Vopiscus is not only the transformer of nature but also its benefactor,³¹ the instruments of his comfort and pleasure such as hot baths and mosaic floors can perhaps be acquitted of the charge of luxury, and therefore of moral decadence. We can then after all fit the troubling phrase *luxuque carentes / deliciae* (92–93) into the eulogistic schema of the poem, since Vopiscus's wealth is used for the good of the land rather than purely private pleasure.

It is possible, however, that Statius intended the careful reader to see such justification of Vopiscus's villa as strained. The denunciation of wealth was a common literary topos even in Statius's day.³² If Statius diverges from contemporary wisdom in his praise of ostentatious wealth, perhaps his praise is not altogether what it seems. White rightly cautions, "the language of a poet who lives by patronage is not always to be trusted."³³ We cannot tell the precise nature of the relationship between Vopiscus and Statius. Since Statius addresses only this poem to him, and does not use any terms of affection, it is unlikely that the two men were very close; certainly Vopiscus was not another Maecenas. Apart from the references to Midas and to Epicurus, there are other, disturbing elements in this poem that subtly undermine the positive view of Vopiscus's villa and character that Statius presents on the surface. These suggest that Statius's

³⁰ See Cicero, *De Finibus* 3. 64. A. A. Long, "Greek Ethics After MacIntyre and the Stoic Community of Reason," *Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1983) 188, cites Epictetus' definition of the wise man as "acting always for the good of the whole and never for exclusively private advantage, treating oneself as a member of a rationally organized structure."

³¹ D. Goguet, "Le paysage dans les *Silves* de Stace: conventions poétiques et observation réaliste," *Latomus* 41 (1982) 610, points out the dual aspect of man's relationship to nature in Statius's villa poems: "Maître absolu de la nature, l'homme est son 'formateur' et son bienfaiteur."

³² Hardie, 174 ff., finds it strange that since Statius lived during the post-Neronian decline in luxury, he did not praise frugality or at least restraint in wealth, a popular literary theme at the time. Cf. Martial, *Epigram* 3. 58 and *Epigram* 12. 50, where he denounces the type of luxury villa Statius describes. Seneca, *Epistles* 90, cites architecture as the first of the artisan crafts which signify man's historical degeneration.

³³ P. White, "The Friends of Martial, Statius, and Pliny, and the Dispersal of Patronage," *HSCP* 79 (1975) 265–300, 267. White concludes that the relationship between poet and patron in the late first century A.D. was fairly tenuous and that there is no evidence for a literary circle around Statius and Martial.

response to Horace's *Epistle* 1. 10 represents more truly Vopiscus's views than the author's own.

The description of Vopiscus's villa, for example, concludes with a list of Italian places to which Vopiscus's Tibur is superior: Tusculum, Ardea, Baiae, Formiae, Circeii, Anxur, Caieta, Antium (83–89). These towns, linked by the anaphora of *cedant*, are not praised for their natural beauty, as we might expect: Martial, for instance, bestows on the Lucrine Lake the epithets *blanda* and *lascivi* (*Epigrams* 4. 57. 1) as well as *mollis* (*Epigrams* 6. 43. 5); Statius, on the other hand, simply says *Lucrinaeque domus* (84) without further elaboration. Moreover, he refers to Anxur in partly negative terms that suggest overbearing pride, *arcesque superbae* / *Anxuris* (86–87). Statius describes the rest of the towns he lists, with the exception of Antium, in terms of their mythical past. Yet this too is strange, for these towns have unhappy or sordid pasts which Statius, by his deliberate allusions, brings to the forefront. Tusculum is named after Telegonus, son of Ulysses and Circe, and a parricide: Ardea is named after Aeneas' maddened foe, Turnus; Formiae is named after Antiphates, who is described as *cruenti* (84), because as king of the Laestrygonians he killed his guests; Circeii is referred to as *iuga perfida Circes* (85), howled upon by wolves. The transference of the epithet *perfida* to the mountain ridges suggests the unattractiveness of the terrain as well as recalling the theme of moral perfidy. The effect of this catalogue of impieties is to diminish the stature of Vopiscus's Tibur. Many places could be better than the ones named in Statius's catalogue without having any great virtue in themselves.³⁴

By naming only Italian towns, Statius automatically narrows the bounds of his encomium. In *Odes* 1. 7 Horace praises Tibur through the same device that Statius uses here, the catalogue. But in Horace's catalogue he lists the most famous cities of the ancient world, those in Greece (1–11). Furthermore, he endows them with encomiastic epithets. For instance, he describes Rhodes as brilliant with sunshine and fame, *claram* (1), Thebes and Delphi as distinguished for their gods Bacchus and Apollo, *insignes* (4), Athens as the city of virgin Athena, *intactae Palladis* (5), the plain of Larissa as fertile, *opimae* (10). Unlike Statius's Italian places, those that Horace lists are physically and morally worthy of great praise. Furthermore, they offer fit subjects for inspired song.³⁵ Thus, unlike Statius, Horace uses the catalogue to throw into sharp relief the virtues of Tibur, a humble

³⁴ In *Silvae* 3. 4. 40–44, Statius uses the same form of catalogue, beginning with *cedet*, to compare the beauty of Earinus to handsome youths of myth. J. Garthwaite's perceptive comments on these lines in the appendix to Ahl (above, note 7) 115–16, reveal that Statius's emphasis is in fact not on the beauty of the youths but on the sterile and destructive passion they inspired. Their fate thus prefigures Earinus's own.

³⁵ E.g. lines 5–6: *Sunt quibus unum opus est, intactae Palladis urbem / Carmine perpetuo celebrare . . .*

Italian town but for beauty, sanctity, and poetry on a level with the most famous places of Greece.

Statius's catalogue also ends in a strange fashion for a supposed panegyric (88–89):

cedant, quae te iam solibus artis
Antia³⁶ nimbose revocabunt litora bruma.

Vopiscus has to leave Tibur in the winter because of the foggy weather. With the final word *bruma*, Statius emphasizes that the climate at Tibur is far from ideal. One would expect Statius's list of Italian towns to end with a resounding note of praise and with a positive affirmation of the superiority of Tibur. In *Odes* 1. 7, for instance, Horace's concludes with a brief but evocative sketch of Tibur's echoing beauty (12–14). Instead, Statius undercuts our expectations by ending on an anticlimactic note that suggests one of Tibur's faults, its poor climate in winter. Horace found the perfect year-round climate at Tarentum where, he tells us in *Odes* 2. 6, spring was long and winters mild, *tepidasque . . . / brumas* (17–18). In *Silvae* 1. 2, the epithalmium for Stella and Violentilla, Statius praises the home of the happy couple for its mild climate where *Bruma tepet* (157). Since Statius dedicates the entire first book of the *Silvae* to Stella, and addresses to him an affectionate and fairly personal preface, he presumably had closer links to Stella than to Vopiscus. Vopiscus's Tibur, on the other hand, is no ideal landscape free from the encroachments of either bad weather or time. Statius's use of *bruma* here has rather sinister overtones, for by linking the word with *solibus artis*, a phrase that also occurs at the end of the line, Statius draws attention to its original meaning of the shortest day in the year, a time associated with the brevity of human existence. There is a similar connection of thought in *Silvae* 2. 1. 215, where *bruma* with its chilly jaws, *ora rigentia Brumae*, is cited in a catalogue listing the violent means by which we mortals inevitably meet our end (213–18). The preceding place mentioned in Statius's catalogue is Caieta, the name of Aeneas's nurse, whose death at the start of *Aeneid* 7 is her sole mention in Vergil's epic. Thus, the conclusion of this rather strange catalogue in *Silvae* 1. 3 subtly associates Vopiscus's Tibur too with the transience of human life and glory.

The partly negative impact of this conclusion is reinforced by the position of the catalogue within the structure of the poem. The catalogue of

³⁶ Since Antia is a reading from marginalia, Vollmer, 278–79, argues for retaining M's reading of *avia* on two accounts, first that Statius is making a personal reference to Vopiscus's choice of a winter retreat, and second that Statius means us to understand the line in the sense of *avia a nimbose bruma*. The preceding catalogue of towns, however, seems to call for one final name in conclusion, particularly since Statius again uses *cedant* (88), the verb that has linked the other place-names together. M's reading can be ascribed to the copyist's unfamiliarity with the name of an obscure Italian town.

towns concludes the section describing the villa and its landscape (1–89); the account of Vopiscus's character follows and completes the poem (90–105). The description of the villa is framed by references to winter, for in the opening line of the poem Statius refers to Tibur as *glaciale*. In a hot climate, coolness is highly desirable but *glaciale* is an odd word to choose, as it connotes not only coolness but unpleasant cold. Elsewhere in Latin literature it is chiefly used of harsh, wintry conditions.³⁷ Statius emphasizes the extreme cold of Tibur again a few lines later (7–8):

talīs hiems tectis, frangunt sic improba solem
frigora . . .

The adjective *improba*, in particular, suggests an extremity of temperature that is inappropriate to the general context of eulogy. The adjective also conflicts with the Epicurean motifs of *Voluptas* (9) and *Venus* (10) that Statius introduces at the start to suggest that Vopiscus is an adherent of Epicureanism.³⁸ Moderation was a key concept of Epicurean thought, but *improba* emphasizes that the cold is excessive.³⁹ At lines 4–5 Statius mentions the Dog Star and the constellation of Leo as signs of unbearable heat. Likewise, at the start of *Epistle* 1. 10, Horace contrasts *rabiem Canis et momenta Leonis* (16) to the coolness of the country which he describes as *hiemes* (15). Unlike Statius, however, he immediately moderates the force of the word by juxtaposing a word suggesting a temperate climate, *tepeant*. Thus Horace maintains the concept of moderation that is so important to his rural ideal. By exaggerating an unpleasant aspect of Tibur's climate at the beginning and end of his villa description, Statius strikes a discordant note that culminates in his suggested reminder of the brevity of human life and possessions. He thus destabilizes the general pattern of the eulogy.

Statius's emphasis on Tibur's coldness jars metaphorically not only with Vopiscus's philosophical pursuits as a quasi-Epicurean but also with his poetic pursuits. Unfortunately we know very little about Vopiscus. Our sole source of information for his literary activities resides with Statius. In the preface to Book 1 of the *Silvae*, Statius describes Vopiscus as a very learned man who is a patron of literature, *vir eruditissimus et qui praecipue vindicat a situ litteras iam paene fugientis* (25–26). In *Silvae* 1. 3. 90–104, Statius tells us that Vopiscus is a poet who has practised a variety of

³⁷ E.g. Vergil, *Aeneid* 3. 285: *glacialis hiems*; Ovid, *Met.* 8. 788: *extremis Scythiae glacialis in oris* (the home of *Fames*). Unlike *glacialis*, the more common adjective *gelidus* can occasionally mean a refreshing coolness; e.g. Juvenal, *Satires* 3. 190: *gelida Praeneste*.

³⁸ Hardie p. 176, describes Vopiscus's philosophical attitude as an "emasculated Epicureanism."

³⁹ J. Conington, *P. Vergilii Maronis Opera*, ed. H. Nettleship (London 1898), vol. 1, comments on Vergil's use of *improbis* for a goose in *Georgics* 1. 119, that the word denotes the absence of "the civic virtue of moderation . . . and is applied to the wanton malice of a persecuting power, E VIII 51, to the unscrupulous rapacity of noxious animals, (G) III 431, A. II 356, etc., and even to things which are exacting and excessive, (G I) 146 'labor.'"

genres. Vopiscus's choice of Tibur as a home thus throws him into comparison with Horace in poetry as well as in landscape. As a poet himself and an admirer of Horace, Statius doubtless had strong feelings about Vopiscus's literary efforts at Tibur. Through his implicit but pervasive comparison between the poetic styles of Horace and Vopiscus, Statius subtly suggests that the latter is an inferior poet.

In *Odes* 4. 2 and 4. 3 Horace claims a direct link between the Tiburtine landscape and his poetic inspiration. The type of poetry that he composes there is not epic but lyric, which is short and perfectly crafted. In keeping with his adoption of the short, carefully wrought poem, Horace compares himself to a bee collecting sweet honey from the moist banks and grove of Tibur (*Odes* 4. 2. 27–32):

... ego apis Matinae
more modoque

grata carpentis thyma per laborem
plurimum circa nemus uvidique
Tiburis ripas operosa parvus
carmina fingo.

In this poem Horace is contrasting his style with the high-blown vehemence of Pindar. By referring to the banks of Tibur, Horace makes the reader envisage a river that is contained. When he describes Pindar's poetry, however, Horace uses the contrasting metaphor of a river that has burst its banks and is racing down a mountain out of control (5–8):

monte decurrens velut amnis, imbres
quem super notas aluere ripas,
fervet immensusque ruit profundo
Pindarus ore

In contrast to these images of violent energy, Horace describes his own poetry in terms of careful, orderly craftsmanship. At Tibur his songs are *operosa* (31), and he fashions them like a sculptor, *fingo* (32)—the same verb that he uses in *Odes* 4. 3. 12 to suggest the formative influence of Tibur on his poetry.

Statius tells us that Vopiscus is versatile as a poet. Like Horace, he writes satires, poetic epistles, and lyric (99–104). He also, however, attempts to rival Pindar: *seu tibi Pindaricis animus contendere plectris* (101). Unlike Horace, then, he attempts the grand style in his poetry as well as in his life. Just as Vopiscus conceives of the humble Tiburtine landscape of Horace on a far greater scale, so he attempts a greater scope as a poet.

The implicit contrast with Horace works to Vopiscus's detriment, of course. History does not record any poet called Vopiscus of even minor fame. Tibur fashions Horace as a poet; at Tibur, as we have seen, Vopiscus

is the craftsman, fashioning the landscape to suit his needs for comfort and ease. Unlike Horace's bee, energetically flitting to and fro, gathering the sweet honey of the Muses, Vopiscus has no intimate poetic relationship with nature. He is also far different from the vehement, resounding Pindar. His poetic inspiration is not associated directly with the physical beauty of the landscape; only its *quies* is a contributing factor. Statius introduces the witty conceit that the Anio deliberately flows more quietly when it passes Vopiscus's villa, fearful of disturbing Vopiscus's poetic meditations and dreams (22–23):

. . . ceu placidi veritus turbare Vopisci
Pieriosque dies et habentis carmina somnos.

Like Horace, Vopiscus as a poet is associated with a quiet, contained river. But the later poet's river has no formative influence; it does not even provide background music.

Furthermore, the phrase *habentis carmina somnos* is rather a strange one. Sleep was often seen as the prelude to inspired song;⁴⁰ that songs should "have sleep" is, however, another matter. *Somnos* appears again at the end of a line (42), and is again used to suggest the quiet of Vopiscus's house. But here the noun is qualified by *nigros*, an adjective that stands out as oddly sinister in this context.⁴¹ In Statius's poetry, *niger* almost invariably has negative connotations. In the *Thebaid* it is frequently used of death, the Underworld, or of places with infernal associations.⁴² In the *Silvae* the adjective appears six times, twice to suggest gloom,⁴³ and three times to describe death.⁴⁴ Its application to *somnos* here causes therefore a somber undercurrent. Silius Italicus uses the similar phrase *niger somnus* of the death of one of his warriors in battle.⁴⁵ As a poetic as well as a physical environment, Vopiscus's Tibur is associated with the end of life and, consequently, with the lack of vibrant song.

Vopiscus's poetic landscape is marked by a curiously emphasized lack of noise and almost of movement. The woods are quiet, *tacentis* (40), the night is undisturbed, *turbine nullo* (41), and is silent, *silet* (42). These words, leading up to the climactic phrase *nigros somnos*, cumulatively suggest that the quiet is less peaceful than deadening. Such an atmosphere

⁴⁰ The neoteric tradition of poetic inspiration gave special importance to the association between sleep and poetry. In a dream Callimachus was transported to Mount Helicon (*Anth. Pal.* 7. 42; cf. Horace, *Odes* 3.4. 9–11).

⁴¹ Hence the suggested emendation of *nigros* to *pigros*. See E. Courtney, "The *Silvae* of Statius," *TAPhA* 114 (1984) 331–32.

⁴² E. g. *Thebaid* 1. 307: *nigra . . . Tartara*; *Thebaid* 9. 851: *nigrae . . . mortis*; *Thebaid* 5. 153: *niger . . . lucus* (where the Lemnian women swear to murder their husbands).

⁴³ *Silvae* 1. 3.103 (of satire); *Silvae* 4. 4. 62 (of Thule).

⁴⁴ *Silvae* 2. 1. 19; 3. 3. 21; 5. 1. 19.

⁴⁵ Silius Italicus, *Punica* 7. 632–33: *membris dimissa solutis / arma fluunt, erratque niger per lumina somnus*.

of deep lethargy can scarcely be conducive to inspired *carmina*. In *Odes* 1. 7, Horace describes Tibur in terms of its resonant music, as *domus Albunae resonantis* (12), and in terms of its movement, *mobilibus . . . rivis* (14). For a poet who models himself on Pindar and Horace, Vopiscus's landscape is strangely without movement or musical echo.

Statius also advances the pleasing fancy that Vopiscus's poetry charms the local divinities (99–100):

hic tua Tiburtes Faunos chelys et iuvat ipsum
Alciden dictumque lyra maiore Catillum.

If there is a compliment here, it is backhanded. The poets referred to by the phrase *lyra maiore* are presumably Vergil and Horace, and possibly also Silius Italicus, who all briefly mention Catullus in their poetry. Vergil and Silius say no more of Catullus than his name (*Aeneid* 6. 672; *Punica* 4. 225); Horace's reference too is exceptionally brief, for he calls Tibur *moenia Catilli* (*Odes* 1. 18. 2). Although it is flattering of Statius to compare Vopiscus to such masters of epic poetry, it is decidedly less so when the basis of comparison involves only one or two words.

Also double-edged is Statius's preceding reference to the Tiburtine Fauns. Ennius set the precedent in Roman literature for associating the Fauns with a primitive form of poetry in the well-known lines from the *Annales* that condemn Naevius' uncultured verse and proclaim Ennius a pioneer in receiving both inspiration from the Muses and the enlightenment of learning:

206 (213)	scripsere alii rem	Vorsibus quos olim Faunei uatesque caneant
208 (215)	[cum] neque Musarum scopulos Nec dicti studiosus [quisquam erat] ante hunc	
210 (217)	Nos ausi reserare ⁴⁶	

Moreover, although Faunus appears as a special symbolic patron of Horace's lyric poetry,⁴⁷ in *Epistles* 1. 19 Horace associates the Fauns as a group with bad poetry. He begins the epistle jokingly with the idea that poets need strong drink, not water, to write immortal verses (1–3). But the result can be excess and lack of decorum (3–5):⁴⁸

ut male sanos
adscriptis Liber Satyris Faunisue poetas,
vina fere dulces oluerunt mane Camenae.

⁴⁶ Book 7. i–ia in *The Annals of Q. Ennius*, ed. O. Skutsch (Oxford 1985). See also the comments of Skutsch on these lines 366–75.

⁴⁷ *Odes* 1. 4. 11; 1. 17. 2; 2. 17. 28; 3. 18. 1.

⁴⁸ Martial likewise associates the Fauns with a fondness for strong drink. See *Epigrams* 8. 50.4; 9. 61. 11.

If this is the kind of audience that Vopiscus's poetry pleases, it is clearly one that does not have high standards of taste. What appears on the surface to be a pleasing rustic fancy turns out to undercut Vopiscus's literary pretensions.

At Tibur Vopiscus tries to be both a Horace and a Pindar in poetry, but he clearly fails at both. Since in his personal life he attempts an amalgam of Horatian principles with the grand style of living, the suggestion is delicately made that here too, in Statius's eyes, he failed. The nature of Vopiscus's art is reflected in his lifestyle. His poetic inferiority to Horace suggests that his physical alteration of Horace's beloved Tiburtine landscape may not, after all, be the unqualified improvement that it seems.

Statius's breathless style of wonder and enthusiasm may seem to militate against my interpretation of this poem. Certainly Statius's initial, and politic, intent is to please Vopiscus. He cannot afford to offend his patron. But in various ways Statius undermines the traditional nature of the encomium to show that he has deep reservations about Vopiscus's attempts to make Horace's Tibur his own. The answers to Horace's rhetorical questions in *Epistles* 1. 10 represent Vopiscus's views, not Statius's, for the comparison between Vopiscus and Horace in lifestyle and in poetry ultimately serves to demonstrate that Vopiscus has violated Horace's spiritual landscape.

Having compared Statius's *Silvae* 4. 4 to Horace's *Epistles* 1. 8, Hardie concludes that, as in *Silvae* 1. 3, the verbal reminiscences of Horace are slight. He still maintains that the Horatian model is clear: "Statius shows that his primary interest is not in superficial borrowing of vocabulary, but in the interpretation, understanding, and adaptation of Augustan ideas."⁴⁹ Hardie's words are highly pertinent to my own discussion of *Silvae* 1. 3. It is through the medium of Augustan poetry, including particularly Horace, that we can best understand the ideas and purposes of *Silvae* 1. 3. The dominating position of Tibur in the first line of the poem invites us from the start to view *Silvae* 1. 3 as a careful reconsideration of the value and meaning of Horace's poetic landscape.

Statius's hyperbolic, quicksilver style reveals his virtuosity as a poet more than it catalogues his patron's wealth. While we learn very little that is concrete about Vopiscus's acquisitions, we are invited to admire a detailed display of Statius's literary skill. It is Statius, rather than Vopiscus, who is more truly the inheritor of Tiburtine Horace, for Statius's method of poetic composition is like that of the bee, flitting around Tibur gathering the sweet honey of poetry and shaping it into an artful poem.

⁴⁹ Hardie 170.

This is a tactful poem. It presumably had to be, since Vopiscus was a patron of the arts, including presumably Statius himself. But beneath the fulsome praise lies an undercurrent of dissent. Through his Horatian allusions, Statius subtly undermines the type of life and poetry that Vopiscus displays at Tibur. Not only in his political poems but in seemingly straightforward private poetry, Statius reveals a complex, skeptical intelligence. On inspection, what seems to be a simple exercise in encomiastic description reveals itself to be showpiece of Statius' virtuosity in handling multileveled meaning. Ultimately, it celebrates not Vopiscus's powers or skill but Statius's own.

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Juvenal, *Satire 16*: Fragmentary Justice

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Our collection of Juvenal's *Satires* concludes with a fragmentary poem of only sixty lines that ends in mid-sentence. *Satire 16* is probably just part of what was or was intended to be a much larger poem that treated a delicate issue in the second century, the Roman army and the advantages it enjoyed. Despite the intriguing subject matter, the poem has received little attention from scholars, who have directed their efforts toward the complete satires.¹

The fragment has presented more than its share of difficulties. Today, however, we can set aside some of these problems, such as the question of authenticity, the satire's problematic position in the corpus of Juvenal, and even the difficulty of the satire's abrupt ending, for we now have acceptable solutions from which we can work.² The time has come to examine the contents of the satire and to take advantage of recent Juvenalian scholarship on the other satires in order to understand what the author intended in this poem. Previous examinations of *Satire 16* have emphasized the military aspects. For instance, G. Highet found here an attack on military ambition, and, in a rather bold reconstruction of the lost portion of the satire, he

¹ See W. S. Anderson, "The Programs of Juvenal's Later Books," *CP* 57 (1962) 151.

² *Authenticity*: In late antiquity the authenticity of *Satire 16* was rejected: *Ista a plerisque exploditur et dicitur non esse Iuvenalis*, *Scholia in Iuvenalem vetustiora*, ed. P. Wessner, (Leipzig 1967) 233–34. In the nineteenth century the poem was included among the spurious works; see O. Ribbeck, *Der echte und der unechte Juvenal* (Berlin 1865) 71–72. The satire, however, has been defended as Juvenal's on grounds of language and style by P. Ercole, "La satira 16 di Giovenale," *Athenaeum* 8 (1930) 346–60, and we may assume today that the poem is genuine. See also G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford 1954) 287–88, n. 4.

Textual problems: In some manuscripts this poem precedes the fifteenth satire. See J. L. Perret, *La transmission du text de Juvenal* (Helsinki 1927) 65; R. Beer, *Spicilegium Iuvenalianum* (Leipzig 1885) 47; U. Knoche, *Die Überlieferung Juvenals* (Berlin 1926) 27; G. Highet, "Housmaniana," *CW* 67 (1974) 367–68, n. 11.

The satire's abrupt ending: some scholars have supposed that Juvenal simply did not finish *Satire 16*, e. g., Knoche 27, and P. de Labriolle, *Les satires de Juvénal* (Paris 1943) 325. But it is just as likely that the last folia of Juvenal's text were lost in late antiquity. See Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* 287, n. 3, and L. Friedländer, *Friedländer's Essays on Juvenal*, trans. J.R.C. Martyn (Amsterdam 1969) 49–50. E. Courtney, *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal* (London 1980) 613, allows for either possibility, but he feels that Juvenal did not give the poem "its final polish."

assumed that this continued to be Juvenal's theme.³ The aim of the present examination is to demonstrate how the work fits into the scheme of Juvenal's later books, where a change in the satirist's approach has been observed.⁴ There is no need to reconstruct the lost portion of the fragment. Rather, we will seek to determine from the extant lines what Juvenal was setting out to satirize, in the hope that the general direction of that attack will become clear. We should not fail to note that certain aspects of the satire deal with civilians, even though the focus here is upon the army. In his recent commentary on Juvenal, E. Courtney has observed that *Satire* 16 as a whole represents the alienation of civilians from the army.⁵ It remains to show how the disparate elements of military and civilian life work together within the satire to form a unified theme.

1

The fragment of the satire can be divided into four sections with transitions that are unusually clear for Juvenal.⁶ In the introduction (1–6) we find the satirist expressing a wish to join the army as he begins with a question put to Gallius (1–2): *Quis numerare queat felicitis praemia, Galli, militiae?* Together with Gallius, the satirist intends to count the army's rewards and advantages; indeed the remaining portion of the satire unfolds by focusing upon these.

The very next sentence, however, is incomplete.⁷ We do not know exactly how long the lacuna is, but the missing lines presumably contained some reference to the advantages and prizes accumulated by a recruit who attached himself to a camp that promised prosperity (2: *nam si subeuntur prospera castra*). When the text begins again Juvenal is ready to enlist as a trembling recruit (3: *me pavidum . . . tironem*), but he curiously insists that the time of his enlistment be under a favorable star, for the period of

³ Highet (above, n. 2, *Juvenal the Satirist*) 154–60; for Highet's reconstruction see pp. 288–89, n. 6. M. Durry, "Juvénal et les prétoriens," *REL* 13 (1935) 95–106, points out that Juvenal takes his advantages of the army actually from the pretorian guard, although it is clear that the attack applies to the military as a whole. Highet and Durry have been the only scholars to deal with the literary content of *Satire* 16.

⁴ Highet (above, n. 2, *Juvenal the Satirist*) 138; Anderson (above, n. 1) 145–60; L. I. Lindo, "The Evolution of Juvenal's Later Satires," *CP* 69 (1974) 17–24, esp. 17, notes 1 and 2.

⁵ Courtney (above, n. 2) 613.

⁶ After the proemium (lines 1–6), each paragraph begins with a transitional sentence calling attention to the advantages of the army:

v. 7: *commoda tractemus primum communia, . . .*

v. 35: *praemia nunc alia atque alia emolumenta notemus . . .*

vv. 51–52: *solis praeterea testandi militibus ius / vivo patre datur.*

See also Courtney (above, n. 2) 613.

⁷ Since O. Jahns' edition (Berlin 1851) the lacuna has been noted. The editions of U. Knoche (Munich 1950) and W. Clausen (Oxford 1959) show the lacuna.

good fate is worth more than a letter on his behalf from Venus or Hera to Mars (3–6).

Juvenal has immediately established in the proemium two conspicuous advantages of the military that are important for the subsequent examination of army life. First, there are allusions to fortune and astrology. The military is lucky (1: *felix*) and the camp itself promises good fortune (2: *prospera castra*). Enjambement emphasizes Juvenal's stipulation that a favorable constellation accompany his enlistment (3–4: *secundo / sidere*). The time of a well-disposed fate (4: *fati . . . hora benigni*)⁸ has been taken as a reference to contemporary astrological notions. The accumulation of ideas concerning fate and good fortune introduces the military as a truly rewarding occupation and the soldier as a very lucky fellow indeed. But, at the same time, the satirist has exaggerated his praise of the soldier's good luck in the hyperbolic claim that fortune and fate are more vital to military success than a letter of recommendation to Mars by Hera or Venus. The effect is an ambivalent view of soldiering, one which, in fact, will hold for the rest of the fragment. The prospects of becoming a lucky recruit are undermined even at this early stage in the poem. Juvenal has created a tension between the ideal of the fortunate soldier and the soldiers who will subsequently be held up for mockery.

Secondly, in the proemium Juvenal's perspective on the lucky army suggests, almost misleadingly, the course he will follow in treating the subject. It is a stance of false admiration that is thoroughly ironic, and through it Juvenal leaves the impression that he is going to provide an evaluation of the army's advantages from a civilian's perspective. Neither he nor Gallius is a member of the army, but both are presented as lowly civilians who admire and count the army's prizes (*praemia*). At this stage, the prizes are left undefined, but they will remain the focus of Juvenal's treatment and eventually they will come to mean something quite different from military rewards. In a military context *praemia* often denoted land grants to veterans in return for their services or a monetary award given upon a soldier's military discharge.⁹ We are thus led to expect a satire on military virtue, specifically *felicitas*, and an enumeration of as many benefits that result from being a good soldier as Juvenal can muster.

A satiric distortion, however, comes in the first advantage (7–34), which Juvenal describes as "conveniences held in common" by soldiers (7: *commoda . . . communia*). The undermining of the military, begun at verses 5–6, is continued here with the solemn announcement that as a soldier you can attack and beat civilians with impunity (8–12). With mock

⁸ J. Gérard, *Juvénal et la réalité contemporaine* (Paris 1976) 382, connects *Sat.* 16. 2–5 with 7. 194–201, as I shall do below.

⁹ See G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army* (New York 1969) 257. The word *praemia* occurs later (35), where it is certainly not used in a strictly military sense. Here, as Courtney has observed (above, n. 2) 614, the term has a non-technical meaning.

admiration the satirist insists that this particular advantage is not the least of the army's privileges (7–8). In his compact description of a beating, Juvenal dwells upon the brutal details: the civilian will not dare to show to the praetor his knocked-out teeth, his swollen face, and his one remaining eye that the doctor gives no promises of regaining sight (10–12).¹⁰

Juvenal's vivid scene of the beaten civilian suggests that the first reward of military service is the privilege of exercising cruelty with total impunity. He accentuates the threat to civilians by pointedly describing the soldier's boots and leggings (14; 24–25). Indeed, if we can believe Umbricius' complaint in the third satire (248), to have a hobnail stuck in one's toe by a soldier's boot was not an uncommon experience in the streets of Rome. Just how far Juvenal is exaggerating any real encounters between soldiers and civilians is not in question for the thrust of the passage. The satirist is intent upon emphasizing the brutality identified with the first military advantage. His perspective on that advantage is one of a threatened civilian who suffers from the actual privileges that soldiers enjoy.¹¹

What is the defenseless civilian to do when he is attacked by a soldier? If he decides to press charges against the soldier, he must present his case before a centurion, a type of individual known for crudity and intimidation.¹² The judge will be an "Illyrian boot," again a menacing symbol of impersonal cruelty.¹³ Besides the physical punishment, the civilian must appear, not in a civil court, but in a military camp, where he will be tried under the ancient laws of the army and according to the *mos Camilli*, a legal practice that purported to keep soldiers within their camp for trials (15–17). The assumption is that Juvenal here is alluding to a contemporary law that forbade soldiers to be away from their standards.¹⁴ Indeed, one of the

¹⁰ This particular passage is sometimes cited as evidence for the cruel treatment of civilians by Roman soldiers. Webster (above, n. 9) 261–66, summarizes some complaints against the army's brutality, taken mostly from the provinces in the fourth century. Actually one of the earliest references to soldiers' brutality is this passage of Juvenal. A later story of a fight between a civilian and a soldier is told by Apuleius, *Meta*. 9. 39–42.

¹¹ Juvenal's perspective of a threatened civilian is further seen in his form of address in the satire. He begins by addressing Gallius as soldier in the second person singular (8: *te*), but this perspective is shifted to that of a civilian, still in the second person singular (24: *habeas*), and the civilian's viewpoint is maintained throughout the fragment.

¹² See Persius, *Sat.* 3. 77–85, 5. 189–91, concerning the brutal nature of centurions. Juvenal's claim here that the civilian must appeal to a centurion raises questions of legal procedure. Usually the civilian would make his appeal to the *praetor urbanus*, who would appoint a judge. Juvenal is the only authority who indicates the judge could be a centurion. See Courtney (above, n. 2) 615.

¹³ Vv. 13–14: *Bardaicus iudex datur . . . calceus . . .*. See J.E.B. Mayor, *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal* (London and New York 1888) 402–403, and de Labriolle (above, n. 2) 327: "Les Bardaei étaient un peuple illyrien, et ce seul nom évoquait l'idée de brutalité." See also Courtney, (above, n. 2) 615–16.

¹⁴ *Dig.* 22. 5. 60; see Highet (above, n. 2, *Juvenal the Satirist*) 287, n. 1; B. d'Orgeval, *L'Empereur Hadrien: oeuvre législative et administrative* (Paris 1950) 87, 348–51; L. Friedländer, *D. Junii Juvenalis Saturarum Libri V* (Leipzig 1895) 595; Courtney (above, n. 2) 616.

satirist's point is that the soldier will not be *procul a signis* (17), whereas the civilian will be *procul . . . ab urbe* (25).¹⁵ To the injured civilian thus the army's advantage resides in a freedom to show cruelty and in a possible trial in a military court where the outsider will be threatened by a legal system of a foreign environment.

In spite of the prospect of an unfair military trial, the injured civilian, here presented as an interlocutor, expresses a naive faith in justice, even going so far as to claim that the centurion's judicial examination will be most just (17–18: "*iustissima centurionum / cognitio est igitur de milite*").¹⁶ He cannot fail to gain revenge for his injuries, provided a fair case is put forward (18–19: "*nec mihi derit / ultio, si iustae defertur causa querellae*"). The satirist's reply is much less naive, however. The whole affair is a lost cause and worth "only the heart of Vagellius, the declaimer," and so it is silly to strike against so many boots and hobnails while you still have two legs (22–25). Under circumstances like these no one would be such a faithful Pylades as to accompany his injured friend to a military camp, and we may as well not trouble our friends by asking them to come to the trial as witnesses (25–28). To be sure, anyone who steps forward when the judge calls for witnesses is worthy of the ancients (29–32). Juvenal concludes the discussion on the first advantage (32–34):

citius falsum producere testem
contra paganum possis quam vera loquentem
contra fortunam armati contraque pudorem.

In the first advantage the satirist has gone out of his way to represent an army composed of brutal soldiers whose good fortune is now defined in terms of the abuse of tradition and power. The ancient laws and military customs have been preserved (16: *servato*) to work only to the soldier's devious benefit. It is wasted effort to argue, even with truth on your side, against the soldier's fortune and honor (34: *fortunam . . . pudorem*). The manner in which Juvenal has juxtaposed these two qualities reflects the divergent directions of his satire. They represent the advantages of being a soldier but they are seen from the viewpoint of the civilian's disadvantage. The soldier's fortune and honor strike fear into civilians, thereby making truth in court an impossibility and preventing them from testifying on behalf of a friend.

¹⁵ Courtney (above, n. 2) 617–18, takes *tam procul . . . ab urbe* (25) as a joke: the praetorian camp would in fact be just outside Rome; if Juvenal has in mind here only the praetorian guard, then the remark should be seen as an excuse from the defendant's friend.

¹⁶ Vv. 17–18 present a troublesome textual problem. At 18 *etsi agitur de milite* has been proposed and defended. See R. R. Kilpatrick, "Two Notes on the Text of Juvenal: *Sat.* 12. 32 and 16. 18," *CP* 66 (1971) 114–15; J. P. Sullivan, "A Note on Juvenal 16. 18," *CP* 79 (1984) 229. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, "Juvenal 16. 18," *CP* 81 (1986) 60–61, however, has argued for the reading in Clausen's Text, *est † igitur † de milite*. Shackleton Bailey says that the *iustissima . . . cognitio* (17–18) should not be taken as a compliment of the centurion and rejects *etsi* at v. 18, which would indicate that centurions could try cases not involving soldiers.

The soldier's advantage has an adverse effect upon civilians. It has rendered civilians helpless and it has destroyed the bonds of true friendship in hard times, such as that symbolized by Pylades (26). The implication in verses 20–28 is that the centurion will work in the military court to support the brutality of soldiers (20): *tota cohors tamen est inimica*. While soldiers have thus banded together in a manipulation of their traditions and legal system and in their animosity toward civilians, the rest of society is fragmented and does not have the advantage of unity found in the army. This appears to be the common advantage (7) now possessed by the military, but not enjoyed by other members of society. The result is that the brutality of the army has extended indirectly into civilian life and the perversion of the military has debased Roman society as a whole.

In the next section of the poem (35–50), Juvenal announces that he will deal with various emoluments accruing from the military oath soldiers have taken (35–36). The word *sacramentum* (36) as a metonymy for military service attracts our attention. Having just concluded that soldiers make truth in a court impossible, Juvenal produces a quick jibe at the military oath. The satirist passes over the army, however, and anticipates the legal complications that would hamper his trial, if he were to prosecute someone for stealing land, removing a boundary stone (38: *sacrum . . . saxum*), or for not repaying a loan. Each of the hypothetical trials is civil and perhaps not of great consequence to other people, the state, or community. But to Juvenal the trial would have great significance and even religious overtones. We see his personal involvement when he states that the stone has been piously kept in order by proper sacrifices, and we are to assume that its removal would constitute to him a sacrilege (38–39).¹⁷ This is, at any rate, not a hopeless case presented before a military court and it is certainly worth more than the cheap declamation of Vagellius' prosecution. We find that Juvenal has gone to the trouble of hiring a lawyer and makes his appearance in court (46–47).

Yet complications arise. Instead of the case being prosecuted immediately, Juvenal complains, he would have to wait an entire year before the matter came to court (42–43). Even when it gets this far there will be a thousand delays and troubles (43–44), some of which are outrageous enough that any hope of justice is dashed. For instance, once in court the plaintiff must wait while the pillows are positioned correctly on the bench, while Caedicius, an eloquent lawyer, removes his cloak, or while Fuscus, the opposing advocate, answers the call of nature (44–47).¹⁸ Finally, when the

¹⁷ Juvenal's worship of the boundary stone recalls Ovid's description of the sacrifice to Terminus (*Fasti* 2. 639–84). The penalty for removing such stones was increased by Hadrian; see Courtney (above, n. 2) 618.

¹⁸ Courtney (above, n. 2) 620, understands *Fusco iam micturiente* (46) to mean that "Fuscus realises that he will have to stay in court for some time and is taking the precaution of going to the lavatory beforehand." I would see the force of *iam* as indicating that Fuscus, like the other lawyer Caedicius (45–46: *iam facundo ponente lacernas / Caedicio*), uses his call to nature as an

trial does get underway, it begins with all the mock severity of a gladiatorial contest. Juvenal and his opponent "fight on the sticky sand of the forum" (47). We are not given the outcome of the trial. Rather, Juvenal goes on to make the point that, in contrast to dilatory civilian courts, soldiers suffer no such protracted trials in their legal procedures (48–50):

ast illis quos arma tegunt et balteus ambit
quod placitum est ipsis praestatur tempus agendi,
nec res atteritur longo sufflamine litis.

Juvenal has spent the major portion of his account of the soldier's second advantage describing his own case and the trouble he can expect to find in court. The brunt of his attack lands upon civilian courts, especially the lawyers with their delaying tactics. The criticisms of the legal profession here are reminiscent of *Satire* 7. 105–49, where Juvenal decries the uselessness of eloquence (see especially lines 135–49). The requisites for an advocate were costly—a shining ring, eight servants and ten assistants—but eloquence was dispensable (7. 140–43). This view of lawyers implies that the legal profession has been reduced to showmanship. In the sixteenth satire the legal system again suffers from a lack of substance. Although Caedicius is eloquent (45), the portrait of his ritual removal of his cloak ridicules an inappropriate interest in rhetorical *actio*, a kind of showmanship that delays, rather than promotes, the process of justice. Even less promising for obtaining justice is Fuscus' exit to the toilet, an action that essentially reduces eloquence in the law courts to obscenity. Juvenal leaves the impression that Caedicius and Fuscus are more interested in such absurd actions than in the substance of the case or justice for their clients.

Although the last paragraph (51–60) is incomplete, it is possible to determine its general direction. On one level, Juvenal sets out to attack the army as affording an opportunity for wealth and promotion. The passage begins with a statement that soldiers alone have the right of making a will while the father is still alive (51–52: *solis praeterea testandi militibus ius / vivo patre datur*). The purpose for this beginning is partly to create the absurd situation of Coranus, apparently a young recruit who is earning money in the army (55: *aera merentem*). In a complete role reversal, Coranus' father, "trembling with old age," pursues his own son's legacy

excuse for delay. Certainly the point that Juvenal is making is that civilian lawyers are dilatory. The frustration of enduring a civilian trial is thus expressed through the *iam . . . iam*. It is not so much that the legal preparations of Fuscus include micturition, as it is a case of an obscene *para prosdokian* which adequately expresses the frustration of the satirist, here representing himself as the participant in the trial.

(55–56). The criticism of the military is obviously aimed at the perversion of military tradition into a means of gaining wealth.¹⁹

On this same level, military promotion is criticized. The attack is expanded rather suddenly by means of the demonstrative pronoun *hunc* (56) as the only indication that the topic is extended: “a fair partiality (*favor aequus*) promotes this man (Coranus) and renders its own recompense for good labor” (56–57). “Fair partiality” is an arresting oxymoron that becomes ironic by virtue of Juvenal’s continued stance of mock admiration. The idea of partiality continues in the association of wealth with promotion in the next sentence, where Juvenal claims that a general will see to it that a brave soldier is also the most wealthy (58–59). There is then mention of the soldier’s bosses and necklaces (60), but these are the last words of the poem. We may imagine that the sentence concluded with something to the effect that soldiers flaunt themselves and prance around in rich ornaments, displaying their rank and wealth.

A second level is also evident in this attack on military rank and wealth. Juvenal is not just criticizing the army, nor is he solely interested in the inheritance laws that soldiers enjoyed. Just as the satirist has been an outside observer of the army and just as he has carefully implied that the advantages of the military work to the disadvantage of civilians, so here too Juvenal means to focus attention on his fellow citizens. It is for soldiers alone (51: *solis . . . militibus*) that the law of inheritance creates convenience. The clear implication is that civilians do not enjoy such a privilege.

Juvenal’s mention of the law of inheritance may help us in putting *Satire* 16 into perspective. The Roman army of the pre-Flavian period enjoyed special privileges of making wills while the father remained alive, but these privileges came from a special dispensation of the general and were not the issue of codified law.²⁰ According to *Digest* 29. 1. 1–14, however, the emperor Nerva granted special indulgence toward soldiers’ rights of inheritance, and Trajan followed suit by providing the same advantages.²¹ Juvenal had thus seen in his own lifetime the creation of a law that was designed for “soldiers alone,” and we may take the implied exclusion of civilians from the law as partly responsible for arousing the satirist’s ire.

¹⁹ The criticism of military life as a means of becoming wealthy parallels Juvenal’s earlier attack at *Sat.* 14. 189–98.

²⁰ J. A. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* (London 1967) 22. See also d’Orgeval (above, n. 14) 87.

²¹ *Dig.* 29. 1. 3–4: . . . *divus Nerva plenissimam indulgentiam in milites contulit: eamque et Traianus secutus est . . .* In all fairness to Trajan, however, this measure was taken to simplify the lives of soldiers and to accommodate their simplicity (29. 1. 10–14): *simplicitati eorum consulendum existimavi*. See also Friedländer (above, n. 14), pp. 599–600, and Courtney (above, n. 2), p. 621, for other allusions to Roman law.

2

As we have seen in the discussion of the last advantage, Juvenal's attack operates on two levels. An interpretation of *Satire* 16 must consider these levels, the one focusing upon the army's privileges, the other upon the unfortunate status of civilians. Surely, one of the features of the poem is the extent to which the satirist draws attention to the Roman citizenry. This is seen most clearly in his account of the second advantage (35-50), where the privilege of an unencumbered trial as enjoyed by soldiers is not in question. Here Juvenal does not really attack the military and its advantage of a quick trial. It would be strange indeed for the satirist or anyone else to suggest that there is some inherent evil in finding swift and uncomplicated justice. At this point, rather than criticize the military, Juvenal launches into an attack upon private lawyers and the civilian legal system for failing to provide to citizens the same convenience as is offered to soldiers. In other words, the soldier's advantage is used merely as a foil for emphasizing the unfortunate state of civil courts (48-50). Juvenal is saying that there is a failure in civilian society. In the second advantage the fault lies in civilian lawyers and civil courts, which are dilatory and unresponsive. At least as far as this passage is concerned, there is no direct link between what is wrong in civil society and the perverted advantages of soldiers. This emphasis upon civilian society in the second advantage merits special attention, for it indicates that the scope of Juvenal's attack is much wider than has previously been noted.

Elsewhere in the fragment the criticism of civilian society is not so direct as in the second advantage. Nevertheless, it is present. For example, Juvenal claims that a civilian cannot expect protective friendship when he must make a complaint in a military court against a soldier (25-28). It is now no longer possible to expect that a witness will stand up and speak the truth on a friend's behalf (29-34). Such faults can be understood as an oblique criticism of a society that has been intimidated by the threats and brutality of Roman soldiers. Another instance of indirect criticism is the passage in which Coranus' father makes a fool of himself by pursuing his soldier son's legacy (54-57). What is wrong here is that, instead of the usual situation in which a younger man pursues an older person's legacy, we have just the reverse. Here again the real villains are not the citizens so much as the soldiers, who are making money and enticing civilians, excluded from the army's wealth, into becoming fools. The army of the satire thus has the effect of perverting civilian society and reversing roles of father and son.

Both the direct and indirect criticism of civil society suggest that Juvenal means to examine Roman society as a whole in *Satire* 16. It is true that the view of society presented here is oversimplified, for the satirist makes the obvious division of Romans into soldiers and civilians with the military enjoying all sorts of conveniences while normal citizens suffer

misfortune. This dichotomy is maintained throughout the fragment by the open conflict between soldiers and civilians (7–34), by the two contrasting legal systems (35–50), and by the law that excludes everyone in society except soldiers (48–50). The contrast is of course presented to us by means of the army's privileges and examples of good fortune. In short, Juvenal has created the type of soldier who will be what the civilian is not: *felix*.

We can now understand better Juvenal's technique of making the army into such a propitious, but perverted and cruel, occupation. We began with the fortunate army (1–2) and the expectation that Juvenal intended to treat somehow military virtue and luck. As a military quality *felicitas* was required of generals and was evinced in battle by such situations as a commander's personal appearance on the field to bring success.²² In the satire, however, Juvenal deals with good fortune in a twofold manner which is unexpected. First, he has changed the military ideal into something grotesque. This was accomplished immediately in the description of the first advantage by Juvenal's definition of good fortune as the ability to mistreat civilians. Secondly, the soldier's fortune has been expanded beyond the scope of the military ideal to include what properly should belong to the realm of a civilian's good fortune. This second step is seen in the passage where Juvenal claims that only soldiers can receive swift justice (48–50). Normally such a convenience should not be viewed as any special privilege of one sector of society, but rather as a civil right belonging to all citizens.

Another and more specific example of this second step is the reference to the brave soldier as *felicissimus* (59). The word occurs in a context of opulence that creates tension for it as a military ideal. The point is that soldiers are becoming wealthy and that the general will strive to make the brave soldier "the richest." Again one would assume that the acquisition of wealth belongs to the civil sector of society and not to the military, especially not to the Roman army. But the army of Juvenal's satire is perverted and so is its value of *felicitas*. Good fortune thus does not mean just military fortune, but it also includes the acquisition of wealth and even such harmless pursuits as obtaining a fair and unencumbered trial.

Good fortune was viewed by Juvenal as an elusive quality. While the satirist is by no means consistent on the subject, one idea from the other satires stands out as particularly relevant for the mock admiration of military benefits. In the seventh satire Quintilian is presented as an abundantly fortunate man (7. 190–93: *felix . . . felix . . . felix orator*), and there follows a passage reminiscent of the proemium of *Satire* 16, since Juvenal claims that fate determines good fortune (7. 199–201). But, we are warned, fate is not often kind and a fortunate man is rarer than a white crow (7. 202). Good fortune and happiness thus are presented as something out of reach.

²² See L. Zieske, *Felicitas. Eine Wortuntersuchung* (Hamburg 1972) 41 ff., on *Sulla Felix* (see also 310), and H. Erckell, *Augustus. Felicitas. Fortuna. Lateinische Wortstudien* (Göteborg 1952) 45–47, concerning Cicero, *Man.* 47–48.

When such a rare phenomenon of good fortune can be found in the army, civilians (in this case, Juvenal and Gallius) can only marvel at the army's advantages over themselves. Of course, the ideal of fortune that Juvenal is establishing here is hardly fair and just, but it is typical of the satirist to twist and undermine such ideals. The contrasts in Roman society become even more painful when the ideal of good fortune is found to be so elusive.

The conspicuous differences between the lucky soldier and the unfortunate civilian are ultimately a matter of inequity in society. It is, therefore, the theme of justice and injustice that provides a unity for what remains of the satire. This is partly seen in Juvenal's use of law, litigation and the courts. The first two advantages center around trials in court, civil or military, and the third benefit begins with the law of inheritance. Recurrent words that represent all levels of justice draw attention to themselves throughout the fragment, and the reader constantly has the image of legal proceedings in such words as *iudex* (29), *legibus* (15), *litiget* (16), "*da testem*" (29), *lites*, *litis* (42, 50), and *testandi . . . ius* (51).²³ The allusions to military law at verses 51–54 also point to Juvenal's interest in developing the theme of justice.

The attack on injustice develops in several directions, as for example in the antithetical motifs in which law is pitted against might and fairness against partiality. The army, perverted as it is, represents the primary destroyer of justice, for soldiers are above civilian law and restraint. Military justice is in no way connected with truth as spoken by a civilian witness in the law court (32–34). Further, Juvenal is careful to point out that soldiers' disregard for truth and justice is a benefit derived from their brute force. Military fortune is viewed as that of an armed man (34: *fortunam armati*, or else soldiers are depicted as those "whom arms protect and the sword belt encircles." Because they bear arms, soldiers can obtain justice on their own terms in their own law courts and they can enjoy uncomplicated trials. Soldiers have thus banded together in a common advantage (7) in order to thwart justice and to create their own standards of equity in the form of intimidation. Their brutal behavior toward civilians partly equates the soldiers' force with justice and reduces the question of equity to armed might.

On a wider level, soldiers' misuse of power also entails an unfair manipulation of law for their own benefit (15–17; 51–54) and the subversion of justice by having partial judges (17–19). One cannot really expect that a centurion's legal judgment concerning one of his own soldiers will be "most just" (17), even if the complaint is well founded. Rather, the soldier's judge and centurion will be partial to his own side in court. The same favoritism shown by the centurion in litigation is carried to a more

²³ Also: *iustissima . . . cognitio* (17–18), *ultio* (19), *iustae . . . causa querellae* (19), *vindicta* (22), *testem* (32), *vana supervacui dicens chirographa ligni* (41) (see also *Sat.* 13. 137), *subsellia* (44), *tempus agendi* (49), *res* (50), and *testandi . . . ius* (51).

general level by the "fair partiality" of verse 56. Juvenal here touches upon a concern that appeared earlier in the *Satires*. For him military justice represents a helplessness on the part of ordinary Romans to find justice in society. A similar situation of helplessness in the face of injustice appeared in *Satire* 3. 297-99, where a poor Roman citizen, who is likewise beaten, cannot appeal to Roman authorities, because he himself might be threatened by a lawsuit.²⁴

In the last advantage Juvenal has moved to examples outside the law courts. Here freedom from litigation meant that a soldier did not even have to enter court to make his will. It also meant that a soldier would not labor in vain and could perhaps gain some personal fortune. *Labor* occurs twice in the last paragraph (52, 57), and it is clear both times that soldiers do not live the frustrated life of civilians. One is reminded again of the third satire, where Umbricius complains that, although he was honest and hard working, in Rome he could not enjoy the advantages of labor (3. 22: *emolumenta laborum*). The unfairness suffered by civilians here is completely the reversal of soldiers' good fortune, which is enhanced either by the law of inheritance or a general's favoritism. The two Roman concepts of justice, *iustitia* and *aequitas*, are thus both represented in the satire, the one in the concrete idea usually associated with litigation and the other in the abstract concept of equity in society.

The civilian, weak in comparison to soldiers, therefore, cannot find justice in society. Justice is an elusive and unrealistic goal before a military court. Almost as bad is the quest for justice in a civilian court. Where justice ought to be the supreme consideration, it is delayed and is reduced to a mockery of showmanship by civil lawyers. Besides suffering injustice from the army and lawyers, Juvenal's civilian also has no protector who as general can establish laws for the citizen's benefit. It is a bleak picture, and the fragment leaves us with civilians caught in an unjust world where there is no hope of being as fortunate as the soldier. Perhaps, as Juvenal moved from the concrete examples of injustice in the Forum to the abstract idea of equity in society, he intended to move to a resolution of the problem. But this cannot be supported by anything other than speculation, and it is better, however grim the picture, to maintain Juvenal's representation of the problem.

Whatever the final outcome was, Juvenal is here dealing with an ethical problem that goes beyond the scope of military life. Other scholars have

²⁴ See J. Adamietz, *Untersuchungen zu Juvenal*, Hermes Einzelschriften 26 (Wiesbaden 1972) 72-73, who saw a connection between *Sat.* 16 and 3 through the idea of "Rechtllosigkeit." F. Bellandi, *Etica diatribica e protesta sociale nelle Satire di Giovenale* (Bologna 1980) 52, likewise found a connection between the maltreatment of civilians by soldiers and that of the citizen of Rome in *Sat.* 3. The specific passage that seems to parallel *Sat.* 16 is 3. 297-99:

dicere si temptes aliquid tacitusve recedas,
tantumdem est: feriunt pariter, vadimonia deinde
irati faciunt.

argued that in Juvenal's later satires there is an increased concern for abstract issues of a broad nature. For example, E. S. Ramage has demonstrated that in the twelfth satire Juvenal was treating the question of friendship.²⁵ S. C. Fredericks has observed that the fifteenth satire deals with the problem of man's inhumanity to man.²⁶ Both scholars have also shown that Juvenal develops his themes via such concrete circumstances as Catullus' shipwreck in *Satire* 12 or Egyptian cannibalism in *Satire* 15. The last poem we have of Juvenal follows a similar pattern in that the satirist attacks injustice in Roman society by means of the Roman army as his subject.

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²⁵ E. S. Ramage, "Juvenal, *Satire* 12: On Friendship True and False," *ICS* 3 (1978) 221-37.

²⁶ S. C. Fredericks, "Juvenal's Fifteenth Satire," *ICS* 1 (1976) 174-89.

Die Mysterien von Eleusis in rhetorisch geprägten Texten des 2./3. Jahrhunderts nach Christus

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Klemens von Alexandrien gilt—nicht zu Unrecht—als ein Kronzeuge für unsere noch immer eher bescheidene Kenntnis der antiken Mysterienkulte. Er hat sich in seinem Προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἑλληνας diese Rolle selber zugewiesen, erhebt er doch im zweiten Kapitel dieser Schrift, welche auf die folgenden Generationen starken Eindruck gemacht hat,¹ den Anspruch, den Schwindel der heidnischen ὄργια endlich einmal schonungslos aufzudecken.² Wie es um diesen Anspruch steht, ist eine viel diskutierte Frage. Ich habe an anderer Stelle zu zeigen versucht, dass Klemens im Kernstück seines Abschnittes über die Mysterien ein nichtchristliches, enzyklopädisch konzipiertes Handbuch exzerpiert und polemisch bearbeitet hat.³ Hier soll auf einen Punkt näher eingegangen werden, der dort nur kurz skizziert werden konnte, von der früheren Forschung indessen fast völlig unbeachtet gelassen worden ist.

Analysiert man nämlich den von Klemens sicher frei komponierten, auf das sehr informative Exzerpt folgenden Schlussteil genauer, so fällt zum einen die grossartige rhetorische Gestaltung auf:

22. 6–7 ὡ τῆς ἐμφανοῦς ἀναισχυντίας.

πάλαι μὲν ἀνθρώποις σωφρονοῦσιν ἐπικάλυμμα ἡδονῆς νύξ
 ἣν σιωπωμένη·
 νυνὶ δὲ τοῖς μυσούμενοις πείρα τῆς ἀκρασίας νύξ ἐστὶ
 λαλουμένη,
 καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐλέγχει τὰ πάθη δαδουχούμενον.

¹ Eusebius zitiert Protr. 11–23. 1 in PE II 2. 64 wörtlich; sicher von Klemens abhängig sind auch Amobius (*Adversus nationes* V) und Firmicus Maternus (*De err. prof. rel.* X, XI u.ö.), cf. unten Anm. 25.

² Protr. 12. 1; 14. 1 ("Ἦδη δέ, καὶ γὰρ καιρὸς, αὐτὰ ὑμῶν τὰ ὄργια ἐξελέγξω ἀπάτης καὶ τερατείας ἔμπλεα") etc.

³ *Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von Alexandrien* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 26). (Berlin-New York 1987) 117 ff. — im folgenden mit "Verf., *Mysterienterminologie*" zitiert.

(7) ἀπόσβesson, ὦ ἱεροφάντα, τὸ πῦρ·
αἰδέσθητι, δαδοῦχε, τὰς λαμπάδας·
ἐλέγχει σου τὸν Ἰακχον τὸ φῶς·

ἐπίτρεπον ἀποκρύψαι τῇ νυκτὶ τὰ μυστήρια·
σκότει τετιμήσθω τὰ ὄργια·
τὸ πῦρ οὐχ ὑποκρίνεται, ἐλέγχειν καὶ κολάζειν κελεύεται.

Ich habe den auf den entrüsteten Ausruf folgenden kunstvollen triadischen Bau durch die Darstellung bereits verdeutlicht: Klemens gliedert diesen Schlussabschnitt, wo er die nächtlichen Mysterien ein letztes Mal durch den Vorwurf unzüchtiger Handlungen zu diskreditieren sucht,⁴ in drei Teile, von denen jeder dieselbe wiederum triadische Binnenstruktur aufweist.

Teil I: Die ersten beiden Perioden sind streng parallel gebaut. Dem "Früher war" steht pointiert das traurige "Jetzt ist" der Mysterienweihe gegenüber, den anständigen Menschen die verruchten Initianden, der Nacht als legitimer Hülle für den ehelichen Umgang⁵ die unzüchtige Mysteriennacht, über die man gar noch spricht (σιωπωμένη—λαλουμένη als Homoioteleuta). Als Abgesang folgt die kürzere und anders strukturierte Phrase καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐλέγχει τὰ πάθη δαδουχούμενον, die mit den vorausgehenden beiden Sätzen immerhin ein passives Präsenspartizip als letztes Glied gemeinsam hat. Als Bauprinzip ergibt sich: a-a'-b.

Teil II zeigt dieselbe Gliederung: Die ersten beiden, nun eher staccatoartigen⁶ Kola sind wiederum weitestgehend parallel gebaut: Imperativ-Vokativ-Objekt (also: a-a'), während das indikativische ἐλέγχει σου τὸν Ἰακχον τὸ φῶς als "b" diese Formeinheit abschliesst. In der Klammerfunktion sind mit den Präsenspartizipien von Teil I die hier ebenfalls am Schluss stehenden Begriffe Feuer-Fackeln-Licht zu vergleichen.

Teil III ist—als Coda—etwas freier gebaut, wobei freilich die analoge Dreigliedrigkeit klar erkennbar bleibt. Die beiden a-Teile haben folgende Gemeinsamkeiten: Imperativ (ἐπίτρεπον ἀποκρύψαι-τετιμήσθω), τῇ νυκτὶ-σκότει, τὰ μυστήρια-τὰ ὄργια. Der abschliessende b-Teil ist zweiteilig; die Verbreiterung hat gewiss Klauselcharakter.

Die stets im Indikativ Präsens stehenden b-Teile erhalten im übrigen durch die Iteration von ἐλέγχειν besonderes Gewicht. Beachtlich ist ferner die die drei Teile übergreifende Abfolge von Begriffen für Nacht-Dunkelheit (N) und für Feuer-Fackeln-Licht (F): N-N-F / F-F-F / N-N-F. Vier

⁴ Dieselbe Polemik zeigt sich bereits in 13. 4 (τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην μαχλῶντα ὄργια); 14. 1–2; 16. 1; 19. 4; 20. 1; 21. 1–2. Unmittelbarer Anlass ist an unserer Stelle die vorausgehende Aufzählung verschiedener Symbola, welche sich nach Klemens in den "cistae mysticae" befinden und als deren letztes er bewusst ein Genitalsymbol nennt (κτεῖς γυναικεῖος).

⁵ Vgl. zum Gedanken Clem. Al. Paed. II 96. 2 (τὰ μυστικά τῆς φύσεως ὄργια sollen nicht am Tag vollzogen werden).

⁶ Diese kurzen, abgehackten Sätze bewirken eine Temposteigerung—in der Musik würde man von einer "Stretta" sprechen.

Erwähnungen der Mysteriennacht stehen fünf des Feuers gegenüber, wobei das erweiterte letzte Glied auch unter diesem Aspekt Klauselcharakter hat.

Soviel zur Form dieses Passus, eines eindrücklichen Beispiels der für das 2. Jh. n.Chr. charakteristischen "Konzert rhetorik."

Inhaltlich ist der Bezug auf die *eleusinischen* Mysterien mit der Anrede der Kultpriester unzweifelhaft gegeben. Der bei der Mysterienschau die heiligen Gegenstände zeigende ἱερο-φάντης und der Fackelträger (δαδοῦχος): diese beiden Priesterfunktionen wurden in Eleusis von den Familien der Eumolpiden und Keryken bekleidet.⁷ Als weitere Sachinformationen sind dem Textabschnitt zu entnehmen: die Nacht (Mysterien waren ja allgemein Nachtfeiern),⁸ das Mysterienfeuer—wobei am Ende eine Umdeutung auf das *Feuergericht* erfolgt,⁹ Fackeln bzw. Fackellicht.¹⁰ Iakchos—an sich die Personifikation des Iakchos-Kultrufes bei der grossen Prozession, welche am Tag vor der Mysteriennacht von Athen nach Eleusis führte¹¹—steht hier wohl einfach metonym für die "schändlichen" Mysterien überhaupt.¹² Mehr lässt sich aus diesem Passus nicht gewinnen. Vor allem aber wäre es verfehlt, mit Foucart aufgrund der Polemik eine Anspielung auf eine "Hiérogamie de Zeus et de Déméter" in Eleusis zu vermuten.¹³ Das hiesse, die Intention des Klemens und seine ganz auf den Effekt bedachte fulminante Rhetorik¹⁴ völlig missverstehen. Quellenwert für unsere Kenntnis der antiken Mysterien hat Klemens lediglich in jenem Abschnitt, wo er, wie erwähnt, ein heidnisches Sachbuch in polemisch bearbeiteter Form wiedergibt (§§ 13–21). In welcher

⁷ Vgl. Aristid. XXII 4 Keil; Clem. Al. Protr. 20. 2; Schol. Aischin. III 18; Paus. I 38. 3; Plut. Alc. 22. 4 etc.; cf. K. Clinton, *The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Philadelphia 1974) 10 ff.; G. Sfameni Gasparro, *Misteri e culti mistici di Demetra* (Roma 1986) 45.; W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge, Mass.-London 1987) 37.

⁸ Vgl. Verf., *Mysterienterminologie* 47 Anm. 81.

⁹ Klemens schliesst damit den Bogen zum Beginn seiner Schlussabrechnung mit den Mysterien (§ 22. 1–2), wo auf das heraklitische Feuergericht (VS 22 B 66 = Marcov. 82) angespielt wird. Ähnlich doppeldeutig sind in § 22. 7 auch "Nacht" und "Finsternis"—die Dunkelheit steht als Symbol für Unwissenheit und heidnische Verirrung, cf. z.B. Philo Quod Deus sit imm. 46, Clem. Al. Protr. 2. 2–3, 114. 1 etc.

¹⁰ Zu den kultischen Entsprechungen dieser Angaben vgl. Verf., *Mysterienterminologie* 47 ff.

¹¹ Vgl. P. Foucart, *Les mystères d'Eleusis* (Paris 1914) 110–13; L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 73; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griech. Religion I* (München 1967³) 664; W. Burkert, *Homo necans* (Berlin-New York 1972) 307 f.; F. Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit* (Berlin-New York 1974) 54 f.

¹² Ἰακχος findet sich bei Klemens nur noch in den orphischen Versen Protr. 22. 1 (dazu M. Marcovich, *Demeter, Baubo, Iacchus, and a Redactor. VChr.* 40, 1986, 294–301) und in Protr. 62. 3 (Nennung der auch aus Paus. I 2. 4 bekannten Praxitelesstatuen der drei Gottheiten Demeter, Kore und Iakchos in Athen).

¹³ Foucart (oben Anm. 11) 480. Einen sicher im Ritual verankerten Mythos von der Vergewaltigung der Demeter durch Zeus bezeugt Klemens bzw. seine Vorlage dagegen für kleinasiatische Demetermysterien (Protr. 15 f.).

¹⁴ Vgl. auch G. E. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton 1961) 305.

Bildungs-tradition dagegen seine eigene Kenntnis der eleusinischen Mysterien steht, soll nun im folgenden aufgezeigt werden.

Als erstes sei ein leider nur recht fragmentarisch erhaltener Papyrus aus hadrianischer Zeit genannt, der formal und inhaltlich überraschende Parallelen zu Klemens Protr. 22. 6–7 aufweist (Pap. della R. Università di Milano, 1937, Nr. 20, Col. I p. 176 f.). Es handelt sich offensichtlich um ein Streitgespräch zwischen Herakles, der zu den eleusinischen Weihen nicht zugelassen wird, und dem Daduchen. Dass Herakles, „das mythische Urbild der eleusinischen Mysterien“, ¹⁵ sich in Eleusis einweihen liess, ist seit Pindar bezeugt. ¹⁶ In Abweichung von der gängigen Tradition, wonach diese Einweihung vor Herakles' Gang in die Unterwelt stattfand, ¹⁷ lässt unser anonyme Autor dieses Streitgespräch nach der Rückkehr aus der Unterwelt stattfinden, ¹⁸ setzt doch Herakles den eleusinischen Weihen, die ihm vom Daduchen verweigert werden, jene weit wahreren entgegen, die—soviel lässt sich den folgenden Worten entnehmen—darin bestanden, dass er die Kore direkt gesehen habe: ¹⁹

Z. 18 λόγοι Ἦρ]ακλέους μὴ ἑωμέ-
 νου τελ]εῖσθαι τὰ Ἑλευσίνια.
 πάλαι μ]εμ(ύ)ημαι. ἀπόκλει-
 σον τὴν Ἑ]λευσείνα καὶ τὸ πῦρ
 τὸ ἱερόν.] δᾶδουχε, καὶ φθό-
 νει νυκ]τὸς ἱεράς· μυστήρια
 πολλῶ] ἀ]ληθέστερα μεμύημαι . . .
 Z. 31] τὴν Κόρην εἶδον . .

Die Parallelen zur erörterten Klemensstelle sind, wie gesagt, nicht zu übersehen: Hier wie dort handelt es sich um eine polemische Auseinandersetzung mit *Apostrophe des Kultpriesters*, der dabei aufgefordert wird, das heilige *Feuer* zu verschliessen (bei Klemens: zu löschen). Als weitere Sachinformation hören wir ferner wiederum von der *Mysteriennacht*.

“Non direi esclusa una esercitazione retorica”: so A. Vogliano, der Herausgeber dieses ägyptischen Papyrus (p. 180). Wir können es noch präziser fassen: Der anonyme Autor und Klemens von Alexandrien fussten

¹⁵ Burkert, *Homo necans* (oben Anm. 11) 284.

¹⁶ Burkert, *ibid.*, 294 Anm. 11.

¹⁷ Apollodor II 5. 12; Diodor IV 25. 1; E. Herc. 613; cf. Aristid. Panathen. 374; Plut. Theseus 30. 5; N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 211 f.; F. Brommer, *Herakles II. Die unkanonischen Taten des Helden* (Darmstadt 1984) 18 f.

¹⁸ Sollte diese Weihe Herakles vom Mord an seinen Kindern entschütten, wie K. Kerényi (*Die Mysterien von Eleusis* [Zürich 1962] 90) vermutete? Auch in der geläufigen Fassung des Mythos wird dem Helden die Weihe zunächst verweigert, ἔπειτα οὐκ ἔνι ἡνσιμενός τὸν Κενταύρων φόνον (Apollodor II 5. 12). Zur Reinigung davon sollen speziell die Kleinen Mysterien von Agrai eingerichtet worden sein, vgl. Burkert (oben Anm. 11) 293 Anm. 4; Richardson (oben Anm. 17) 212 f.; Sfameni (oben Anm. 7) 61 f.

¹⁹ Nicht nur in der rituellen Erscheinung, wie sie für die eleusinischen Mysterien anzunehmen ist—vgl. Verf., *Mysterienterminologie* 60 ff.

offensichtlich auf derselben rhetorischen Bildungstradition, wenn beide mit den gleichen Materialien eine "controversia" über die eleusinischen Mysterien gestalten.

Dass die Mysterien von Eleusis zu dieser Zeit ein beliebtes Thema für rhetorische Übungen aller Art waren, zeigen verschiedene weitere Texte aus dem 2./3. Jh. n.Chr. Herausragend ist in diesem Zusammenhang ein echtes Schulbeispiel: Beim Rhetor Hermogenes von Tarsos ist uns ein fiktiver Fall überliefert, bei dem es um die heikle Frage geht, ob ein Eingeweihter die strenge Schweigepflicht verletzt und somit zu Recht der Mysterienprofanation angeklagt wird, wenn er einem Nichteingeweihten, der in einer Traumvision die Mysterien geschaut hat, bestätigt, dass dies tatsächlich die eleusinischen Mysterien seien (Περὶ τῶν στάσεων IV 37, p. 64. 17 ff. Rabe):

... οἷον ἀμύητος ὄναρ ἰδὼν τὰ μυστήρια ἤρετό τινα, εἰπὼν
 ἂ εἶδεν, εἰ οὕτως ἔχοι· συγκατέθετο ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς καὶ ὡς ἐξειπὼν
 ὑπάγεται.

Dass sich ein solches Fallbeispiel ausserordentlich gut für eine deklamatorische Gerichtsrede zu Schulzwecken verwenden liess, zeigt die weitere Ausgestaltung dieses ζήτημα durch Sopatros im 4. Jh. n.Chr. Besondere Erwähnung verdient dabei zum Vergleich mit dem oben erwähnten Papyrus Sopatros' weitere argumentative Überlegung, ob denn dieser nicht eingeweihte Mensch nicht eine viel bessere Weihe erfahren habe, da er doch im Traum nicht nur durch einen Hierophanten, sondern durch die Götter persönlich eingeweiht worden sei (Rhet. Gr. Walz VIII, p. 122. 23 μνηθῆναι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐντελέστερον ἢ ὁ ἱεροφάντης τελέσειε).²⁰ Die Parallele zu Herakles' Argumentation liegt auf der Hand: Die Einweihung durch die Götter direkt (ob in Traum oder Unterwelt) wird gegen die Einweihung durch die eleusinischen Priester ausgespielt.

Auf dem Hintergrund dieser rhetorischen Bildungstradition gewinnt auch die Schlusspartie von Aristides' berühmter Klagerede über die Verbrennung und Verwüstung des eleusinischen Heiligtums beim Einfall eines dakischen Volksstammes im Jahre 170 n.Chr.²¹ neues Relief. Aus gegebenem Anlass konnte Aristides in dieser enkomologischen Klagerede auf u.a. aus dem Rhetorikunterricht vertrautes Material zurückgreifen. Die Fackeln begegnen uns hier ebenso wieder wie die Mysteriennacht und das Mysterienfeuer (§ 11):

ὦ δῖδες, ὕψ' οἷων ἀνδρῶν ἀπέσβητε, ὦ δεινὴ καὶ ἀφεγγὴς
 ἡμέρα, ἥ τὰς φωσφόρους νύκτας ἐξείλες, ὦ πῦρ, οἷον ὥφθης
 ἀνθ' οἷου.

²⁰ Vgl. p. 123. 12 f. βελτίων ἢ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τελετή, 124. 3 ff.

²¹ Die Katastrophe ist auch archäologisch nachweisbar, vgl. Mylonas (oben Anm. 14) 160 f.

Auch von Mysterienprofanation ist natürlich die Rede: Die Kostoboken haben mit ihrer Brandschatzung die Mysterien "ausgetanzt,"²² τὰ ἄφαντα φήναντες (§ 13).

Echte Mysteriengeheimnisse werden in allen diesen rhetorischen Darstellungen der eleusinischen Mysterien²³ nicht berührt, bei Aristeides so wenig wie bei Klemens—auch wenn dieser christliche Autor, der offensichtlich keine eigene Anschauung von den Eleusinien hatte,²⁴ dies mit seiner Polemik zu suggerieren versucht.²⁵

Natürlich braucht dieses Wissen, da es nicht über das spätestens seit dem 5. Jh. v.Chr. allgemein über Eleusis Bekannte hinausgeht, nicht immer ausschliesslich auf die rhetorische Bildungstradition zurückzugehen. Dass indessen die eleusinischen Mysterien in den ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhunderten ein auf allen Stufen der Rhetorik—von den προγυμνάσματα bis zu den μελέται—beliebtes Übungsbeispiel waren,²⁶ scheinen mir die angeführten Beispiele hinlänglich zu dokumentieren.²⁷ Man geht wohl nicht

²² Zu ἐξορχεῖσθαι siehe Verf., *Mysterienterminologie* 58.

²³ Philostrate der Erste soll nach Suda s.v. vier "eleusinische" Reden verfasst haben.

²⁴ Vgl. Verf., *Mysterienterminologie* 120 f.

²⁵ Dasselbe gilt für Gregor von Nazianz Or. 5. 30 f., der im übrigen (trotz Verf., *Mysterienterminologie* 48 Anm. 91) doch wohl direkt von Klemens abhängt—man vergleiche die folgenden weiteren Parallelen: Greg. Na. Or. 4. 108 . . . μυστήριον . . . αἰσχρὸν . . . καὶ νυκτὸς ὄντως ἄξιον—Clem. Al. Protr. 22. 1 ἄξια μὲν οὖν νυκτὸς τὰ τελέσματα κτλ., Greg. Na. Or. 39. 4 οὐδὲ Κόρη τις ἡμῖν ἀρπάζεται (cf. Clem. Al. Protr. 12. 2; 17. 1), καὶ Δημήτηρ πλανᾶται (cf. Clem. Al. Protr. 20. 1), καὶ Κελεοῦς τινὰς ἐπεισάγει καὶ Τριπτολέμους καὶ δράκοντας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ πάσχει (Anspielung auf Clem. Al. Protr. 15. 1?). αἰσχύνομαι γὰρ ἡμέρα δοῦναι τὴν νυκτὸς τελετὴν (vgl. zur Formulierung Clem. Al. Protr. 13. 4 . . . Κινύρας . . . τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην μαχλῶντα ὄργια ἐκ νυκτὸς ἡμέρα παραδοῦναι τολμήσας) . . . (C) . . . οὐδὲ Ἀφροδίτης πορνικὰ μυστήρια, τῆς αἰσχρῶς, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, καὶ γεννωμένης καὶ τιμωμένης. Von diesen Aphroditemysterien (vgl. dazu W. H. Engel, *Kypros. Eine Monographie Bd. II* [Berlin 1841] 136 ff.; M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung mit Ausschluss der attischen* [Stuttgart 1906] 364 f.) berichtet einzig Clem. Al. Protr. 13. 4 und 14. 2; von ihm abhängig sind Arnob. Adv. nat. IV 24 und V 19 sowie Firm. Mat. De err. prof. rel. X 1.

²⁶ Wie ich meine, gehört auch Epiktet, der ja mit dem Rhetorikbetrieb seiner Zeit durchaus in Berührung gekommen ist (vgl. Diatribe III 23; III 9), in diesen Zusammenhang, wenn er in III 21. 13 Menschen, die sich leichtfertig als Lehrer der Philosophie ausgeben, mit Mysterienfrevlern vergleicht: Τί ἄλλο ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε, ἢ τὰ μυστήρια ἐξορχῇ καὶ λέγεις· οἴκμα ἔστι καὶ ἐν Ἐλευσίνι, ἰδοὺ καὶ ἐνθάδε. ἐκεῖ ἱεροφάντης· καὶ ἐγὼ ποιήσω ἱεροφάντην. ἐκεῖ κῆρυξ· καγὼ κήρυκα καταστήσω. ἐκεῖ δαδούχος· καγὼ δαδούχον. ἐκεῖ δαδες· καὶ ἐνθάδε. αἱ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· τὰ γινόμενα τί διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐκείνων;

²⁷ Ausgerechnet über die der Geheimhaltung unterstellten "unsagbaren" Mysterien Reden zu halten, muss ja besonders reizvoll gewesen sein; vgl. etwa auch die detaillierten Ausführungen Sopatros' über die eleusinische Schweigepflicht (Rhet. Gr. W. VIII p. 118. 12 ff.).

fehl, wenn man die Vorliebe für dieses Thema im Zusammenhang mit dem für die zweite Sophistik charakteristischen "Attizismus der Motive" sieht.²⁸

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²⁸ A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern-München 1971³) 935; vgl. zu Lukian J. Delz (*Lukians Kenntnis der athenischen Antiquitäten*, [Freiburg i.d. Schw. 1950]), der von einem "sachlichen Attizismus" spricht (184).

Patristic Textual Criticism

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(1) Athenagoras, *Legatio pro Christianis* 13. 4 ed W. R. Schoedel (Oxford 1972): Τί δέ μοι ὅλοκαυτώσεων, ὧν μὴ δεῖται ὁ θεός; Καὶ προσφέρειν, δέον ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν τὴν λογικὴν προσάγειν λατρείαν; Schoedel translates, "But what have I to do with whole burnt offerings which God does not need? And what have I to do with sacrificing, since what is required is to offer up our rational worship as an unbloody sacrifice?"

I think Eduard Schwartz (*T.U.* 4. 2, Leipzig 1891) was right when positing a lacuna after καὶ. Read instead: Τί δὲ (δεῖ) μοι ὅλοκαυτώσεων, ὧν μὴ δεῖται ὁ θεός; Καὶ (αἷμα) προσφέρειν, δέον ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν "τὴν λογικὴν προσάγειν λατρείαν" (cf. *Rom.* 12:1).

For the supplement δεῖ compare 24. 1 Τί δὲ δεῖ (μοι) . . . (already Schwarz read Τί δε(ι) μοι); as for the added αἷμα, compare ἀναίμακτον, in the context, and 13. 2: 'Ο τοῦδε τοῦ παντός δημιουργός καὶ πατήρ οὐ δεῖται αἵματος οὐδὲ κνίσης . . .

(2) *Idem* 14. 1. Every city worships its own god. So: 'Αθηναῖοι μὲν Κελεὼν καὶ Μετάνειραν ἵδρυνται θεούς, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ Μενέλεων . . ., Ἰλιεῖς δὲ . . . "Ἐκτορα φέρουσιν, καὶ Κεῖοι 'Αρισταῖον . . ., Θάσιοι Θεαγένην . . ., Σάμιοι Λύσανδρον . . ., Μήδειαν ἢ Νιόβην Κίλικες, Σικελοὶ Φίλιππον τὸν Βουτακίδου, 'Ονησίλαον 'Αμαθούσιοι, 'Αμίλκαν Καρχηδόνιοι.

The Cilicians do not worship Medea but Melia. Read: Μελίαν καὶ Νιόβην Κίλικες (καὶ for ἢ already Prudentius Maran, Paris 1742), and compare Pherecydes ap. Schol. in Eurip. *Phoen.* 159 (p. 271. 16 Schwartz); Apollodor. *Bibl.* 3. 5. 6; Pausanias 2. 21. 9; Sophocle. *Antig.* 834; E. Maass, *Neue Jahrbh. f.d. Klass. Alt.* 14 (1911) 46.

(3) *Idem* 14. 2. Τὸ δὲ κατ' Αἰγυπτίους μὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦ· τύπονται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὰ στήθη κατὰ τὰς πανηγύρεις ὥς ἐπὶ τετελευτηκόσιν καὶ θύουσιν ὥς θεοῖς. "I cannot help thinking that what goes on among the Egyptians is ridiculous. For on their festivals they go to the temples and beat their breasts as though lamenting the dead, and yet they sacrifice to them as though to gods!" (Schoedel).

It is Osiris, in the first place, whom the Egyptians bewail as a dead person, and at the same time worship as a god, as this becomes clear from the quotation of Herodotus 2. 61 at *Legatio* 28. 8. Consequently, read: κατὰ τὰς πανηγύρεις ('Οσίρει καὶ ἄλλοις) ὡς ἐπὶ τετελευτηκόσιν καὶ θύουσιν ὡς θεοῖς, and compare Plutarch *Amatorius* 763 D Ξενοφάνης Αἰγυπτίους ἐκέλευσε τὸν "Οσίριν, εἰ θνητὸν νομίζουσι, μὴ τιμᾶν ὡς θεόν, εἰ δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦνται, μὴ θρηνεῖν; Seneca Fr. 35 Haase (ap. Augustine *De Civ. Dei* 6. 10); Theophilus *Ad Autolyicum* 1. 9; Minuc. Felix *Octavius* 22. 1 et *Isiaci miseri caedunt pectora et dolorem infelicissimae matris* [i.e. *Isidis*] *imitantur* . . . *Nonne ridiculum est vel lugere quod colas, vel colere quod lugeas?*; Firm. Matern. *De errore* 8. 3 et alibi.

(4) *Idem* 15. 2. 'Ἄλλ' ὡς ὁ πηλὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν σκευή γενέσθαι χωρὶς τέχνης ἀδύνατος, καὶ ἡ πανδεχὴς ὕλη ἄνευ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ διάκρισιν καὶ σχῆμα καὶ κόσμον οὐκ ἐλάμβανεν. Athenagoras opposes God as the active Demiurge to the passive matter. Thus read τεχνίτου for τέχνης. The term τεχνίτης appears three times in the context: τεχνίτης vs. παρασκευή (15. 2); 'Ὡς γὰρ ὁ κεραμεὺς καὶ ὁ πηλός, ὕλη μὲν ὁ πηλός, τεχνίτης δὲ ὁ κεραμεύς, καὶ ὁ θεὸς δημιουργός, ὑπακούουσα δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν τέχνην (15. 2); τὸν τεχνίτην ἐπαινοῦμεν, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς σκεύεσι δόξαν καρπούμενος (15. 3).

(5) *Idem* 16. 3. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν παραλιπόντες οἱ ἀθλοθέται τοὺς κιθαριστάς, τὰς κιθάρας στεφανοῦσιν αὐτῶν. "Judges do not neglect the players in a contest and crown their lyres instead!" (Schoedel). The translation is correct, but the Greek text is not; read: Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνισ(μά)των.

(6) *Idem* 22. 1. Athenagoras quotes Empedocles B 6. 2-3:

Ζεὺς ἀργής, . . . "Ἦρῃ τε φερέσβιος ἡδ' Αἰδωνεὺς
Νῆστis θ', ἢ δακρυοῖς τέγγ(ε)ι κρούνωμα βρότειον.

τέγγει κρούνωμα is an emendation of Stephanus and Gesner (Paris, 1557), the Arethas codex A (Paris. gr. 451 a.D. 914) has τ' ἐπικούρου νωμαί. Robert Grant asks, "But how did Epicurus get into the text?" (*Vigiliae Christianae* 12 [1958] 146), while suggesting that the error goes back to Athenagoras himself: "The conclusion we should draw from this fact is that Athenagoras himself was writing about Empedocles while thinking about Epicurus. It is hard to explain the error otherwise."

This is not at all likely. *Epicurus* is the makeshift of a desperate scribe. After νωμα had been separated from κρούνωμα to make a νωμαί, the rest, ΤΕΓΓΕΙΚΡΟΥ, was misread as ΤΕΠΙΚΡΟΥ, and interpreted as τ' Ἐπικούρου. Here is a similar misreading of the same line. Michael, the

scribe of Paris. suppl. gr. 464, comprising Hippolytus' *Refutatio*, writes at 7. 29. 4 κρουνῷ μακρόγιον, and at 10. 7. 3 κρουνῷ μαβρόντιον, for the correct κρούωμα βρότειον.

(7) *Idem* 22. 3. . . . ἐὰν μίαν καὶ τὴν (αὐτὴν) τοῦ τε ἀρχομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχοντος δύναμιν θῶμεν, λήσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἰσότιμον τὴν ὕλην, τὴν φθαρτὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν, τῷ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀϊδίῳ καὶ διὰ παντὸς συμφώνῳ ποιῶντες θεῷ. "If then we attribute one and the same power to the ruled and the ruling, we shall inadvertently make perishable, unstable, and changeable matter equal in rank to the uncreated, eternal, and ever self-same God" (Schoedel).

Again, the translation is correct, but the Greek original is slightly lacunose. Read: καὶ διὰ παντὸς (ἑαυτῷ) συμφώνῳ ποιῶντες θεῷ, and compare Aristides *Apology* 13. 5 Geffcken, ἑαυτῷ ἐστι σύμφωνον; Theodorus Heracleensis ap. *Cat. Joh.* 14:27, αὕτη [sc. the peace of Christ] . . . οὐ μόνον . . . πάντα κοινῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συνάπτει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ σύμφωνον ἀποτελεῖ.

(8) *Idem* 25. 1. Athenagoras quotes Euripides Fr. 901 N.² Its text is corrupt. I am offering the following tentative reading:

Πολλάκι μοι πραπίδων διήλθε φροντίς,
εἴτε τύχα (τις) εἴτε δαίμων τὰ βρότ(ε)ια κραίνει,
παρὰ τ' ἐλπίδα καὶ παρὰ δίκαν
τοὺς μὲν ἀπ' οἴκων (οὐ)δένα(ς) ἐκ)πίπτοντας
5 ἄτερ θεοῦ, τοὺς δ' εὐτυχοῦντας (εἰς)άγει.

2 τις add. A. Matthiae | βρότεια E. Dechair (Oxonii 1706) : βιότια A |
κραίνει A : κρίνει coniec. Nauck || 4 (οὐ)δένα(ς) ἐκ)πίπτοντας
scripsi : δ' εναπίπτοντας A : ἀπο- vel καταπίπτοντας Gesner (Parisiis
1557) : ἀναπίπτοντας Dechair || 5 ἄτερ θεοῦ Gesner : ἀτὰρ Θυ A:
ἄτερ βίου Grotius, Dechair | (εἰς)άγει scripsi : ἄγει A

(9) *Idem* 27. 2. Καὶ ὅσα καθ' αὐτὴν, ὡς ἀθάνατος οὖσα, λογικῶς κινεῖται ψυχὴ, ἢ προμηνούουσα τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἐνεστηκότα, τούτων τὴν δόξαν καρποῦνται οἱ δαίμονες. "And the demons harvest the fame of all the remarkable things which the soul, because of its immortal nature, brings about in a rational way of itself, whether it be foretelling the future or healing present ills" (Schoedel).

The soul is a creator, it "conceives and brings forth" wonderful things. Consequently, read: ὅσα . . . λογικῶς κυεῖται ψυχὴ, for the transmitted

κινεῖται. First, we read in 27. 1 that the irrational movements of the soul mould and *conceive* different images (ἀναπλάττουσιν καὶ κυοῦσιν). Second, Athenagoras is a *Philosophus Platonicus* and as such employs Platonic terminology. Compare Plato *Sympos.* 206 c 1 κυοῦσιν γὰρ . . . πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν; 209 a 2 ἃ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κυῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν . . . φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν; *Theaet.* 184 b 1 ὧν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης [sc. Θεαίτητος]; 151 b 8; 210 b 4.

(10) *Idem* 28. 8. Athenagoras quotes Herodotus 2. 61: “ἐν δὲ Βουσίρι πόλει ὡς ἀνάγουσι τῇ Ἴσι τὴν ἑορτήν, εἴρηται πρότερόν μοι. Τύπτονται γὰρ δὴ μετὰ τὴν θυσίην πάντες καὶ πᾶσαι, μυριάδες κάρτα πολλαὶ ἀνθρώπων· τὸν δὲ τύπτονται τρόπον, οὗ μοι ὁσιόν ἐστιν λέγειν.” “All the men and women, numbering many many thousands, beat their breasts after the sacrifice. I would profane their rites were I to say how they beat their breasts,” translates Schoedel.

There is no secret in the way the Egyptians beat their breasts while mourning the death of Osiris. The expression, τὸν δὲ τύπτονται, means, “But *whom* they are mourning (I am not going to reveal).” Compare Herodotus 2. 132. 2: ἐπειδὴν τύπτωνται Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν οὐκ ὀνομαζόμενον θεὸν ὕφ’ ἐμεῦ [sc. Ὀσίριν]; 2. 42. 6: τύπτονται οἱ περὶ τὸ ἱρὸν ἅπαντες τὸν κριόν; and point (3), *supra*. A scribe had misunderstood the sense of τύπτονται and added τρόπον, which is not present in Herodotus and should be deleted.

(11) *Idem* 31. 3. Συνέσει γὰρ πάντας ὑπερφρονοῦντες, οἷς ὁ βίος ὡς πρὸς στάθμην τὸν θεὸν κανονίζεται, ὅπως ἀνυπαίτιος καὶ ἀνεπίληπτος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ἵστε τούτους μηδ’ εἰς ἔννοιάν ποτε τοῦ βραχυτάτου ἐλευσομένου ἀμαρτήματος. “For you [sc. Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus], whose wisdom is greater than that of all others, know that men whose life is regulated, so to speak, by God as their measure, so that each one of us may be blameless and faultless before him, have no intention of doing the least wrong” (Schoedel).

This interpretation leaves ἄνθρωπος unaccounted for. Wilamowitz tried to get rid of this ἀνῶς by reading it παρὰ, while Schwartz conjectured ἐναντίον instead. Both changes are violent. But γένοιτο means “may become,” not “may be.” Accordingly, read the clause as follows: ὅπως ἀνυπαίτιος καὶ ἀνεπίληπτος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (ἂν) “ἄνθρωπος αὐτοῦ” γένοιτο. “. . . so that each one of us, remaining faultless and blameless, may become “a man of Him [sc. God].”

While the end of the sentence has in mind Matthew 5:28 (as this becomes clear from *Legatio* 32. 3 and 33. 3), the idea of “becoming a man of God” alludes to *Romans* 14:8 τοῦ κυρίου ἐσμέν; 2 *Timothy* 3:17 ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος; 1 *Tim.* 6:11 ὦ ἄνθρωπε θεοῦ; Ignatius of Antioch

Ephes. 8. 1 ὅλοι [sc. ὑμεῖς] ὄντες θεοῦ; *Romans* 6. 2 τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ θέλοντα εἶναι [sc. ἐμέ]; *Philadelphians* 3. 2 ὅσοι γὰρ θεοῦ εἰσιν.

(12) *Idem* 34. 2. . . . οὗτοι δὲ ἃ συνίσασιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοὺς σφετέρους λέγουσι θεούς, ἐπ' αὐτῶν ὡς σεμνὰ καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄξια αὐχοῦντες, ταῦτα ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦνται . . . " . . . they [these gentile adulterers and pederasts] revile us [the Christians] for vices they have on their consciences and which they attribute to their own gods, boasting of them as noble deeds and worthy of the gods" (Schoedel).

"Ἀξια is Schwartz's emendation of A's αὐτά. Read instead: . . . οὗτοι δὴ [P. Ubaldi, 1920] ἃ συνίσασιν αὐτοῖς καὶ (περὶ) τοὺς σφετέρους λέγουσι θεούς, ἐπ' αὐτῶν ὡς σεμνὰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ ἀν(ήκον)τα αὐχοῦντες, . . . The expression, τῷ θεῷ ἀνήκοντα, "beseeming God," may use the terminology of *Philemon* 8 τὸ ἀνήκον; *Ephes.* 5:4; *Col.* 3:18, and is closer to A's αὐτά. Incidentally, Baanes, the scribe of A, six lines later (34. 3) writes αὐτοὺς for ἀνῶς (= ἀνθρώπους).

(13) Pseudo-Justin, *Cohortatio ad Graecos* 6 ed. C. Otto (Jena 1879). Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ τριμερῇ αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν ψυχὴν] εἶναι φησιν, καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ θυμητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν εἶναι λέγει. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ κοινοτέραν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι φησιν, ἐν ᾧ περιείληπται καὶ τὰ φθαρτὰ μόρια, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν μόνον. Otto translates (p. 37): "Aristoteles vero non tam late patere animam ait, ut partes etiam corruptioni obnoxias comprehendat, sed id tantum quod rationis est particeps."

However, the comparative κοινοτέραν and the gender of ἐν ᾧ reveal a textual corruption. Read instead: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ κοινὸν ὅρον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι φησιν, ἐν ᾧ περιείληπται καὶ τὰ φθαρτὰ μόρια, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν μόνον, and compare Aristotle *Polit.* H 14, 1333 a 16; *De anima* Γ 9, 432 a 25; *M.M.* A 1, 1182 a 23.

(14) *Idem* 7. Ὁ γοῦν Πλάτων ποτὲ μὲν τρεῖς ἀρχὰς τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι λέγει, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ εἶδος, ποτὲ δὲ τέσσαρας· προστίθησι γὰρ καὶ τὴν καθόλου ψυχὴν [cf. *Plat. Laws* 10, 899 a 2; *Epinomis* 981 b 7; 984 c 4]. Καὶ αὐτὶς τὴν ὕλην ἀγέννητον πρότερον εἰρηκώς, ὕστερον γεννητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγει [cf. *Hippol. Refut.* 1. 19. 4]. καὶ τῷ εἶδει δὲ ἀρχὴν ἰδίαν πρότερον δεδωκώς καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ οὐσιῶσθαι ἀποφύνας, ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγει. The final part of the passage, dealing with the idea, is translated by Otto (p. 39) as follows: "atque, licet prius ideae principium proprium tribuerit eamque per se subsistere professus sit, postea eam ipsam in mentis notionibus esse dicit."

But Platonic ideas (or Middle-Platonic paradigms) do not exist in a man's mind. Accordingly, read: ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς (τοῦ θεοῦ) νοήμασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγει, and compare Aetius 1. 3. 21 = 1. 10. 3: ἰδέα δὲ

οὐσία ἀσώματος ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ. The suggested supplement is confirmed by Cyrillus of Alexandria, *Contra Iulianum* 2 (P.G. 76, 573 CD), who copies our passage and has τοῦ θεοῦ.

(15) *Idem* 9 (p. 44 f. Otto). The author quotes Diodorus 1. 94. 1: Μετὰ γὰρ τὴν παλαιὰν τοῦ κατ' Αἴγυπτον βίου κατάστασιν, τὴν μυθολογουμένην γενέσθαι ἐπὶ θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων, πείσαι φασιν ἐγγράφοις νόμοις πρῶτον χρῆσθαι τὰ πλήθη Μωϋσῆν, ἄνδρα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέγαν καὶ τῷ βίῳ ἱκανώτατον μνημονευόμενον. "Nam post antiquum qui in Aegypto fuit vitae statum . . . primus Moses populis persuasisse dicitur ut scriptis legibus uterentur, vir et magnitudine animi et utilitatibus vitae adlatis celeberrimus" (Otto).

I think, in this passage there is no mention of Moses either in Diodorus or in Pseudo-Justin. The text is heavily corrupt and should read: . . . πείσαι φασιν ἐγγράφοις νόμοις πρῶτον χρῆσθαι (καὶ)¹ βιοῦν (τὸν) ἄνδρα² καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέγαν καὶ τῷ βίῳ καινότετον³ (τῶν) μνημονευομένων.⁴

¹ καὶ p^{p.c.} et Diodori codd. C F : om. A et Cyrillus [c. *Iul.* 1, P.G. 76, p. 525 B] ² βιοῦν (τὸν) ἄνδρα scripsi ex Diodori codd. D C : βιοῦν ἄνδρα A et Cyrillus : βιοῦν μωσῆν ἄνδρα p^{m.} rec., agnoverunt Ed. Pr. [Parisiis 1539], Rob. Stephanus [Lutetiae 1551], alii : βιοῦν τὸν ἄνδρα Diodori codd. D C : βιοῦν τὸν μωσῆν ἄνδρα Diodori cod. F : τὸν Μνεῦην, ἄνδρα Diodori codd. ceteri, agn. Fr. Vogel ³ καινότετον scripsi ex Cyrillo : κοινότετον Diodori codd. : ἱκανώτατον A ⁴ τῶν μνημονευομένων scripsi ex Diodoro et Cyrillo : μνημονευόμενον A

In brief, most probably Pseudo-Justin quoted Diodorus from a manuscript similar to D. The Arethas codex A (= Paris gr. 451, A.D. 914) is reliable enough, but must be controlled by the excerpts from Pseudo-Justin in Cyrillus (died A.D. 444). The introduction of the name of Moses has no authority, since it goes back to a later corrector of p (= Parisinus gr. 174, saec. XII), itself being no more than an apograph of A. The source of inspiration was probably a manuscript of Diodorus similar to F.

(16) *Idem* 14 (p. 58 Otto). Δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, . . . ζητεῖν καὶ ἐρευνᾶν ἀκριβῶς καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων, ὡς αὐτοὶ φατε, διδασκάλων εἰρημένα. Πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς θείας τῶν ἀνθρώπων προνοίας καὶ ἄκοντες ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἰπεῖν ἠναγκάσθησαν . . .

The apologist is not concerned with what the teachers of the Greeks—Orpheus, Homer, Pythagoras, Plato—have to say in general, but only with what they were forced by divine providence to say about the Christians even

against their own will. Thus read: καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων . . . διδασκάλων (περὶ ἡμῶν) εἰρημένα, and compare ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν in the next sentence.

(17) *Idem* 21 (p. 74 Otto). “Ἐγὼ” γάρ, φησίν, “εἰμὶ ὁ ὢν” [*Exodus* 3:14], ἀντιδιαστέλλων ἑαυτὸν δηλονότι ὁ ὢν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν, ἵνα γνῶσιν οἱ πρότερον ἀπατηθέντες ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ οὖσι προσέσχον.

There is only one God who is ὁ ὢν. Consequently, the text should read: ἵνα γνῶσιν οἱ πρότερον ἀπατηθέντες ὅτι οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ οὖσι προσέσχον (θεοῖς), as it is witnessed by John of Damascus (died in 749), who in his *Sacra Parallela* quotes our passage as emended (cod. Coislinianus 276 fol. 223^v = Fr. 105 Holl: *T.U.* 20. 2).

(18) *Idem* 24 (p. 84 Otto). Οὕτως γὰρ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν Χαλδαίων καὶ Ἑβραίων εἰρημένος σημαίνει χρησμός· πυθομένου γάρ τινος, τίνας πῶποτε θεοσεβεῖς ἄνδρας γεγενῆσθαι συνέβη, οὕτως εἰρηκέναι αὐτόν φατε·

Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφὴν λάχον, ἡδ' ἄρ' Ἑβραῖοι,
αὐτογένητον ἄνακτα σεβαζόμενοι θεὸν αὐτόν.

To what do the words αὐτόν φατε refer? Read instead: πυθομένου γάρ τινος (χρηστηρίου τινός), τίνας πῶποτε θεοσεβεῖς ἄνδρας γεγενῆσθαι συνέβη, οὕτως εἰρηκέναι αὐτό [sc. τὸ χρηστήριον] φατε . . . The same oracle recurs in chapter 11, where we read: Ἐρομένου γάρ τινος, ὥς αὐτοὶ φατε, τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν χρηστήριον, τίνας συνέβη θεοσεβεῖς ἄνδρας γεγενῆσθαι ποτε, οὕτω τὸ χρηστήριον εἰρηκέναι φατέ· “Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφὴν λάχον, ἡδ' ἄρ' Ἑβραῖοι κτλ.”

(19) *Idem* 25 (p. 84 Otto). Ἰδιον γὰρ τῶν δι' εὐχῆς καὶ θυσιῶν φιλανθρωπίας τυγχάνειν ἀξιούντων τὸ παύεσθαι καὶ μεταγινώσκειν ἐφ' οἷς ἥμαρτον, οἱ δὲ [scripsi : γὰρ A] ἀνεπιστρεφὲς τὸ θεῖον οἰόμενοι εἶναι, οὐδαμῶς ἀφίστασθαι τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων προήρηνται, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἐκ τῆς μετανοίας ἔξιν οἰόμενοι.

Otto translates: “Proprium enim est eorum, qui precibus et victimis misericordiam consequi volunt, finem peccandi facere et poenitentiam agere de iis quae peccaverunt; qui autem divinum numen inflexibile existimant esse, nequaquam a peccatis discedere volunt . . .” But we expect *Dei misericordiam*, not simply *miseriordiam*, as it is witnessed by τὸ θεῖον (*divinum numen*) in the context. Consequently, read: τῶν δι' εὐχῆς καὶ θυσιῶν (τῆς θείας) φιλανθρωπίας τυγχάνειν ἀξιούντων, and compare Justin Martyr *Dialogus* 47. 5: “Ἡ γὰρ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλανθρωπία τοῦ θεοῦ” [*Tit.* 3:4] καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον τοῦ πλούτου αὐτοῦ [cf. *Rom.* 2:4] τὸν μετανοοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων . . . ὥς δίκαιον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον ἔχει.

(20) *Idem* 32 (p. 106 Otto). Plato knew of the Holy Ghost, but he called it Virtue (cf. *Meno* 99 e 4—100 a 1) fearing the Athenians and knowing well what had happened to Socrates (cf. cc. 20; 25): . . . δεδιώς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δωρεὰν πνεῦμα ἅγιον ὀνομάζειν . . . , τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν αὐτὸ παρὰ θεοῦ κατιέναι ὁμολογεῖ, οὐ μὴν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, ἀλλὰ ἀρετὴν ὀνομάζειν αὐτὸ ἡξίου. The form ἡξίου suggests that we should read ὁμολόγει for ὁμολογεῖ.

(21) *Idem* 33. For the same reason, what Moses calls Day (*Gen.* 1:5) Plato calls Time (*Tim.* 38 b 6): . . . ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ἡμέραν ὀνομάζει χρόνον, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ, ἡμέρας μεμνημένος (καὶ addidi) ὥς πάντῃ τοῖς Μωϋσέως ἐπόμενος ῥητοῖς, παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις κατηγορεῖσθαι. “. . . ne mentionem diei faciens . . . , apud Athenienses videatur accusandus” (Otto).

But κατηγορεῖσθαι cannot yield the sense *accusandus*. Read: ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ . . . παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις (ἄξιος εἶναι τοῦ) κατηγορεῖσθαι. Compare c. 20: Πλάτων . . . διὰ δὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα Σωκράτει δεδιώς μήπως καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀνυτόν τινα ἢ Μέλητον καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι π α ρ α σ - κ ε υ ἄ σ η κατηγοροῦντα αὐτοῦ παρ’ Ἀθηναίοις . . .

(22) *Idem* 35 (p. 114 Otto). Νυνὶ δὲ ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνατόν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μήτε παρ’ ἐκείνων [sc. τῶν προγόνων ὑμῶν] ὑμᾶς [sc. the Greeks] μανθάνειν, μήτε μὴν παρὰ τῶν ἐνταῦθα τὴν ψ ε υ δ ῶ ν υ - μ ο ν ταύτην φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπαγγελλομένων, ἀκόλουθον ὑμῖν ἔσται λοιπὸν τὴν τῶν προγόνων ὑμῶν ἀπωσαμένους π λ ἄ ν η ν ἐντυγχάνειν ταῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀνδρῶν προφητείαις . . .

What is the object of μανθάνειν? Evidently, the religious *truth*. Thus read: μήτε παρ’ ἐκείνων ὑμᾶς (τάληθές) μανθάνειν, μήτε μὴν παρὰ τῶν . . . , and compare the expressions ἡ ἀληθὴς θεοσέβεια (twice) and ἡ ἀλήθεια, at the beginning of the chapter, as well as c. 36: Εἰ δὲ ἡ τάληθοῦς εὗρεσις ὅρος τις λέγεται παρ’ αὐτοῖς (τῆς) φιλοσοφίας . . .

(23) Pseudo-Justin, *De monarchia* 1 (p. 128 Otto, Jena 1879). Καὶ πολλῷ χρόνῳ μεῖναν τὸ περισσὸν ἔθος [i.e. εἰδωλοποιία] ὥς οἰκεῖαν καὶ ἀληθὴ τὴν πλάνην τοῖς πολλοῖς παραδίδωσι. “. . . consuetudo postquam diu valuit errorem ut vernaculum et verum quidpiam multitudini tradit” (Otto).

There is no *quidpiam* in the Greek original. Read instead: ὥς οἰκεῖαν καὶ ἀληθὴ (θρησκείαν) τὴν πλάνην τοῖς πολλοῖς παραδίδωσι, and compare ἀλήθεια and θρησκεία ἡ εἰς τὸν ἕνα καὶ πάντων δεσπότην, at the opening of the treatise.

(24) *Ibidem*. Καὶ δι’ ὀλίγων νομὴν πονηρίας ἔσχον οἱ πολλοί, ἀμαυρούμενοι τῇ εἰς τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἄτρεπτον γνώσει ὀχλικῇ συνηθείᾳ. “Et per paucos contagio nequitiae ad multitudinem pervenit,

cognitione, quam de eo quod certum et immutabile est obtinebat, per popularem consuetudinem obscurata" (Otto).

This is not a credible Greek. Read instead: Καὶ δι' ὀλίγων (αἰτίαν) νομὴν πονηρίας ἔσχον οἱ πολλοί, ἀμαυρούμενοι τὴν εἰς τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἄτρεπτον (ὄνομα) (ἐπὶ)γνωσιν ὁχλικῇ συνηθείᾳ. The word ἐπίγνωσις recurs at the beginning of the treatise, εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας. What is more important, the author refers to the Judeo-Christian God as "the true and immutable *name*" in the closing sentence of the treatise (c. 6, p. 156 Otto): Ἀσπάζεσθαι γὰρ χρὴ τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἄτρεπτον ὄνομα. Compare also the expression preceding our sentence, τὸ μόνῳ τῷ ὄντως θεῷ πρέπον ὄνομα. In so doing, the author is probably following Philo. Compare τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄνομα at Philo *Legat.* 366; John 17:3; 1 *Thess.* 1:9; 1 John 5:20; Clement *Paedag.* 1. 14. 5; *Strom.* 4. 90. 2; τὸ ἄτρεπτον ὄνομα: Philo *De mutat. nom.* 175; *De somniis* 1. 232; 2. 221; *De Cherubim* 19; *Leg. alleg.* 2. 33.

(25) *Idem* 2 (p. 132 Otto). Ἀλλὰ καὶ Φιλήμων, τὰ ἀρχαῖα εὐπορήσας φράσαι, κοινωνεῖ τῇ περὶ τῶν ὄντων γνώσει, ὡς γράφει·

Θεὸν δὲ ποῖον, εἰπέ μοι, νομιστέον;

Τὸν πάνθ' ὀρώντα καὶ τὸν οὐχ ὀρώμενον.

"Sed etiam Philemon . . . a veri cognitione alienus non est, pro eo atque scribit" (Otto). This is a Jewish *Pseudepigraphon* (Trag. Fr. Adesp. 622 Kannicht-Snell; cf. ad Frr. 617–24 and A.-M. Denis, *Fragmenta Pseudepigraphorum quae supersunt Graeca* [Leiden 1970], p. 163 c). As such, the fragment does not speak of τὰ ὄντα, but about the Jewish God. Consequently, read: κοινωνεῖ τῇ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως θεοῦ γνώσει, ὡς γράφει· "Θεὸν δὲ ποῖον . . ."

This is confirmed by Clement of Alexandria, who quotes the same two lines as deriving from Euripides (*Protr.* 68. 3), while appending the following commentary: οὗ δὲ χάριν καὶ ἄκοντες μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν [sc. Greek poets and philosophers] ἓνα τε εἶναι θεὸν . . ., ὄντως ὄντα αἰεί. Cf. also *De monarchia* c. 1 ὁ ὄντως θεός.

(26) *Idem* 3 (p. 138 Otto). The end of another Jewish *Pseudepigraphon*, attributed by our author to Philemon, and by Clement (*Strom.* 5. 121. 1) to Diphilus (Fr. 246 Kock; p. 169 g Denis), reads in the two manuscripts of *De monarchia* (Parisinus gr. 450 A.D. 1363, and Argentoratensis gr. 9, saec. XIII–XIV, perished in the fire of 1870) as follows:

Μηδὲν πλανηθῆς· ἔστι κἀν Ἄιδου κρίσις,
ἥν περ ποιήσει θεὸς ὁ πάντων δεσπότης,
οὗ τοῦνομα φοβερὸν οὐδ' ἂν ὀνομάσαιμ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ Εὐριπίδης·

Ἄφθονον βίου μῆκος δίδωσι πρὸς κρίσιν.

"Οστις δὲ θνητῶν οἶται . . .

Clement offers instead: οὐδ' ἂν ὀνομάσαιμι ἐγώ· ἢ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι πρὸς μῆκος βίου ἢ δίδωσιν. ἢ εἴ τις δὲ θνητῶν οἶται . . .

Both texts are corrupt. In Pseudo-Justin, the quotation from Euripides begins with "Οστις δὲ θνητῶν (Fr. 835 N.), and the preceding text should read as follows:

οὐ τοῦνομα φοβερὸν οὐδ' ἂν ὀνομάσαιμι ἐγώ·

(ὅς τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσιν) ἄφθονον βίου

μῆκος δίδωσι πρὸς κρίσιν . . .

Καὶ Εὐριπίδης·

"Οστις δὲ θνητῶν οἶται . . .

(27) *Idem* 6 (p. 154 Otto). Ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἔλεγχος ἀρετῆς καὶ γνώμης σύνεσιν ἀγαπώσης· ἐπαναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς συζυγίας κοινωνίαν καὶ προσάψαι ἑαυτὸν συνέσει εἰς σωτηρίαν αἰρεῖσθαι τε τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων ἐκλογὴν (κατὰ τὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπῳ κείμενον αὐτεξούσιον), μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς ἡγουμένους τῶν ὅλων δεσπότας . . .

Pseudo-Justin closes his treatise with the same idea he had advanced at the very opening of *De monarchia* (a kind of *Ringcomposition*): 1 (p. 126 Otto) Τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὸ κατ' ἀρχὴν συζυγίαν συνέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας λαβούσης εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας θρησκείας τε τῆς εἰς τὸν ἕνα καὶ πάντων δεσπότην (ἄσκησιν addidi) . . . In our sentence, we hear that man is endowed with free will and can choose between the true God and the false gods of the Greeks. But such a choice is not expressed by μὴ τοὺς. Consequently, read: αἰρεῖσθαι τε τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων ἐκλογὴν . . . ἢ (ἀσπάζεσθαι) τοὺς ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς ἡγουμένους τῶν ὅλων δεσπότας, and compare the closing sentence of the treatise: Ἀσπάζεσθαι γὰρ χρὴ τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἄτρεπτον ὄνομα (i.e., the true God).

(28) *Ibidem*. Ἀσκληπιὸς (δὲ) καὶ Ἀπόλλων παρὰ Χείρωνι τῷ Κενταύρῳ ἰᾶσθαι διδάσκονται, τὸ καινότατον παρὰ ἀνθρώπῳ θεοί. "Aesculapius et Apollo apud Chironem Centaurum mederi discunt, quod maxime novum est: apud hominem dii" (Otto).

Read: διδάσκονται, (καὶ διὰ) τὸ καινότατον παρὰ ἀνθρώπῳ θεοὶ (ἡγοῦνται). Compare the expression, τοὺς ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς ἡγουμένους τῶν ὅλων δεσπότας, in the preceding sentence, and Athenagoras, *Legatio* 30. 1 τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τέχνῃ [sc. κληθῆναι θεοὺς], ὡς Ἀσκληπιόν; Cicero *De natura deorum* 2. 62 *Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque communis, ut beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate tollerent . . . hinc Aesculapius . . .*

(29) *Ibidem*. Εἰ γὰρ τις μὴ μαθὼν τὰς περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα θείας πράξεις μιμήσαιο, κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν κιβδήλων ἀλλότριος βίου καὶ

ἀνθρωπότητος λογισθείη· γνοὺς δέ τις εὐλογον ἔξει τὴν τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀποφυγὴν, οὐ παρανομίαν δεικνύων τὴν τῶν θεϊκῶν τολμημάτων μίμησιν. “Si quis enim in iis de quibus dictum est deorum actiones quum [eas] non noverit imitetur, secundum ipsa facinora inhonesta ab omni more vivendi humanitateque alienus existimetur . . .” (Otto).

Evidently, Otto is sailing troubled waters. Read instead: Εἰ γάρ τις μὴ μαθὼν τὰς περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα (ὀνόματα) θείας πράξεις μιμήσαιο, κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν (ἐλασσόνων) κιβδήλων ἀλλότριος (ἄν) βίου καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος λογισθείη. “For if somebody, not knowing of the divine misdeeds linked to the (divine) names mentioned earlier, would repeat them, even at lesser transgressions (than those committed by the Greek gods) he would be deemed alien to the accepted conduct and humanity.”

“The divine names” recurs in the next sentence: Εἰ δ’ ἄρα τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιμέμψαιο, ἀνέλη καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων γνωσθέντα ὀνόματα. As for the words, τὰ κίβδηλα, their sense is most probably, “*vetita*, prohibited actions, trespasses.” Compare Theodoretus *Quaest. 27 in Lev.* (P.G. 80, 377 A) [*Lev.* 19:19; *Deut.* 22:11] “Ὅτι γὰρ οὐ τὸ ἱμάτιον κίβδηλον λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν . . .

(30) Pseudo-Justin, *Oratio ad Graecos* 1 (p. 634. 21 ed. Adolf Harnack, *SB Akademie Berlin*, 1896 [Erster Halbband], 627–46). Ταῦτα παιδεύεσθαι οὐ θέλω· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς ἐπιδικάζομαι, ἵνα τοῖς Ὁμήρου μύθοις πείθωμαι. “Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα ῥαψωδία, Ἰλιάδος τε καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, γυνή.

This is nonsensical. Helen is the cause of the events described in Homeric poems, thus read: “Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα ῥαψωδία(ς αἰτία) . . . γυνή.

(31) *Idem* 3 (p. 635. 25 Harnack). Τὸν γὰρ τριέσπερον Ἀлк(ε)ίδην, (τὸν) τῶν ἀγώνων ἡγήτορα, τὸν δι’ ἀνδρείαν ἀδόμενον, τὸν τοῦ Διὸς υἱόν, ὃς βριαρὸν κατέπεφνε λέοντα, καὶ πολύκρανον ὤλεσεν ὕδραν, ὃν δ’ ἄγριον ὁ νεκρώσας, ὄρνιθας δ’ ἀνδροβόρους ἵπταμένας καθελεῖν ὁ δυνηθείς, καὶ κύνα τρικάρηνον ἐξ Ἀιδου (ὁ) ἀναγαγών . . . — ὁ τὰ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα δρᾶσαι δυνηθείς, ὡς νήπιος ὑπὸ Σατύρων κατακυμβαλισθείς, καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικείου ἔρωτος ἡττηθείς ὑπὸ Λυδῆς γελώσης κατὰ γλουτῶν τυπτόμενος ἦδετο, καὶ τέλος τὸν (Ν)έσσ(ε)ιον χιτῶνα ἀποδύσασθαι μὴ δυνηθείς, πυρὰν καθ’ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς ποιήσας τέλος ἔλαβε τοῦ βίου.

There are two small lacunae in this long passage. The first one is after the word ὕδραν, the second one after the word κατακυμβαλισθείς. Consequently, read: Τὸν γὰρ τριέσπερον Ἀлк(ε)ίδην . . ., ὃς βριαρὸν κατέπεφνε λέοντα, καὶ πολύκρανον ὤλεσεν ὕδραν (e.g. τί μοι λέγειν;) ὃν δ’ ἄγριον ὁ νεκρώσας . . ., while comparing the end of the chapter (Τὰ δὲ Οἰδίποδος κέντρα τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;), and: ὡς νήπιος

ὑπὸ Σατύρων κατακυμβαλισθεῖς (e.g. κατεπλάγη), καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικείου ἔρωτος ἡττηθεῖς . . . τυπτόμενος ἦδετο, καὶ τέλος . . . πυρὰν καθ' αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς ποιήσας τέλος ἔλαβε τοῦ βίου.

(32) *Ibidem* (p. 636. 4). . . . ταύρους δὲ καὶ ἔλαφον (ὁ) ἀνελών, ὦν μυζωτῆρες ἔπνεον πῦρ . . . Heracles subdued only one Cretan bull, and the hind of Ceryneia did not breathe out fire, but the Thessalian horses of Diomedes did. Thus read: ταῦρον δὲ καὶ ἔλαφον (ὁ) ἀνελών (καὶ ἵππους), ὦν μυζωτῆρες ἔπνεον πῦρ, and compare Eurip. *Alc.* 493 Εἰ μὴ γε πῦρ πνέουσι [sc. the horses of Diomedes] μυκτῆρων ἄπο; *Herc. Fur.* 380–88; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 5. 8; Diodor. 4. 15. 3–4; Philostr. *Imag.* 2. 25; Qu. Smyrn. *Posthomer.* 6. 245–48; Io. Tzetzes *Chiliad.* 2. 302–11; Ovid *Met.* 9. 196; Hygin. *Fab.* 30. 9.

(33) *Ibidem* (p. 636. 7). Καὶ (ὁ) ὄρη πηδήσας [sc. Heracles], ἵνα λάβῃ ὕδωρ ἔναρθρον φωνὴν ἀποδιδόν, ὡς λόγος. Complementing and correcting what I had said in *Journal of Theol. Studies*, N.S. 24 (1973) 501–02, our author is dealing with Heracles' discovery of the prophesying spring of Castalia. Compare Panyassis ap. Paus. 10. 8. 9: Πανύασσις δὲ ὁ Πολυάρχου πεποιηκὼς ἐς Ἑρακλέα ἔπη θυγατέρα Ἀχελφῶου τὴν Κασταλίαν φησὶν εἶναι· λέγει γὰρ δὴ περὶ τοῦ Ἑρακλέους·

Παρνησσὸν νιφόεντα θεοῖς διὰ ποσσὶ περήσας
ἵκετο Κασταλίας Ἀχελώϊδος ἄμβροτον ὕδωρ.

Plut. *Maxime cum principibus* 776 D: καὶ γὰρ εἰ δεινὸς ἦν περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγῇν, ὥσπερ ἱστοροῦσι τὸν Ἑρακλέα . . . ; Paus. 2. 32. 4; Lucian *Iupp. Trag.* 30 . . . ἡ πηγῆς μαντικῆς, οἷα ἡ Κασταλία ἐστίν; Nonnus *Dionys.* 4. 309–10; Ovid *Amor.* 1. 15. 35–36; *Suda*, s.v. Κασταλία; RE 10 (1917) 2338.

(34) *Ibidem* (p. 636. 14). Ἐπεὶ οὖν, ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, οἱ μὲν θεοὶ ὑμῶν ὑπὸ ἀκρασίας ἡλέγχθησαν, ἄνανδροι δὲ οἱ ἥρωες ὑμῶν, ὡς αἱ παρ' ὑμῖν δραματουργοὶ ἱστορίαι ἐδήλωσαν. * [lacunam statuit Harnack] τὰ μὲν Ἀτρέως ἄγῃ θυέστου (τε) λέχη καὶ Πελοπιδῶν μύση καὶ Δαναὸν φθόνῳ φονεύοντα καὶ ἀτεκνοῦντα μεμεθυσμένον, καὶ τὰ Θυέστεια δειπνα, (ἃ add. H. Stephanus, 1592) Ἑρινύες ἥρτυον.

Improving upon what I said in *JTS* (1973) 502, I would now read: Ἐπεὶ οὖν, ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, οἱ μὲν θεοὶ ὑμῶν ἐπ' ἀκρασίας ἡλέγχθησαν, ἄνανδροι δὲ οἱ ἥρωες ὑμῶν, (e.g. οὐ διάφοροι δὴ καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς ὑμῶν), ὡς αἱ παρ' ὑμῖν δραματουργοὶ ἱστορίαι ἐδήλωσαν. Τὰ μὲν (γὰρ) Ἀτρέως ἄγῃ (εἰσήγαγον, καὶ τὰ) Θυέστου λέχη καὶ Πελοπιδῶν μύση, καὶ Δαναὸν φθόνῳ φονεύοντα, καὶ (Αἵγυπτον suppl. Stephanus) ἀτεκνοῦντα μεμεθυσμένον, καὶ τὰ Θυέστεια δειπνα. . .

For the supplement, οἱ βασιλεῖς (after οἱ θεοὶ and οἱ ἥρωες) compare the Christian contrast, 5 (p. 637. 6): "Ἐλθετε λοιπόν, ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, . . . καὶ θεῖω λόγῳ παιδεύθητε, καὶ μάθετε βασιλέα ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τοὺς τούτου ἥρωας ἐπίγινωτε . . . The expression, καὶ Αἴγυπτον ἀτεκνοῦντα μεμεθυσμένον, most probably means, "and Aegyptus, bereft of his sons and stupefied with grief." Compare Nonnus *Dionys.* 6. 31; 28. 211; 36. 79; Oppian. *Hal.* 5. 228; *Cyneg.* 4. 204; Theocrit. 22. 98 (and Gow ad loc.); *Odyssey* 18. 240.

(35) *Idem* 4 (p. 636. 28). Τί ἀγανακτεῖς, Ἕλλην ὦν, πρὸς τὸ τέκνον σου, εἰ τὸν Δία μιμούμενος ἐπιβουλεύει σοι; Καὶ εἴ τι(ς) σου τὸν γάμον σεσύληκε, τί τοῦτον ἐχθρὸν ἡγήῃ, τὸν δὲ ὅμοιον αὐτῷ σέβῃ;

Obviously we should read: τὸν δὲ (Δία) ὅμοιον αὐτῷ σέβῃ; as it is witnessed by the Syriac version (cod. Nitriacus Mus. Brit. Add. 14658, p. 41; ed W. Cureton, *Spicilegium Syriacum*, London 1855, p. 66. 19: "And if somebody commits adultery with your wife, why do you regard him as an enemy, while (at the same time) you pray to and worship the Lord of the gods, who is like him?" (my translation).

(36) *Idem*, *Syriac Version* 3 (p. 41 N; p. 67. 1 Cureton; p. 632 D. Baethgen ap. Harnack, *SB Akademie Berlin*, 1896): "Let the Athenians set *Socrates* free! For no one like *Cronus* is close to him. Let them not put *Orestes*, who killed his own mother, to death!"

Socrates is guilty of no cannibalism, but *Thyestes* is. Thus read *Thyestes* for *Socrates*, and compare the presence of the cannibal *Cronus* in the context. A little bit later, the same scribe writes *Orestes* for *Atreus*, and *Philippus* for the *Pelopids*.

(37) Prosper od Aquitaine, *De providentia Dei* [ca. A.D. 416] 7–9 (ed. M. P. McHugh, The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, Vol. 98, Washington 1964):

Ac si te fracti perstringunt vulnera mundi,
turbatumque una si rate fert pelagus,
invictum deceat studiis servare vigorem.

What is the point of the poet being carried over a troubled sea in a single bark? And to take *una* for an adverb ("at the same time") would be equally weak in sense. Read *ima* for *una*, and translate: "Even if you are stricken with the wounds of a shattered world, or the hold of a boat carries you over a troubled sea, still you should keep your strength undaunted by your studies." Compare *Vulgate Jonas* 1:5 *et Jonas descendit ad interiora navis*; *Itala Acta* 16:24 *misit eos in ima carceris*; Prudentius *Peristephanon* 5. 241 *imo ergastulo*; Verg. *Aen.* 1. 84 *e sedibus imis* = Silius 8. 197 *et saepius*.

(38) *Idem* 53–56:

Nulla sacerdotes reverentia nominis almi
 discrevit miseri suppliciiis populi:
 sic duris caesi flagris, sic igne perusti,
 inclusae vinclis sic gemuere manus.

Hands cannot groan, but priests can. Read *inclusas*, and translate: "they were equally bemoaning their fettered hands." Compare Verg. *Georg.* 3. 226–27; Silius 17. 483; Statius *Theb.* 9. 767; 12.285.

(39) *Idem* 269–71:

. . . audiat a primis distare parentibus actum
 per delicta genus, multa et rubugine morum
 corrupti exiguum semen superesse vigoris.

Read: *corruptum exigui semen superesse vigoris*, and translate: ". . . let me tell him that the human race today is very distant from our first parents [Adam and Eve], being driven through so many sins, and that only a seed of poor strength had survived, corrupt by the moral turpitude." Compare Prosper *De ingratiss* 485–86 *insit | semine damnato genitis in corpore mortis*.

(40) *Idem* 335–40. Read the lines in this order:

- 335 Cumque nefas placitum toto persisteret orbe,
 nec nisi diluvio deleri crimina possent,
 337 sola Noë servata domus: quae, libera cladis,
 340 illaesa mundo pereunte superfuit arca,
 338 conclusis paribus spirantum de genere omni,
 339 unde forent vacuis reparanda animalia terris.

Conclusis paribus etc. ("in which pairs of living creatures of every kind were enclosed") cannot come before the mention of the ark itself. (v. 340 *arca*).

(41) *Idem* 849–52:

Nec enim mala mors est
 ulla bonis: quibus e vario longoque labore
 quilibet in requiem patet exitus. Aspera vitam
 dat via, nec campo capitur, sed fine corona.

The end of the passage reads, "The rough road gives life, and the crown is not taken in the field, but is the prize at the end" (McHugh). But this contradicts the poet's point, "For there is no evil death for good men . . . any exit leading to the eternal rest is good enough to them!" Consequently,

read: *nam campo capitur, non fine corona* ("for the heavenly crown is won not by the kind of death but in the open field"), and compare v. 604–05:

. . . sed ut superas caperemus in illis,
hic decertato virtutis agone, coronas.

v. 912 *et cupidus victo certamine solvi*; *Doctrina apostol.* 6. 5 Schlecht: *per haec sancta certamina pervenire ad coronam*; Cassiodor. *Instit. div.* 32: *in agone sanguinis . . . positae . . . coronae.*

(42) *Idem* 887–88:

*Iam quos peccantes Deus arguit, hos etiam nunc
 diligit et patrio vult emendare flagello.*

Read *nam* for *iam*, and compare *etiam nunc*.

(43) *Idem* 906–07: *Hunc pecus abductum, domus ustae potaque vina |
 afficiunt . . .*—*Versus claudicat*. Read: *domus usta epotaque vina*.

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Some Ancient Notions of Boredom

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There is no need to apologise for a discussion of ancient concepts of boredom. Through fifteen hundred years of Western culture the notion of boredom has been a vital one. Ranging from dark age and medieval monastic *acedia*, from the "English disease" of the seventeenth, eighteenth centuries and the French Enlightenment, from the *mal de siècle* of nineteenth century Europe, to the "nausea" and alienation of twentieth century existentialists and Marxists, the concept has had a long and powerful history.¹ It is a history, furthermore, of literary and sociological significance. (As much felt, that is, as written about.) The topic did not have the same importance for the ancients as it does for moderns. Yet there are references to the concept in ancient literature. These provide the justification for my paper.

In spite of its ubiquity the notion of boredom—in ancient or modern literature—is very hard to pin down. The meaning seems to shift with the centuries and, even within these centuries, to shift according to the sensibility and the age of the person using it. It is, however, a notion which most eras take for granted. Definitions, therefore, must come first. The concept of boredom cannot be isolated in ancient contexts unless we are sure of that to which we are referring. Here are some of the definitions which are currently in use.² The bulk of these are, because of the obvious danger of anachronism, inapplicable to the ancient world. Thoroughness, however, demands at least a partial listing.

1. A sense of boredom or simple tedium may be the result of, say, being shut up too long. It is also the case that people can be as "boring" as situations. In people an excess of long-windedness, for example, or an unwillingness to vary a long practised routine is often described as "boring."

¹ See Kuhn's book cited in Note 2 and M. Bouchez, *L'ennui: de Sénèque à Moravia* (Paris 1973).

² Some of these definitions may be found in R. Kuhn's *The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature* (Princeton 1976) 3–13.

(A "bore," of course, may also be a person who is judged socially inept or socially inferior.)

2. Kuhn describes a state which he terms *horror loci*.³ Typically this state of mind is seen in a rich man who hurries to his country house only to become bored with this. He then hurries quickly back to his city house where the same thing happens all over again. This state of restless dissatisfaction does not necessarily imply the more "spiritual" conditions described below. Indeed it may indicate nothing more than a low tolerance to boredom of the type described above.

3. There is another type of boredom, sometimes described as a spiritual boredom or ennui, which can infect a whole life. In some cases *horror loci* could be seen as a manifestation of this condition. This type of emotion is perhaps more familiar from the literature of the nineteenth century where it was termed the *mal de siècle*. It has had a sort of an afterlife in the conditions suffered by Roquentin in Sartre's *La Nausée* or by Mersault in Camus' *La Peste*, or by Dino, the protagonist of Moravia's *La Noia*. Such conditions are surely related to alienation in the Marxian sense—reification as it is sometimes called. This is the sort of thing which an assembly line worker may suffer.⁴

4. There is also depression.⁵ In the psychological sense depression (or, as Aristotle termed it, melancholy) can resemble boredom or ennui. But they are not really the same thing. The ancients and the moderns view depression as an illness and do not confuse it with boredom. Spleen, the "English Disease" prevalent in eighteenth century England and in the French Enlightenment, is perhaps more readily identifiable with depression. So too is *acedia*, the monkish "demon of noontide," that destructive sense of depression so feared by the medieval cleric. Depression and melancholy, since they are to be distinguished from boredom, are not to be the subject of this paper.

Such a listing, as is obvious, is procrustean and exclusive. (Where, it might be queried, is Durkheim's anomie? Can simple boredom not result from depression?) Yet without some attempt at the categorisation of the emotion of boredom any attempt to discuss its ancient manifestations is

³ See Kuhn, *op. cit.* in Note 2, 23. Kuhn does not state whence the term is derived. It seems to resemble such "English" Latin as *horror vacui* (on which see the entry in the *OED*) for which it could be a rough sort of antonym. The condition, at least in ancient literature, is alluded to more than once. Kuhn's term, which I will use henceforth, seems to me to be as good as any other.

⁴ The "bored housewife" syndrome is probably irrelevant here. Kuhn (*op. cit.* in Note 2, 7) links this to a type of sense deprivation: "unconscious goals, aspirations and ideals . . . are maintained in this state of boredom, but the ability to reach them is interfered with by the repression of these goals and the rejection of substitutes that all seem inadequate."

⁵ For histories of which see R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy* (London 1964), and Stanley W. Jackson, *Melancholy and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times* (New Haven 1986). Worth consulting in a more general sense is Bennett Simon, *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca 1978).

doomed. In the following pages some of the contexts in which boredom is alluded to will be discussed. The intention is to determine in what ways, if any, such contexts mirror the conceptualisations of the emotion which are reproduced above.

Perhaps at the very outset a list of the ancient terms used to describe boredom is in order. Their location in a text will help to focus the discussion. In Greek there is ἄλυσ and its verbal forms ἀλύω, ἀλυσθαίνω, ἀλύσσω, ἀλυστάζω etc., and nouns (and their verbal forms) such as ἀπάθεια, ἀκηδία,⁶ ἀπληστία, ἄση, κόρος, πλησμονή or, in some contexts, verbal forms such as ἀνιάω, ἐνοχλέω or τρυφάω. In Latin there are words such as *taedium* and related forms, *fastidium* and related terms, *otium*, *satietas* and related forms, *vacare*, *fatigo*, *defatigo*, *defetiscor* etc., *torpor* and related forms, *languidus* and related terms, *desidia*, *inertia*, *ineptia*, *piget* and related forms, *hebes* and related forms, *obtundo*, *molestus*, *odiosus*, *odium*, *vexo* and so on. The list could be extended, but, as is probably obvious, most of these terms are mere approximations.⁷ They do allow, however, a few conclusions to be drawn. The term used to describe "boredom" in Greek is not at all common and, with the sense of "boredom," is late. *Taedium* is the best of the Latin terms, but it lacks concision. Its lexical ambit is far wider than the English "boredom" (or, for that matter, terms in modern languages such as *l'ennui*, *la noia* or *Langweile*). Speaking lexically, therefore, the ancient notion of boredom was not a precise one. But this observation needs to be tested against the ancient descriptions.

In Greek of the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic periods, references to boredom are very hard to find. They are, furthermore, conjectural. Here is a fairly typical example. It is from Plato, *Symposium* 173c, and occurs soon after the beginning of the dialogue. After stating that he knows of nothing which gives him greater pleasure than discussing philosophy, Apollodorus continues to say: . . . τοὺς ὑμετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτὸς τε ἄχθομαι ὑμᾶς τε τοὺς ἐταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἷσθ' ἐτι ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες.

Dover⁸ interprets the use of the word ἄχθομαι in this context as "bored." This is doubtless correct, but it remains an interpretation: "wearyed" or even "annoyed" might have done. Notice too that Dover's imputed sense of "being bored" here is comparable only to the simple emotion described as number one above. It would be incredible to maintain that Greeks did not feel such an emotion.

⁶ I doubt that this word can be satisfactorily included within this list, notwithstanding the famous medieval sense. The sole example which may be relevant is Cic. *ad Att.* 12. 45. For the problems associated with the word in this context see Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus*, vol. 5 (Cambridge 1966) 337–38.

⁷ In some contexts yawning might denote boredom. One could add to the list, therefore, χάσκω in Greek, and in Latin *oscito*, *oscitatio* and *hio*.

⁸ In his *Plato: Symposium* (Oxford 1980) 79.

In Pindar (and frequently in oratorical literature) a fear is expressed that a lengthy text may induce in the listener the emotion of κόρος. At first sight the word may seem to imply boredom. Closer examination will show that, as with Plato, such an assumption is conjectural. Here from Pindar, *Pythian* 1. 81–83, is a typical reference to this fear:⁹

καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο, πολλῶν πείρατα συντανύσαις
ἐν βραχεῖ, μείων ἔπεται μῶμος ἀνθρώ-
πων· ἀπὸ γὰρ κόρος ἀμβλύνει
αἰανῆς ταχέας ἐλπίδας·

What is the state of mind referred to here? Does "satiety" entail "boredom" or "weariness?"¹⁰ Or could it even entail, as Burton¹¹ maintains, "some sort of offensive action." The κόρος may be the product of excessive long-windedness, which may produce weariness. Or such fulsome praise may rouse the envy of the audience and thus bring hostility against the addressee. In other contexts the result of κόρος may be the weakening of the force of the speaker's argument (defence, accusation, request etc.).¹² It is not easy to decide which emotion is being appealed to. All three emotions may be referred to. The point, however, is that in Pindar (and in later contexts) the emotion is not made precise. Having only words upon which to make deductions one must conclude that the imprecise labelling meant, as far as boredom is concerned, an imprecise perception of the emotion. Pindar and the orators, therefore, offer no help.

Two other passages which may profitably be compared are *Iliad* 24. 403 and Euripides, *Iphigeneia in Aulis*, 804–08. Both passages are instructive in a negative way. Both describe situations which, on first reading, seem to allude to boredom. Indeed, boredom might be expected in such situations. Yet, on closer reading, neither context mentions the emotion. This may well indicate the regard in which this mental state was held. In the former Hermes, pretending to be one of Achilles' Myrmidons, is speaking to Priam. He states that the Achaeans will begin fighting the Trojans at dawn.

⁹ Other examples may be seen at *Pythian* 8. 32, at *Nemeans* 7. 52 and 10. 20.

¹⁰ Eur. *Med.* 245 offers an analogous instance but uses the word ἄση. Medea is in the midst of her great monologue on the role of women in Greek society:

ἀνὴρ δ', ὅταν τοῖς ἐνδον ἄχθῃται ξυνών,
ἔξω μολὼν ἔπανσε καρδίαν ἄσης.

Whether ἄση refers to "satiety," "weariness" or plain "boredom" is impossible to say. (Notice too the use of ἄχθομαι).

¹¹ See Pindar's *Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962) 107: "The risk of κόρος is always present in his thoughts: it is not merely a passive state of mind in an audience but a positive emotion that may issue in some sort of offensive action." On the rhetorical force of κόρος see E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, UCPCP, 18 (1962) 13, 40, 74 ff.

¹² The *topos* had a long history. Compare, from amongst the many possible examples, Isocrates, *Panegy.* 7; Ovid, *Pont.* 3. 7. 3; Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 100. 11; Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* 8. 6. 14; 10. 1. 31 and Rutilius Namatianus, *de red.* 2. 3. This rhetorical *topos* never clearly distinguishes between boredom, weariness and offence.

They have had enough of waiting (ἀσχαλόωσι γὰρ οἷδε καθήμενοι). Their leaders can no longer restrain them. One might have expected Hermes to express some notion of boredom here—it might be expected to be implicit in καθήμενοι. Yet ἀσχαλόωσι is a precise word. It demonstrates that the soldiers were not “bored,” but vexed at having to wait. We might have preferred them to be bored. In the passage from the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, Achilles has just come on stage and addresses the chorus. He asks for Agamemnon and seems to complain about the delays they are enduring, bottled up at Aulis. These are his words:

οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ μένομεν Εὐρίπου πέλας.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ὄντες ἄζυγες γάμων
οἴκους ἐρήμους ἐκλιπόντες ἐνθάδε
θάσσουσ' ἐπ' ἄκταις, οἱ δ' ἔχοντες εὐνίδας
καὶ παῖδας.

The key words are θάσσουσ' ἐπ' ἄκταις, which are occasionally interpreted as referring to the boredom of being bottled up. Yet, on closer examination, this does not seem to be what Euripides is saying. The soldiers may be sitting by the shore; but their attitude is likely to be one of impatience to get on with the war and to get back to their deserted homes which will need their care. Boredom, in both passages, seems latent in the descriptions. Yet this is not what was really chosen for emphasis.¹³

Recourse to the dictionary listed occurrences of ἄλυσ or ἀλύω casts no doubt upon the suspicion that for Greeks of this period boredom was a neglected emotion. The *LSJ* offers two early uses of the word where the meaning seems to be “boredom” or “ennui.”¹⁴ The first comes from the Epicurean philosopher Metrodorus.¹⁵ Metrodorus links the verb ἀλύω with the words ἐπὶ τῶν συμποσίων. The context is fragmentary but Metrodorus seems to be referring to the tedium which can be induced by a bad drinking party. Lacking a context it is difficult to state anything with confidence. Yet here it seems not unreasonable to interpret the reference to boredom as being of the simple type. Zeno, as reported by Clement of Alexandria (von Arnim, *SVF* i, p. 58), uses the word in a manner which may be appropriate to simple boredom, or so suggests the *LSJ*. To judge from the following lines it may be better to gloss the word ἄλυσ as “annoyance”: ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν μυροπωλίων καὶ χρυσοχοείων καὶ ἐριοπωλίων ἄλυσ καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐργαστηρίων, ἔνθα ἐταιρικῶς κεκοσμημέναι, ὥσπερ (αἱ) ἐπὶ τέγουσ καθεζόμεναι, διημερεύουσι.

Taken on their own the passages and contexts discussed above can prove nothing. The knowledge, however, that the contemporary term for boredom

¹³ Compare Plutarch, *Eumenes* 11—which is discussed below. Here Plutarch makes much of the boredom suffered not just by the cooped up soldiers, but also by the cooped up animals.

¹⁴ Epicurus (fr. 496) may refer to the emotion, if not use the term ἄλυσ. See Note 34 below.

¹⁵ Papyrus Herculanensis, 831. 13, ed. A. Körte.

was rarely used, and that the mental state was rarely described or alluded to, does allow us to note a tendency to ignore the emotion. Perhaps judging it trivial, Greeks of these periods did not dignify it with frequent reference.¹⁶

For the first unequivocal description of boredom we have to wait for Lucretius. Lucretius *DRN*, 3. 1053–75¹⁷ is a famous passage. Its depiction of the anxious, bored lives of the Roman rich¹⁸ was imitated later by Horace and by Seneca. Lucretius' ennui-ridden individual tires of being at home, goes out, returns again dissatisfied; he hurries from his city house to his country home to escape the sense of anxiety and ennui only to find the same experience awaiting him in the country. The key lines are *DRN*, 3. 1060–67:

exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille,
esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque <revertit>,
quippe foris nilo melius qui sentiat esse.
currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter,
auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans;
oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae,
aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit,
aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit.

Lucretius seems to blame the unsettled emotions of his wealthy Roman on a fear of death.¹⁹ Presumably Lucretius means that the desire for a change of place of habitation reflects a hope that novelty will assuage or distract the fear of death. That *horror loci* is being described is manifest. That boredom is at issue is made obvious by the use of the words *oscitat*.

Lucretius' diagnosis of the cause of *horror loci* is doubly interesting. It may demonstrate his unwillingness to accept that such a simple emotion as boredom could cause such havoc in a life. Thus it may reinforce the suspicion that boredom was not a state taken very seriously in the ancient world. Furthermore Lucretius *DRN*, 1053–75, being such a confident portrait, suggests that the emotional state of his wealthy man was not uncommon. Bailey²⁰ remarks that "boredom and restlessness were a

¹⁶ Arist., *Ach.* 30 has Dicaeopolis, as he waits for the assembly to convene, listing a series of discomforts. Amongst the words appears the perfect tense of *χάσσω*:

στένω κέχηνα σκορδινῶμαι πέρδομαι,
ἀπορῶ γράφω παρατίλλομαι λογίζομαι.

It seems to me most probable that this is a reference to boredom (cf. ἀπορῶ).

¹⁷ According to Klibansky, *op. cit.* in Note 5, 356, in the tract on melancholy of Agrippa of Nettesheim, Lucretius is said to be a melancholic (as are Hesiod, Ion, Tynnichus of Chalcis and Homer.) The assertion is unprovable. However, it makes more sense than the assertion of Kuhn, *op. cit.* in Note 2, 25 ff., that Lucretius was subject to ennui.

¹⁸ Their probable wealth is stressed by Kenney, *Lucretius, De rerum natura: Book III* (Cambridge 1971) 239.

¹⁹ So Bailey, *Titi Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex* (Oxford 1947) vol. 2, 1171, and Kenney, *op. cit.* in Note 18, 239.

²⁰ *Op. cit.* in Note 19, vol. 2, 1171.

characteristic of Roman life at the end of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire." Whence he drew this information I am unsure—though doubtless his observation is correct in spite of the paucity of contemporary evidence. Yet the passage must point to its prevalence. It deserves to be noted, however, that in spite of the probable prevalence of this type of emotion, Roman literature of this and later periods makes few references to the emotion.²¹ That in itself is surely significant. The Roman valuation matches that of the Greeks. The experience may have been another matter.

At this point attention must be directed backwards, chronologically speaking, to an important relic of one of Ennius' plays, the *otium* fragment from the *Iphigenia*. From an historical point of view this fragment ought to have been treated before Lucretius, antedating the *DRN* as it does by well over one hundred years. Its imputed purpose, a description of *horror loci*, is simpler to judge when viewed in the light of Lucretius' unequivocal description.²² The sense of v. 199–202 of this fragment may point to the type of emotion whose symptoms Lucretius inveighs against in the Roman rich. The fragment (XCIX, v. 195–202 in Jocelyn) follows:

otio qui nescit uti
plus negoti habet quam cum est negotium in negotio.
nam cui quod agat institutum est †in illis† negotium,
id agit, <id> studet, ibi mentem atque animum delectat suum;
†otioso initio† animus nescit quid velit.
hoc idem est: em neque domi nunc nos nec militiae sumus.
imus huc, hinc illuc; cum illuc ventum est, ire illinc lubet.
incerte errat animus, praeter propter vitam vivitur.

Otium could conceivably be interpreted here as boredom—although the use is doubtless punning. The chorus of soldiers may be telling us that *otium* ("ease") can quickly become "boring" or "wearying" (*otiosum*). Thus it is with them. They go here and there (like Lucretius' rich man) but cannot settle (*incerte errat animus*) nor derive satisfaction from life (*praeter propter vitam vivitur*). It needs to be observed, however, that the manuscript readings are crucial. Jocelyn's text,²³ reproducing the *codices*, tends to remove the sense of "boredom" by reproducing the less comprehensible reading *otioso initio* rather than Lipsius' widely accepted *otioso in otio*.²⁴

²¹ As a rhetorical demonstration of this point we could point, for example, to Cicero's letters of 59, say, *Att.* 6. 9 and 11, which do not mention or describe boredom. One might have expected them to. Similarly one might have expected Ovid in *Tomis* to be consumed by the emotion. Yet his *Epistulae ex Ponto* contain no such references (cf. *Ex Ponto* 1. 5. 8, 43–44; 3. 4. 57).

²² Farquharson in his *The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus* (Oxford 1944) vol. 2, 514, implies the link between this passage and Lucretius.

²³ Which is the one reproduced here: *The Tragedies of Ennius* (Cambridge 1967) 112 and 333 ff.

²⁴ On this fragment and *otium* see J. -M. André, *Recherches sur l'otium romain* (Paris 1962), and, more generally, *L'otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine* (Paris 1966). See too

As read above the fragment seems to have more to do with laziness (a "lazy beginning?") or indecisiveness than with boredom. When one makes a lazy start, the fragment could be saying, one does not know where one is. Begin indecisively then things continue that way and a task becomes laborious.²⁵ The chorus of soldiers could be referring, therefore, not to any sense of *horror loci* (which seems unlikely in their occupation) but to the indecisiveness which has overtaken them due to poor initiation and direction.²⁶ It is doubtful, therefore, that this fragment offers any assistance in pinning down Roman notions of boredom.

Horace, perhaps unlike Ennius, seems to reflect Lucretius' description of *horror loci*.²⁷ In Stoic or Epicurean contexts such as *Satires* 2. 7. 28–29, in *Epistles* 1. 8. 12; 1. 11. 27 and 1. 14 Horace inveighs against the victims (himself included) of this type of ennui. *Satire* 2. 7 reports a dialogue between Horace and one of his slaves, Davus. Taking advantage of the freedom of speech allowed slaves during the Saturnalia, Davus upbraids his master for philosophical pusillanimity. The basic notion of the poem is that only the wise man is free. Davus the slave is in fact the true free man, while free Horace is in reality a slave. One of Davus' demonstrations of Horace's lack of freedom hinges upon *horror loci*: this is expressed in v. 28–29. Like Lucretius' wealthy man, Horace is unable to find contentment in either the city or the country.

Romae rus optas, absentem rusticus urbem
tollis ad astra levis.

The emotion, not perhaps as acute as that described by Lucretius, is none the less of the same order. In *Epistles* 1. 14 it is Horace giving the advice, this time to his *vilicus*, who longs for the excitements of the city life which he has willingly abandoned for the farm. The dissatisfactions which Horace's slave feels are a type of *horror loci* and are comparable to those denounced by Davus in *Satires* 2. 7. Note also that the solution to the problem of the *vilicus*, according to Horace, is hard work. The implication

Jocelyn, *op. cit.* in Note 23, and O. Skutsch, *Studia Enniana* (London 1968) 157–65 (a reprint of his *Rh.M.* 96 [1953] 193 ff. article.)

²⁵ The reading *otioso initio* is defended by R. J. Baker, "Well begun, half done: *otium* at Catullus 51. 13 and Ennius, *Iphigenia*," forthcoming. Baker interprets the phrase as an ablative of attendant circumstances and cites Cic. *de leg.* 3. 37 (*hoc populo* etc.) as a comparable construction. The reading does produce a scanable half line (the first two metra of this trochaic septenarius are comprised of two trochees followed by two anapaests) provided one allows hiatus between *initio* and *animus*.

²⁶ Exactly the same point could be made of the use of *otium* in the final stanza of Catullus 51. Here indecisiveness or laziness could have been the trouble rather than boredom. (See R. J. Baker, "Propertius' Monobiblos and Catullus 51," *Rh.M.* 124 [1981] 312–24.) If one accepts Lipsius' emendation, however, it is a different matter. Horace, *Odes* 2. 16, seems to refer neither to boredom, laziness nor indecisiveness. See Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 211 ff.

²⁷ See Kenney, *op. cit.* in Note 18, 241.

is that the emotion is normal and doubtless afflicts many. Horace does not suggest that it is a result of a fear of death.

Epistles 1. 11, addressed to a Bullatius, who was travelling abroad and, the poem seems to suggest, who was prone to the disorder described in *DRN* 3. 1053–75, again uses the image of *horror loci*. Like *Epistles* 1. 8, which will be discussed shortly, this poem presents Bullatius' problems as symptomatic of a larger problem. V. 25–30 summarise:

... nam si ratio et prudentia curas,
non locus effusi late maris arbiter aufert,
caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt.
strenua nos exercet inertia: navibus atque
quadrigis petimus bene vivere. quod petis hic est,
est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus.

The (*strenua*) *inertia* —a synonym for *taedium*—is certainly a form of boredom, but one whose consequences are most apparent in *horror loci*.²⁸ The solution to the problem is the exercise of *ratio* and *prudentia* and the resultant possession of an *aequus animus*. The cure is philosophical. It needs to be stressed that Horace's opinion of *horror loci* seems to differ from that of Lucretius. The incessant desire for change, which this emotion reflects, is symptomatic for Lucretius of a deeper malaise, the fear of death. Novelty distracts one from the fear, whilst sameness is inclined to encourage it. Horace does not appear to see anything so sinister in *horror loci*. For him it is a typical human emotion which can be cured by common sense and hard work.

Epistles 1. 8. 11–12 seems to continue the idea. Here it is Horace describing himself:

quae nocuere sequar, fugiam quae profore credam;
Romae Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam.

In this short poem, however, Horace's inability to be content with his lot is the result not so much of a lack of philosophical conviction as of his own psychology. In v. 9–10 he describes himself as locked into a perverse frame of mind which generates the *horror loci*:

fidis offendar medicis, irascar amicis,
cur me funesto properent arcere veterno.

Whether Horace's condition is better characterised as ennui or depression (melancholy) is a moot point.²⁹ I believe that it is melancholy, not ennui.

²⁸ The notion is also picked up in *Odes* 2. 16. 18–20: *quid terras alio calentis / sole mudamus? patriae quis exsul / se quoque fugit?*

²⁹ Klibansky, *op. cit.* in Note 5, 50, reports Rufus of Ephesus, who wrote not much later than Horace, as describing a melancholic as "bloated and swarthy; plagued by all manner of desires, depressed . . . ; cowardly and misanthropic; generally sad without cause, but sometimes immoderately cheerful; given over to various eccentricities, phobias and obsessions." Is this

What is important is that the emotion (here termed metaphorically as *veternus*)³⁰ has been complicated and expanded to the point that it has become almost spiritual. The condition, alternatively, is close to that of the seventeenth century melancholy, spleen, or to that of the nineteenth century ennui. As in so many instances, however, no clear-cut reference to boredom is apparent.

In Seneca's writings the notion of boredom appears frequently. Its range of connotations is broad and seems to stretch from simple boredom to a type of boredom which reflects that described by Horace in *Epistles* 1. 8. Boredom can become so all-pervasive as to sour one's whole approach to life. Similarly broad is Seneca's use of the key term *taedium*: the word can mean anything from "disgust" or "weariness" through simple boredom to full-blown ennui. Seneca's perception of the emotion, speaking textually, represents something new.

Simple boredom is referred to, for example, at *Nat. Quaest.* 4 A. Praef. 2, and at *Ep. Mor.* 40. 3. 6 and 70. 3. 7. The latter pair may be cited as representative. Speaking of a style of speech which is too slow Seneca suggests that the "boredom" (or "weariness") caused by halting speech induces an audience to lose interest: *nam illa quoque inopia et exilitas minus intentum auditorem habet taedio interruptae tarditatis*. . . . In the second passage, *Ep. Mor.* 70. 3. 7, Seneca is using a nautical metaphor. He contrasts the reactions of sailors to slow and to speedy voyages. Sailors trapped into the first type of passage are wearied by the boredom induced by the windlessness: *alium enim, ut scis, venti segnes ludunt ac detinent et tranquillitatis lentissimae taedio lassant, alium pertinax flatus celerrime perfert*. Notice that the term used here for boredom is *taedium*.³¹ Such a use of the word *taedium* is clearly linked to its common use meaning "weariness" or "disgust."³²

Seneca repeats some of the notions of *horror loci* which are familiar from Lucretius and Horace. One could cite, above all, *Ep. Mor.* 28, which refers specifically to Horace, *Epist.* 1. 11. 27, and expands, Stoic fashion, on this notion throughout the letter. The opening couple of sentences of the letter are indicative of the theme of the whole: *hoc tibi soli putas accidisse et admiraris quasi rem novam, quod peregrinatione tam longa et tot locorum varietatibus non discussisti tristiam gravitatemque mentis?*

Horace? Ross S. Kilpatrick, *The Poetry of Friendship: Horace, Epistles I* (Edmonton 1986) 38–39 argues that Horace is the victim of melancholy.

³⁰ Kiessling–Heinze, begging the question, compare ἀκηδία in Cic. *ad Att.* 12. 45, on which see Note 6 above.

³¹ The OLD (s.v. *taedium*) allows the meaning "ennui" for *taedium* only when it stands without the genitive. This seems to me to be unnecessarily prescriptive. This is especially so in the case of the second of the two citations above. A meaning "boredom" seems as apposite.

³² See amongst others, *Ep. Mor.* 56. 9. 5; 59. 15. 8; 100. 11. 5; *de ira* 3. 1. 5. 6, or *de beneficiis* 2. 5. 2. 7; 2. 11. 6. 2; 6. 16. 6. 2 or 7. 2. 4. 2.

animum debes mutare, non caelum . . . The theme is repeated with variations in *ad Helv.* 12. 3. 4, where Seneca refers to the extremes to which the rich will go to avoid *taedium*. In this case they vary their bored lives by imitating the poor: *nec tantum condicio illos temporum aut locorum inopia pauperibus exaequat; sumunt quosdam dies, cum iam illos divitiarum taedium cepit, quibus humi cenent et remoto auro argentoque fictilibus utantur.*³³ Somewhat the same theme is repeated in *Ep. Mor.* 18. 7. 3, where the rich are seen to attempt to escape *taedium* through luxury. Seneca, though a professed Stoic, seems to have more in common with Lucretius than Horace. In *Ep. Mor.* 28 the cause of *horror loci* is seen to be a fear of death. Novelty can distract from this fear, but the real cure rests in the eradication of fear through philosophy.

Boredom (or *taedium* as Seneca usually terms it) can spoil a whole life. Seneca seems fully conversant with the emotions described by Horace in *Epistles* 1. 8 and with the larger problems indicated by Lucretius' *horror loci*. The invasive *taedium* which produced the *horror loci* outlined above is one example. The emotion outlined in *Ep. Mor.* 24 seems stronger again. It can be so powerful as to lead to suicide. The passage (*Ep. Mor.* 24. 26), though lengthy, requires quotation in full.

Quosdam subito eadem faciendi vivendique satietas et vitae non odium sed fastidium, in quod prolabimur ipsa impellente philosophia, dum dicimus: "Quousque eadem? Nempe expergiscar dormiam, <eadem> esuriam, algebo aestuabo. Nullius rei finis est, sed in orbem nexa sunt omnia, fugiunt ac sequuntur. Diem nox premit, dies noctem, aestas in autumnum desinit, autumnus hiemps instat, quae vere conpescitur: omnia sic transeunt ut revertantur. Nihil novi facio, nihil novi video: fit aliquando et huius rei nausia." Multi sunt qui non acerbum iudicent vivere, sed supervacuum.

(Notice that in this passage the word *taedium* does not appear. It is replaced by *satietas*, *fastidium* and, most remarkably, by *nausia*).³⁴ Seneca's portrait of boredom has taken the pervasive, souring but limited emotion of Lucretius and Horace to its logical extreme. *Horror loci* has become so severe that it influences all portions of life. The victim is left with but one alternative: *multi sunt qui non acerbum iudicent vivere, sed supervacuum*. This can only be suicide.

³³ Compare *Ep. Mor.* 100. 6 and Martial 3. 48.

³⁴ The term *taedium* is used earlier in the letter (24. 22): *Obiurgat Epicurus non minus eos, qui mortem concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: "Ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio vitae, cum genere vitae, ut currendum ad mortem esset, effeceris."* The sense is the same. The quotation is reproduced by Usener, *Epicurea* (repr. Rome 1966) as fr. 496 of Epicurus' remains. It would be useful to know what Epicurus said and to have a context. This might alter the conclusions concerning the earlier Greek conceptions of the emotion. As it stands, Seneca may be guilty of distortion.

Before leaving Seneca perhaps some mention should be made of the fascinating dialogue *de tranquillitate animi*.³⁵ The dialogue is addressed to a young Annaeus Serenus, who complains of a condition which, at the outset of the dialogue, seems to resemble at times melancholia at times boredom. Soon afterwards (1. 4) the emphasis of the dialogue shifts from the physiological to the moral. Serenus complains that he is unable to chose between a life of luxury and a life of frugality, between a public and a private life, and so on. In spite of frequent references to *taedium vitae* and *displacencia sui*³⁶ the thrust of the dialogue is to diagnose and to correct this state of mental equivocation and to replace it with a state of philosophical tranquillity. The concern of the dialogue is only tangentially with boredom.

It is, after Seneca, Plutarch who provides the most useful set of references to the notion of boredom.³⁷ To judge from the occurrences of the word ἄλυσ, he preserves part of the range of the meanings evident in Seneca. There are in Plutarch several references to the simple form of boredom.³⁸ *Eumenes* 11. 3 provides the clearest example. In this passage the effect of the close confinement of besieged forces is described and Eumenes' attempts to alleviate the feeling of ἄλυσ which was taking hold of the soldiers. The crucial clause is this: . . . οὐ μόνον τὸν ἄλυν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπραξίας μαραινόμενων ἀπαλλάξαι βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . Here boredom is the result above all of inactivity (ἀπραξία). Like *taedium* the word also may have the sense of "distress" (see *Brut.* 5) or even "depression" (see *Mar.* 78). As far as I can see, however, there are no common references in Plutarch to *horror loci*.

Perhaps the most startling reference to boredom occurs in *Pyrrhus* 13. Pyrrhus, after becoming regent of Epeirus and later of Macedonia, withdrew from the latter possession in disappointment at the disloyalty of his subjects. It was in description of this point of his life that Plutarch makes his reference to "boredom." The passage deserves quoting in full:

Τότε δ' οὖν εἰς Ἡπειρον ἐκπεσόντι τῷ Πύρρῳ καὶ προεμένῳ Μακεδονίαν ἡ μὲν τύχη παρείχε χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀπραγμόνως καὶ ζῆν ἐν εἰρήνῃ, βασιλεύοντι τῶν οἰκείων· ὁ δὲ τὸ μὴ παρέχειν ἑτέροις κακὰ μὴδ' ἔχειν ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἄλυν τινὰ ναυτιώδη νομίζων, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐκ ἔφερε τὴν σχολήν . .

Boredom—to the point of nausea—did not allow Pyrrhus to enjoy his retirement. He was only content, according to Plutarch, when doing or receiving mischief. To alleviate the boredom Pyrrhus launched himself on a new round of military activities at the end of which he lost his life.

³⁵ Kuhn, *op. cit.* in Note 2, 31, insists incorrectly that the concern of this dialogue is ennui. See too Griffin, *Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics* (Oxford 1976) 322.

³⁶ See, for example, 2. 6. 2; 2. 10. 2; 2. 11. 4; 3. 1. 1; 3. 6. 2 and 17. 3. 7.

³⁷ Other instances, but scattered ones, exist. See, for example, *Martial* 12. 82. 14, which refers to the boring importunities of a man seeking a dinner invitation.

³⁸ Amongst others one could cite *Eum.* 11, *Ant.* 51, *Pyrrh.* 16, *Tim.* 14 and *Rom.* 5.

Boredom, therefore, and its avoidance is seen as the motivating force in Pyrrhus' life. Whether or not Pyrrhus is telling us historical truth is irrelevant—nor do we have any means of ascertaining the state of Pyrrhus' psychology. What is vital is Plutarch's perception of the emotion. Boredom, like the *mal de siècle*, has become a spiritual malady and is seen as capable of devouring a whole life.

The century following Plutarch, as expected, provides further references to boredom. There is, for example, Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 25 Chilton) referring to the fickle and bored manner in which passers-by read his work. Or Aelian (*Varia Historia* 14. 12) singling out the king of Persia who, to avoid boredom when travelling, kept a knife and a piece of linden wood for whittling. Farquharson, the editor of Marcus Aurelius, argues for the presence of a reference to ennui, precisely *horror loci*, in 2. 7 of the *Meditations*.³⁹ The passage is as follows:

Περὶ σπᾶι τί σε τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐμπίπτοντα; καὶ σχολὴν παρέχε σεαυτῷ τοῦ προσμάνθανειν ἀγαθόν τι καὶ παῦσαι ῥεμβόμενος. ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν περιφορὰν φυλακτέον· ληροῦσι γὰρ καὶ διὰ πράξεων οἱ κεκμηκότες τῷ βίῳ καὶ μὴ ἔχοντες σκοπόν, ἐφ' ὃν πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν καὶ καθάπαξ φαντασίαν ἀπευθύνουσιν.

The expression οἱ κεκμηκότες τῷ βίῳ may indeed be a very condensed way for describing the aimless Roman aristocrat. The expression, however, does not allow of easy interpretation. It may well refer to a spiritual ennui. That it may also refer to *horror loci* is uncertain.

As a topic worthy of serious consideration boredom must wait for the fourth century, the next period of great cultural revival. Reference in this period, however, has inexorably been altered by Christianity. The focus, through the work of men such as the Christian mystic Evagrius or of St. John Chrysostomos, is now on the deadly sin of *acedia*, the depressed condition which led anchorites to despair of god.⁴⁰ It has been indicated previously that *acedia* may better be considered as depression. But demonstration of this point is beyond the scope of this paper.

There are several conclusions which may be drawn from this brief survey. The first and most obvious is that the ancients were subject to boredom. But there are qualifications which need to be made to this assertion. Greek literature down to the Hellenistic period lacks reference to anything more than the simplest form of boredom. Indeed the word boredom only seems to appear in the fourth century. Serious or unequivocal consideration of boredom begins in the first century B.C. in Rome, but here it is limited to the less complex form of *horror loci*. It is in the first and second centuries A.D. that a spiritual form of boredom is first referred to. This is apparent in the works of Seneca and then Plutarch. Boredom in

³⁹ Farquharson, *op. cit.* in Note 22, vol. 2, 514.

⁴⁰ The most recent discussion of this topic is contained in Jackson, *op. cit.* in Note 5, 46–77.

Seneca is seen as an emotion which effects not only sporadically but can spread to influence one's every waking action. It can become a spiritual disease. Plutarch, to judge from his life of Pyrrhus, was quite familiar with the concept. In Seneca and Plutarch, therefore, there seems to be the beginnings of the modern concepts of the emotion. Why the early empire should mark the inception of such an emotion is another question.

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Eucheria's Adynata

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH AND ARISTOULA GEORGIADOU

I¹*A. L.* 390 Riese = 386 Shackleton Bailey reads:

- Aurea concordī quae fulgent fila metallo
 setarum cumulīs consociare volo;
 Sericeum tegmen, gemmantia texta Laconum
 4 pellibus hircinis aequiperanda loquor.
 Nobilis horribili iungatur purpura burrae;
 nectatur plumbo fulgida gemma gravi.
 Sit captiva sui nunc margarita nitoris
 8 et clausa obscuro fulgeat in chalybe.
 Lingonico pariter claudatur in aere smaragdus;
 conpar silicibus nunc hyacinthus eat.
 Rupibus atque molis similis dicatur iaspis.
 12 Eligat infernum iam modo luna chaos.
 Nunc etiam urticis mandemus lilia iungi,
 purpureamque rosam dira cicuta premat.
 Nunc simul optemus despectis piscibus ergo
 16 delicias magni nullificare freti:
 auratam craxantus amet, saxatilis anguem,
 limacem pariter nunc sibi tructa petat.
 Altaque iungatur vili cum vulpe leaena,
 20 perspicuam lyncem simius accipiat.
 Iungatur nunc cerva asino, nunc tigris onagro,
 iungatur fesso concita damma bovi.
 Nectareum vitient nunc lasera tetra rosatum,
 24 mellaque cum fellis sint modo mixta malis.
 Gemmantem sociemus aquam luteumque barathrum,
 stercoribus mixtus fons eat inriguus.

¹ Part I is by M. Marcovich, part II by A. Georgiadou.

28 Praepes funereo cum vulture ludat hirundo,
cum bubone gravi nunc philomela sonet.
Tristis perspicua sit cum perdice cavannus,
iunctaque cum corvo pulchra columba cubet.

32 Haec monstra incertis mutant sibi tempora fatis:
rusticus et servus sic petat Eucheriam.

3 texta *Heinsius* : tecta *codd.* | 5 burrae *codd.* : byrro *coniecit Vollmer* | 13–14 *respicit A. L. c.* 729. 5–6 | 15 despectis *Monacensis* 22227, *Meyer* : dispectis *cett.* | 16 dilicias *Parisini* 8071 et 8440 : diuitias *Valencenensis* 387 | 17 craxantus *Parisinus* 8440 : crassantus *cett.* | 21 *respicit A. L. c.* 729. 7 | 23 lasera *Ducange* : lausera *codd.* | 26 mixtus *Marcovich* : mixtis *codd.* | 31 hic versus a *Iuliano Toletano citatur (Anecd. Helv. ed. Hagen: Gramm. Lat. Suppl. p. CCXXXI. 6)* | 32 sic *codd.* : si *Shackleton Bailey*

The threads of gold, shining with the glitter of the concordant metal, I want to put together with the heaps of bristles; a silken garment, a Spartan cloak wrought with gems, I want to put on the same level with goatskins. Let a noble purple tunic be attached to an awful shaggy rag. (6) Let a shining gem be affixed to a piece of heavy lead. Let now a pearl be deprived of its luster, let it shine being shut in the darkness of a box made of steel. Similarly, let a smaragd gem be hidden in a box made of Lingonic copper; let a hyacinth gem pass for a match to a pebble stone. Let a jasper stone be likened to a piece of rock, to a millstone. (12) Let the moon prefer to abide in the hellish chaos.

(13) Let us now order the lilies to join the nettle in company; let the ill-omened hemlock embrace the crimson rose. (15) In the same vein, let us now disdain the fish and engage in vilifying the precious gifts of the deep see: let a toad fall in love with a gilthead, a rock bass with a snake; and let a trout woo a snail. (19) Let now the noble lioness be united in love with the base fox; let the monkey take in marriage the pretty lynx. Also let a hind be united in love with a donkey, a tigress with a wild ass, the nimble doe with the sluggish bull.

(23) Let now the loathsome asafetida spoil the rose wine sweet as nectar; let the honey be mixed with the terrible gall. Let us pour together the crystal clear water taken from a spring and the muddy water taken from a pit; let the irriguous fountain flow down while being mixed with dung. (27) Let the swift swallow play with the ill-fated vulture; let the nightingale sing together with the grievous horned owl. Let the somber night owl join the pretty partridge in love, let the beautiful dove lie down in love with the raven.

(31) Let all these beasts exchange their way of life for an uncertain fate: then only may a countryman, and a servant to that, come to woo Eucheria.

Apparently, Eucheria's striking but playful elegy has escaped the attention of scholars. Back in 1891, Max Manitius suggested that the poetess might have been the wife of the poet Dynamius from Marseille, a friend of Venantius Fortunatus (second half of the sixth century).² In his turn, Franz Skutsch (in 1907) was unable to give a more favorable verdict about Eucheria's poem than this one: "Die Form ist teils gesucht teils plump."³ The poem, however, must have been known enough in late antiquity to allow an anonymous poet from *Latin Anthology* (No. 729) to imitate it,⁴ while Julian, the archbishop of Toledo (642–690), found line 31 of the poem worthwhile quoting in his *Grammar*.

I think the poem deserves a closer look for at least three reasons. First, apparently this is the longest extant catalogue of *adynata* in the entire Latin poetry: no less than twenty-seven *adynata* are comprised in fifteen elegiac couplets (1–30).⁵ That leaves Licentius (end of the fourth century) as a distant second (with a list of eleven *adynata*),⁶ and the anonymous poet of No. 440 from *Latin Anthology* as a third (with a list of nine *adynata*). Second, Eucheria's poem displays a carefully conceived design. For one thing, the reader is left in suspense about the reason for such a huge catalogue of *adynata*, and will learn the *fiat applicatio* only in the closing

²Max Manitius, *Geschichte der christlich-lateinischen Poesie bis zur Mitte des 8. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart 1891) 471 f.

³RE VI (1907), 882. 19, s.v. *Eucheria*.

⁴A. L. No. 729 Riese is a clear imitation of Eucheria's poem (sure borrowings are italicized):

RESPONSUM PUELLAE

	Conspicua primum specie quam fata bearunt, desine pompifero tu violare toro.	
	Absit ut albiplumem valeat calcare columbam	[cf. v.30]
4	inter tot niveas rustica milvus avis.	[cf. v.27]
	Nec rubeis <i>cardus</i> succrescat iure <i>rosetis</i> , <i>lilia</i> nec campis vana <i>cicuta</i> premat.	[cf. v.14] [cf. v.13]
8	Nec miser eximiae <i>cervae</i> iungatur <i>asellus</i> , quem stimulis crebris sarcina saeva domat.	[cf. v.21]

⁵On the figure of *adynaton* compare Ernest Dutoit, *Le thème de l'adynaton dans la poésie antique* (Thèse Fribourg, Suisse [Paris 1936] (Eucheria's catalogue is not mentioned on p. 163); H. V. Canter, "The Figure ἀδύνατον in Greek and Latin Poetry," *AJP* 51 (1930) 32–41 (Eucheria's poem is mentioned on p. 37); J. Demling, *De poetarum Latinorum ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύνατον comparationibus* (Würzburg 1898) [not available to me].

⁶Licentius 93–102 ap. Augustine *Epist.* XXVI (p. 92 f. ed. Goldbacher). Compare Claudian *Paneg. dictus Probino et Olybrio coss.* (l). 169–73, and Levy, in *RE* XIII (1926) 205 f., s.v. *Licentius*.

line, and the name of the poetess in the last word of the poem (32). Finally, Eucheria's lexicon seems to be of importance.

(1) *Adynata*. The richness and variety of Eucheria's *adynata* are unparalleled, as may be seen from the following synopsis.

- | | | |
|-------|----------------------------|--|
| I. | <i>Clothing</i> | (1) aurea fila : setarum cumuli (1-2) |
| | | (2) Sericeum tegmen/gemmantia texta :
pelles hircinae (3-4) |
| | | (3) purpura : burra (5) |
| II. | <i>Precious
stones</i> | (4) gemma : plumbum (6) |
| | | (5) margarita : chalybs (7-8) |
| | | (6) smaragdus : aes Lingonicum (9) |
| | | (7) hyacinthus : silex (10) |
| | | (8) iaspis : rupes/mola (11) |
| III. | <i>Astronomy</i> | (9) luna : chaos (12) |
| IV. | <i>Flowers</i> | (10) lilia : urticae (13) |
| | | (11) rosa : cicuta (14) |
| V. | <i>Fish</i> | (12) aurata : craxantus (17) |
| | | (13) saxatilis : anguis (17) |
| | | (14) tructa : limax (18) |
| VI. | <i>Beasts</i> | (15) leaena : vulpes (19) |
| | | (16) lynx : simius (20) |
| | | (17) cerva : asinus (21) |
| | | (18) tigris : onagrus (21) |
| | | (19) damma : bos (22) |
| VII. | <i>Liquids</i> | (20) rosatum : laser (23) |
| | | (21) mel : fel (24) |
| | | (22) aqua gemmans : barathrum (25) |
| | | (23) fons inriguus : stercora (26) |
| VIII. | <i>Birds</i> | (24) hirundo : vultur (27) |
| | | (25) philomela : bubo (28) |
| | | (26) perdix : cavannus (29) |
| | | (27) columba : corvus (30) |

If we now ask: What was the source of inspiration for Eucheria in composing her long catalogue of *adynata*, my answer would be: (1) most probably, the poetess did not use one single source, but rather is combining motifs deriving from many different sources. (2) While being inspired by the traditional *adynata*, she is producing new examples of her own, displaying imagination and inventiveness. This suggestion seems to be in accord both with Skutsch's remark (o.c., 882. 27), "doch kann ich ein bestimmtes Vorbild nicht angeben," and with the fact that *exact parallels* to the example of our list are not easy to find (I was able so to do only for

motifs Nos. 9 and 25). Now, I think we can see Eucheria's method at work. Here are a few examples.

Motif No. 9, "Moon residing in Hades instead of in heaven" (12, *eligat infernum iam modo luna chaos*). Most probably, it is part of this traditional *adynaton*: Eurip. Fr. 687. 2 f. N.², πρόσθε γὰρ κάτω | γῆς εἶσιν ἄστρα; Verg. *Aen.* 12. 205, *caelumque in Tartara solvat* | ; Seneca *Octavia* 222 f., *Iungentur ante . . . | . . . Tartaro tristi polus* | , et alibi. But the point is that Eucheria seems to combine this *adynaton* with the *magic* motif of *caelo . . . deducere lunam* (Verg. *Ecl.* 8. 69), worthy of a Thessalian witch.

Motifs Nos. 10 and 11 — the combinations, lilies and nettle, roses and hemlock — may well have been inspired by such *adynata* as, e.g., Theognis 537, Οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ σκίλλης (squill) ῥόδα φύεται οὐδ' ὑάκινθος; Theocritus 1. 132 f.:

Νῦν ἴα μὲν φορέοιτε βάτοι, φορέοιτε δ' ἄκανθοι,
ἀ δὲ καλὰ νάρκισσος ἐπ' ἀρκεύθοισι κομάσαι.

Verg. *Ecl.* 8. 52 f., *Nunc et . . . | . . . narcisso florebat alnus*. Take notice that with the same ease the imitator of Eucheria, A. L. No. 729 (quoted in note 4), was able to replace the couples of our lines 12–13, *lilia-urticae* and *rosa-cicuta*, with the couples, *cardus-rosetum* and *lilia-cicuta*, respectively (729. 5–6).

Motif No. 13—the marriage between a rock bass and a snake—may have been inspired by the classical marriage between a sea-eel (murena) and a viper: Pliny *N. H.* 9. 76 and 32. 14; Achill. Tat. *Leucippe et Clitophon* 1. 18. 3; Aelian. *N. A.* 1. 50 and 9. 66; Oppian. *Hal.* 1. 554 ff.; Basil of Caesarea *Homil. in Hexaem.* 7. 5.

Motif No. 18—the liaison between a tigress and a wild ass—may have been inspired by such *adynata* as, e.g., Horace *Epodes* 16. 31, . . . *mirus amor, iuuet ut tigris subsidere cervis*; Verg. *Ecl.* 8. 27, *iungentur iam grypes equis*.

Motif No. 25—a singing contest between the nightingale and the owl—finds its exact parallel both in Theocritus 1. 136, κῆξ ὀρέων τοι σκῶπες ἀηδόσι δηρίσαντο, and in Calpurnius *Ecl.* 6. 8, *vocalem superet et dirus aedona bubo*. Only that this time Vergil and Lucretius have done what our Eucheria seems to be doing throughout her poem—Vergil, by replacing the contestants *nightingale* and *owl* with the couple *swan* and *owl* (*Ecl.* 8. 55, *certent et cynis ululae*), Lucretius, by replacing them with *swallow* and *swan* instead (3. 6 f., *quid enim contendat hirundo | cynis?*).

Finally, motif No. 27—the marriage between a dove and a raven—may have been inspired by Horace, *Epodes* 16. 32, *adulteretur et columba milvo*.⁷ Incidentally, the imitator of Eucheria (A. L. No. 729. 3–4) replaced *raven*

⁷ Compare Lucretius 3. 752, . . . *accipiter fugiens veniente columba*.

with *kite* (*milvus*), as if recognizing Eucheria's source of inspiration—Horace.

In conclusion, the learned poetess Eucheria seems to have collected her *adynata* from different sources, while at the same time engaging in heavy improvisation.

(2) *Design*. It is not difficult to see why Eucheria is selecting the traditional *adynata* and creating her own ones. To suit her own purpose—to demonstrate the absurdity of a *marriage* between the noble *lioness* Eucheria (19, *altaque . . . leaena*) and a common, poor peasant (32, *rusticus et servus*).⁸ Now, the unity of her design is reflected in the following three devices.

First, in the fact that verbs implying, "to be united in marriage," reverberate throughout the poem: *iungatur* (5, 19, 21, 22); *iungi* (13); *iuncta* (20); *nectatur* (6); *amet* (17); *petat* ("to woo, to ask in marriage," 18 and 32); *accipiat* ("to take in marriage," 20); finally, *cubet* (30).

Second, in such obvious allusions to the rustic way of life of a common countryman as are: "bristles" (2); "skingoats" (4); "a terrible shaggy rag" (*burra*, 5); "millstone" (11); "nettle" (13); "the base fox" (19); "monkey" (20); "donkey" (21); "bull" (22); "the mud of a pit" (25); "dung" (26); finally, "raven" (30). Now, from the positive opposite of each given couple it is not difficult to see how high Eucheria values herself—opening with gold, silk, purple garments and precious stones, and closing with *pulchra columba* (30). The identity of "the beautiful dove" is unmistakable.

Third, in the postponement of the very reason for the presence of such a long catalogue of *adynata* to the last line of the poem (32)—*rusticus et servus sic petat Eucheriam* (echoing *petat* of line 18). Such a device may be paralleled, for example, by Licentius (*supra*, note 6), where the *fiat applicatio* appears in the last, eleventh, line of a catalogue consisting of eleven *adynata*: (92), *Ante sub Aegeo aptabunt pia tecta palumbes* | . . . , (98), | *ante* . . . , (100), | *ante* . . . , (102), . . . *quam mihi post tergum veniant tua dona, magister* |. Or by A. L. No. 440 (*De bono quietae vitae*), where the reason for a list of nine *adynata* appears only in the last, sixth, couplet: (1), | *Ante* . . . , (3), | *ante* . . . , (5), | *ante* . . . , (7) | *ante* . . . , (11) | . . . *quam mihi displiceat vitae fortuna quietae* Therefore, it is quite possible that Eucheria was following such a model from late antiquity in keeping her surprise for the closing line of the poem.

⁸What the expression of line 32, *rusticus et servus*, socially implies, is not clear enough to me. I have translated vaguely, "a countryman, and a servant to that." For hardly would a *colonus* and *serf* dare to come and ask the noble lioness Eucheria in marriage. I guess the suitor Eucheria has in mind is a *common and poor but free farmer*. The imitator of Eucheria (A. L. No. 729. 4) seems to allude to this rustic wooer by employing the metaphor, *rustica . . . avis*. Skutsch's suggestion (o.c., 882. 13), "Auch die Werbung des *servus rusticus* ist wohl am besten aus gallisch-germanischen Verhältnissen zu verstehen," remains enigmatic to me. Can a medievalist help us elucidate the term, *rusticus et servus*?

Still, the idea of "an impossible marriage union" is absent in our late sources to serve as a reason for the poetess to introduce such a long list of *adynata*. Consequently, I would suggest that Vergil's eighth eclogue served as the most likely source of inspiration for Eucheria's poem:

26 *Mopso Nysa datur: quid non speremus amantes?*
 Iungentur iam grypes equis, aevoque sequenti
 cum canibus timidi venient ad pocula dammae.

52 *Nunc et ovis ultro fugiat lupus, aurea durae*
 mala ferant quercus, narcisso floreat alnus,
 pinguia corticibus sudent electra myricae,
 certent et cygnis ululae . . .

Eucheria seems to share with Vergil two elements. First, Nysa weds Mopsus—what a monstrous union! What may we lovers not expect now? Just as monstrous would be the marriage between the noble Eucheria and the *rusticus et servus* (32). And second, both impossible marriages evoke a catalogue of *adynata*. In addition, two of Vergil's *adynata*—"Now griffins may as well be mated with horses" and "Now let owls compete in song with swans!"—strongly resemble Eucheria's *adynata* Nos. 18 and 25.⁹

(3) *Lexicon*. There are three *hapax legomena* in Eucheria's poem: 3 *Sericeus*; 5 *burra*; 17 *craxantus*. While 1 *Sericeum* (for *Sericum*) seems to be a produce of metrical necessity (just as is the irregularity of 10, *silicibus*¹⁰), the other two words are not. Being opposed to a *nobilis purpura* (5), the horribilis *burra* is best understood as "a cheap shaggy or woolen piece of rustic clothing" befitting a peasant (32 *rusticus*). Walde-Hofmann (*L.E.W.*, s.v.) bring the word in connection with *reburrus*, "with bristling hair," or "with hair brushed up," "widerhaarig,"—a word known since Augustine,—and translate *burra* as "zottiges Gewand," "Wolle." That *burra* was a cheap rustic piece of garb is attested by its metaphorical sense in Ausonius 7. 1. 4 f. (*Ausonius Drepano filio*): *At nos inlepidum, rudem libellum, 1 burras, quisquiliis ineptiasque . . . 1* (compare German *Flaus* : *Flausen*).

Craxantus (17), or *crassantus*, "toad," is being brought into connection by Walde-Hofmann with proper names *Craxantus*, *Craxa*, *Craxanius*, and translated as "Kröte" (cf. *trucantus*).

Moving to the semantic peculiarities of Eucheria's lexicon, *captiva* (7) most probably means, "being deprived of," and is being employed with a

⁹ Skutsch (o.c., 882. 26) refers to the *adynata* at Vergil *Ecl.* 8. 27 f., but misses the point by omitting the crucial line 26, *Mopso Nysa datur: quid non speremus amantes?*

¹⁰ There is no need to change *silicibus* into *et silici*, as Heinsius had suggested; we have to live with metrical irregularities of Late Latin poetry.

genitivus inopiae—sui nitoris: compare TLL III. 375. 59 (= *priva* ?); 376. 28. — *Eat*, in lines 10 and 26, is employed in two different senses: “to pass for” (in 10), and “to flow down” (in 26). — The postponement of *ergo* (15) to the end of the line may be paralleled by Propertius 2. 32. 1; Ovid *Met.* 12. 106; Grattius *Cyneg.* 73 (cf. TLL V. 761. 62–72). — In line 17, *saxatilis* is rather *rock bass* than *rockfish*; and *anguis* rather a *land snake* than an *eel* (= *anguilla*, cf. Juvenal 5. 103; Pliny *N. H.* 29. 111). — *Perspicua* (*lynx*, in 20; *perdix*, in 29) does not mean, “bunt” (as Skutsch, o.c., 882. 22 has it), but rather “pretty, handsome, goodlooking.” Compare *Corpus Gloss. Lat.* Loewe–Goetz IV. 271. 35: *Perspicuus* = *splendidus, pulcher*, εὐπερίβλεπτος. — Judging by the contrasting juxtapositions of lines 5, *nobilis horribili*; 8, *obscurus fulgeat*; 27, *praepes funereo*; 29, *tristis perspicua*, we may assume that in the antithesis of line 22, *iungatur fesso concita damma bovi*, the qualifier *fessus* means rather, “sluggish,” than “weary, tired,” as being opposed to “the nimble doe.”¹¹ — In line 22, *vinum* is to be understood with *rosatum*: compare Greek ῥόδινον, ῥοδωτόν. — Finally, in line 25, the epithet, *gemmans* = *lucidus* (TLL VI. 1757. 73), “crystal clear,” as applied to water, can be easily paralleled (e.g., Silius 4. 350, *gemmanti gurgite*; Martial 9. 90. 2, *gemmantibus . . . rivis*). But its opposite, *luteum barathrum*, in the sense of, “a muddy well or pit,” looks strange. The best I can do is to refer to the Glossaries, which explain *barathrum* as *cenum, puteus, fossa, fovea* (TLL II. 1723. 51).

Speaking of Eucheria's lexicon, two words from her poem may help us in trying to determine an approximate date for our poetess—*tructa* (18), and *cavannus* (29). *Tructa* (= τρώκτης) appears first in Ambrose (*Hexameron* 5. 3. 7, *troctas*), then in Plinius Valerianus (sixth century) 5. 43, and in Isidore of Seville (*Orig.* 12. 6. 6). And *cavannus* = *noctua* occurs in *Italia* (Lugdun.), *Deut.* 14:15; *Schol. Bern.* ad Verg. *Buc.* 8. 55; Eucherius of Lyons (died ca. 455), *Instruct.* 2. 9 (p. 155. 25 Wotke); Damigeron *De lapidibus* 28 (sixth century); cf. TLL III. 624. 4–19. On the other hand, a positive *terminus ante quem* for our poem is provided by Julian of Toledo (seventh century), who quotes line 31. Consequently, most probably our Eucheria lived somewhere in the fifth or sixth century. That her residence was Gaul, is strongly indicated both by the Gallic word *cavannus*¹² (so Skutsch, o.c., 882. 6), and by the term, *Lingonicum aes* (9), probably hinting at the famous iron mines of Langres (so Manitius, o.c., 472).

¹¹ In addition to these examples of *antithesis*, Eucheria's poem abounds in examples of *alliteration*: 1 (f); 1–2 (c); 3 (t); 3–4 (l); 5 (*pur-* : *bur-*); 6 (g); 7 (s; n); 17 (a); 19 (v); 24 (m); 30 (c); 31 (m); 32 (s). *Versus Leonini* are present in lines 11; 16; 24; 26 (?); 31.

¹² French *chouan*; compare Meyer–Lübke, *R.E.W.*, s.v.

II

Unlike the bulk of the poems with *adynata*, where this figure plays only an auxiliary role, in Eucheria's impressive elegy *adynata*—no less than twenty-seven of them—constitute the framework of the entire poetic construction.¹ As Professor Marcovich has pointed out, most probably Eucheria is reshaping the available traditional *adynata* so as to conform to the key idea of her poem—*mismatching*. Eucheria's originality, and even a certain exuberance, is best reflected in the way she adapts the traditional *adynata* to her specific purpose. A closer look at the *adynata* of the poem seems to reveal a deliberate effort, on the part of the poetess, to avoid repeating the stereotyped examples by experimenting with novel ideas and combinations.

Here are a few relevant examples and close parallels of the traditional, proverbial and standard *adynata* which I think may be useful in assessing Eucheria's innovations. In lines 1–5, the contrast between fine and rustic clothing has the obvious *social connotation* of *high vs. low, noble vs. common*. The proverb (Diogenian 7. 94, et alibi), Πίθηκος ἐν πορφύρα (ὅτι οἱ φαῦλοι, κᾶν καλὰ περιβάλονται, ὅμως οὐ λανθάνουσι πονηροὶ ὄντες), comes to mind (compare also Macarius 7. 12, Πίθηκος ὁ πίθηκος κᾶν χρυσᾷ ἔχη σάνδαλα).

The gap separating the *noble* from the *vulgar* is equally clearly implied by the five *adynata* of lines 6–11, dealing with gems and precious stones. Compare, for example, Lucian *Apology* 11, . . . εὐρήσεις . . . τοσοῦτον εἰκότας ἀλλήλοις τοὺς βίους, ὅσον μόλυβδος ἀργύρῳ καὶ χαλκὸς χρυσῷ καὶ ἀνεμώνῃ ρόδῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πίθηκος; Diog. Laert. 6. 65, 'Ιδὼν [sc. Diogenes] εὐπρεπῇ νεανίσκον ἀπρεπῶς λαλοῦντα, "Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ" ἔφη "ἐξ ἐλεφαντίνου κολεοῦ μόλυβδίνην ἔλκων μάχαιραν;"; Aristaenetus *Epist.* 1, p. 142 Hercher, "Ἄλλως τε" φησὶ "Κυδίππην Ἀκοντίῳ συνάπτειν οὐ μόλυβδον ἂν συνεπιμίξειας ἀργύρῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκατέρωθεν ὁ γάμος ἔσται χρυσοῦς";² Plato *Sympos.* 219 a 1, χρυσέα χαλκείων.³

Of course, examples for an impossible *mating* between two different species of animals abound. Compare, e.g., Aristoph. *Pax* 1077, καὶ πῶς, ὦ κατάρατε, λύκος ποτ' ἂν οἶν ὑμεναιοῖ;; Horace *Odes* 1. 33. 7 f., . . .

¹ For the figure of *adynaton* as a dominating idea in a poem compare A. G. 5. 19 (2 *adynata*); 9. 575 (4 *adynata*); A. L. No. 729 Riese (4 *adynata*); No. 440 (9 *adynata*); App. Verg. *Dirae* 4–8; 15–24; 67–68; 72–74; 81–101.

² Cf. D. A. Tsirimbis, *Platon* 2 (1950) 25–85, esp. p. 76.

³ The contrast between the lustrous pearl and a box made of steel, of lines 7–8, may be paralleled by Arnaut Daniel (XII–XIII century), *Poems* 14. 49 f.:

Ans er plus vils aurs non es fers

C' Arnautz desam lieis ont es femanz necs.

("Sooner will gold become cheaper than iron than will Arnaut cease to love the woman to whom he is secretly attached.")

sed prius Appulis l iungentur capreae lupis . . .; Seneca *Phaedra* 572, *et ora dammis blanda praebebunt lupi*; Paraphrase of Oppian's *Hal.* 4. 7, τὴν ἐρωτικὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς κίχλαις ὁ τρισάθλιος κόσσυφος . . .; or the Modern Greek proverb, 'Ο κολιὸς (= fish κολίας) τὴν παλαμύδα ἀπ' ἀγάπην τὴν ἐπῆρε.⁴

Finally, the impossible marriage between the noble Eucheria and a *rusticus et servus*, of the closing couplet of the poem, may be paralleled by this medieval couplet:

Rustice callose, cunctis populis odiose,
vis tu formose te sociare rose?⁵

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⁴ Cf. N. G. Polites, Μελέται περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς γλώσσης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ λαοῦ. Παροιμίαι, I–IV, (Athens 1899–1902) II, p. 72; R. Strömberg, *Greek Proverbs*, (Götterborg 1954), p. 21.

⁵ J. Werner, *Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sinnsprüche des Mittelalters*, Heidelberg 1912): Basel Codex 12 (IV century), No. 79, p. 86. – I am indebted to Dr. David Larmour for some valuable suggestions.

Corippus and Ennius

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"Corippus in the sixth century could not possibly have known Ennius," pronounces Otto Skutsch in his recent edition (Oxford 1985) of the *Annals*¹ (p. 20), there implicitly decrying the "faint similarities" amassed by I. Cazzaniga.² Subsequently (p. 592), on some linguistic concordance between the pair (see later), he remarks that "If Corippus had Ennius in mind he knew him through Macrobius or a Virgil commentator."

For all his magisterial tone, Skutsch cannot be said to have settled this matter, which is indeed part of the larger and complex issue of the transmission and survival of early Latin texts in late antiquity. Moreover, Skutsch does not take account of all that has been written on the point, whilst other commentators on Ennius and Corippus have not always been aware of their mutual work. Hence further discussion will serve to draw together the threads, provide a convenient *l'état de la question*, and encourage colleagues in both fields to join in. It seems certain that the early fourth century grammarian Nonius Marcellus had a text of at least some of Ennius' tragedies, whilst Ausonius looks to have had access to Book 1 of the *Annals*, perhaps more.³ Other late scholars—Charisius, Diomedes, Macrobius, Servius, Priscian, and Isidore—often duplicate the same information and are always vulnerable to the charge of lifting their quotations from earlier compilations.⁴

Corippus is not the only late Latin epicist whose acquaintance with Ennius has been both postulated and questioned; Birt (p. cci in his edition) thought Claudian owed debts to both him and Lucilius, a notion questioned

¹ Fragments of the *Annals* will be referred to by the numberings of Skutsch, Vahlen (3rd ed., Leipzig 1928), and Warmington in vol. 1 of the Loeb *Remains of Old Latin* (2nd ed., London 1961), using the simple initials S, V, and W. Vahlen and Warmington provide fragments from Ennius' other works; the tragedies are edited with commentary by H. D. Jocelyn (Cambridge 1967).

² I. Cazzaniga, "Del nuovo Ennio nella *IOANNIDE* di Corippo?" *RIFC* 99 (1971) 276–87; cf. the same author's "Corippo ed Accio," *GIF* 22 (1970) 36–38.

³ See Skutsch 38 and Jocelyn 56 for discussion and bibliography.

⁴ Skutsch 38–44 provides a detailed assessment.

by Vahlen⁵ and more recently Alan Cameron.⁶ But we really have not one question but two: would Corippus, a poet operating in sixth century Africa and then Constantinople, know or care anything about Ennius? If so, where could he find a text?

Whether or not he had been a *grammaticus* and small-town teacher,⁷ Corippus was an educated man with educated tastes. His older coeval Priscian almost certainly came from Africa, whence he too had emigrated to Constantinople.⁸ They were perhaps too far apart in age to know each other, Priscian belonging more to the age of Anastasius whilst Corippus' two extant epics came out respectively c. 548/9 and 566/7, unless we can credit Priscian with the longevity of a Cassiodorus who in his *De orthographia*, written at the age of 93, confirms (*GL* 7. 207, 13) that Priscian was a teacher at Constantinople *nostro tempore*.⁹ But we do not need to follow Cazzaniga in postulating a connection between "Africitas" and archaic literary interests to accept that both men will have had much the same grounding in the same Roman authors.¹⁰ And Corippus could obviously have known Priscian's writings, if not the man himself.

The fact that Priscian's Ennian learning seems largely borrowed from predecessors need not stand as reproach or disqualification. If there were now no complete texts to work from, what else could he do?¹¹ And if there were, the fact that he has many quotations in common with others does not have to argue automatically for scholarly indolence or dishonesty. All modern studies on Elizabethan English no doubt share many identical references to Shakespeare. The *interests* of the late grammarians were genuine.

Likewise with Corippus. Not all educated men of his day cared about Ennius. For notable instance, his name is not dropped by John Lydus when discussing Roman comedy and satire at *De mag.* 40–1, where Titinius and Lucilius are invoked as the founders of stage comedy and satire in hexameter verse. The recurring debate over the genuineness of John's claims to Latin

⁵ *Praef.* cxix–cxxii.

⁶ *Claudian: Poetry and Propaganda at the Court of Honorius* (Oxford 1970) 315, reserving full discussion for his promised edition of the *De bell. Gild.*; cf. Skutsch 19–20.

⁷ A matter gone into with amiable disagreement by myself, "The Career of Corippus," *CQ* 28 (1978) 372–76, and Averil Cameron, "The Career of Corippus Again," *CQ* 30 (1980) 534–39.

⁸ Cf. the notice of him in *PLRE* 2 (Cambridge 1980) 905.

⁹ On Priscian, see M. Salamon, "Priscianus und sein Schülerkreis," *Philologus* 123 (1979) 91–96.

¹⁰ Not that there is any sign of Ennius or other early writers in that other product of late Vandal Africa, Luxorius; cf. the edition of M. Rosenblum (New York 1961) 52–64. But the subject matter of epigrams written in imitation of Martial was hardly amenable to Ennian echoes.

¹¹ We should also remain alert to the evidence of papyri. As far as I know, Ennius has not (yet) turned up in late antiquity, but extracts from the *Andria* of Terence equipped with Greek glosses have; cf. Pack² no. 2934, also R. Cavenaile, 'Papyrus littéraires latins et philologie,' *L'Ant. Class.* 50 (1981) 127.

expertise need not be gone into here;¹² the names he chooses to drop furnish the pertinent clues to contemporary literary interests. Still, this neglect of Ennius may only mean neglect of his comedies and satires, the remains of which are in any case comparatively negligible.

Epos latinum primus digne scripsit Ennius, observed Diomedes (GL 1. 484), and throughout the imperial Roman period it was for the *Annals* rather than his tragedies (much less his other miscellanea) that he was best known and most cited.¹³ Typical and familiar items of evidence are Suetonius, *Aug.* 67. 2; *Tib.* 21. 5; *HA, Hadr.* 16. 6. It was the *Annals* that Aulus Gellius (18. 5. 1–4) heard an “Ennianista” reciting from in the theatre at Puteoli, and the *Annals* that Gellius himself (20. 10. 1) could declaim from memory. It was the *Annalium Ennii elenchi*, a work Suetonius thought *praecipuum opusculum*, that the indigent author M. Pompilius Andronicus sold for 16,000 sesterces and that was put back into circulation by Orbilius (Suetonius, *De Gramm.* 8).

The first extant epic of the African Corippus was on an African theme, the exploits of a local hero, John Troglita, campaigning for Byzantium against the Berbers.¹⁴ Prominent literary influences are Virgil and Lucan, both utterly unsurprising. The abiding power of the *Aeneid* need no comment, and Lucan retained readers until the end of antiquity; both, of course, featured African settings and action.

But there was one section of the *Annals* of Ennius to which Corippus could logically have been drawn for further inspiration: Books 8 and 9, encompassing the war with Hannibal and Scipio in Africa. Apart from the provision of pertinent *exempla*, he might have hoped to get some ideas on how to force intractable African proper names into his hexameters! In point of fact, Corippus does not do much harking back to the Punic Wars; neither Scipio nor Hannibal feature in Partsch's index of names. No doubt memories of their defeat comported residual resentment in the hearts and minds of Carthaginians (in whose city the *Johannis* was recited, before its *proceres*) even in the sixth century!

Cazzaniga's attempts at tracing Ennian influence on the language of this poem were not always very successful. For instance, à propos, *Joh.* 4. 555–63, a passage to which he devotes three rambling pages, there is not much point in glossing the phrase *ferreus campus* with the remark, “*ferreus imber* è tipicamente enniano.” Corippus, indeed, has *ferreus imber/confluit* (*Joh.* 4. 746–47)—though Cazzaniga does not adduce this!—but he

¹² Cf. my remarks with bibliography in “Continuity and Change: the Practical Genius of Early Byzantine Civilisation,” in R. L. Hohlfelder (ed.), *City, Town and Countryside in the Early Byzantine Era* (New York 1982) 21–22.

¹³ Jocelyn 55 makes this point in his account of the evanescence of texts of the tragedies; cf. Skutsch 44–46 for a repertoire of pertinent passages.

¹⁴ See the admirable account with bibliography to previous studies by Averil Cameron, “Corippus' *Johannis*: Epic of Byzantine Africa,” *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar* 4 (Liverpool 1983) 167–80.

obviously got it not from Ennius¹⁵ but Virgil, *Aen.* 12. 284, *ferreus ingruit imber*, albeit he could have noticed the Ennian original in Macrobius' note (6. 1. 52) on the *Aeneid* passage. Cazzaniga cannot avoid admitting that *Joh.* 4. 562–63, *horrescit ferreus hastis/campus resplendetque novis terroribus aer*, derives from Virgil, *Aen.* 11. 601–02, *ferreus hastis/horret ager campique armis sublimibus ardent*, but seeks to pull an Ennian chestnut out of the fire by insisting that Corippus' *resplendet* is added from a knowledge of the well-known *sparsis hastis longis campus splendet et horret*.¹⁶ Now there is no reason to deny that Corippus knew this line, one of Ennius' most celebrated,¹⁷ but equally no grounds for calling the present verse a conscious echo. For one thing, Corippus is fonder of the verb *resplendeo* than the lone example given in Partsch's index suggests, employing it at (e.g.) *Joh.* 8. 318 (actually adduced by Cazzaniga in another connection, p. 282) and *Laud. Just.* 2. 387. For another, Corippus' *resplendet* in the passage under discussion is governed by *aer*, not *campus*! And for yet another, there is Virgil, *Aen.* 7. 526, *horrescit strictis seges ensibus, aeraque fulgent*, not to mention *Aen.* 12. 663–64, *stant densae strictisque seges mucronibus horret/ferrea*, and *Georg.* 2. 142, *nec galeis densisque virum seges horruit hastis*. These last two passages show that it is needless for Cazzaniga to find archaic if not Ennian redolence in *Joh.* 3. 558–59, *Martis per latos acies densissima campos/Imurorum in morem celantur corpora densis*. This is one place where I would be glad to think Cazzaniga was right, because the very pertinent Ennian line *densantur campis horrentia tela virorum*¹⁸ is adduced by Priscian (*GL* 3. 479, 4). Unfortunately, one need go no further than Lewis & Short to find an abundance of parallels, with even the prosaic Caesar yielding one in *densissimis castris* at *BG* 7. 46. 3. A further Virgilian debt passed over by Cazzaniga here is *Joh.* 4. 561, *galeae cristisque comisque micantes*, surely owed to *Aen.* 3. 468, *galeae cristasque comantis*.

Another Corippian sequence analyzed at length by Cazzaniga is *Joh.* 2. 252–54, on the first line of which, *ungula sidereos contristat pulvere campos*, we get one and one-half pages dedicated to the proposition that the novel expression *sidereos campos* is modelled on such Ennian phrases as *caerula prata*. Apart from the fact that the reading and sense of this fragment are doubtful,¹⁹ Cazzaniga manages not to notice the obvious point that Corippus also has the phrase *siderei campi* at *Joh.* 3. 215, and the adjective in several other passages and meanings. Any credit for *sidereos campos*

¹⁵ S 266, V 284, W 281.

¹⁶ V 14 (in his *Varia* section), W 6 (under the *Scipio* rubric).

¹⁷ Thanks in part to Lucilius' ridicule of it, as reported by Servius on *Aen.* 11. 601.

¹⁸ S 167, V 285, W 280.

¹⁹ S 127. V 143, W 149. / *caerula prata* is cited by Festus as an Ennian joke. The first word is variously expanded by editors to read *caeli*, *ponti*, *Neptuni*, or *campi*.

should go to Corippus himself,²⁰ helped though he may have been to it by the Greek parallels assembled by Cazzaniga.

In all of this, I am not saying that Corippus never goes in for archaisms (quite the contrary), merely that one has to be more careful with the overall evidence than Cazzaniga and much less precipitate in jumping to Ennian conclusions. Two more examples will do. At *Joh.* 1. 538, if the text is right, Corippus has the unparalleled verb *subitans*, a frequentative form of *subeo* so rare that it eluded Lewis & Short altogether. Cazzaniga sees this as inspired by the archaic *aditare* of Ennius and Plautus, though he might have added the possible example of Columella 8. 3. 4 and should certainly have noticed the parallel from Cyprian, *Ep.* 60. 2, in Partsch's index! At *Joh.* 4. 45, Corippus has the archaic active *tutamus* instead of *tutamur*, not noticing that the poet also uses it at *Laud. Just.* 2. 256. There is certainly no need to specify Ennian influence here, above all since *tutatur* in a passive sense occurs in Fronto, *Laudes neglegentiae* (204, 10 Van Den Hout = 1. 46 Haines); the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* exemplifies²¹ the active forms from such disparate quarters as Hyginus, *Fab.* 100. 1, and *CIL* 4456. Cazzaniga should also have acknowledged *veneramus* for *veneramur* at *Laud. Just.* 2. 258, a form needlessly emended to *veneramur* by Ruiz since the active form has both Apuleian and Virgilian (*Aen.* 3. 460, not 466 as Stache) pedigree; Averil Cameron²² emends the deponent form *veneramur* at *Laud. Just.* 4. 174 on the basis of 2. 258, but Corippus perhaps deliberately allows the two forms to co-exist in his poem, as did Virgil.

Anyone looking for Ennian echoes in the *Johannis* with special reference to the African context might do better to consider such items as 1. 563–66, *et quanti ex ipsis palmam sumpsero periclis! ut decet esse duces . . . sit labor ille animis*, possibly tinged with awareness of Ennius' *qualis consiliis quantumque potasset in armis*.²³ I only wonder about a connection because Ennius' line is in a marginal gloss on Hamilcar Rhodanus at Orosius 4. 6. 21 (there is another at 4. 14. 3, concerning Hannibal), suggesting that it was a popular tag in late antiquity and beyond, one that Corippus could have had in his literary consciousness.²⁴ It is also just conceivable that when Corippus wrote *placata Charybdis* at *Joh.* 1. 218, he was thinking of *Juno coepit placata favere*,²⁵ adduced by Servius in exegesis of *Aen.* 1. 281 where there is no direct linguistic concordance. There is also *pecudum per prata balatus* at *Joh.* 2. 174, possibly conditioned by Ennius'

²⁰ Ennius never used the adjective *sidereus*, according to the word indexes of Skutsch and Vahlen.

²¹ Its evidence is equally ignored in the note on 2. 256 by U. J. Stache in his edition (Berlin 1976) of the *Laud. Just.*

²² In her admirable edition (London 1976) of the *Laud. Just.*

²³ S 213, V 222, W 271.

²⁴ On these Ennian glosses in Orosius and cognate matters, see Skutsch 379–80 and Jocelyn 56.

²⁵ S 288, V 291, W 293.

balantum pecudes,²⁶ though both Lucretius 2. 369 and Juvenal 13. 233 are close enough to be the model.

One or two Ennian moments have been detected in the *In Laudem Justini* by modern editors, albeit there is no consensus over what and where. Stache, avowedly basing himself on a parallel cited by the *TLL*, thinks that 1. 200–01, *alarumque dedere/plausibus adsiduis et acuta voce favorem* might derive from the Ennian *favent faucibus russis/cantu plausuque premunt alas*;²⁷ Cameron adduces neither Ennius nor any other author as possible model. But Ennius can be dismissed in terms of a complete text of this play.²⁸ Corippus is describing how the cocks crowed (*gallorum cantu*) in greeting Justin to the palace. Now the source of these Ennian verses is Cicero, *De div.* 2. 26. 57, adduced by him to illustrate Democritus' explanation of *cur ante lucem galli canant*. Need we look further than this?²⁹

At *Laud. Just.* 3. 292–93, Corippus writes *fremituque sonoro/cornipedum liquidos cava terruit ungula campos*, advanced by Stache as a possible redolence of Ennius' *it eques et cava concutit ungula terram*,³⁰ cited by Macrobius 6. 1. 22 in illustration of *Aen.* 8. 596, *quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum*. As we have seen, Skutsch insists that Corippus knew this Ennian line (if at all) through Macrobius or a Virgil commentator. A perfectly reasonable conclusion. Yet Ennius had a particular affection for this effect, also writing *totam quatit ungula terram*³¹ and *consequitur; summo sonitu quatit ungula campum*,³² both elsewhere adduced by Macrobius to illustrate the same line of Virgil. Corippus may well have noticed this predilection from the ancient commentaries. But his line also smacks of *Aen.* 6. 591, *aere et cornipedum pulsus simularet equorum*, whilst not to be overlooked are *Joh.* 7. 442–45, *duro sonat ungula cornu/et latet aspersis campus coopertus harenis/cornipedum fodiens densis calcaribus armos/hostis uterque volat*. Indeed, if we could ask Corippus which author he was consciously imitating in which passage, he might find it hard to answer at once.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that *cava* is Petschenig's emendation of the manuscripts' *cave* or *ceu*, a detail minimised by Stache; Patsch indeed retained *ceu* in his *MGHAA* edition, which is why this particular example of *cavus* is absent from his index. I certainly prefer *cava*

²⁶ S 169, V 186, W 180.

²⁷ V 219–21, W 226–28, Jocelyn 344.

²⁸ Vahlen and Warrington assign this fragment to the *Iphigenia*, whereas Jocelyn prints it amongst the *Incerta* with no discussion.

²⁹ Stache furthermore takes no account of the relative frequency of *faveo/favor* connoting applause, clearly a favourite idiom of Corippus; cf. *Laud. Just.* 2. 390; 4. 63, 70, 210; *Joh.* 1. 580; 8. 232. It is also common in classical authors, as the dictionaries show.

³⁰ S 431, V 439, W 429.

³¹ S 242, V 224, W 204.

³² S 263, V 277, W 283.

myself, but it has to be admitted that this putative Ennian echo has come out of a modern conjecture. Furthermore, Skutsch's eagle eye also fell on Ovid, *Ex Pont.* 4. 8. 80, *ungula Gorgonei quam cava fecit equi*, which might have to be reckoned with as a contributory source.

There remains the phrase *vivumque per ora fatentur* at *Laud. Just.* 3. 129, likened by Cameron and Stache both to Ennius, *volito vivos per ora virum*,³³ and Virgil, *Georg.* 3. 9, *virum volitare per ora*. Neither scholar mentions *Aen.* 12. 235, *vivusque per ora feretur*, or 12. 328, *virum volitans*. This relative plethora of Virgilianisms probably swings the balance that way, though Corippus could have seen the Ennian tag (on the poet's own fame) in Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 1. 15. 34.

One passage not considered by any other commentator in connection with Ennius is *Laud. Just.* 4. 35–49, a description of the felling of various trees:

protinus omnigeni caeduntur robora ligni,
quaeque suis aptanda locis: durissima costas,
mollia dant tabulas. quadrata caesa bipenni
fraxinus, et crebris cadit ictibus ardua pinus,
tunc fagi dulces et suco taxus amaro,
iliceaeque trabes fortes et pallida buxus,
pulchra magis pallore suo. cecidere securi
antiquae quercus et amictae vitibus ulmi,
cedrus olens, solidum numquamque nabile robur,
aesculus, alnus, acer, terebinthus, populus, ornus.
in tenues tabulas abies montana secatur,
iuniperi tiliaeque leves et odora cupressus.
mille secant in frusta trabes: tonat aethera pulsans
malleus, et tractae strident scabredine serrae,
curvaque percusso longo sonat ascia ligno.

To be sure, Corippus' debts both to Virgil (*Aen.* 6. 179–82; 11. 135–38; *Georg.* 2. 437–53) and other authors are many and palpable, duly registered by Cameron and Stache. The poet also adds some distinctive touches of his own, notably the very rare words *nabilis* and *scabredo*. But we should also adduce, as did Macrobius 6. 2. 27, these lines of Ennius:³⁴

incedunt arbusta per alta, securibus caedunt,
percellunt magnas quercus, exciditur ilex,
fraxinus frangitur atque abies consternitur alta,
pinus proceras pervortunt: omne sonabat
arbustum fremitu silvae frondosae.

At first glance, the two passages may not seem to have much in common. They do, however, share the noun *abies*, not in any of the Virgil

³³ *Ep.* 18 V, *Ep.* 10 W.

³⁴ S 175–79, V 187–91, W 181–85.

passages. The proximity of *taxus amaro . . . buxus* is somewhat reminiscent of the Ennian *amaro corpore buxum*³⁵ and *buxus icta taxus tonsa*.³⁶ Other Ennian features in this sequence include repetitions of the same word³⁷ (*caeduntur/caesi, ligni/ligno, trabes/trabes*) and alliterations such as *strident scabredine serrae*. Given that the sequence is blatantly a collage from different authors, it is at least possible that Corippus includes some deliberate Ennian effects, his knowledge of Ennius probably coming from Macrobius and other ancient commentators.

Returning by way of finale to the introductory dogma of Skutsch, it can fairly be said that the question of Ennian influence on Corippus remains one open to further study, also that the question needs to be refined and bifurcated, as has here been done. For in this particular connection, it does not vitally matter whether complete texts of Ennius existed in the sixth century or not. If Corippus consciously shaped a phrase in Ennian style on the basis of finding one in Priscian, Servius, Macrobius, or wherever, then that constitutes a literary decision and taste prompted and nourished by Ennian influence.

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³⁵ S 224, V 263, W 240.

³⁶ V 13 (*Incerta*), W 29 (*Varia*).

³⁷ See Skutsch 343 (on the Ennian tree fragment in question) for repetition of a word as a common feature.

Subtractive Versus Additive Composite Numerals in Antiquity

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1. Introduction

The numeral systems all over the world have the common characteristic that the lowest numbers are referred to by a basic set of (different) words which bear no formal likeness to one another, but which can be grouped in a series in such a way that the minimal difference in meaning between the successive members is "one." This basic set may run to "ten" or "five," even to "two" or "three" only, but once it is exhausted the universal method to make further numerals is to combine the members of the basic series or to form derivatives of them.

In the Indo-European languages this procedure starts with numbers higher than "ten," or can be shown to have started there in former times, because phonetic change may have blurred the original coherence: "eleven," "twelve" were once derivatives of "one" and "two," but these pairs have phonetically drifted apart. The connection, however, between e.g. "six," "sixteen," "sixty" and "seven," "seventeen," "seventy" is clear: compounds like "sixteen" have a meaning in which the numerical values of the components "six" and "-teen" (a variant form of "ten") have been added together and are therefore termed *additive* numerals, while in the *multiplicative* numeral "sixty" the value of "six" is multiplied by "ten" ("-ty" being originally a variant form of "ten").

On the other hand, there are languages in which the basic set of numerals is much earlier exhausted. In Wolof, a language spoken in modern Senegal, "six" is "five-one," "seven" is "five-two," etc., "ten" being a totally different word; and the same holds good of ancient Sumerian.¹

¹ A. Falkenstein, *Das Sumerische* (Leiden 1959) 40–41. The notable instance of languages not having numerals other than the basic set are those of the natives of the Australian Continent. They either count "one, two, many" or "one, two, three, many." Cf. R.M.W.

Addition and *multiplication*, however, are not the only arithmetical procedures used in forming further numerals from the basic set. A third method is *subtraction*. In Yoruba, one of the languages of modern Nigeria, "eleven" up to "fourteen" are referred to by compounds meaning "one over ten," "two over ten," etc., "twenty" by a new word which bears no likeness to any member of the basic set of numerals, while "fifteen" up to "nineteen" are compounds meaning literally "five short of twenty," "four short of twenty," etc. These latter five are then *subtractive* numerals. This subtractive procedure is followed not only in 25 to 29, 35 to 39, etc., but also for the uneven decads 50, 70, 90 up to 170, which can be analyzed as 10 short of three times 20, 10 short of four times 20, etc.² Just as the additional method, subtraction is in some languages operative already between "five" and "ten." In modern Finnish the numerals for eight and nine are derivatives for the words for "two" and "one" respectively, and are therefore subtractive from the numerical value of ten.

In the modern Germanic, Romance, and Slavic languages subtraction is not employed, but the English way of indicating the time combines both addition and subtraction: "A quarter past nine" and "half past nine" are additive, but "a quarter to ten" is subtractive.

In the following survey of the most important and best known ancient languages around the Mediterranean Sea we shall also introduce a further distinction between systematical and incidental subtractives, for it is clear that the additive "twenty nine" is part of the numeral system of the English language, while subtractive expressions like "thirty less one" and "one short of thirty" are not.

2. Latin

The numeral system of the Romans contained both additives and subtractives: *undecim*, *duodecim* up to *septendecim* on the one hand, *duodeviginti*, *undeviginti* on the other; *viginti-unus* up to *viginti-septem*, then *duodetriginta*, *undetriginta*, and so on in the further decads, the highest subtractive actually recorded being *undecentum* (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 7. 214).

The Roman figures used to indicate these subtractive numerals do not normally correspond with the linguistic peculiarity of the latter. *Duodeviginti* is written as XVIII or XIIX (so *CIL* V 2499) which are additions of X and VIII or IIX. *Undeviginti* is XVIII or XIX (Dessau nos. 1999 and 2000), likewise additions of X and VIII or IX. An example of a Roman subtractive figure actually reflecting the subtractive value of the numeral for which it stands is IIL for *duodequingenta* in *CIL* X 3427.

Dixon, *The Languages of Australia* (Cambridge 1980) 107–08, 120.

² E. C. Rowlands, *Yoruba* (London 1969) 106–07. The word for "200" is a new word and not 20 x 10. Consequently "190" is "10 short of 200."

Note that the basic numerals *quattuor*, and *sex* up to *novem* are likewise incongruously represented by the subtractive and/or additive figures IV, VI, VII, VIII/IX, VIII/IX.³

This rather striking characteristic of Latin, which distinguishes it from most of the other Indo-European languages, is not commented on by Leumann in his historical grammar,⁴ although Sanskrit offers a close parallel. For by the side of the additive *navadaśa*, 19, there also occurred the subtractive *īnavimsātiḥ*, "twenty less," in which *ūna-* is short for *ekona*, "less one." This alternative method could be used for all the decads plus nine up to 99, and has survived, apparently as the only method, in a number of modern Indian languages.⁵

Incidentally Latin authors used instead of the additive *undecim* up to *septendecim* and the subtractive *duodeviginti* and *undeviginti* numerals formed in a different way. As the series 11 – 19 was in itself heterogeneous, there were attempts to replace the two subtractives (18 and 19) by numerals formed on the analogy of *undecim* – *septendecim*; and so Livy uses *octodecim* in 39. 5. 14 *tetrachma Attica centum octodecim milia*, and Scaevola in *Digesta* 33. 2. 37 *usque dum filia mea annos impleat octodecim*.

The dictionary of Lewis and Short also contained a lemma *novendecim* with references to Livy 3. 24 and Livy, *Epitome* 18 *cum annos novendecim haberet*. However, at 3. 24 the editions have *undeviginti*, while the 18th periocha does not contain the passage quoted. It is found in the 119th, in which it is said that Octavian was appointed consul *cum XVIII annos haberet*. The lemma is no longer present in the new OLD.⁶

More often the whole series 11 – 19 was replaced by numerals of the types *decem (et) . . . or . . . (et) decem*, both being used, for instance, by Cicero in his *Pro Roscio Amerino* 7. 20 *fundos decem et tris* and 35. 99 *tribus et decem fundis*. Most probably these numerals were formed in imitation of the compounds with *viginti*, *triginta*, etc., such as *viginti et septem . . . tabulas* (Cicero *Verr.* 4. 123), *septem et viginti* (Plautus *Merc.* 430), *tres et viginti pondo* (Varro *De re rustica* 2. 4. 11). Further instances up to 19 are:

³ This shows by the way the danger of making inferences about the linguistic nature of a numeral system from its graphic representation by numerical symbols. In the same way the Maya figures for 6, 7, 8, 9 are combinations of a horizontal stroke and one dot, two dots, etc. The corresponding numerals, however, are four mutually different *prefixes* which in their turn bear no formal likeness to those for "five" and "one," "two," etc. either; see A. M. Tozzer, *A Maya Grammar* (New York 1977) 98–99.

⁴ M. Leumann–J. B. Hofmann–A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik I* (München 1963) 293.

⁵ M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit – English Dictionary* (Oxford 1964⁴ repr.) 221a. Cf. J. Beames, *A Comparative Grammar of the Modern Aryan Languages, to wit, Hindi, Panjabi, Sindhi, Gujarati, Marathi, Oriya and Bangali* (Delhi 1966, repr.) II 136.

⁶ Ch. T. Lewis–Ch. Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1966, repr.) 1219b; cf. P.G.W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1982) 1194c, 2092a s.v. *undeviginti* (Liv. 3. 24. 10).

- 13: *decem tres/tria* in Livy 29. 2. 17; 37. 30. 8; 37. 46. 3; 45. 43. 5 (he uses *tredecim*, however, at 36. 45. 3)
- 17: *decem septemque* in Nepos *Cato* I 2; Vulg. 2 Chron. 12:13; *decem et septem* in Vulg. 3 Reg. 14:21; 4 Reg. 13:1; etc.; *decem septem* in a bilingual Latin-Greek inscription at Ephesus A.D. 103–104: *sestertia decem septem milia nummum*; the amount is expressed otherwise in the Greek part: δηνάρια τετρακισχίλια διακόσια πεντήκοντα (Dessau no. 7193); *septem decem* in Aulus Gellius 10. 28, perhaps quoted from Tubero *Hist.* I.
- 18: *decem et octo* in Caesar *Bell. Gall.* 4. 19. 4 (but *duodeviginti* at 2. 5); Eutropius I 1; Vulg. Judices 3:14; 10:8; 20:25; etc.; Luke 13:4, 11, 16.
- 19: *decem et novem* in Livy 40. 40. 13; 45. 43. 5 (he uses, however, *undeviginti* at 3. 24. 10; 23. 46. 4; 34. 10. 4); Vulg. Jos. 19:38; 2 Sam. 2:30; etc. *decem novem* in Caesar *Bell. Gall.* 1. 8; Tacitus *Hist.* 2. 58 (but *undeviginti* in *Ann.* 12. 56).

It is difficult to say to what extent the mss. represent in this respect the original wording of the authors. During the manuscript tradition fully written numeral words may have been copied as figures or vice versa, but if the mss. were reliable here, our instances seem to indicate that some authors used different types side by side. The reason for doing so may have been their desire of stylistic variation. One passage, however, points rather to the opposite inclination: in 45. 43. 5 Livy combines within one passage *decem tria*, *decem et novem* and *viginti et septem*, probably for uniformity's sake, instead of the rather dissimilar *tredecim*, *undeviginti* and *viginti et septem*.

The new formations did not succeed in supplanting the series *undecim* up to *quindecim*, which have survived, be it in a modified form, in Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, *sedecim* also in Italian and French. Only *septendecim* and both the subtractives *duodeviginti* and *undeviginti* are no longer extant in the Romance languages and were definitely replaced by the newer compounds. The Vulgate version of the Bible has *undecim* up to *sedecim*, then *decem et septem*, *decem et octo*, *decem et novem*,⁷ and in old French likewise *dis e set*, *dis e uit*, *dis e nuef* (ca. 1190 A.D.) occur. Apparently these new formations were not popular for 11 to 15/16; they may have sounded somewhat learned because of their likeness to Greek τρεῖςκαίδεκα (classical Attic) or δέκα καὶ τρεῖς and δεκατρεῖς (both

⁷ *duodeviginti* at 2 Sam. 8:13 is present only in the edition of the Abbey of St. Jerome (*Biblia Sacra iuxta latinam vulgatam versionem ad codicum fidem cura et studio monachorum Pont. Abbatiae S. Hieronymi in urbe* (Rome 1926–1972); the Sixto-Clementina had *decem et octo*, see B. Fischer, *Novae Concordantiae* . . . (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt 1977) 1669 .

Hellenistic).⁸ It is, however, difficult to say why then exactly *septendecim*, which is no longer present in the Vulgate, was the exception. Only in Rumanian the complete series 11 – 19 has been given up and replaced by compounds meaning “one above ten,” “two above ten,” etc., which are, moreover, usually shortened to “one above,” “two above,” etc.

The replacement of the subtractives for 28, 38, . . . , 98, and 29, 39, . . . , 99 is certainly to be explained from the analogy of the numerically preceding *viginti-unus* . . . *viginti-septem*, etc. An instance outside of the Vulgate is present in Seneca *Ep. ad Luc.* 77. 20 (*Sattia*) *quae inscribi monumento suo iussit annis se nonaginta novem vixisse*, whereas *undecentum* is used once by his contemporary Pliny the Elder (*Nat. Hist.* 7. 214). The Vulgate version does not contain any subtractives between 20 and 100.⁹

Another kind of subtractives could be used when one wanted to express that a specific number, usually a “round number,” that is a multiple of decads, was almost but not wholly involved. These were no compounds but word groups, as appears from the varying order of the constituent elements, and consisted of a) the numeral not attained; b) the word *minus*; and c) a second numeral expressing the shortage.

A well-known instance is found in Paul's Second Letter to the Corinthians 11:24: *A Iudaeis quinquies quadragenae una minus accepi*, “Five times I have received at the hands of the Jews the forty lashes less one” (RSV). As this instance goes back via the Greek to a Hebrew—Aramaic expression ensuing from a rather specific motive, it will be discussed in 5. 2. Ovid, however, offers a less complex example in *Met.* 12. 553–55, where Nestor, the son of Neleus, relates that his eleven brothers had all been killed by Hercules, but does so as follows:

bis sex Nelidae fuimus, conspecta iuventus!
bis sex Herculeis ceciderunt me minus uno
viribus.

This is a poetical way of saying what Apollodorus elsewhere phrased in prose as: “He killed Neleus and his sons, except Nestor” (*Bibl.* 2. 7. 3). The phenomenon can be paralleled by many modern instances. But why is it done? Because psychologically it is not the same to say “ninety-nine” or “a hundred less one.” The former is certainly less impressive, as shopkeepers know by instinct that an article sells more easily at the price of 99 cents than for one dollar.¹⁰ For that reason alone it is less correct to translate the passage from Paul quoted above as the New English Bible does:

⁸ E. Schwyzer–A. Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik* I (München 1968⁴) 594; F. Blass–A. Debrunner, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (Göttingen 1965¹²) par. 63.

⁹ See Fischer, *Novae Concordantiae* 1669, 5293.

¹⁰ See the remarks by J. Gonda, “Varia over indonesische telwoorden,” *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 109 (1953) 25–27.

"Five times the Jews have given me the *thirty-nine* strokes"; but see 5. 2.

3. Greek

About the numerals in the oldest Greek that we have—Mycenaean—nothing can be said, because in the Linear B script all numbers (and there are many of them) are written in figures. As soon as numbers were written as words, that is in Homer, it appears that there are additives for numbers between decads, not only for the lower up to "seven and . . ." (ένδεκα *Il.* 2. 713, δώδεκα *Il.* 1. 25, δυώδεκα *Il.* 2. 637, δυοκαίδεκα *Il.* 2. 557, ἐκκαίδεκάδωρος *Il.* 4. 109, ἐπτά δὲ καὶ δέκα *Od.* 5. 278, ἐν καὶ εἴκοσι *Il.* 13. 260, δύω καὶ εἴκοσι *Il.* 2. 748, πῖσυρές τε καὶ εἴκοσι *Od.* 16. 249, etc.), but also for those that contain "eight and . . .," "nine and . . .": ὀκτωκαίδεκάτη (*Od.* 5. 279), ἐννεακαίδεκα (*Il.* 24. 496) or perhaps ἐννέα καὶ δέκα. One may indeed ask the question whether composite cardinals are in Homer compound words already or word groups yet. Passages like *Od.* 5. 278–79 ἐπτά δὲ καὶ δέκα μὲν πλέεν ἤματα ποντοφορέων· ὀκτωκαίδεκάτη δ' ἐφάνη ὄρεα σκιόεντα rather seem to indicate the latter (cf. *Od.* 16. 249).

Subtractives are, on the other hand, wholly lacking in Homer, and so likewise in Hesiod, Pindar, the Tragedians, and Aristophanes. This does not, however, imply that they did not exist, because poets abandon sometimes the current ways of expressing numbers by using circumscriptions. Hesiod, for instance, uses τρισεινάδα, "27th day," instead of ἐπτακαίεικοστήν (*Op.* 814, cf. τρειςκαίδεκάτην *Op.* 780); Aeschylus paraphrases τριακόσiai by τριακάδας δέκα and διακόσiai καὶ ἐπτά by ἑκατὸν δις . . . ἐπτά θ' (*Pers.* 339; 343). So when Pindar uses τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ (*Pyth.* 9. 113), this may be the numeral which he used in his spoken language, but it is also possible that he has rephrased here a subtractive numeral, and the same may be said for Homer's ἐννεακαίδεκα (*Il.* 24. 496), for as soon as we turn to prose writers it appears that subtractive numerals existed as well.

If we leave aside subtractive expressions which contain indefinite elements, such as Isaeus 11. 43 "1000 drachmae but for a trifle," Herodotus 1. 202 "all but one," Plutarch *Caesar* 30. 3 "all but a few," we may discern within the exact subtractions three types which differ a little in meaning:

A) *pure* subtractives: "forty ships less one"; the things subtracted and those from which they are subtracted belong to the *same* kind.

B) *impure* subtractives: "three drachmae less two obols," the things subtracted are of a *different* kind.

C) *combinations* of A and B: Herodotus 9. 30 ένδεκα μυριάδες ἦσαν, μιῆς χιλιάδος πρὸς δὲ ὀκτακοσίων ἀνδρῶν δέουσαι, all together "there were eleven myriads of men less one thousand and eight hundred";

this subtraction is *pure* because ultimately men are subtracted from men, *impure* because formally a chiliad is subtracted from myriads which are different things, although the whole is semantically equivalent to "110,000 less (1,000 + 800)." In the majority of the cases, except those of class B, the subtracted numeral (e.g. 2) is smaller than the one that otherwise would have had to be added (8 in this case). Only once, in "300 less 8" (Thuc. 4. 38. 5) is the subtracted number larger, and in "120 less 5" (Diod. Sic. 13. 14. 4) the numbers would be equal. In all cases, however, the speaker/author takes care to mention provisionally a round number which is higher than the one he would have mentioned otherwise, according to the additive method that is. But this does not imply that in the sentence the round number always precedes the subtracted number. Both orders occur; in Aristotle *Rhet.* 2. 14. 4 $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα (sc. ἔτη) the round number follows the small subtracted one.

Formally, that is according to the terminology which is used, the subtractives show the following diversity:

1. Verbs (ἀπο-, κατα-)δεῖν, almost always a participle with the shortage in the genitive case, e.g. Plutarch *Pomp.* 79. 4 ἐξήκοντα μὲν ἐνὸς δέοντα βεβιωκῶς ἔτη. Aristotle *Rhet.* 2. 14. 4 quoted above is the only instance of an infinitive construction.

2. Verb δεύειν: Apoll. Rhod. 2. 974–75 τετράκις εἰς ἑκατὸν δεύοιτό κεν εἴ τις ἕκαστα πεμπάζοι (sc. ῥέεθρα), "four times would one miss in a hundred if one would count each of the streams."

3. Verbs (ἀπο-)λείπειν, participles, but in different constructions. With genitive in Diodorus Sic. 13. 14. 4 τριήρεις μὲν ἐπλήρωσαν πέντε λειπούσας τῶν ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι, "they manned triremes five missing of the 120" (the same in Isocrates 12. 270 γεγονῶς μὲν ἔτη τρία μόνον ἀπολείποντα τῶν ἑκατόν). With dative Josephus *Ant.* 4. 238 πληγὰς μιᾷ λειπούσας τεσσαράκοντα, litt. "40 stripes falling short by one" (the same *Ant.* 4. 248).

4. Preposition πλήν: Hdt. 1. 202 τὰ πάντα πλὴν ἐνός.

5. Preposition παρά with accusative: Paul, 2 *Cor.* 11:24 ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων πεντάκις τεσσαράκοντα (sc. πληγὰς) παρά μίαν ἔλαβον, "five times I have received at the hands of the Jews the forty lashes less one" (RSV). Although this passage will be dealt with in a special paragraph (5. 2) because of its Jewish background—together with Josephus *Ant.* 4. 238; 248 quoted above—some remarks are to be made here as to the way it is treated in Bauer's lexicon to the New Testament.¹¹ The parallel material

¹¹ W. Bauer, *Griechisch - Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments* (Berlin 1958⁵), s. v. παρά.

there adduced consists of quotations from classical authors which are *impure* examples because "days" are subtracted from "years," etc. (Hdt. 9. 33; Jos. Ant. 4. 176; P. Oxy. 264. 4 (see below)), or there are no definite cardinal numerals involved (Plut. *Caes.* 30. 5 see above). Of course, they do illustrate the use of *παρά* in subtractive constructions, but there is a better parallel which matches Paul's wording in every respect: Dio Cassius 58. 20. 5 τῶ γοῦν ἐπιόντι ἔτει, . . . , πεντεκαίδεκα στρατηγοὶ ἐγένοντο· καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἔτη συνέβη, ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἑκκαίδεκα, ἔστι δ' ὅτε παρ' ἑνὰ ἢ καὶ δύο χειροτονεῖσθαι, "next year there were 15 praetors, . . . , and for many years the following also happened, (namely) that at one time 16 praetors but at another time one or even two fewer were chosen." A comparable remark is made by Dio at 59. 20. 5 but there it runs: ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐνὶ πλείους ἢ καὶ ἐλάττους.

With regard to the motivation of the subtraction the different kinds that we distinguished above (indefinite, pure, impure, combined) are not alike. The cases in which either the round number or the subtracted number or both are rendered by an indefinite numeral or adjective are always clearly motivated: "all but a few" (Plut. *Caes.* 30. 3), "one thousand drachmae but for a trifle" (Isaeus 11. 43), "fifteen talents but for a trifle" (Lysias 19. 43), "not much short of ninety years" (Polybius 12. 16. 13). In these latter three the shortage is considered to be so insignificant that it is not deemed worth to be specified.

Likewise when dissimilar things are subtracted (class B) these things are always in themselves relatively small fractions of the units from which they are subtracted, so that the motivation of the subtraction is self-evident. Hdt. 2. 134 "He (the pharaoh Mycerinus) left a pyramid as well but one much smaller than that of his father (Cheops); each of its sides falls 20 feet short of three plethra (*i.e.* 300 feet)"; Jos. Ant. 4. 176 "When forty years but for thirty days had passed, . . . "; especially in Greco-Egyptian accounts and contracts on papyrus these subtractions—usually by *παρά* with accusative—are very frequent: "I agree that I have sold to you the weaver's loom belonging to me measuring three weaver's cubits less two palms" (P. Oxy. II 264. 2-4; A.D. 54). This cubit, γερδιακὸς πῆχυς, probably equalled five palms.¹² The method is almost normal in the Byzantine period in prices expressed in (x) νομίσματα (χρυσοῦ) παρὰ (y) κεράτια, or "(x) golden solidi less (y) siliquae" (*i.e.* 1/24 solidus), of which Preisigke listed selection-wise over a hundred instances.¹³ The *keration* was both a coin and a weight, and at least in a number of these cases the subtraction is not so much motivated by the wish to mention an amount in round numbers as by the fact that nominally the number of solidi was correct indeed but that these golden coins through abrasion had no longer their correct weight. This

¹² That is, if it was the same as the linen weaver's cubit (λινούφικὸς πῆχυς). See F. Preisigke, *Fachwörter des öffentlichen Verwaltungsdienstes Ägyptens* (Göttingen 1915) 118.

¹³ F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* . . . III (Berlin 1931) 348a-b.

appears from P. Cairo Masp. 70. 2 which contains the line, "the solidi were found to be seven *keratia* less" (VIth cent. A.D.).

A very special instance of dissimilar subtraction—also quoted by Bauer—is Hdt. 9. 33 ἀσκέων δὲ πεντάεθλον παρὰ ἐν πάλαισμα ἔδραμε νικᾶν Ὀλυμπιάδα. At first sight this seems to suggest that he won in four events (jumping, running, throwing the discus and the javelin) but lost in the wrestling and hence was no Olympic victor. The parallel version in Pausanias 3. 11. 6–8 states clearly, however, that he (Teisamenos) had won in two events (running and jumping), which implies that his opponent (Hieronymus) had won in the other two. On the other hand, it is known that in the final event, the wrestling, one had to be floored thrice to be the loser, and since *palaisma* also means "wrestling bout," the meaning of the whole is not so much that he won in two events, like his opponent, but lost in the final one, but rather that he won in two events and two wrestling bouts, like his opponent, but lost only the third decisive wrestling bout.

The passages in which numerical substantives are subtracted from numerical substantives or from numerals (class C) are formally not different from the kind which we have just discussed, but as, for instance, μία χιλιάς and χίλιοι are semantically hardly different, we shall discuss these cases together with the pure subtractions (class A).

The motivation of the following subtractions of small numbers from large numbers in classes A and C seems evident, also to our modern mind: 110,000 but for 1,800 (Hdt. 9. 30), 20,000 less 2,000 (Dion. Hal. 7. 3. 2), 10,000 less 300 (Thuc. 2. 13. 3), 1500 less 15 (Hdt. 2. 7), 300 less 8 (Thuc. 4. 38. 5), 160 less 2 (Aristotle in Diog. Laert. 5. 27), 130 less 2 (Hdt. 1. 130), 120 less 5 (Diod. Sic. 13. 14. 4), 100 less 4 (Apoll. Rhod. 2. 974–5), 100 less 3 (Isocr. 12. 270).

The most natural motivation is, of course, always that one which is provided by the context itself, as in Hdt. 9. 70 "the Greeks were in a position to kill in such a way that of the 300,000 men of the (Persian) army—less the 40,000 with whom Artabazus had fled—not even 3,000 of the remaining soldiers survived." The above quoted instance of "130 less 2" (Hdt. 1. 130), although its motivation seems clear, may nevertheless belong rather to the category with which we shall deal now, that of "decads less two/one." For although the total number of occurrences is rather small, Herodotus—in compound numerals above 20—appears to have a slight predilection for using subtractives with "less two/one," of which he has nine instances,¹⁴ instead of additives with "and eight/nine" which he uses five times. If we assume the subtractives to be here the rule, we can offer reasonable explanations for at least four out of these five "additive exceptions."

¹⁴ 1. 14. 16. 130. 214; 2. 157; 4. 1. 90; 5. 52; 6. 57.

Two of the occurrences of ὀκτώ καὶ εἴκοσι ἔτεα (1. 106; 4. 1) happen to refer to the same span of time in history, to wit the number of years that the Scythians were ruling the Near East. In 1. 106 where he mentions these 28 years for the first time, he expresses them by an additive numeral because their mention happens consciously in anticipation of 4. 1—the first paragraph of his “Logos Skythikos”—where the 28 years will get a very specific illustration. He mentions these years twice there, first by using the subtractive ἔτεα δυῶν δέοντα τριήκοντα, with the reference ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι εἴρηται back to 1. 106, next by using again the additive ὀκτώ καὶ εἴκοσι ἔτεα, and telling us what was so curious about these years, namely that their Scythian wives, who had stayed at home, had meanwhile had intercourse with their slaves and given birth to a new generation of men, and when the Scythians returned from Asia they were met by an army consisting of these young men. The alternating use of “additive” and “subtractive” here is no coincidence; note also the shift in the position of the substantive ἔτεα in these three phrases. A comparable situation is present in 6. 27 where he tells that the inhabitants of Chios had sent a company of a hundred young men to Delphi of whom only two returned. Next he goes on to explain what had happened to the ἐνενήκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ: an additive construction because the subtractive is already implied in the foregoing. These cases then betray a reluctance to repeat identical expressions, which is certainly also responsible for the varying order of τεσσεράκοντα καὶ τριηκόσια καὶ χίλια ἔτεα versus μυριοῖσι τε ἔτεσι καὶ χιλίοισι καὶ πρὸς τριηκοσίοισι τε καὶ τεσσεράκοντα in 2. 142, and of ἐξήκοντα καὶ τριηκόσιοι versus τριηκόσια καὶ ἐξήκοντα in 3. 90. In short, it seems that in the context of these subtractives it is stylistic variation that was responsible for the use of the additives.

In 7. 186, however, this explanation does not work. We read there that the total number of the Persian army resulting from the foregoing addition amounted to πεντακοσίας τε μυριάδας καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ὀκτώ καὶ χιλιάδας τρεῖς καὶ ἑκατοντάδας δύο καὶ δεκάδας δύο ἀνδρῶν or 5,283,220 men. Although it would have been possible to use here καὶ δυῶν δεούσας τριάκοντα, this subtraction is probably avoided because the result would not be a round number—as in 9. 30—since there are still three additions to be made here. No explanation at all can be given for 8. 48 ἀριθμὸς δὲ ἐγένετο ὁ πᾶς τῶν νεῶν, πάρεξ τῶν πεντηκοντέρων, τριηκόσια καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ. The exception introduced by πάρεξ did certainly not prevent the subtraction here, because πάρεξ and subtraction are found together elsewhere (1. 130); this passage must remain an exception.¹⁵

With “18,” however, the usage seems to be the opposite of the

¹⁵ Hdt. 3. 89: 70 + <8> μνέας has been left out because it is due to a conjecture; it rather had to be <8> + 70, cf. J. Enoch Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Hildesheim 1960 repr.) 100 s.v. εἴκοσι.

foregoing: he uses six times ὀκτώκαιδέκα,¹⁶ while δυὼν δέοντα εἴκοσι is found only once (1. 94). Neither the additives nor the subtractives seem to be used for a special reason, except perhaps ὀκτώκαιδέκα σταδίους ἢ εἴκοσι in 1. 126, where variation may have been the reason for suppressing another εἴκοσι (δυὼν δέοντας).

In the work of his younger contemporary Thucydides, the use of subtractives is still more pronounced. Additives with eight or nine are not found at all, and instead subtractives with "two" or "one" are used eleven times, six of which are "20(th) less two/one";¹⁷ "300 less 1" (4. 102. 3) is of course an instance which is very clearly motivated.

Further instances from prose are: Hippocrates *Aff.* 9 and *Loc. hom.* 6, both "20 less 2"; *IG* I 374. 405–17 (=CIA I 325) "20 less 1," "30 less 1," although the figures added have an additive structure; Xenophon *Hell.* 1. 1. 5 "20 less 2," but on the basis of Thuc. 8. 108. 1–2 one would expect here "22" instead, so there may be an error here; Xenophon has ὀκτώκαιδέκα in *Anab.* 3. 4. 5; 7. 4. 16; Plato *Leg.* 5, 738a has "60 less 1" but ὀκτώκαιδέκα in *Leg.* 2, 666a and 8, 833d (the latter, however, in the close context of εἴκοσι, cf. Hdt. 1. 126 above); Aristotle *Rhet.* 2. 14. 4 (1390b10–11) "50 less 1"; *Hist. anim.* 3. 20 (522a30–31) "20 less 1"; *Polit.* 5. 9. 23 (1315b36) δυοῖν δέοντα εἴκοσι (*sc.* ἔτη) is preceded in the same paragraph by ὀκτώκαιδέκα, cf. Hdt. 4. 1 above; Plutarch *Pomp.* 79. 4 "60 less 1."

As compared to the language of the poets, in which as far as "18" and "19" are concerned, additive constructions occur right from the start and subtractives are absent, it is a remarkable fact that so many of the latter are to be found in prose, and that some of the additive competitors can be shown to occur there in stylistic opposition to subtractives.

This raises, of course, the question of which of the two is to be considered to represent the more original situation. In view of the rather low frequency of additives for "18," "19," etc., one wonders at least why so many grammars in their survey tables of the numerals suggest that addition was the norm here and subtraction the exception. Only Jannaris presents both as equivalent possibilities for older Greek,¹⁸ but adds that subtraction formed no part of the spoken language.¹⁹

Especially with regard to subtractions from lower decads as "20" and "30," of which the motivation is no longer apparent in contexts where much higher numbers play a role, we may also reckon with the possibility that in prose some of them were replaced in the course of the long manuscript

¹⁶ 1.126; 2. 100. 111. 175; 3. 50; 8. 1; the numeral for 19 does not occur.

¹⁷ 5. 16. 3; 7. 31. 4; 7. 53. 3; 8. 6. 5; 8. 17. 3; 8. 102. 1; the remaining are found at 2. 2. 1; 5. 68. 3; 8.7; 8. 25. 1.

¹⁸ A. N. Jannaris, *An Historical Greek Grammar Chiefly of the Attic Dialect* (Hildesheim 1968, repr.), par. 645 and 642–43 (pp. 172–73).

¹⁹ *ibid.* par. 643.

tradition, first by figures which were later "reworded" as additives, or immediately by the latter. This assumption seems quite plausible in view of the variation of numeral versus figure which occurs, for instance, in the New Testament manuscripts.

An intermediate stage is to be seen in *IG* I no. 374 in which the subtractions "20 less 1" and "30 less 1" are accompanied by figures which in Greek always have an additive structure. We believe therefore that some cases of ὀκτώκαίδεκα and ἐννεακαίδεκα in earlier prose are not original but due to the replacement process just sketched, either immediately or indirectly via the stage of figure notation. Only when a subtractive was motivated, as in 2 *Cor.* 11:24, could it resist such a rewording, and at best the higher numeral was written as a figure, here in mss. F and G: ὑπάρα μᾶν. In other cases, however, replacements are not exceptional in the New Testament. At John 5:5 the readings of the numeral vary between τριακοντα και οκτω, τριακοντα οκτω, and λη', and instead of the frequent δωδεκα some mss. have δεκαδυο at Luke 9:17; Acts 19:7; 24:11; etc.²⁰

Although this cannot be proved by textual variants, it seems not farfetched to assume that in early prose these lower subtractives were slightly more frequent than it appears from the present state of the mss., also because the uncial (stage of the) tradition of these works must have been twice as long as that of the New Testament writings.

With regard to the subtractives in Classical Attic Jannaris remarks: "This clumsy circumlocution was hardly proper to popular speech even in *A* (*i.e.* Classical Attic) times. As a matter of course it is unknown to *N* (*i.e.* Neohellenic)" (see n. 19). This conclusion does not seem to follow with necessity from the facts as described above and is therefore not very convincing. For it is equally well possible that the use of subtractives for "18," "19," etc., was the original situation which was kept up in the everyday spoken language and in prose up to the beginning of the fourth century B.C., parallel to the situation in Latin up to the Principate.

The motivation for these subtractions from "20" may originally have been the same as that illustrated above for other numerals. In a very simple rural society "20" may have been at first a relatively high number. Not many persons owned that much sheep or cattle, but "20" lost this connotation of course, as soon as situations arose in which higher numbers were involved. The subtractives once formed may have persisted for a very long time, as Latin shows.

The spoken language as well as prose writing was probably much more conservative in this respect than the poets, who can be shown to have been innovative in specific areas of style and language. They increased, for

²⁰ Xenophon has the Koine-form δέκα-πέντε only in *Anab.* 7. 8. 26, elsewhere he uses πεντεκαίδεκα (*Anab.* 4. 7. 16, etc.). *Anab.* 7. 8. 25-26, however, are generally considered to be an appendix added by a later editor.

instance, their means of varying their usage by admitting elements from other dialects, such as Aeolic πίσυρες by the side of Ionic τέσσαρες, and were also responsible for the birth of many new compounds, like those beginning with ποικιλο-, etc. They may have been the first to replace the "clumsy" subtractives, and then it is no coincidence that, for all we know, the first additives with "8" and "9" occur in poetry: τεσσεράκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ in Pindar *Pyth.* 9. 113 (474 B.C.) and ἔννεα καὶ δέκα in Homer, *Il.* 24. 496.

The gradual substitution of the subtractives, which is halfway in Herodotus, would then be comparable to what happened to the ordinal numerals. In the Attic inscriptions up to the time of Augustus²¹ the compound ordinals consisted of two ordinals with intervening καί: τρίτος καὶ δέκατος, "thirteenth." This too is a rather "clumsy" way of formulating which again had its exact parallel in Latin *tertius decimus* etc., and was henceforward substituted by the type τρεῖσκαιδέκατος. This latter type, however, was already used by Homer, *Od.* 5. 279 ὀκτώκαιδεκάτη. Herodotus made use of both types, at least according to the mss. tradition: in 3. 93–94 he has in a series the ordinals from τρίτος καὶ δέκατος up to εἵνατος καὶ δέκατος, but elsewhere τεσσερεσκαιδέκατος (1. 84) and ἑκκαιδέκατος (2. 143 twice). Thucydides likewise has the double ordinals, nine times,²² and ἑπτακαιδέκατος only twice, at 4. 101. 1 and 7. 28. 3; but here several editions, such as Hude's and Forster Smith's, nevertheless read ἐβδόμη καὶ δεκάτη and ἐβδόμῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ, just as elsewhere, following Krüger's conjecture; these two exceptions may indeed be due to later copyists. So if we assume that the "clumsy" double ordinal type was the original construction which was kept up in the spoken language, in prose writings and in inscriptions, it again seems likely that the type τρεῖσκαιδέκατος was introduced by poets; Pindar's ἐβδόμῃ σὺν καὶ δεκάτῃ. (*Pyth.* 4. 10) shows, however, that they could use the older type as well. Herodotus' use of both types of ordinals, like his use of both subtractives and additives, either reflects a transitory stage in the spoken language, or it is a conscious enlargement of his stylistic repertoire.

4. Coptic

During the greater part of its literary existence the Egyptian language was written in various consonant scripts. First in the picture-like hieroglyphs, later also in hieratic, the cursive form of the hieroglyphs, still later also in demotic, which in its turn was a more cursive form of hieratic. These three writing systems were used side by side as late as the Roman period. Only when by the side of these a fourth system, the Greek alphabet, also began to

²¹ At least according to K. Meisterhans–E. Schwyzler, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften* (Berlin 1900³) 163. We are, of course, waiting for Thraette's volume on morphology to appear.

²² 1. 87. 6; 2. 2. 1; 5. 56. 5; 5. 81. 2; 5. 83. 4; 6. 7. 4; 6. 93. 4; 7. 18. 4; 8. 58.1.

be used for writing Egyptian, which probably was the case already in the second century A.D., this language showed for the first time its vowels. It is therefore only from Coptic, as Egyptian in Greek letters is called, that one can get a clear vision of the structure of the numeral system.

The basic set of numerals ran from "one" to "ten," and included also the decads for "twenty," "thirty," and "forty" as they bear no likeness at all to "two," "three," and "four;" the decads for "fifty" to "ninety," it is true, bear some likeness to the numerals from "five" up to "nine" but not systematically, and it is best, therefore, to consider them as basic numerals, too, just as the words for "100," "1,000," and "10,000." Alternatively, "80" was sometimes expressed or circumscribed as "4(x)20" (cf. quatre-vingts) or "50(+30)" (cf. soixante-dix) and "100" as "5(x)20."²³

The numbers between the decads were formed in two different ways. First, there were compounds consisting of decad (10–90) and basic numeral (1–9); in these formations the decads 10, 20, 30, 80, 90 and the basic numerals 1–8 had special variant forms. For instance, "ten" was *mêt*, and "seven" was *sašf*, but "seventeen" was *māit-sašfe*. Second, it was also possible to make word groups consisting of decad + "and" + unit, such as *maabe mñ psite*, "39" (Pach. 99b, 15 ff.) by the side of the compound *mabpsite* (Pach. 96. 9).²⁴ In these word groups the constituent numerals had no special variant forms. A third, alternative method was to juxtapose a decad and a compound. In this way are formed "50(+22)" for "72," and "50(+29)" for "79"; compare "50(+30)" for "80" above.²⁵

Of the Old Egyptian numerals only the basic units as well as those for "100," "1,000," "10,000," and "100,000" were sometimes spelled in full, and are therefore known to us, that is to say of course, only their consonantal skeleton. All other numbers were indicated by figures, "93" for instance by repeating 9 times the sign for "10" followed by three vertical strokes for "3." The historical grammar of Coptic makes it clear, however, that the Old-Egyptian words to be postulated for "50" up to "90" were derivations of some kind from the basic numerals for 5 up to 9, possibly plurals from the formal point of view, as in the Semitic languages.²⁶

The numeral system of the Coptic language did not contain any subtractive formations; of Old Egyptian nothing is known in this respect. Incidentally, however, there occur in Coptic subtractive expressions, one of them being, as might be expected, 2 Cor. 11:24, which is present in both the major Coptic versions of the New Testament (in the Sahidic and

²³ W. C. Till, *Koptische Grammatik* (Leipzig 1955) 84 (par. 167).

²⁴ Till, *o.c.*, *ibid.*

²⁵ Till, *o.c.*, *ibid.*

²⁶ A. Gardiner, *Egyptian Grammar* (Oxford 1957³), par. 260; E. Edel, *Altägyptische Grammatik* (Rome 1955–1964), par. 395; C. E. Sander-Hansen, *Ägyptische Grammatik*, (Wiesbaden 1963), par. 219.

Bohairic dialects). We refer again to par. 5. 2 for the treatment of this passage.

In the Greek papyri found in Egypt, prices, weights, and other measures are often expressed as a whole with a shortage, especially prices in the Vth–VIIIth centuries. Lists and accounts drawn up in Coptic show this phenomenon, too. Two instances are found on ostraca unearthed at Wadi Sarga and dating from about the same period, the VIth–VIIth centuries.²⁷

The first is a shipment account of wine and runs: “+The list of the wines. We shipped from Tuho ten “hands” and six “simpula” which make seven hundred and seventy less one.”²⁸ Apparently the “hands” and “simpula” were larger wine measures, adding up to almost the round number of 770 of a much smaller measure, which number was then preferred to the less surveyable 769, or else “770 less one” might indicate the price, and in that case “one” probably rather represents a smaller unit of currency subtracted from an amount expressed in larger units, comparable to what happens in our second ostrakon.

This is likewise an account of a shipment, this time of fodder and barley: “+ Lo, nineteen ‘artabae’ of fodder less one ‘oipe,’ and nineteen ‘artabae’ of wheat less two ‘oipe’ have I sent southward. + Written 10th of Mesore, 6th Indiction.”²⁹ Of the same kind are two more instances: “fifteen years less three months” (RNC 40) and “seven holokottina (*i.e.* solidi) less one ‘trimesion’ (*i.e.* 1/3 solidus)” (P. Jkôw).³⁰ These four instances all betray the same preference for mentioning rather a higher number less something than a lower number plus something.

5. Hebrew and Aramaic

The numeral systems of the West-Semitic languages (Hebrew and the various Aramaic dialects, including Syriac) were all of the same structure. The basic set of numerals ran up to “ten”; the words for “eleven” to “nineteen” were additive compounds of the basic numerals and “ten”; “twenty” was formally the masculine plural of “ten,” which is supposed to have replaced an earlier dual of “ten”;³¹ the further decads were formally masculine plurals of the basic numerals from “three” to “nine”; the numerals in between were additive wordgroups consisting of decad + “and” + basic, in which the “higher” usually preceded the “lower” element. Apparently the

²⁷ F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* . . . II (Berlin 1927) 232b–233a s.v. παρά.

²⁸ W. E. Crum–H. I. Bell, *Wadi Sarga. Coptic and Greek Texts* (Coptica consilio et impensis Instituti Rask - Oerstediani edita III) (Copenhagen 1922) 118 (no. 133); for *simpulum* cf. p. 112.

²⁹ Crum–Bell *o.c.* 150 (no. 191).

³⁰ Both instances taken over from W. E. Crum, *A Coptic Dictionary* (Oxford 1939) 593a–b.

³¹ H. Bauer–P. Leander, *Historische Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache des Alten Testaments* (Hildesheim 1965 repr.), I 626.

system did not contain subtractive formations. Nevertheless, in post-biblical Hebrew and Jewish Aramaic literature one does find a number of instances of subtractive numerals, be it only with the formula "less one."

These instances can be divided into two categories: 1. Cases in which there is a deviation, in the sense of a diminution, from a round number given in the Bible or from an otherwise normative count. 2. Cases based upon the principle of the "fence around the Law" (*s^eyag la-Torah*), developed in post-biblical Judaism.

5.1. Clear instances of deviations from a biblical number: In Exod. 16:35, Num. 14:33-34; Deut. 8:2; 29:5; and Joshua 5:6, it is stated that after the exodus the people of Israel wandered for forty years in the desert. In the Babylonian Talmud (= Bavli), *Zevahim* 118b, the rabbis say: "The duration of the Tent of meeting (*i.e.* the Tabernacle) in the wilderness was forty years less one. How do we know that? Because a master said: In the first year (*sc.* of the exodus) Moses made the Tabernacle; in the second the Tabernacle was set up" (cf. a similar passage *ibid.* 119a).³² A comparable case is Talmud, *Arakhin* 13a: "Whence do we know that it took seven years to conquer (*sc.* the Land)? Caleb said: "Forty years old was I when Moses the servant of the Lord sent me from Kadesh-Barnea to spy out the land (Joshua 14:7) . . . and now lo, I am this day four-score and five years old (Joshua 14:10)." And a master said: "The first year Moses built the Tabernacle, in the second the Tabernacle was put up, then he sent out the spies. When Caleb passed over the Jordan, how old therefore was he? He was two years less than eighty years old."³³ When he distributed the inheritances, he said: "Now lo, I am this day four-score and five years old" (Joshua 14:10). Whence it follows that it took seven years for them to conquer the land."

An instance of deviation from a round number within Scripture itself is mentioned by the rabbis in Talmud, *Bava Bathra* 123a: "Why do you find the number seventy in their total (*sc.* of Jacob's sons and grandsons in Genesis 46:27) and only seventy less one in their detailed enumeration (in Gen. 46:8 ff.)?" This problem was solved by later rabbis in the following way. *Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer* 39 reads: "When they (*sc.* Jacob and his descendants) came to the border of Egypt, all the males were enrolled (*sc.* in genealogical tables, to the number of) sixty-six; Joseph and his two sons in Egypt (made a total of) sixty-nine."³⁴ But it is written, "With seventy persons your fathers went down into Egypt" (Deut. 10:22). What did the

³² Cf. Josephus *Ant.* 4. 176 τῶν δὲ τεσσαράκοντα ἐτῶν παρὰ τριάκοντα ἡμέρας συμπληρωμένων Μωϋσῆς . . . λέγει τοιάδε· κτλ.

³³ Allowing forty years for the sojourn of Israel in the wilderness. It should be noted here that the same passage recurs in *Zevahim* 118b where the printed editions have "78," but codex Munich reads "eighty less two."

³⁴ So the extant mss.; the early editions, however, read "seventy less one" probably on the basis of mss. now lost.

Holy One, blessed be He, do? He entered into the number with them, and the total became seventy, to fulfil that which is said, "I will go down with thee into Egypt" (Gen. 46:4). When Israel came up from Egypt, all the mighty men were enrolled (amounting to) six hundred thousand less one. What did the Holy One, blessed be He, do? He entered into the number with them, and their total amounted to six hundred thousand, to fulfil that which is said, "I will go down with thee into Egypt, and I will also surely bring thee up again (Gen. 46:4)."³⁵

Instances with deviations from round numbers not from Scripture but from tradition: Talmud, *Jevamoth* 64a, states: "The divine presence does not rest on less than two thousand and two myriads of Israelites. Should the number of Israelites happen to be two thousand and two myriads less one, and any particular person has not engaged in the propagation of the race, does he not thereby cause the divine presence to depart from Israel?" (cf. a very similar passage in *Bava Qamma* 83a). Talmud, *Sotah* 36b: "(It was stated above that on the stones of the ephod) there were fifty letters, but there were fifty less one! Rabbi Isaac said: One letter was added to the name of Joseph, as it is said, 'He appointed it in Joseph for a testimony, when he went out over the land of Egypt' (Psalm 81:6, where Joseph's name is spelt with five letters instead of the usual four, *yhwsp* instead of *ywsp*)." Talmud, *Nedarim* 38a: "Fifty gates of understanding were created in the world, all but one were given to Moses." Very curious is Talmud, *Sanhedrin* 95b: "The length of his (*sc.* Sanherib's) army was four hundred parasangs, the horses standing neck to neck formed a line forty parasangs long, and the grand total of his army was two million six hundred thousand less one. Abaye inquired: Less one *ribbo* (ten thousand), one thousand, one hundred, or one? The question stands over." Not in every case it is clear how a tradition of these round numbers (22,000; 50; 2,600,000) has come into being,³⁶ but for our purposes that is not important.

It should be added here that in some isolated instances in the Aramaic dialect of the Jerusalem Talmud the Greek loan-word *παρά* is used in its subtractive meaning: *Eruvin* 20b *shov'in min shov'in ha' hamishah 'alafin para' me'at*: $70 \times 70 = 5000 - 100$. *Demai* 24c *hada' para' šivhad*: one minus a little bit. Cf. *Kethuvot* 30d.³⁷

In general the principle is clear: a given round number, mostly either biblical or traditional, is the point of departure, and deviations from it to below are indicated by a subtractive way of counting.

³⁵ G. Friedlander's translation *Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer* (London 1916) 304, slightly revised.

³⁶ For other instances see *Niddah* 30a (sixty less one) and *Eruvin* 83a (seventy less one).

³⁷ See G. Dalman, *Grammatik des jüdisch-palästinischen Aramäisch* (Leipzig 1905 repr. Darmstadt 1960) 134 (par. 23).

5.2 The same holds for the category to be discussed now, but nevertheless it is dealt with separately because the relevant material is concerned with the principle of "a fence around the Torah." This principle (formulated in Mishna *Avoth* I 1) can be described as follows: In order to avoid that a commandment in the Torah be transgressed, rules are developed that create a margin of safety (a "fence") around the commandment.³⁸ This can best be illustrated by presenting the material under discussion. In the Torah, in Deuteronomy 25:3, it is said: "They may give him forty strokes, but not more; otherwise, if they go further and exceed this number, your fellow-countryman will have been publicly degraded." The explicit injunction "not more" made people be aware that it would constitute a serious transgression if the person concerned would receive more than 40 strokes. Hence, as a "fence" it was ordained in post-biblical Judaism that, for safety's sake, the punishment would consist of "forty less one" strokes, so that, even if the executor would make a mistake in counting and inflict a stroke too much, the man or woman would not get more than 40. Hence the Mishna, *Makkoth* 3. 10, states: "How many stripes do they inflict on a man? Forty less one (*'arba'im haser 'ahat*), for it is written, "by number forty," (that is) a number near to forty".³⁹ For the same reason the apostle Paul writes in 2 Cor. 11:24 ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων πεντάκις τεσσαράκοντα παρὰ μίαν ἔλαβον,⁴⁰ which shows that the principle is older than the Mishna, as can also be inferred from Josephus *Ant.* 4. 238 ὁ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ποιήσας πληγὰς μιᾷ λειπούσας τεσσαράκοντα τῷ δημοσίῳ σκύτει λαβὼν κτλ. Cf. *ibid.* 248 πληγὰς τεσσαράκοντα μιᾷ λειπούσας λαμβάνων κτλ. (but note that in *Ant.* 10. 77 and *Bell.* 6. 270 Josephus uses τριακονταεννέα). Two Targums (sc. Onkelos and Pseudo-Jonathan, Aramaic paraphrastic translations of the Old Testament) render Deut. 25:3 as follows: "Forty (stripes) may be laid upon him, but with one less shall he be beaten, (the full number) shall not be completed, lest he

³⁸ G. F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* I (Cambridge, Mass. 1927) 259: "Avoth I 1 'Make a fence for the Law', that is, protect it by surrounding it with cautionary rules to halt a man like a danger signal before he gets within breaking distance of the divine statute itself."

³⁹ This "by number forty" is arrived at by the rabbis by linking up the final word of Deut. 25:2 *b'mispar*, "by number," with the first word of Deut. 25:3 *'arba'im*, "forty." Thus they tried to give a biblical basis to their deviation from the biblical number. See S. Krauss, *Sanhedrin - Makkot* (Die Mishna IV 4-5) (Giessen 1933) 369-70. Cf. the Talmudic discussion of this Mishna in *Makkoth* 22b: "if it were written 'forty in number,' I should have said it means forty in number, but as the wording is 'by number forty,' it means a number coming up to the forty" (Soncino translation).

⁴⁰ On the question of how Paul could have incurred this maximum penalty see A. E. Harvey, "Forty Strokes Save One," in A. E. Harvey (ed.), *Alternative Approaches to New Testament Study* (London 1985) 79-96.

should add to smite him beyond those thirty-nine and he be in danger."⁴¹

There is another instance in the Mishnah that is sometimes referred to in this context,⁴² wrongly in our opinion. In *Shabbath* 7. 2 the context is a discussion of the types of work forbidden on sabbath. The text runs: "The main classes of work are forty less one ('*arba'im haser 'ahat*')." The same tradition is found in the Midrash, *Numbers Rabbah* 18. 21: "The principal categories of work (forbidden on sabbath) are forty less one." At first sight one would expect that there is a fixed number 40 in Scripture or tradition relating to this issue. But there is no such number, and if it were there, the Mishnah would make no sense, for the principle of "a fence around the Torah" would demand in that case *more*, not *less* than 40 kinds of forbidden labour. So this principle cannot be at work here, and it is very hard to say what is the reason for this specific way of counting here. Sidney Hoenig's suggestion, "The 40 mentioned biblically in the case of *malkot* (punishment by lashes) was utilized for application in a parallel manner for the sabbatical prohibitions,"⁴³ is not and cannot be proved. Even if that would apply to the use of the number 40, it definitely does not apply to the formula "40 less 1," since the "fence-principle" is operative in only one of the two cases, not in both. One might, however, suggest that the use of "40 less 1" instead of "thirty-nine" in the case of forbidden kinds of work may have been a rather mechanical transfer of terminology which existed already longer (for the 39 strokes), to a different situation in which the same number (39) played a role, albeit without the same background. It is, therefore, interesting to see that in the Midrash *Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael*, *Shabbata* 2 (III p. 206 Lauterbach) it is stated in connection with Exod. 35:1 ("And He said unto them: These are the words etc."): "Rabbi says: This includes the laws about the thirty-nine (*sheloshim we-tesha'*) categories of work prohibited on the Sabbath which Moses gave them orally." The fact that in this passage the usual additive numeral is used makes clear that "forty less

⁴¹ See also H. L. Strack - P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* III (München 1926) 527-28. J. le Moyne, *Les Sadducéens* (Paris 1972) 239. G. F. Moore, *Judaism* II-III (Cambridge, Mass. 1927-1930) II 27-28, III 171. Characteristically, the later Syriac version of 2 *Cor.* 11:24 uses about the same words as the Mishnah: '*arba'in' arba'in hasir hada'*', "each time forty less one" (Peshitta *ad loc.*; cf. Vulgate *quadragenas* instead of *quadraginta*). It is uncertain whether the terminology in *Acta Pilati* (*Evang. Nicodemi*) 4:3 (λέγουσιν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι τῷ Πιλάτῳ· ὁ νόμος ἡμῶν περιέχει· ἄνθρωπος εἰς ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἁμαρτήσιν, ἃ ἐστὶν λαμβάνειν τεσσαράκοντα παρὰ μίαν, ὃ δὲ εἰς θεὸν βλασφημῶν λιθοβολίᾳ λιθοβολεῖσθαι αὐτόν) depends upon 2 *Cor.* 11:24 or shows independent knowledge of Jewish usage.

⁴² E.g. W. H. Roscher, *Die Zahl 40 im Glauben, Brauch und Schrifttum der Semiten*, Abh. der phil.-hist. Klasse der kön. sächs. Akad. der Wiss. 27:4 (Leipzig 1909) 25. This study by Roscher is a supplement to his *Die Tesserakontaden und Tesserakontadenlehren der Griechen und anderer Völker*, Berichte über die Verhandl. der kön. sächs. Ges. der Wiss., phil.-hist. Klasse 61 (Leipzig 1909).

⁴³ See S. B. Hoenig, "The Designated Number of Kinds of Labor Prohibited on the Sabbath," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 68 (1978) 205.

one" had not become a fixed expression in relation to types of work forbidden on Sabbath, unlike the forty less one strokes. Also clear is the fact that the forty less one types of work are later than the forty less one strokes (Paul precedes the Mishna by one and a half century). One might suggest that the number of types of work prohibited on Sabbath—performance of which made one liable to beating⁴⁴—was worked out to match the number of blows in the beating and therefore the same form of numeral was used.⁴⁵ But this is no more than an educated guess. It seems to be impossible to state with certainty what was the background in this case.

6. Conclusions

It may have become clear that the principles operative behind the use of subtractive numerals are definitely not the same in all languages discussed in this article. For Latin it was already known that subtractives were very old elements that remained in use for a long time (till the first centuries of our era) but then gradually disappeared and hence are no longer part of the Romance languages. As to Greek, however, subtractives have either been totally neglected by modern scholars or considered to be a rare and clumsy irregularity in the otherwise additive system. Now it turns out to have been a usage of much wider currency than has always been thought. Most probably it was, as in Latin, an element of the early spoken language that has persisted in prose writings till the end of the Classical period. Contrary to the classical languages, in Semito-Hamitic languages (Egyptian, Coptic, Hebrew, Aramaic) subtractives have never been part of the numeral system. Hence there are considerably fewer instances, but, as far as Hebrew and Aramaic are concerned, in almost all these cases it could be demonstrated that the use of subtractives was caused by the existence of a normative round number from which there is a deviation to below. To this category, and only to this, belongs the only passage in the Bible where a subtractive numeral occurs, 2 Cor. 11:24.

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⁴⁴ Flogging is the punishment for all kinds of violations, by overt act, of negative biblical injunctions (Mishna, *Makkoth* 3:1–9); see H. H. Cohn, *Encyclopaedia Judaica* 6 (1972) 1349; Z. W. Falk, *Introduction to the Jewish Law of the Second Commonwealth* II (Leiden 1978) 160.

⁴⁵ We owe this suggestion to Prof. Morton Smith of New York (letter of 25 September 1985).

Eva Sachs on Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

WILLIAM M. CALDER, III

I. Introduction

Theodor Klauser in his exemplary life of Henri Leclercq (1869–1945) remarks at its beginning the rapidity with which the details of a scholar's life are scattered and forgotten soon after his decease:¹

Schon wenige Jahre nach dem Tode eines prominenten Mannes von heute sind seine Lebensumstände nur dann noch feststellbar, wenn sie in irgendwelchen wohlbehüteten Personalakten nachzulesen sind. Wer keinem Verband angehört hat, der solche Personalakten führt, ist bald nach seinem Tode nur noch ein blasser Schatten; es fehlen alle deutlichen Konturen.

Only three women of great age are alive today who knew Eva Sachs (1882–1936). The one who could say most will say nothing. Eva Sachs' name has been forgotten by all except the most specialized of Platonists and historians of ancient mathematics. Even for them, it is but a name on a title-page. She wrote her dissertation with the greatest Hellenist of modern times. Her work was praised by the highest authority and its contribution to knowledge is agreed to be a permanent one. Her unselfish aid eased the publication of one of the three or four most influential books on Plato of this century. Of classical philologists of the golden age who were women she has only one rival—the editor of Suidas, the Danish Jewess, Ada Adler.²

The discovery of two new documents that cast light on the brief and unhappy life of this brilliant woman, one of which reveals much about her great teacher, have caused me to gather what can be known still and seek to restore contours to the pale shadow.

¹ Theodor Klauser, "Henri Leclercq 1869–1945: vom Autodidakten zum Kompilator grossen Stils," *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum Ergänzungsband 5* (Münster 1977) 10.

² For Ada Adler (1878–1946) see Per Krarup and Hans Raeder, *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon 1* (Copenhagen 1979) 55, a reference I owe Dr. J. Mejer (Copenhagen). Her letters to Wilamowitz survive.

II. A Forgotten Life

Two published documents survive concerning the life of Eva Sachs (1882–1936). The first is a brief Latin autobiography that ends her dissertation. Because of its importance, brevity, and the difficulty in obtaining it,³ I republish it here rather than paraphrasing it.⁴

Nata sum Eva Henrica Sachs Id. Apr. a. 1882, Berolini patre Emanuelo, matre Minna e gente Lachmann, quos praematura morte mihi abreptos esse doleo. Fidei addicta sum iudaicae. Inde ab anno 1889 usque ad annum 1898 ludum puellarum frequentavi, cui nomen est "Charlottenschule" et qui tum regente Carolo Goldbeck+ florebat. Litterarum elementis imbutam Carolus Goldbeck, vir humanissimus, summo antiquorum litterarum amore inflammatus, a recentiorum temporum studio ad antiquorum revocavit. Qui vir summus non solum magister venerandus sed etiam amicus carus mihi meisque extitit.

Proximis annis in instituto, quod dicebatur "Victoria Lyceum" historicis studiis me dedi. Inde ab anno 1902 privatis curis instructa gymnasium puellarum, cui praefuit J. Wychgramm, frequentavi, ubi mihi contigit, ut scholis Guilelmi Moeller interesssem, viri vere philologi.

Vere 1904 maturitatis testimonium adepta universitatem Berolinensem adii, ut studiis historicis et philologis, imprimisque Platonis me darem.

Docuerunt me viri doctissimi: Cassirer, Diels, Harnack, Helm, Hirschfeld, Imelmann, Lehmann-Haupt, Mewald, Eduardus Meyer, Münch+, Norden, Paulsen+, Riehl, Simmel, M.P.C. Schmidt, Guilelmus Schulze, Stumpf, Wentzel, de Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Winnefeld, Woelfflin.

Sodalis fui proseminarii philologici per tria, seminarii per tria, seminarii historici regente Ottone Hirschfeld per unum, moderante Eduardo Meyer per sex semestria.

Ad exercitationes historicas me admisit C. Lehmann-Haupt, ad epigraphicas Winnefeld, ad philosophicas Cassirer.

Quibus omnibus viris gratiam habeo quam maximam, praeter ceteros Hermannō Diels, Eduardo Meyer, Eduardo Norden, e quibus Dielesius etiam in hac dissertatione perpoliēda liberalissime me adiuvit.

Udalrico de Wilamowitz-Moellendorff gratias non ago: eorum quae ab eo dona accepi, —τούτων θεοῖσι χρὴ πολὺμνηστον χάριν τίνειν.⁵

³ I cite the copy in the Classical Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am grateful to Professor David Sansone, who aided me in tracking it down.

⁴ Eva Sachs, *De Theaeteto Atheniensi Mathematico: Dissertatio inauguralis quam ad summos in philosophia honores rite capessendos consensu et auctoritate amplissimi philosophorum ordinis in alma litterarum universitate Friderica Guilelma Berolinensi* (Diss. Berlin 1914) 71.

⁵ A. Ag. 821–22, long a favorite play of Wilamowitz, who had edited it with translation in 1885 and published a famous revised translation in 1900. He translates these verses:

She was early orphaned and avoided the easy way of Protestant baptism, taken by so many assimilated Jews of the period. 1898–1902 she attended the famous Victoria-Lyzeum, the leading girls-school in Berlin. There she may have met Adelheid Mommsen, who with her father's permission was studying to become a school-teacher.⁶ Perhaps she would have heard Wilamowitz, who had lectured there regularly since his appointment to the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in 1897.⁷ In 1904, already determined to study Plato, she matriculated at that university. She received the finest classical education available in the history of the discipline. One should note that she did not confine herself to philology in the narrow sense. The breadth of her interests was extraordinary; and she took her time. She defended her dissertation 29th April 1914. During ten years at the university she heard besides the great classical scholars: the young philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945);⁸ the church historian Adolf Hamack (1851–1930); the Roman historian Otto Hirschfeld (1843–1922);⁹ the universal historian Eduard Meyer (1855–1930); the historian of higher education Friedrich Paulsen (1846–1908); the neo-Kantian Georg Simmel; the linguist Wilhelm Schulze (1863–1935); the psychologist and musicologist Carl Stumpf (1848–1936) and the art-historian Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945).¹⁰

The great mentor was always Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848–1931). The courses he offered during her time at Berlin are known.¹¹ He was particularly interested in Plato at this period. His *Platon* would have appeared sooner had it not been for the war. Between 1904 and 1914

Des Dankes für der Götter Beistand dürfen wir niemals vergessen.

See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griechische Tragödien*, 2 (Berlin 1900) 78–79.

⁶ Adelheid Mommsen, *Theodor Mommsen im Kreise der Seinen* (Berlin 1936) 63.

⁷ See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Erinnerungen 1848–1914*, ed. 2 (Leipzig 1929) 247 and for the foolishness of some of the girls *ib.*, 226. He had already begun to lecture there in autumn 1897. *Daphnis* was delivered at the opening of the winter semester 1897 at the Victoria-Lyzeum in the presence of the Empress of Prussia: see Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Reden und Vorträge*, I ed. 4 (Berlin 1925) 259, n. 1. For Friedrich Paulsen's (1846–1908) unfortunate experience at the school see Friedrich Paulsen, *An Autobiography*, translated by Theodor Lorenz (New York 1938) 278–80. He was discontinued because of his unwise criticism of the Prussian aristocracy. As a student Eva Sachs attended his university lectures.

⁸ See David R. Lipton, *Ernst Cassirer: the Dilemma of a Liberal Intellectual in Germany 1914–1933* (Toronto 1978).

⁹ For Otto Hirschfeld see Ernst Komeremann, *BiogJahr* 202 (1924) 104–116. He was victim of the violent antisemitism of Karl Julius Beloch (1854–1929): see Karl Christ, *Von Gibbon zu Rostovtzeff: Leben und Werk führender Althistoriker der Neuzeit* (Darmstadt 1972; repr. 1979) 265, n. 65.

¹⁰ For the lectures he delivered at Berlin 1901–1912 see Meinhold Lurz, "Heinrich Wölfflin: Biographie einer Kunsttheorie," *Heidelberger Kunstgeschichtliche Abhandlungen* NF 17 (Worms 1981) 381–82.

¹¹ F. Frhr. Hiller v. Gaetringen and Günther Klaffenbach, *Wilamowitz-Bibliographie 1868 bis 1929* (Berlin 1919) 79–81.

he offered the following lectures and seminars on Plato: *Cursory Readings in Plato's Laws* (WS 1905/06); Plato, *Critias* (SS 1906); Plato, *Euthydemus* (WS 1908/09); Plato and *Plato Laws VI* (SS 1909); Plato, *Symposium* (WS 1911/12); Plato, *Republic* (SS 1913).¹² He inspired her to write her dissertation under his direction with Hermann Diels as second reader. The dissertation proved that Theaetetus the son of Euphronius from Sounion was both the mathematician and the friend and student of Plato, one of whose dialogues bears his name. That the Souda, whom Bentley called "a sheep with golden fleece," makes the one man into two (Θ 93, 94 Adler) is an error. She further cogently argued that the battle of Corinth (*Th.* 142a) after which Theaetetus died was that of 369 B.C. and not 394 B.C. These conclusions have been accepted by the highest authorities.¹³ Her first book was dedicated "to the memory of her dearest parents."

The expanded German version of the dissertation, "The Five Platonic Solids: On the History of Mathematics and the Theory of Elements in Plato and the Pythagoreans," has remained authoritative in its field.¹⁴ The book was already finished in summer 1913 and was submitted along with her Latin dissertation. In summer 1914 several details were added and Chapter II. 2 ("Das Werk des Theaetet"), translated into German from the Latin. The book had been accepted by the press (Weidmann) to appear in the series *Philologische Untersuchungen*, edited by Wilamowitz. The outbreak of war in August 1914 delayed publication. In fall 1915 in spite of wartime difficulties the press agreed to publish her manuscript. The volume appeared in 1917.¹⁵ Werner Jaeger was quick to greet in a letter to Wilamowitz of 24 July 1917 the "ungewöhnlich selbstständige u. kluge Buch." He has some questions: "Aber die Tendenz, die Einwirkung der

¹² For an informed view of Wilamowitz' views on Plato see Jaap Mansfeld, *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren*, edd. William M. Calder III, Hellmut Flashar, Theodor Lindken (Darmstadt 1985) 217–20.

¹³ See for example Paul Friedländer, *Plato 3, The Dialogues: Second and Third Periods* (London 1969) 486, n. 3; Kurt von Fritz, *RE* 5A (1934) 1351. 30–41; W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 3 (Cambridge 1969) 499 with n. 2; Vol. 4 (Cambridge 1975) 52 with n. 2; Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago 1933) 572. The most welcome praise Eva Sachs lived to read: see Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon I* (ed. 2) (Berlin 1920) v: "Fräulein Eva Sachs, die durch die endgültige Feststellung der Abfassungszeit des Theaetet einen Angelpunkt der platonischen Chronologie jedem Zweifel entrückt hatte, ist mir eine Treiberin gewesen, und ihre eigene philosophische Forschung hat die meine befruchtet."

¹⁴ See the scholar most able to judge: Kurt von Fritz, *RE* 5A (1934) 1363. 17–24. Her dissertation is cited with approval at R. S. Brombaugh, "Plato's Mathematical Imagination," *Indiana University Publications: Humanities Series* 29 (Bloomington 1954; reprinted: Millwood 1977) 275, n. 30 (for the development of the irrationals [=incommensurables]). Her book is cited for the elucidation of *Ti* 53–54 and *Rep* VII at 296, n. 36. As no page numbers are provided the citations may well be second-hand.

¹⁵ For the *Entstehungsgeschichte* see Eva Sachs, "Die fünf Platonischen Körper: Zur Geschichte der Mathematik und der Elementenlehre Platons und der Pythagoreer," *Philologische Untersuchungen* 24 (Berlin 1917) v. She remarks: "So muß ich den Leser bitten, zu berücksichtigen, daß er ein vor vier Jahren geschriebenes Buch vor sich hat."

Mathematik auf Platon zu erkennen, ist jedenfalls sehr fruchtbar."¹⁶ The book is dedicated to no one. At the end of the preface there is a mysterious sentence (viii): "Zu eigen ist dieses Buch, auch ohne Widmung, meinem Lehrer Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff."

This mystery was solved when about 1974 I was able to interview at the home of Margarete Bieber the cousin of Eva Sachs. Professor Vera Regina Lachmann (1904–1985) then professor of classics at Brooklyn College. I published the substance of this interview in 1978.¹⁷ I reprint it here:

A brilliant Jewess, Assistentin to Wilamowitz, she helped much for *Platon* (see *Platon* I. v). She was in love with Wilamowitz. Forbidden by Marie Mommsen to enter the house, she dared not even dedicate her book to him, as male students did . . . She was ugly and went mad, ending her days in an insane asylum, speaking ancient Greek and believing "she could save Socrates if she got there in time."

That Marie Mommsen imposed *Hausverbot* on Eva Sachs struck me as improbable, a typical embellishment that years of retelling often add. A similar case, however, may confirm Vera Lachmann's statement. One other woman wrote a dissertation under Wilamowitz' direction. Luise Reinhard, *Observationes criticae in Platonem* (Diss. Berlin 1916), later expanded to "Die Anakoluthe bei Platon," *Philologische Untersuchungen* 25 (Berlin 1926), was directed by Wilamowitz.¹⁸ Wilamowitz writes to Eduard Norden on 27 August 1927 (unpublished): "Frl. Reinhard hat definitiv mit mir und meinem Hause gebrochen. Die ist also erledigt—mag sie ihren Unsinn drucken, um unsere Rückständigkeit zu erweisen. Da hat man wieder viel zu viel Wohlwollen verschwendet, Sie auch." Luise Reinhard will not visit Wilamowitz' house again. No reason is stated, though foolish ideas and stubbornness are implied. In any case the initiative was hers; certainly not Marie Mommsen's.¹⁹ The death of Eva Sachs in an asylum will be confirmed below.

¹⁶ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Selected Correspondence 1869–1931," edited by William M. Calder III, *Antiqua* 23 (Naples 1983) 179. After Wilamowitz' forced retirement in 1921, his successor Werner Jaeger's (1888–1961) opinion on Eva Sachs' habilitation would have been decisive. His intolerance of talented contemporaries (e.g., Karl Reinhardt) is known; and I should not be surprised if he discouraged her.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 182, n. 92.

¹⁸ See Wilamowitz' tribute to her remarkable knowledge of Platonic Greek at *Platon* I (ed. 1) v. At KS 3. 460 he accepts her emendation of Pl. *Ep.* 7. 344b7.

¹⁹ Dr. Luise Reinhard wrote to me on 9 June 1979:

Ich besaß viele Briefe von Ulrich von Wilamowitz, die ich Ihnen gern zur Verfügung gestellt hätte. Bei einem Luftangriff 1944 wurde meine Wohnung in Berlin völlig zerstört, ich verlor meine gesamte Bibliothek und alles, was mir an Briefen und Erinnerungen teuer war. Daß ich den Angriff überlebte, verdanke ich dem Umstand, daß ich damals mit der Augusta-Schule in Cottbus war.

An unpublished letter of Wilamowitz to Eduard Norden dated 15 April 1919 casts considerable light on Eva Sachs' later career. He writes:²⁰

Die [sic] gute Fr. Sachs quält sich und andere mit ihrer Zukunft. Zunächst will sie wie sonst Übungen halten, schickt den anliegenden Anschlag, der wie sonst an unser schwarzes Brett des Institutes kommen soll. Ich unterbreite ihn Ihnen; sie meinte, ich sollte Ihnen nur schreiben, den Zettel Friedländer geben. Aber so ist es correct. Ich denke, das kann ihr ohne weiteres gestattet werden. Sie macht es ja sehr gut. Uns schiert die Summe der Dozenten nicht. Regenbogen²¹ kommt noch nicht in Betracht.

Aber sie denkt auch an Habilitation. Auch da sage ich mir, das Geschlecht kann nicht mehr hindern.²² Fr. Bieber ist in Gießen angenommen.²³ Leistungen sind genügend; über eine besondere Habilitationsschrift einigen wir uns vorher. Daß wir so viele Dozenten haben, alle Juden beinahe, ist nicht angenehm, aber wie ich den Pr. Doz. ansehe, ist nur die moralische und wissenschaftliche Qualität maßgebend. Ich würde am liebsten Maas²⁴ als Byzantinisten zum a.o.Prof. hier oder sonst wo befördern. Als Philologe²⁵ hat er keine Aussicht, ist auch bei

Friedrich Solmsen, *Kleine Schriften* III (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1982) 432 must refer to this incident when he writes that Luise Reinhard participated in Wilamowitz' *Graeca* "from 1921 to 1928." He adds unhelpfully: "Miss Reinhard left for personal reasons."

²⁰ I am grateful to Dr. Klaus Hänel for permission to quote both these letters. The transcriptions of both were made by the late Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald.

²¹ For Wilamowitz' skeptical view of Otto Regenbogen (1891–1966) at this time see Solmsen, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 19) 442. For Regenbogen see H. Gundert, *Gnomon* 39 (1967) 219–21; *Id.*, *Gymnasium* 74 (1967) 105–07; Viktor Pöschl, "Literatur und geschichtliche Wirklichkeit: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze zur Römischen Prosa und zur Klassischen Philologie, *Kleine Schriften* II," ed. Wolf-Lüder Liebermann, *Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften* NS 2, 74 (1983) 277–79. For Regenbogen's dismissal under National Socialism because he did not reveal the Jewish ancestry of his wife see: Cornelia Wegeler, *Die Selbstbeschränkung der Wissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie seit dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, untersucht am Beispiel des Instituts für Altertumskunde der Universität Göttingen (1921–1962)* (Diss. Wien 1985) 119, n. 4 [=n. 3].

²² For Wilamowitz' view in 1897 on higher education for females see his remarks at *Die akademische Frau. Gutachten hervorragender Universitätsprofessoren, Frauenlehrer und Schriftsteller über die Befähigung der Frau zum wissenschaftlichen Studium und Berufe*, ed. Arthur Kirchhoff (Berlin 1897) 222–25. Thirty years later he was more tolerant: see Solmsen, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 19) 449: "In the University he was generally friendly to students and remarkably polite to the women; for although at heart he did not believe in women's study, they were 'Damen,' and with a kind of old-time courtesy he kept his hat in his hands as long as he talked to them."

²³ For the art historian Margarete Bieber (1879–1978) see Larissa Bonfante, "Margarete Bieber (1879–1978): An Archaeologist in Two Worlds," *Women as Interpreters of the Visual Arts, 1820–1979*, ed. Claire Richter Sherman with Adele M. Holcomb (Westport/London 1981) 239–74.

²⁴ For Paul Maas (1880–1964) see Eckart Mensching, *Über einen verfolgten deutschen Alphilologen*: Paul Maas (1880–1964) (Berlin 1987).

²⁵ Dr. Buchwald observes that Wilamowitz means "Als <Klassischer> Philologe."

allem Scharfsinn zu enger Emendator. Friedländer wäre Verpflanzung sehr zuträglich.²⁶ Aber wer kann da jetzt hoffen und wirken?

Clearly he does not think that Frl. Sachs should be encouraged. She has made a sensible suggestion for her teaching. Wilamowitz approves but asks Norden's opinion. As far as habilitation goes, although not enthusiastic, he is ready to accept the inevitable. Antisemitism plays no role in his decision. Morality and scholarly ability must rule in every case. Wilamowitz and Norden are to agree on its subject beforehand. She is qualified to habilitate. She never did. Already she is victim to self-torture. This may have been indicative of her later illness and a reason why she never completed the habilitation.

III. The Two New Documents

Vera Regina Lachmann described the mental illness and death of her cousin some 40 years after the event. A contemporary source has recently been discovered. Otto Kern (1863–1942), an admirer of Wilamowitz, who did not return the admiration,²⁷ sought in the last years of his life to write a biography of his teacher. The manuscript is unfinished and in the opinion of Freifrau Hiller did not deserve publication. It survives today in the Göttingen *Nachlaß* in 455 handwritten pages.²⁸ The manuscript is often valuable for facts otherwise unattested. Kern had interviewed people now deceased and even made an effort to gather documents. Furthermore, the full corpus of Wilamowitz' letters, so far as Freifrau Hiller had assembled them, was available to him. Because he was unable to discover the date of death for Eva Sachs, he enquired in 1940 of Hiller von Gaertringen, Wilamowitz' son-in law, who passed the enquiry on to Josefine von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich's grandniece, then at Kobelnik, the *Schloß* of her grandfather Hugo, Ulrich's eldest brother and inheritor of the estates. The first document is her reply to Kern.²⁹

²⁶ For Wilamowitz' evaluation of Paul Friedländer (1882–1968) in 1914 see William M. Calder III and Christhard Hoffmann, "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff on the Basel Greek Chair," *Museum Helveticum* 43 (1986) 260–61.

²⁷ For Otto Kern see Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, *Gnomon* 18 (1942) 124–25 and Werner Peek, *NDB* 11 (Berlin 1977) 522–23. For Wilamowitz' disdainful view of his work see *Antiqua* 23 (1983) 5–6 with n. 31; 110 with n. 101; and William M. Calder III and Robert L. Fowler, "The Preserved Letters of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff to Eduard Schwartz edited with Introduction and Commentary," *SBAW philos.-hist. Klasse* Heft 1 (1986) 59–60; 63. There exists at the Winkelmann-Institut, Humboldt Universität, Berlin-DDR, the manuscript of *Meine Lehrer: Erinnerungen von Otto Kern Weihnachten 1939*. I owe my copy of them to the kindness of Professor Dr. Wolfgang Schindler.

²⁸ There are copies at the Villa Mowitz and the Library of the Freie Universität West Berlin.

²⁹ The original letter is preserved at Otto Kern, *Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Leben und Werke* 394–95.

1. Josefine von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff to Otto Kern:

Kobelnik b. Kruschwitz
 Wartheland 13. 8. 40.

Sehr verehrter Herr Geheimrat,

mein Onkel Hiller schreibt mir eben, dass Sie für Ihre Wilamowitz-biographie gern das Todesdatum von Fräulein Dr. Eva Sachs wissen möchten. Ganz genau kann ich es Ihnen leider nicht mitteilen. Ich weiss nur, dass sie im Herbst 1936 in einer Nervenheilstalt bei Wien gestorben ist.

Ich lernte sie im September—ausgerechnet dem 25., Onkel Ulrichs Todestag—1933 in einem Salzburger Gebirgsort kennen, und dort hat sie mir tagelang begeistert von Onkel Ulrich erzählt. Sie lebte damals schon in Wien und ich lege Ihnen einen Teil aus einem Brief vom 18. Dezember 1933 bei, in dem sie von Onkel Ulrich spricht—aber wahrscheinlich ist Ihnen das alles bekannt.

In Januar 1935 hat man die Unglückliche in eine Heilstalt bringen müssen. Ihr Zustand liess keine Besuche mehr zu, und im Herbst, ich glaube 5 September 1936 ist sie in völliger Umnachtung gestorben.

Eine Schwester von Eva Sachs war damals noch in Wien, ist aber bald darauf nach Amerika ausgewandert.³⁰ Ich habe nicht feststellen können wohin, sodass ich auch über die Verstorbene nichts weiter erfahren habe.

Vielleicht sind Ihnen diese wenigen Mitteilungen von Nutzen. Den Brief von Eva Sachs, deren ich mich gern und voll erinnere, bitte ich mir bei Gelegenheit zurückzuschicken.

Mit den besten Grüßen

Ihre sehr ergebene
 Josefine Wilamowitz

2. Eva Sachs to Josefine von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff:³¹

Aus einem Brief vom 18 Dezember 1933 an Josefine v. Wilamowitz von Eva Sachs:

³⁰ Nothing else is known of a sister of Eva Sachs. Possibly Vera Regina Lachmann, her maternal cousin, is meant.

³¹ The fact that the introductory sentence is in the same copper-plate hand as the text of Eva Sachs's letter proves that Kern had the original copied by an amanuensis and presumably then returned it as requested to Josefine von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Presumably only a bit from the beginning of the letter was withheld. The text is found at Kern, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 29) 391–93. The paragraphs, "Was sich nicht . . . das Wilamowitz eigen ist" were copied in error out of place at p. 391. A second version is inserted at 392–93 in its correct place. I have followed the correct arrangement.

Vielleicht habe ich in oder nach den Feiertagen noch ein bisschen Ruhe um Ihnen noch einmal zu schreiben, denn dieser Brief muss gleich fort, um noch schnell da zu sein.

An diesem Tage als Gruss ein Wort von Wilamowitz, das erste, das ich als Schülerin, heimlich in die Universität eingeschlichen, im Auditorium Maximum von ihm hörte:³²

"Denn der Mensch, wenn er was taugt, ist immer mehr wert, als alle Werke, die er geschaffen, und alle Bücher, die er geschrieben hat" (über Clemens von Alexandria).

Ein anderes: "Ein ordentlicher König und ein ordentlicher Gott brauchen sich nicht vor Majestätsbeleidigung zu fürchten."

Am Schluss einer Vorlesung über Aphrodite (1905 Winter): So wird sie ewig in unseren Herzen leben, "denn das Leben ist schön, und das Leben will gelebt werden."³³

Über Platon: "nur³⁴ solche Menschen haben dann, wie man zu sagen pflegt, kein Glück."

Nach der Niederlage von 1918 schrieb er mir: "Jetzt heisst es, im Moment und in der Ewigkeit leben."³⁵

1919: "Jetzt müssen wir die Klaglieder des Jeremias lesen!"³⁶

Er hätte wie Äschylos auf sein Grab³⁷ schreiben lassen, dass er einer von denen gewesen sei, die bei Marathon gegen die Perser gekämpft habe, nichts von seinem Dichten.³⁸

³² Probably spring 1901, during the public lectures on "Greek Literature of the Empire from Nero on." For Wilamowitz' positive opinion of Clemens Alexandrinus see Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Die griechische Literatur des Altertums," *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* I. VIII (ed. 3), ed. Paul Hinneberg (Leipzig-Berlin 1912) 267-68. Note especially (267): "Man gewinnt ihn lieb, je mehr man mit ihm verkehrt, mag auch die Achtung vor seinem Wissen und vor seinem Urteil sinken."

³³ In Winter Semester 1904/05 Wilamowitz' public lectures were on "Die Götter der Griechen." The best commentary on this sentiment is Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Griechische Tragödien* I (Berlin 1899) 120-21, where the Aphrodite of Euripides in *Hippolytus* is an anthropomorphic incarnation of the sexual drive. This, says Wilamowitz (120), is a divinity in which both Euripides and he believe.

³⁴ "nur" in the sense "however." One thinks of the death of Dion and the failure of the Sicilian venture: see my remarks at *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren*, 101-07.

³⁵ The best commentary is the *Nachwort zu Band II* at Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon* I (ed. 2) (Berlin 1920) vi, where he takes refuge in "das Reich der ewigen Formen." As far as the world goes there is no future, only the moment. He has but to "die out."

³⁶ To Eva Sachs he cites the Old Testament. For this mood of utter despair compare his letter of 26 November 1918 to Werner Jaeger at *Antiqua* 23 (1983) 187-89. Rather than the *Lamentations of Jeremiah* he cites to Jaeger A. Ag. 139, 159, a text cited on other occasions: see *ibid.*, 190, n. 126.

³⁷ *TrGF* 3 T 162. For Wilamowitz on this epitaph which he considered contemporary and composed in Athens see Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aischylos Interpretationen* (Berlin 1914) 233-34, esp. (234): "... es redet nur von dem Ruhme des Kriegers, nicht von dem des Dichters." See further *id.*, *KS* IV. 204-05.

³⁸ Eva Sachs' instinct was correct. The custom at Schulpforte was that alumni write their own obituaries. Wilamowitz' is published at *Ecce* (Naumburg 1931) 8-11. He states in this (9)

Nach dem Friedensschluss schrieb er mir: "Ich preise Tycho glücklich, er ist noch im Glauben und in der Liebe gestorben."³⁹

Was sich nicht wiedergeben lässt und auch Sie vielleicht nie von ihm ganz erlebt haben, war die gesammelte Kraft und Leidenschaft, die ausstrahlte, wenn er in Auditorium Maximum eine öffentliche Vorlesung hielt, wirklich die Radiumkraft seiner Seele auf die versammelte Menge der Hörer,⁴⁰ und dann das andere, wenn er in seinem stillen Zimmer ganz schlicht und still über Platon sprach, "den Menschen, den ich vor allen auf der Welt am meisten liebe."⁴¹ Er sprach von ihm so schlicht und herb, wie von einem nahen Verwandten. Wenn Sie den Staat gelesen haben, werden Sie verstehen, was ich meine, wenn ich sage, er war Platons jüngerer Bruder Glaukon.⁴²

Jetzt, wo ich dies alles in Hast und Eile niederschreibe, bin ich ganz traurig, dass ich Ihnen nicht mehr geben kann, und sehe, wie eben die künstlerische Kraft nicht da ist, dies Bild so zu formen, dass er Ihnen nahe

that the highest point of his life was when on 16 June 1871, returning victorious from the French campaign, he marched before his king. The next highest was when he performed Egmont at Pforte on Shrove Tuesday 1867. He was in his own estimation first a soldier, second an actor, and then teacher and scholar.

³⁹ Wilamowitz refers to the heroic death of his son, Tycho (1885–1914), in battle against the Russians before Iwangoorod in the early morning of 16 October 1914. An eyewitness of his death, Steinecke, Leutnant der Reserve, reported to Wilamowitz: "Tycho eilte der Artillerie zu Hilfe gegen eine Übermacht und machte die Geschütze frei. Er erhielt bei seinem Siegeslauf einen Kopfschuss. Gelitten hat er nicht. Ohne jeden Laut ist er zu Boden gesunken. Sein Gesicht war vollkommen ruhig, nicht schmerzverzerrt. Von seinem Tode hat er nichts geahnt. Er selbst wünschte sich einen solchen Tod." Wilamowitz' *Glaube* means faith in the justice of his cause; *Liebe* means love for his fatherland and comrades. His formulation recalls the famous mot attributed to Solon at Hdt I. 32. 7 never to call a man happy before he is dead.

⁴⁰ The closest parallel is Eduard Schwartz' description, written October 1938 to Otto Kern, of the young Wilamowitz lecturing at Greifswald: see *Quaderni di storia* 7 (1978) 211–12 with an English translation at Calder-Fowler, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 27) 7.

⁴¹ The adoration of Plato was early. Wilamowitz himself dates his conversion to autumn 1866: see *Antiqua* 27 (1984) 155 with notes 38–41. As a man, he remarked to Norden (*KS* 668): "Fidem profiteor Platoniam." A close parallel to the sentiment recalled by Eva Sachs is found in an unpublished letter to Max Fränkel in my possession (13 August 1875):

Stutzig gemacht hat mich Ihr zweifel, ob Platon ein großer dichter oder sonst was sei. freilich der größte dichter der Hellenen ist er, überhaupt die incorporation alles deßen was groß schön wahr in der alten welt ist; ich kenne auf diesem planeten nur zwei solche menschen noch, gegen die der größte gott, den sich die menschen erfanden, ein ganz armseliger schulknabe ist, der eine heißt Raffael und der andere heißt Göthe.

I preserve the orthography and punctuation of the original.

⁴² For the ancient testimonia for Glaukon son of Ariston, brother of Adeimantos and Plato, see Paul Natorp, *RE* 7 (1910) 1402. 50–1403. 25. Eva Sachs errs when she calls Glaukon Plato's younger brother. Plato was the youngest in a family of four children: see Wilamowitz, *Platon* I. 35–36. Wilamowitz describes Glaukon (*ib.*, 37) as "äußerst lebhaft, vorwitzig, leidenschaftlich."

sein könnte. Denn der Mann als Ganzes war von einer Herrlichkeit, gegen die alle Feinheit und Klugheit der Stefan Georgeleute verblasst; aber dazu gehörte eben einer, der dies eigentlich heldische Wesen mit festem Griffel festhalten könnte. Auch er war eine "ins Geistige verirrt Taternatur,"⁴³ viel mehr als Stefan George,⁴⁴ der freilich auch die Macht des "Führers" über die Seelen besass, aber nicht das Wickingergewesen, das Wilamowitz eigen war.

Nun leben Sie wohl. Ich wünsche Ihnen ein frohes Fest im verschneiten Hause. Haben Sie Tannenwald in der Nähe? Das ist das einzige, was ich in der schönen, der Stadt so nahen Natur hier vermisste; denn die Schneefülle würde herrlich sein auf Tannenwald; von den Nadelbäumen, ausser wenn Rauhref ist, gleitet sie ab.

Grüssen Sie, bitte, die Ihren und sagen Sie auch ihnen meine besten Wünsche. Und verzeihen Sie mein langes Schweigen und diesen unfestlichen Brief.

Mit herzlichem Gruss

Ihre

Eva Sachs

*Translation*⁴⁵

Perhaps I shall have a bit of leisure during the holidays or after to write you once again: for this letter must be posted immediately in order to be there quickly.

On this day as greeting a word from Wilamowitz, the first that I heard from him in the Auditorium Maximum, as a schoolgirl, secretly smuggled into the University:

"For a human being, when he is any good, is always of greater value than all the work that he has done and all the books which he has written" (about Clement of Alexandria).

Another: "A decent king and a decent God need not fear *lèsé-majesté*."

⁴³ I cannot identify the source of this quotation. No matter. She provides a profound insight into Wilamowitz' nature; for she has discerned the quintessence of his attraction to the Herakles figure and the reason for his emphasis on an otherwise obscure text, Aristotle, *Problemata Physica* XXX.1, which describes Herakles along with Plato and Socrates as the type of the "melancholic man," that is a sort of unstable genius. In Wilamowitz' words Aristotle sets Herakles "in die Reihe der Heroen des Geistes" (*Herakles* II. 93): see my discussion, *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren*, 97. Aristotle's Herakles is precisely the man of action who has gone astray into the intellectual.

⁴⁴ For an expert discussion of the complicated relations between Wilamowitz and the George Circle see Ulrich K. Goldsmith, "Wilamowitz and the *Georgekreis*: New Documents," *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren*, edd. William M. Calder III, Hellmut Flashar, Theodor Lindken (Darmstadt 1985) 583-612, and for his parodies of George *Id.*, "Wilamowitz as Parodist of Stefan George," *Monatshefte* 77 (1985) 79-87.

⁴⁵ The translation is intended only to make an important and beautiful document available to those without German and in no way replaces the original.

At the end of a lecture about Aphrodite (Winter 1905): so she shall live ever in our hearts, "for life is beautiful and life wants to be lived."

About Plato: "However, such men, as one is used to say, have no good luck."

After the defeat of 1918 he wrote me: "Now we must live day by day and in eternity."

1919: "Now we must read the *Lamentations of Jeremiah*."

Like Aeschylus, he would have allowed to be written on his grave that he was one of those who had fought against the Persians at Marathon, — nothing of his poetry.

After the armistice he wrote me: "I count Tycho happy. He was still able to die in faith and love."

What cannot be communicated and what, furthermore, you perhaps never experienced from him, was the concentrated strength and passion, which radiated forth onto the assembled crowd of listeners when he held a public lecture in the Auditorium Maximum, truly the emanation of his soul. And then the other side, when, in his quiet room, very simply and quietly, he spoke of Plato, "the human being whom I love more than any in the world." He spoke of him so easily and candidly, as though of a close relative. If you have read the *Republic*, you will understand what I mean when I say he was Plato's younger brother Glaukon.

I regret now, when I write all this hurriedly, that I can't give you more; and see that the artistic power is simply not there to form this picture, so that he could be close to you. For the man as a whole was of a magnificence in comparison with which all the elegance and cleverness of the Stefan George people pale. But for that task someone would be needed who would be able to capture with a firm brush this truly heroic being. He too was "a man of action who went astray into the intellectual," far more so than Stefan George, who of course also possessed the power of the "leader" over minds; but not the Viking nature that was Wilamowitz'.

Farewell. I wish you a happy holiday in a house covered with snow. Have you a fir-wood in the neighborhood? That is the only thing I miss here in the beautiful countryside near the city. The snowfall would be lovely in a forest of firtrees. From conifers, except when there is hoar-frost, it slides off.

Greet your family, please, and convey to them also my best wishes. And excuse my long silence and this non-festive letter.

Sincerely yours,

Eva Sachs

IV. What have we learned?

This fragment of a letter brings Eva Sachs nearer than her two books and all else that we know of her short and tragic life. Like Plato, she was a philosopher and a poet. Of the four descriptions of Wilamowitz that have survived by women, one is by his mother, two by his daughters; but only this by a woman, not a relative, but a disciple and a brilliant classical scholar. She was a student of great intelligence, capable of acute observation, and she adored him. In the mountains near Salzburg on the second anniversary of Wilamowitz' death she met his grandniece and for days spoke inspired only of her master. The first part of her letter consists of *sententiae* of Wilamowitz, which over thirty years she had never forgotten. She had read Plutarch and Diogenes and knew how sentiments reveal character.

The rest of the letter is her attempt, which she considers inadequate, to communicate to a younger woman, who, although not a scholar, had known Wilamowitz all her life, what the man was. Her comparison with George is revealing. Hers is the only contemporary comparison written by one not a Georgeaner. She is the only one who noticed their similarity. She was a Platonist as was he. No other contemporary describes so well the profound, personal, almost familial, closeness that he felt toward Plato. Perhaps he thought that he could reveal to her an attachment too personal to admit to a man. His irony in the letter to Norden is meant to conceal how intimately he had spoken to her about himself. Did the Platonic specialist *err* in thinking that Glaukon was the younger brother? More easily she purposely neglected a fact to strengthen the analogy.

She detected, as Eduard Schwartz had, the *charisma* in Wilamowitz' nature, the irrational attraction he was able to exert upon his hearers. Wilamowitz himself knew this and described it once in a letter to Ernst Krieck of 12 August 1921.⁴⁶

Die stärksten charakterbildenden Wirkungen hängen an den irrationalen Ausstrahlungen des Wesens.⁴⁷ Dafür wird es dann also keinerlei Methode geben; das lernt sich überhaupt nicht, sondern ist ein Charisma.⁴⁸ Da wird es doch zweifelhaft, ob man Erzieher bilden kann. Daß die Erziehung die Hauptaufgabe der Gesellschaft ist, von deren Lösung alles abhängt, weiß ich von Platon; da dürfte zu lernen sein.

⁴⁶ The full text of this important letter is edited in honor of the tenth anniversary of Wilamowitz' death by Ernst Krieck, "Erinnerungen an Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf," *Volk im Werden* 9 (1941) 19-20. For Krieck and Wilamowitz see Gerhard Müller, *Ernst Krieck und die nationalsozialistische Wissenschaftsreform: Motive und Tendenzen einer Wissenschaftslehre und Hochschulreform im Dritten Reich* (Weinheim/Basel 1978) 371, 373-74. I owe both these references to Bernhard vom Brocke.

⁴⁷ Krieck (*ibid.*, 19) edits "Wesens <des Lehrers>."

⁴⁸ I should argue that the source for Wilamowitz' use of *charisma* is Plato and not Max Weber. The next sentence shows that Plato is in his mind.

She detected also the strain of brutality. She called it his Viking Nature. Schadewaldt recalled it.⁴⁹ Jaeger called it "the archaic element in Wilamowitz' genius."⁵⁰ Eva Sachs also detected another characteristic of Wilamowitz, his unpredictability, which she called "his 'Heraclitean' quality: νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρηι."⁵¹ This could be documented both in his personal life and in scholarship. She died three years after her letter to Josefine, who knew only that she had died in September 1936. I wonder if it was the 25th, the fifth anniversary of his death.⁵²

The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

⁴⁹ For Schadewaldt's view of Wilamowitz see *Antiqua* 23 (Naples 1983) 257–63. I did not there include that on 10 June 1974 Schadewaldt also stressed the brutality of which Wilamowitz was capable. He recalled an incident when Wilamowitz, irritated by something a young man said, wheeled about, turned his back on him, and said nothing until he had left the room. Such behavior could be devastating.

⁵⁰ See Solmsen, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 19) 444.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 453, where the spelling of the Heraclitan citation needs to be corrected. The fragment Eva Sachs cites is now frag. 58 Marcovich. It is revealing that in Heraclitus the epithet is used of Helios who is new every day.

⁵² I am grateful for various details to Dr. Bernhard vom Brocke (Marburg/Lahn); Professor Dr. Richard Kannicht (Tübingen); Dr. Paul Keyser (Colorado); Professor Dr. Christoph Konrad (Colorado); Dr. Jørgen Mejer (Copenhagen); Professor Dr. Wolfgang Schindler (Berlin-DDR); Professor Dr. Wilt Aden Schröder (Hamburg); and Professor John van Sickle (Brooklyn). I thank Dr. K. Hälzel (Göttingen) and Frau Josefine von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Bibach) for permission to publish the new texts. I am most grateful, however, to my colleague and friend, Professor Emeritus Dr. Ulrich K. Goldsmith (Colorado) for invaluable aid on transcription and interpretation. He has read the whole manuscript and improved it considerably.

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Plutarch

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PLUTARCH

ROBERT FLACELIÈRE

(1904–1982)

IN MEMORIAM

Preface

The present issue of *ICS* comprises the papers presented at the Conference of the International Plutarch Society held in the summer of 1987 at Athens. I have included the contributions by the scholars unable to attend the Athens Conference. In preparing the typescripts for publication I have been assisted by such renowned Plutarchean scholars as Fr. E. Brenk, S.J. (Rome), J. P. Hershbell (Minneapolis), and Ph. A. Stadter (Chapel Hill). My gratitude to them is sincere and immense. Thanks are also due to D. Tsekourakis (Thessaloniki), M. M. Kokolakis (Athens), W.D.E. Coulson (Director, American School of Classical Studies, Athens), and C. Williams (Director, Canadian Archaeological Institute, Athens) for their kind assistance with the Conference.

The Plutarch-issue of *ICS* is dedicated to the memory of Robert Flacelière (1904–1982), in recognition of his invaluable efforts and merits for the creation of the Budé Plutarch over twenty-five years (1957–1982).

Mary Ellen Fryer, Barbara Kiesewetter, and Dr. Richard Warga have successfully processed foreign languages.

Miroslav Marcovich

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Rencontres avec Plutarque*

JACQUELINE DE ROMILLY

Nous devons tous être reconnaissants aux organisateurs de ce congrès et à la Grèce qui veut bien l'accueillir.

Que la Grèce soit hospitalière pour des gens qui aiment Plutarque n'a rien qui doive surprendre. Hospitalière, elle l'a toujours été. Et Plutarque n'est pas seulement un des très grands auteurs de la Grèce ancienne: il est celui qui a, si l'on peut dire, révélé la Grèce à l'Europe de la Renaissance. En France, la découverte de Plutarque fut un phénomène sans précédent; il était dû en partie à la qualité de la traduction d'Amyot, mais avant tout au fait que l'on trouvait dans l'oeuvre de Plutarque tous les aspects de l'Antiquité: les grands hommes de l'histoire, les doctrines des philosophes, la religion de Delphes, et aussi, entremêlés, des citations de poètes et des mots historiques, des arguments et des anecdotes, et des hauts faits, et des curiosités. L'engouement, d'ailleurs, ne fut pas propre à la France: Érasme a traduit du Plutarque comme Guillaume Budé, et Shakespeare, plus tard, s'en est inspiré plus largement que Corneille.

D'autre part, si tout converge et se rencontre en Plutarque, comment n'offrirait-il pas un thème de choix pour des échanges internationaux? La collaboration, avec lui, est une loi. On ne peut en effet comprendre une Vie de Plutarque si l'on n'a pas une solide formation d'historien de l'Antiquité, si l'on ne peut comparer les sources et les critiquer à l'aide de documents divers: il faut être historien de Rome et de la Grèce, des époques les plus anciennes comme les plus récentes, historien de Solon comme de Sylla, d'Aristide comme de Philopoemen; et le travail fait pour une des Vies ne prend vraiment quelque portée qu'une fois comparé avec les résultats obtenus pour d'autres. Sans compter qu'il en va de même pour ces centaines d'anecdotes, cousues l'une à l'autre dans les Traités moraux: elles ont leurs sources, elles aussi, plus difficiles à discerner, et parfois leurs variantes, sur lesquelles il faut faire le point. Mais c'est loin d'être tout. Car, si l'histoire envahit les Oeuvres morales, il n'est pas une page des Vies où n'affleure la réflexion morale, avec de brefs commentaires inspirés de Platon ou bien des stoïciens;

* Remarques destinées à l'ouverture du Congrès Plutarque à Athènes.

et, du coup, c'est toute la philosophie de la Grèce qui intervient à côté de l'histoire, et toute sa religion aussi, chaque fois qu'un geste de piété ou d'impiété suscite une remarque de l'auteur. Qu'il s'agisse des *Vies* ou des *Moralia*, la collaboration et les échanges sont également nécessaires. Et je ne dis rien de l'histoire de la langue ni des emprunts littéraires, avoués ou non, qu'il est si nécessaire de percevoir si l'on veut comprendre le texte à fond.

En un sens, cela justifie qu'intervienne aujourd'hui quelqu'un qui comme moi—vous le savez—n'est d'aucune manière spécialiste de Plutarque: ainsi sera du moins respecté l'équilibre entre les diverses spécialités, dont aucune ne sera alors privilégiée.

Je voudrais, en fait, profiter de cette incompétence même. Car j'essaierai de partir de mon expérience d'helléniste habituée au cinquième siècle avant J. C. et à des textes qui se placent un demi-millénaire avant Plutarque. Cela fait un grand recul. Et le recul est parfois utile. Il permet en l'occurrence de mieux mesurer les changements profonds qui sont intervenus en Grèce et qui ont permis à Plutarque de devenir ce qu'il est devenu. C'est grâce à eux qu'il a pu produire cette oeuvre qui est comme la somme de l'Antiquité, en effet, mais une somme déjà tout entière tournée vers un monde et vers des habitudes modernes. Oui, il a fallu des changements profonds; et mes rencontres avec Plutarque aideront à mesurer, par contraste, cette puissante transformation interne de la pensée grecque.

*

J'ai d'abord rencontré Plutarque dans le prolongement de Thucydide. Le plus austère et le plus sobre des historiens m'a conduite au biographe de Périclès, de Nicias, d'Alcibiade, et à ces anecdotes personnelles que ces *Vies* apportent sur leur vie privée. Il faut être juste: formée à l'école d'un historien comme Thucydide, j'ai parfois éprouvé quelque agacement pour la liberté avec laquelle Plutarque traite les différentes versions d'un événement, ou néglige la densité des analyses au profit du détail révélateur. L'année dernière encore, j'étais à Jérusalem, et je faisais une conférence sur Thucydide et Plutarque, comparant dans le détail les emprunts et leur modèle;¹ or, je dois l'avouer, j'insistais surtout sur ce qui s'était perdu en cours de route, sur l'affaiblissement du sens et le rétrécissement de la pensée politique.

Mais le point de vue que j'adoptais là faussait les perspectives. Car Plutarque savait ce qu'il faisait et ne songeait pas à être un nouveau Thucydide. Il fondait un genre nouveau, appelé à devenir le grand genre à la mode de nos jours; et il le fondait consciemment, lucidement.

Je dis "fondait"; et j'ai l'air par là de prendre parti dans les longs débats des dernières décennies sur l'origine de la biographie; en fait, par cette

¹ J. de Romilly, "Plutarch and Thucydides on the Free Use of Quotations," *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 22–34.

expression, je refuse plutôt de prendre parti. Car il est clair que Plutarque n'est pas parti de rien, qu'il a eu des modèles et des précédents. Sans même rappeler ici le rôle, tant commenté, des biographies hellénistiques, comment oublier qu'il fut, pour le domaine latin, postérieur à Cornelius Nepos et contemporain de Suétone? Tout cela était dans l'air du temps. Mais l'ampleur de l'oeuvre de Plutarque et la variété des vies traitées, sans parler du talent, font de lui, aux yeux de la postérité, la véritable père de la biographie. Et il avait un but lucidement défini. On cite en général le témoignage de la Vie d'Alexandre; et il est décisif: "En effet, nous n'écrivons pas des Histoires, mais des biographies; et ce n'est pas surtout dans les actions les plus éclatantes que se manifeste la vertu ou le vice. Souvent, au contraire, un petit fait, un mot, une plaisanterie montrent mieux le caractère que des combats qui font des milliers de morts, que les batailles rangées et les sièges les plus importants" (1, 2). C'est pourquoi il cherche, dit-il, grâce à ces signes distinctifs de l'âme, "à représenter la vie de chaque homme, laissant à d'autres la grandeur et les luttes."

Je ne m'attarderai pas sur ces déclarations de principe, si précises et au demeurant si connues. Elles justifient tous les traits du récit: le recours à l'anecdote, aux sentiments, à ce que nous appelons la "petite histoire" (encore que nos modernes aillent beaucoup plus loin que lui sur cette voie!). Elles justifient le souci d'une présentation vivante, du dialogue, de la scène révélatrice. Mais, si elles m'intéressent, c'est plutôt parce qu'elles révèlent, depuis mon Vème siècle avant J. C., une véritable révolution dans les principes.

Tout l'intérêt a basculé. Et le contraste avec Thucydide est ici éclatant.

Thucydide, homme de la cité avant tout, ne s'intéressait à Périclès que dans la mesure où son action avait déterminé le sort d'Athènes. Au second siècle après J. C., en revanche, le temps des cités est depuis longtemps révolu. Plutarque, certes, ne dédaigne pas les responsabilités ni les magistratures; il ne désespère pas non plus d'avoir, par ses écrits, une influence sur ses contemporains, soit en offrant des modèles et des principes de conduite aux hommes politiques, soit en aidant, par sa juxtaposition des grands hommes Grecs et Romains, à fonder l'amitié destinée à faire de Rome la protectrice de la liberté et de la culture grecque. Mais ce qui l'intéresse avant tout est—il l'a dit—de discerner les "signes distinctifs de l'âme" et la vie de chacun (τὸν ἐκάστου βίον). Donc les hommes d'État eux-mêmes comptent à ses yeux en tant qu'individus. Il montre Périclès avec ses maîtres, Périclès avec Aspasia, Périclès en deuil, Périclès mourant... Un tel intérêt ne pouvait évidemment naître qu'après une mutation complète de la vie des gens et des cités. Elle ne pouvait naître, aussi, que dans le sillage de toutes les curiosités nouvelles que cette mutation avait facilitées, et en fonction d'habitudes de vie nouvelles qu'elle avait suscitées. Plutarque ne pouvait venir qu'après l'essor de la psychologie et de la morale individuelles: après Aristote et Théophraste, après les querelles entre stoïciens et épicuriens, après Sénèque. De même, il ne pouvait venir que dans un

moment de culture livresque, permettant que s'épanouisse un homme érudit, éloigné des affaires—un homme, si j'ose dire, appartenant aux temps nouveaux de l'Antiquité.

Ces gauchissements de l'histoire, telle que Plutarque la perçoit, sont donc passionnants à cerner, jusque dans le détail des mots: ils sont eux-mêmes, directement, le reflet même de l'évolution historique.

Cependant le déplacement d'intérêt que traduit le contraste entre Thucydide et Plutarque va plus loin encore. Car Plutarque ne veut pas seulement définir de façon vivante la psychologie de l'individu: il se veut moraliste et trace des modèles. Il le dit franchement—par exemple au début de la *Vie de Périclès*, quand il parle des actions qui inspirent l'admiration et l'émulation. Certes, ces modèles ne sont pas tracés à coup de faits mensongers ou d'inventions gratuites: ce n'est jamais le cas; mais le choix d'un épisode, le mise en valeur d'une qualité et le choix même des qualités à mettre en valeur, tout cela est son oeuvre et révèle une série d'interventions subtiles, dont nous n'avons pas fini de déceler la présence ni les procédés.

Il faut révéler cette orientation, car elle est bien à lui. Après tout, Plutarque est contemporain de Tacite, et contemporain de Suétone: l'oeuvre du premier prouve que l'on pouvait encore être un historien lucide et exigeant; celle du second prouve que l'on pouvait se faire biographe sans flatter ses personnages ni chercher à présenter des modèles d'ordre moral. Plutarque a fait ce choix, préférant le rayonnement du bien à l'éclat même du vrai. Il l'a fait avec honnêteté et prudence; mais l'intention apologétique existe. Et je crois que le fait explique pour une bonne part l'étrange destin qui fut le sien. Car le XVI^{ème} siècle s'émerveille de trouver dans son oeuvre "les beaux dits des Grecs et des Romains" ou bien "de sages avertissements et de fructueuses instructions"; mais la notion même de modèles, unie à celle de grands hommes, a détourné de lui les lecteurs en des âges plus blasés et moins confiants dans les leçons du passé. C'est ce que le livre de R. Hirzel rendait déjà sensible en 1912: depuis, le culte des grands hommes ne s'est pas accru, non plus que le souci d'imiter le passé, il s'en faut! Et le rayonnement de Plutarque en souffre. Quand on fait table rase du passé et que l'on veut inventer soi-même ses valeurs, on se détourne de lui.

Je voudrais cependant relever ce qu'a d'injuste l'espèce de suspicion qui pèse sur lui et l'assimile un peu trop vite à ce que l'on a appelé le culte des héros. Car la merveille est justement que, porté par ce souci moral indéniable, Plutarque soit resté toujours modéré, lucide, et gentiment critique. On pourrait ainsi rappeler (et ce serait vrai) qu'il y a des biographies qui n'offrent nullement des modèles (comme celles de Démétrios ou d'Antoine, sans parler de celle de Néron, qui est perdue): Plutarque aime discerner des vertus, différentes selon les cas, et il se réjouit chaque fois que l'occasion s'en offre; mais il n'est jamais de mauvaise foi. D'autre part ses grands hommes n'ont pas grand chose à voir avec les "héros" de Carlyle. Ils ne les a même pas choisis en tant que modèles, mais simplement parce qu'il s'agissait d'hommes sur lesquels, à cause leur grand rôle, on est mieux

renseigné que sur les autres. Leurs actes ont eu des conséquences, leurs paroles ont été transmises, leur sort comporte un enseignement qu'il est possible de dégager. Ils aident à comprendre l'homme, comme ces grands caractères d'écriture, plus lisibles que les petits, où Platon cherchait une définition de la justice en se référant d'abord à la justice dans l'État. Ils ne sont que des signes, comme les héros de la tragédie, dont les auteurs montraient la grandeur, sans pour autant les présenter ni comme parfaits ni comme des modèles à imiter.

Je retiendrai donc surtout de cette notion de modèle, si injustement perçue de nos jours, une difficulté de plus pour les spécialistes de Plutarque. Avec lui, même dans le domaine historique, c'est toujours de morale qu'il s'agit. Il faut donc à tout prix s'occuper de dégager les procédés subtils par lesquels il réussit à orienter les faits sans les trahir et à mettre en relief des vertus dans un récit qui n'est pourtant pas tendancieux. Voilà du travail! Il faut aussi savoir quelles sont ces vertus.

Et là, avouons le, nous aurons aussitôt la confirmation éclatante de la différence entre ses hommes illustres et les héros à la Carlyle. Car il se trouve que Plutarque raconte la vie des hommes illustres avec le souci constant de célébrer en eux des vertus de douceur et de mansuétude, qui conviennent entre toutes à la vie individuelle, à la vie privée.

Je viens d'employer le mot de "douceur": il me mène tout droit à ma seconde rencontre avec Plutarque.

*

Cette seconde rencontre s'est faite à l'occasion de mon livre *La douceur dans la pensée grecque* (il ne s'agit pas, comme certains l'ont cru, d'une étude sur les desserts et autres sucreries, mais des vertus qu'expriment des mots comme *πρᾶος*, *ἐπιεικής*, *φιλόανθρωπος*). Or tout, dans ce livre, me jetait vers Plutarque. En effet, alors que je suivais au cours des oeuvres les emplois de ces mots et les progrès de cette notion, je consacrais très rarement un chapitre entier à un auteur; mais, pour Plutarque, il en a bien fallu deux: un pour les *Vies* et un pour les *Moralia*! Et j'ai dû m'arrêter là, à Plutarque, car il fournissait le parfait épanouissement de ces idées. Dans les deux séries d'oeuvres, les résultats étaient les mêmes: ces mots étaient partout, dans chaque vie, dans chaque traité, et avec tous leurs sens, réunis en gerbe. Bien plus, il y avait d'autres. Plutarque emploie des mots comme *εὐγνώμων*, *φιλόφρων*, et *μέτριος*, et *ἰλαρός*. Il a aussi de beaux substantifs: le *φιλοστόργον* (un mot qui ne commence qu'avec Xénophon), le *φιλητικόν* (un mot qui ne commence qu'avec Aristote), l'*ἀγαπητικόν* (un mot qui ne se rencontre pas avant Plutarque lui-même); il recourt là à des neutres substantivés, toujours aptes à désigner les dispositions de l'âme. Et tous ces mots, il les distingue, les groupe, les combine. D'autre part, il découvre des applications de cette vertu partout. Il en reconnaît le bien-fondé et l'universalité. Comme il le dit—et cela est très peu stoïcien—"Il y a dans

notre âme un penchant à l'affection: elle est faite pour aimer"; ou encore: "à moins de contrarier la nature, nous ne pouvons vivre sans amis, sans relations, en solitaires."² Cette φιλανθρωπία est à ses yeux la vertu grecque par excellence. Dans l'appréciation du mérite de chacun, elle est le premier critère. Et elle peut s'étendre à tous les gestes de la vie quotidienne, chez les simples particuliers. La vertu d'humanité vaut même pour la conduite envers les serviteurs, envers les animaux domestiques; elle doit se prolonger quand ils sont vieux—vieux chevaux ou vieux chiens, usés par l'âge. Et il le dit, notre Plutarque. Il le dit même—voyez cette combinaison imprévue—dans la *Vie de Caton l'Ancien* (5)—cela parce que le sens de l'économie empêchait ce dernier de pratiquer ces formes de douceur: ce défaut du personnage nous vaut, de la part de Plutarque, une page entière de commentaires sur la beauté de tels égards et de tels gestes d'humanité envers les animaux atteints par l'âge.

Je ne poursuivrai pas plus loin la démonstration de ce rôle extraordinaire que joue l'idéal de douceur et d'humanité chez Plutarque. Il avait d'ailleurs été signalé par d'autres avant moi.³ Je voudrais plutôt m'arrêter, ici encore, à la mutation profonde qu'un tel choix impliquait.

Cet idéal avait pénétré lentement l'atmosphère morale du monde classique, qui s'attachait plus à la justice et au courage qu'à de telles vertus. On le voit progresser peu à peu, régulièrement, de façon visible et indéniable. Mais ce n'est pas tout. Car quand la douceur avait commencé à pénétrer les textes classiques, au IV^e siècle, il s'agissait presque toujours de célébrer la clémence des vainqueurs ou la douceur du bon roi. Or la douceur célébrée par Plutarque—nouveau signe des temps—est très souvent une vertu de la vie privée. Naturellement, la forme politique existe toujours. Mais, même pour les princes ou les chefs d'armée, elle se traduit aussi dans leurs vies d'hommes. On a vu, dans le passage cité à l'instant, que Caton était dur: oui, mais dur pour les travailleurs, dur pour les animaux. D'autres ont, dans Plutarque, un air avenant avec chacun, qui leur gagne les cœurs. D'autres acceptent la mort avec sérénité. . . L'intérêt pour les individus, qui expliquait le passage de l'histoire à la biographie, nous fait ici passer du domaine public au domaine privé. Et, si les vertus douces ont en effet pour caractéristique de s'appliquer aisément au commun des hommes, leur puissant épanouissement en cette époque tardive n'est pas non plus un hasard. Cet épanouissement, lui aussi, suppose la fin du monde des cités. Il suppose également un intérêt accru pour la psychologie individuelle.

² Solon, 7, 3; *De l'amour fraternel*, 479c.

³ Les deux études principales sont celles de H. Martin: "The concept of *praotes* in Plutarch's Lives," *GRBS* 3 (1960) 65–73; et "The concept of *philanthropia* in Plutarch's Lives," *AJP* 82 (1961) 164–75. Voir aussi C. Panagopoulos, "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque," Univ. Besançon, *Dial. Hist. ancienne*, 3 (1977) 197–235. Dans notre livre sur *La douceur dans la pensée grecque* (Paris 1979), l'étude de Plutarque occupe les pages 275–307.

Et voilà tout à coup toutes les formes de la tendresse humaine qui interviennent. On sait que Plutarque a écrit de merveilleuses pages sur la tendresse qui lie un homme à sa femme, quand, avec les années, progressent entre eux deux "le respect, la complaisance, l'affection et la confiance mutuelle." Avant Plutarque, seul Xénophon avait célébré cette tendresse; mais la sensibilité de Plutarque laisse loin derrière elle l'austérité de l'*Économique*; et les détails de la vie conjugale ne s'arrêtent plus aux soins du ménage. . . Plutarque a aussi parlé des enfants, de leur façon de donner un jouet ou de leur chagrin de le perdre: les enfants de l'époque classique ne surgissaient que dans le deuil de la tragédie ou dans le pathétique des adieux. Plutarque a parlé des repas, de la politesse, du bavardage, de la patience. Comme il a plusieurs fois traité des sujets parallèles à ceux de Sénèque, la comparaison est facile: au stoïcisme de l'un s'oppose le sourire de l'autre; le sage ici, est marié, et bon mari, et bon maître de maison.

Marquer ces petits décalages et ces nuances souvent subtiles est une des tâches du spécialiste de Plutarque quand il s'occupe de son idéal moral.

Mais il est temps de le dire: bien d'autres tâches l'attendent, en ce domaine, notre spécialiste. Car, emportée par mon élan, j'ai tout de suite évoqué ce rôle de la douceur et de l'humanité. Mais c'était simplifier les choses que de les présenter comme l'expression naïve d'un tempérament affable. En fait, la morale de Plutarque présente un autre trait qui n'est pas moins surprenant quand on part du Vème siècle athénien: c'est qu'elle se double d'une philosophie, où se reflètent les âpres débats théorétiques des nouveaux temps. Même là où Plutarque semble innocemment prêcher une vertu de simple humanité, il est clair qu'il retouche son très cher Platon à la lumière des vertus de sociabilité découvertes par Aristote; et il est clair aussi qu'il retouche, plus qu'un peu, les idées des stoïciens sur le rôle des sentiments et de l'affectivité. Nous découvrons donc là, affleurant à peine, mais bien réel, tout un monde de débats où se sont peu à peu posés les problèmes.

La fidélité de Plutarque au platonisme pourrait faire croire à une continuité entre deux grands auteurs. Mais il suffit d'un simple coup d'oeil sur les traités pour voir que la philosophie s'était compliquée et nuancée. Interprétation du *Timée*, problèmes du destin et du libre arbitre, rôle et action de la providence, existence d'un âme animale: tout était débattu, à coup d'arguments et de preuves. L'aimable douceur de Plutarque plonge donc ses racines dans de laborieux échanges, dont il est passionnant de retrouver le fil—dans un congrès, par exemple, ou bien dans les échanges qui prennent naissance lors d'un congrès! Ces débats savants rendent d'autant plus remarquable l'accent personnel que Plutarque a su donner à ses choix.

Or j'ai parlé de l'idéal moral, mais il en va exactement de même de la religion. Là aussi, on trouve, par rapport à l'âge classique, de nouveaux problèmes, un nouveau cadre de pensée, de nouvelles orientations.

Dans ce domaine aussi, les questions ont fusé. Il n'y a pas eu seulement les curiosités historiques qu'un homme instruit et pieux comme

Plutarque ne pouvait pas ne pas éprouver: sur l'E de Delphes, ou sur les oracles de la Pythie, ou sur le défaut des oracles. Il y a eu aussi, et surtout, toutes les questions métaphysiques posées au cours des années, y compris l'interprétation allégorique des mythes et des rites de la religion traditionnelle, et l'existence des démons, avec les diverses questions qu'elle pose et qui, aujourd'hui, nous déroutent un peu comme les débats scolastiques du Moyen-Age. Les spécialistes connaissent bien ces problèmes, et les embûches qui guettent le lecteur de Plutarque, même s'il est armé d'une solide culture dans la philosophie du temps—et à plus forte raison s'il y est tant soit peu étranger.

C'est là encore du travail en perspective; mais aussi encore une marque du lent renouvellement de la pensée antique. Et j'ajouterai: encore une différence radicale de cadre!

Car c'est un fait: au temps de Thucydide ou des tragiques, la religion était essentiellement affaire collective. Les dieux protégeaient la cité, présidaient aux fêtes et aux concours, exigeaient, récompensaient. La théologie existait bien: Eschyle en est la preuve; mais elle ne cherchait qu'à comprendre, pour guider son action, le sens de la justice divine. Au temps de Plutarque tout s'est renouvelé. Les débats dans lesquels il faut prendre parti impliquent des choix individuels, des réponses individuelles.

Et pourtant, tout comme la morale de Plutarque semble le reflet d'une personnalité, ses choix et ses orientations dans le domaine religieux forment un ensemble où on le retrouve.

Prêtre d'Apollon à Delphes, il croit aux dieux, aux oracles, aux prophéties. Il approche parfois du mysticisme et aime à citer des cas étranges d'inspiration ou de révélations. Mais, avec cela, il n'a rien d'un dévot perdu dans le culte ou même dans la contemplation. Il ne renonce ni à l'action humaine, ni à la raison. Et la "superstition" lui paraît pire que l'athéisme. Il juge en effet stupide de toujours craindre un pouvoir divin qui est en fait "doux comme un père." N'évoque-t-il pas comme une explication possible aux délais de la justice divine l'idée que dieu aurait voulu accorder aux coupables le temps de se réformer? Sa religion aussi a de la "douceur."

En tout cas cette religion, ainsi intériorisée et teintée de spiritualité, est donc aussi différente de la religion classique que l'était sa morale. On perçoit l'évolution, la longue mutation qui est intervenue. Et le fait est que l'on a parfois cherché des concordances entre lui et les textes chrétiens, qui étaient en gros contemporains, mais qu'il ne connaissait pas.

Là comme en tout, Plutarque apporte la somme du passé, mais avec cette touche nouvelle qui l'oriente déjà vers le monde et la pensée modernes. Sans doute est-ce pour cela qu'il a naguère rendu l'héritage ancien si aisément accessible à des lecteurs qui en ignoraient presque tout.

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Tout cela suggère bien l'importance du travail qui attend encore les savants, travail de comparaison, verticale et horizontale, établissant des relations, directes et indirectes, qui permettent de situer Plutarque dans cette longue file de textes divers, où se reflète une maturation intérieure dont il est l'un des aboutissements. Une telle recherche vaut tous les efforts; et le croisement de tant de fils en ce point de rencontre que constitue Plutarque lui donne un prix particulier.

Mais avant de laisser les spécialistes s'engager dans ces voies, je voudrais encore évoquer une troisième rencontre avec Plutarque: c'est une rencontre, et si je puis dire, par personne interposée; et elle nous ramènera à un Plutarque que nous aurions risqué d'oublier. À force de le voir dans l'histoire et couronnant une longue évolution, nous pourrions en effet perdre de vue cet aspect intemporel que l'on peut appeler la sagesse de Plutarque, et qui est de tous les temps.

On reconnaîtra là le titre d'un petit ouvrage d'extraits qu'à composé Robert Flacelière. Et, puisqu'il s'agit aujourd'hui d'honorer cet ami disparu, je voudrais, pour finir, évoquer son souvenir. Car, à travers lui, tel que je l'ai connu, on avait un peu le sentiment d'être directement en contact avec un Plutarque *redivivus*.

Que l'on se rassure: je ne suis pas aveuglée ni par l'amitié ni par le patriotisme. Je sais, comme vous, ce que les études sur Plutarque doivent à de grands savants de divers pays. Konrat Ziegler a ouvert la voie; et nul ne pourrait travailler sur Plutarque sans avoir recours à lui. Je cite ce nom; je pourrais en citer bien d'autres. Chaque année voit surgir de nouvelles éditions commentées, de nouvelles Vies ou de nouveaux traités, de nouvelles études. Je ne citerai personne, par crainte d'omettre trop de noms.

Mais Robert Flacelière occupe une place privilégiée; et il a consacré toute sa vie à Plutarque.

Né en 1904, il avait été membre de l'École française d'Athènes et, à ce titre, avait été travailler à Delphes. Delphes—cela voulait dire Plutarque: Plutarque, qui était prêtre d'Apollon à Delphes et citoyen de cette ville; Plutarque, qui avait laissé de nombreux traités sur Delphes et ses oracles. . . Tout jeune encore, Flacelière consacra sa thèse complémentaire à une édition commentée du traité *Sur les oracles de la Pythie*. Puis d'autres traités l'occupèrent, et il les édita: les traités delphiques et les traités sur l'amour; et puis, pendant vingt-cinq ans, de 1957 à 1979, ce furent toutes les Vies qui, grâce à lui, parurent à un rythme régulier dans notre collection des Universités de France (dite collection Budé). Ce n'était pas une petite affaire que de traduire Plutarque en français après Amyot: la traduction nouvelle est aisée et précise. Ce n'était pas non plus une petite affaire que de se débrouiller dans tous ces faits, dans toutes ces sources. Flacelière ne pouvait pas faire oeuvre originale sur tout; mais il a su être toujours bien informé et raisonnable, dégager l'essentiel, faire le point de façon lucide. Cela lui était

rendu facile par la familiarité ininterrompue qu'il avait entretenue avec son auteur. Chez nous, en France, on ne nommait jamais Plutarque dans une conférence, même en passant, sans que les regards se tournent vers Flacelière, en souriant, comme si l'on avait parlé de lui.

Et voyez cette vie studieuse de Plutarque, ce désir de s'initier à tout, de se faire une idée des problèmes, et de rédiger ouvrage sur ouvrage: ce fut la vie de Flacelière. Aucun auteur grec n'occupe dans la collection Budé autant de volumes que Plutarque (qui en occupera vingt-cinq): aucun collaborateur n'en a produit autant que Flacelière. Cela n'empêchait pas Plutarque d'exercer des fonctions publiques à Chéronée: Flacelière a de même assumé la direction de plusieurs grands établissements. Sa maison était accueillante, comme celle de Plutarque. Plutarque aimait les récits vifs et vivants: Flacelière détestait les exposés lourds et prétentieux. La morale de Plutarque était de douceur, de courtoisie: Flacelière était souriant, bienveillant. Plutarque a chanté la tendresse conjugale: la vie de Flacelière en fut remplie à un point rare. Et les deuils éprouvés en commun ont encore rapproché les époux, comme pour Plutarque. Plutarque était prêtre d'Apollon, et plein de foi dans la divinité: la foi chrétienne de Flacelière rayonnait du même éclat.

Ces traits peuvent provenir—et proviennent sûrement en partie—d'une rencontre de tempéraments, qui a, précisément, poussé le jeune savant vers l'auteur à qui il se consacra. Mais je crois aussi que l'on se laisse peu à peu influencer par un auteur, quand on passe sa vie entière à le lire et à le fréquenter.

Et, à la vérité, ce n'est pas pour le seul plaisir de rendre hommage à un savant disparu que j'évoque ici cette parenté à travers les siècles, et presque cette symbiose: c'est parce que je crois, pleinement, à ce rayonnement des oeuvres.

J'ai évoqué tout à l'heure le texte célèbre de la Vie de Périclès, où Plutarque dit qu'il faut diriger la pensée vers des spectacles susceptibles de faire naître l'émulation et le désir d'imiter ce qui est bien: il ne me déplait pas qu'à travers ce qu'un auteur comme lui admire et fait admirer, il naisse chez le lecteur un même désir d'imitation, conscient ou inconscient, fondé sur la sympathie.

Le fait que Plutarque intervienne si directement dans ses oeuvres facilite cette sympathie. Le fait qu'il ait le talent de présenter agréablement ses idées l'encourage. Et tout ce qu'il devait lui-même aux livres crée un admirable précédent.

Tous les témoignages des premiers lecteurs modernes trahissent bien cette influence et cette sympathie. Montaigne s'est réjoui de trouver en Plutarque "des opinions douces et accommodables à la société civile"; Brantôme a parlé de cette "si affectueuse recommandation de la vertu." La sagesse de Plutarque déteint sur ses lecteurs, tout comme, dans ses dialogues, elle semble déteindre sur les amis qu'il met en scène.

Et l'on arrive alors à un double résultat.

Parce qu'il était un homme infiniment cultivé, qu'il multipliait partout les récits, les citations, les allusions aux poètes et aux philosophes, Plutarque a pu devenir l'agent de transmission de l'héritage classique, dont il était nourri et pénétré. Mais, parce que sa sagesse a pris, à ce contact, un certain tour courtois et ouvert, il a à son tour contribué—et peut encore contribuer—à façonner et à aider d'autres générations d'hommes. Ce phénomène est très exactement ce que l'on appelle la culture.

L'exemple de Flacelière nous éclaire sur le rôle que peut jouer Plutarque. Et c'est un très beau rôle.

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On me dira qu'un congrès scientifique ou un recueil d'études savantes n'ont pas à se soucier de ce rayonnement moral, fait pour les profanes, et que la science et la culture suivent des voies divergentes. Dans le cas des auteurs anciens, et plus particulièrement de Plutarque, j'en doute un peu. J'aurais plutôt tendance à penser qu'elles ne cessent de s'entraider, sans même qu'on le désire ou qu'on le sache. Et je souhaite, en l'occurrence, qu'elles continuent. Car enfin ce Plutarque, qui a représenté à la Renaissance le meilleur de la culture classique et qui a été plus lu et plus traduit qu'aucun autre, mériterait bien d'être aujourd'hui un peu moins négligé. Or il n'est pas exclu que l'attention des savants, leurs découvertes et leurs émerveillements soient de nature à réveiller le goût de lire un auteur. Plutarque en aurait bien besoin. Et notre monde actuel plus encore.⁴

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⁴ Ce texte a été préparé pour le Congrès Plutarque d'Athènes; des difficultés de dernière heure tenant à l'organisation du congrès et à mes propres obligations m'ont empêchée de me rendre à Athènes pour en donner lecture. Je suis d'autant plus reconnaissante à ceux qui ont bien voulu l'accueillir aujourd'hui.

Plutarch and Athens

ANTHONY PODLECKI

Periclean Athens, a city raised by one man's will to its cultural and military zenith, is a concept that owes much of its vitality to Plutarch.¹

This topic suggested itself to me by a passage in the *Life of Aristeides*. Struck by the largesse of the Athenian people to a descendant of Aristeides and Aristogeiton's grand-daughter, Plutarch remarks: "We need not be surprised to hear that the people took such care of families living in Athens The city of Athens has given many such examples of humanity and goodness of heart (φιλανθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος . . . δείγματα) even in my own day, and for this she is justly praised and admired."² I asked myself, what kind of practical effect did this favorable impression made by Athens have on Plutarch's work? How often, in fact, does he allude to Athenian customs, institutions, cults and monuments? What kinds of things does he record about ancient Athens? What particularly has stuck in his mind, so that he singles it out for mention?

A preliminary word about method. Research for this paper was done with the TLG laser disc and an Ibycus computer at the University of Washington, Seattle; I am grateful to the Classics department and especially Professors L. Bliquez, J. Clauss and M. Langdon for their courteous assistance. I have left out of account those treatises marked doubtful or spurious by D. A. Russell.³

One obvious yardstick of Plutarch's interest in Athens is the number of Athenian subjects of his biographies: 10 out of the 23 Greek *Lives* (3 Spartan, 2 Theban and the rest "other").⁴ But within the *Lives* themselves and scattered throughout the *Moralia* there are numerous references to Athenian cults, customs and institutions. In addition, there are certain treatises that are devoted to Athenian topics, either wholly, such as *De gloria Atheniensium*, or in part, such as *De malignitate Herodoti*; or that

¹ C. P. Jones, "Plutarch," in T. J. Luce, ed., *Ancient Writers, Greece and Rome* (New York 1982) II. 979.

² *Arist.* 27. 6-7, trans. Scott-Kilvert; cf. *Mor.* 558C for honors paid to Cimon's descendants.

³ *Plutarch* (London 1973) 164-72.

⁴ Cf. R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and His Times* (London 1967) 53.

have an Athenian setting, e.g., certain books of the *Quaestiones convivales*; or which almost of necessity (because of the subject matter) draw their examples largely from Athenian history, like *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*.

Of course, Plutarch had ample opportunity to become familiar with Athens and her monuments and to learn about her history. Born sometime between 40 and 45 A.D. he was a pupil of the philosopher Ammonios at Athens in about 65, is known to have been there in about 80 and was present at the celebration of the City Dionysia of 96-97.⁵ At some point in his career he was made an honorary Athenian citizen of the tribe Leontis.⁶ At the end of *Themistocles* Plutarch reveals that some of the information about the descendants of the fifth-century statesman came from a later Themistocles, whom Plutarch describes as "a friend and fellow-student of mine in the school of Ammonios the philosopher" (*Them.* 32. 6, trans. Scott-Kilvert). He has special information about the tribe Aiantis (*Arist.* 19. 6, *Mor.* 628A-E), which suggests that he was on close terms with someone from that tribe, or at least that he took special care to seek out information about it. He relates an incident towards the end of *Demosthenes* that he says occurred "a little while before I moved to Athens" (*Dem.* 31. 1). Athens was, as Plutarch reminds his friend the poet Serapion, who had the cultural advantages offered by residency there, a "great city" (*Mor.* 384E). In Plutarch's view there was something permanent, unchanging, but utterly characteristic of Athens and her people. "One could recognize Athens [Plutarch remarks] on seeing it after a lapse of thirty years, and the present traits and moods, games and graver interests, favoritisms and angers of the δῆμος are like those of old" (*Mor.* 559B).

To return to the passage at the end of *Aristeides*. The qualities which Plutarch commends in the Athenian nation are φιλανθρωπία and χρηστότης. As a small but telling example of this φιλανθρωπία Plutarch twice cites the refusal of the Athenians to break the seal in the letter sent by Philip of Macedon to his wife Olympias when the Athenians had intercepted Philip's messengers and read all the other letters they had seized (*Demet.* 22. 2, *Mor.* 799E). There is another, rather frivolous, example in the *De sollertia animalium*. Plutarch tells two animal stories, the first of which he says occurred "when our fathers were studying at Athens." A dog relentlessly pursued a robber whom it had seen stealing treasures from the temple of Asclepius. Finally the culprit was apprehended and punished, whereupon the dog was rewarded with a public ration of food and entrusted to the care of the temple priests (*Mor.* 969F-970A). This reminds Plutarch of another incident illustrative of the Athenians' φιλανθρωπία: a mule

⁵ Plutarch and Ammonios at the time of Nero's visit to Greece: *Mor.* 385B, C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 16-17; "in Athens in the early 80s," Jones 22 with n. 16; Dionysia of 96-97, Jones 27 n. 52.

⁶ Jones (preceding n.) 21, 109.

that because of age and infirmity had been retired from its task of hauling stones for the Parthenon nevertheless voluntarily accompanied the other draught-animals, "turning back with them and trotting along by their aide, as though to encourage and cheer them on" (Helmbold's trans.). As with the dog, the Athenians rewarded the enterprising beast with maintenance at public expense (*Mor.* 970A–B and *Cat. mai.* 5. 3).

This quality of gentle and civilized self-restraint ("philanthropy") clearly made a strong impression on Plutarch. The characteristic is mentioned, but is not the only quality to be included in a list of items that, for Plutarch, mark the Athenian character. In the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* he comments at length on the necessity that the statesman, ὁ πολιτικός, be versatile, adaptable and ready to mould himself to the ever-changing populace he is trying to lead. "For the Athenian δῆμος," Plutarch comments, "is easily moved to anger, easily turned to pity, more willing to suspect quickly than to be informed at leisure; as they are readier to help humble persons of no reputation, so they welcome and especially esteem facetious and amusing speeches; while they take most delight in those who praise them, they are least inclined to be angry with those who make fun of them; they are terrible even to their chief magistrates, then kindly [the word Plutarch uses is again φιλόανθρωπος] even to their enemies" (*Mor.* 799C, trans. Fowler).

At the end of the *Life of Dion*, Plutarch reports that Dion's slayer, the Athenian Callipus, sent a letter back to Athens, an outrageous act from which he should have been deterred by "reverence and fear of that city, only second to the gods," after committing such a sacrilege. "But it seems [Plutarch remarks] that it is truly said of Athens that she produces good men who are the best in virtue and bad men who are worst in vice, just as the Athenian soil grows the sweetest honey and the deadliest hemlock" (*Dion* 58. 1).

There are other allusions to this theme. "Cimon's liberality surpassed even the ancient hospitality and φιλοανθρωπία of the Athenians" (*Cim.* 10. 6). Nicias pleaded with his captor, Gylippus, to return like for like, saying "when the Athenians were successful, they dealt moderately and gently (μετρίως . . . καὶ πράως) with you" (*Nic.* 27. 5). When the pro-Spartan Thebans fled to Athens after the capture of the Cadmeia in 382 B.C., Sparta actually demanded that they be handed over. The Athenians refused, both, Plutarch says, in repayment of the favor shown by the Thebans, who declined to join in overthrowing the democracy in 403 B.C., and also "in accord with the philanthropy which was ancestral and natural to them" (*Pelop.* 6. 4–5). A less attractive, perhaps even dangerous aspect of this mildness or leniency (πραότης) of the Athenians was their willingness to gloss over Alcibiades' flagrant misbehavior, calling it mere "playfulness and ambition" (*Alc.* 16. 4). Plutarch is troubled by the reaction at Athens to news of Philip's death. The Athenians "leapt upon and sang Paeans over his

corpse," even though, when Athens herself was down, "Philip had treated her *ἡμέρως καὶ φιλανθρώπως*" (*Dem.* 23. 4).

In the short, rather strange treatise *De gloria Atheniensium*, the paradoxical position is maintained that Athens' most lasting and significant achievements were those of her military commanders, not of her tragedians, historians or orators (this is a bias that manifests itself elsewhere in Plutarch's work, as, e.g., at the beginning of *Pericles*). Plutarch singles out for special commendation the bravery of the exhausted and outnumbered Athenians who faced Epaminondas at Mantinea in 362 B.C. (*Mor.* 346B ff.), and in a rhetorically effective passage he contrasts various orators' accounts of Athens' accomplishments with the glorious events themselves: Aristides at Plataea, the deposition of the "Thirty Tyrants," Phocion's expedition to Byzantium in 339 B.C. (*Mor.* 350B–C). Plutarch had a deep and genuine admiration for what Athens had achieved in the military and political spheres. In the *De exilio* (604D–E) he conflates two passages from Euripides (frs. 360. 7–10 and 981 Nauck), referring to the lines as the "Encomium on Athens."⁷ The quality praised by Euripides' character in the first passage is autochthony (. . . *λεὼς οὐκ ἐπακτὸς ἄλλοθεν, αὐτόχθονες δ' ἔφουμεν*) in contrast with other cities, whose populaces had had to be imported (*εἰσαγώγιμοι*). (A contrast between Athens and Rome in this respect may have been in the back of Plutarch's mind as he cited the lines; he contrasts the two cities elsewhere in his work.) The second Euripidean citation praises Athens' climate, *οὐρανὸν . . . εὖ κεκραμένον*, neither too hot nor too cold, with a variety of natural products (or perhaps imported foods). Several times, in fact, Plutarch remarks on certain natural and topographical features of the city. Athens and Syracuse are about the same size (*Nic.* 17. 2). The Academy (which Sulla ravaged) was the most wooded of Athens' suburbs (*Sulla* 12. 3), and during the siege by Sulla the Heptachalco (near the Peiraic gate⁸ and an area which was regularly left unguarded) proved to be the weak spot in the city's defenses, for it was through this that Sulla led his troops and took control of the city. During Sulla's invasion the Cerameicus "ran with blood" (*Mor.* 505B).

Athens and Rome

Given Plutarch's career, the comparison with Rome seems often very near the surface in his remarks about Athens, and occasionally it breaks out into the open. At the beginning of the *Life of Theseus* Plutarch explains why he has gone back to this subject after publishing his *Lycurgus* and *Numa*: "I decided [he writes] to make the founder of lovely and famous (*τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰδιμῶν*) Athens stand against the founder of invincible and glorious

⁷ This suggests (although it does not prove) that Plutarch found the lines already anthologized.

⁸ Cf. Judeich, *Topographie von Athen*, 2nd ed., 368 n. 8.

(τῆς ἀνικτήτου καὶ μεγαλοδόξου) Rome." In chapter two he comes back to his reasons for pairing Romulus and Theseus: "Of the most outstanding (τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων) cities, Romulus founded one and Theseus synoecized the other" (*Thes.* 2. 2). Plutarch is of course aware that Rome's comparability to Athens is of relatively recent date. "By the side of the great public works, the temples, and the stately edifices, with which Pericles adorned Athens, all Rome's attempts at splendor down to the times of the Caesars, taken together, are not worthy to be considered; nay, the one had a towering pre-eminence above the other, both in grandeur of design and grandeur of execution, which precludes comparison" (*Comp. Per. et Fab.* 3. 7, trans. B. Perrin). At *Cat. mai.* 23. 2-3 he observes that Cato was wrong when he said Rome would lose her empire when she became filled with Greek learning; "when Rome was at its greatest height," Plutarch remarks, "she naturalized (ἔσχεν οἰκείως) every form of Greek learning and culture." From Cato's perspective the contrast could work to Greece's disadvantage. Plutarch refutes the story that, while in Athens, Cato delivered a speech in Greek before the Athenian δῆμος in which he alleged that he admired the ἀρετή of the ancient Athenians and was pleased to be an admiring observer (θεατής) of the city's beauty and size. Plutarch finds this story difficult to accept in view of the acid comment made by Cato who, while in Athens, availed himself of the services of an interpreter; "... the Athenians were astonished at the speed and pungency (ὀξύτης) of his discourse. For what [Cato] himself set forth with brevity, the interpreter would repeat to them at great length and with many words; and on the whole [Cato] thought the words of the Greeks were born on their lips, but those of the Romans in their hearts" (*Cat. mai.* 12. 7, trans. B. Perrin). There is a similar criticism, this time by Plutarch himself, implied in the observation of the different relationships between Nicias and Marcus Crassus and their respective cities. The former held back when the Athenians were enflamed with martial ardor for the conquest of Sicily, whereas Crassus' φιλαρχία and φιλοτιμία coerced the Romans into undertaking war with the Parthians against their better judgement; "the Athenians sent an unwilling Nicias to war, but it was the Romans who were unwilling when Crassus led them out" (*Comp. Nic. et Crass.* 3. 8). One further explicit comparison made by Plutarch may be noted. In the *Fortuna Romanorum* he remarks that the μέγας δαίμων of Rome blew upon the city not just by sea (ἐνάλιος), as that of Athens did, but "from its first creation [it] grew in maturity, in might, and in polity together with the city, and remained constant to it on land and sea, in war and in peace, against foreigners, against Greeks" (*Mor.* 324B, trans. F. C. Babbitt). In other words, Rome's successes were far more varied and enduring than those of other powers, among them Athens, with which Rome might in principle be compared.

Dates

Since Plutarch has in mind an international audience, which he must have hoped would include literate Athenians, he frequently mentions equivalent Athenian dates. (He also had a special interest in dates and wrote a treatise *περὶ ἡμερῶν*⁹.) Hekatombaion is Boeotian Hippodromios (*Cam.* 19. 4). Syracusan Carneios is equivalent to Metageitnion (*Nic.* 28. 2; Plutarch dates the Syracusan festival Asinaria, created to celebrate Nicias' capture, on the 26th of that month; Metageitnion is also mentioned in passing at *Mor.* 601B). The second day of Boedromion is unlucky and regularly omitted from the Athenian calendar because of Poseidon's quarrel with Athena on that day (*Mor.* 489B; cf. *Quaest. conv.* IX. 6, 741 ff.). The battle of Plataea occurred on 4th Boedromion (*Arist.* 19. 8); he dates the battle of Gaugamela by an eclipse in Boedromion, "just about the beginning of the mysteries in Athens." The Athenians label one of their months from seeding-time, Pyanepsion (*Mor.* 378E). Roman January is equivalent to Poseideon (*Caes.* 37. 3). Athenian Lenaion (i.e., Gamelion) has no Boeotian homonym (fr. 71a). Athenian Anthesterion is equivalent to Boeotian Prostaterios (*Mor.* 655E) and Macedonian Daisios (*Arat.* 53. 5; Plutarch remarks that Aratus "freed the city [Sicyon] from tyranny" on the 5th, which is kept as a feast day).

Monuments

Naturally, Plutarch's residence at Athens allowed him time for sight-seeing, and many of her buildings and civic monuments (such as statues and other works of art) made a special impression on him. In a glowing passage in *Pericles* he describes the spiritual exhilaration he derives from contemplating these memorials to Athens' past greatness. Each of the buildings, he remarks, "possessed a beauty which seemed venerable the moment it was born, and at the same time a youthful vigor which makes them appear to this day—μέχρι νῦν—as if they were newly built. A bloom of eternal freshness hovers over these works of [Pericles] and preserves them from the touch of time, as if some unfading spirit of youth, some ageless vitality had been breathed into them" (*Per.* 13. 5, trans. Scott-Kilvert). Elsewhere, Plutarch links the Olympieion with Plato's *Critias* as "beautiful fragments."¹⁰ He is shocked by Demetrius Poliorcetes' misbehavior on the Acropolis (*Demet.* 24. 1 and *Comp. Demet. et Ant.* 4. 2), even though the goddess Athena herself had allegedly entertained Demetrius in the Opisthodomos of the Parthenon. Plutarch says it would "not be becoming to the city" to tell the sordid details.

⁹ Fr. 142, from *Cam.* 19.

¹⁰ *Sol.* 32. 2. The temple was completed by Hadrian in 131/2.

Various other buildings are mentioned as enduring to Plutarch's own time (μέχρι or ἔτι νῦν, καθ' ἡμᾶς). At Gargettus there was an ἀρατήριον or shrine which commemorated Theseus' cursing of his ungrateful countrymen (*Thes.* 35. 5). He mentions a μνημεῖον Ἰνδοῦ which marked the spot where an Indian grandee in Augustus' train lay down on his own funeral pyre (*Alex.* 69. 8). He notes the tomb of the ἑταίρα Pythionice, built for her by her husband Harpalus, which was still there to be seen in Hermus, on the road from Athens to Eleusis (*Phoc.* 22. 2; cf. *Paus.* 1. 37. 5). Plutarch describes Nicias' dedications which included a Palladion that had lost its gilding and a temple surmounted by his choregic tripod in the precinct of Dionysus (*Nic.* 3. 3). He alludes to Pheidias' statue of Athena with its attendant snake (*Mor.* 381D; Sulla let Athena's lamp go out for want of oil, *Sulla* 13. 3–4), the statue of Athena Hygieia dedicated by Pericles (*Per.* 13. 3), and the wooden statue of Athena Polias preserved to his own time (*fr.* 158. 5). He is not quite sure whether the altar of Peace which the Athenians showed him really was a commemoration of the "Peace of Callias," as they maintained (*Cim.* 13. 5). He says that he saw at Athens the pillars that were to be removed to Rome by Domitian, which were recut for the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (*Publ.* 9. 3). Everyone, he says, venerates the Theseion along with the Parthenon and Eleusinion, even though Theseus had to go into exile (*Mor.* 607A). He mentions the temple of Asclepius (*Mor.* 969E), and a temple or precinct known as the Iakcheion (*Arist.* 27. 4). He recounts how the statue of Dionysus in the Gigantomachy near the south wall of the Acropolis (dedicated by Attalos of Pergamum, according to *Paus.* 1. 25. 2) was dislodged by strong winds, along with colossal statues of Eumenes and Attalos himself, and blown down to the theater below (*Ant.* 60. 4). He explains the significance of the bronze tongueless lioness at the Acropolis gates (*Mor.* 505E–F).

Cults

Plutarch has an abiding interest in cults and religious observances (which is not surprising, in view of his own career). He notices the following Athenian festivals, ordered by Attic month as in Athens' "Festkalender" (Dübner): [Hekatombaion] Kronia (*Mor.* 477D), Panathenaia (*Thes.* 24. 3; *Demet.* 12. 3, peplos *Mor.* 477D – cf. *fr.* 212, where Theodoret credits Plutarch with the statement that the Panathenaia, Dionysia, Thesmophoria and Eleusinian mysteries were brought to Athens by Orpheus); [Boedromion] thanks for Plataea (*Mor.* 349E), Artemis Agrotera (*Mor.* 862B, also 862A procession to Agrae, 1099E Marathon feast ἄχρι νῦν), Boedromia (*Thes.* 27. 3), Greater Mysteries (*Phoc.* 6. 7, *Alex.* 31. 8, *Demet.* 26. 1, *Mor.* 604C; cf. *Lyc.* 30. 6 the Spartan Stratonikos' comment that "the Athenians should conduct mysteries and processions, since that's what they excel at"); [Metageitnion] Metageitnia (*Mor.* 601B); [Pyanepsion] Theseia (*Thes.* 4. 1, 36; Cychreus 10. 3; Theseus' appearance at Marathon

35. 8 with Paus. 1. 15. 4), Thesmophoria (*Dem.* 30. 5; *Mor.* 378E fast by women sitting on the ground on the second day, the Nesteia; cf. fr. 212), Oschophoria (*Thes.* 22); [Gamelion] Lenaia (fr. 71A) and Theogamia (fr. 165. 18 near conjunction of the sun and moon); [Anthesterion] Anthesteria (Pithoigia *Mor.* 655D–E, cf. 735D–E; Choes on the second day *Ant.* 70. 3), Lesser Mysteries, or Mysteries in Agrai (*Demet.* 26. 1), Diasia (*Mor.* 477D); [Elaphebolion] City Dionysia (*Demet.* 12 festival renamed “Demetria”; Menander *Mor.* 347E; cf. 604C, fr. 212); [Munichion] “Munichia” victory at Salamis (*Mor.* 349E ff.), Olympieia (*Phoc.* 37. 1 hippeis’ procession to Zeus); [Thargelion] Thargelia (*Demet.* 8. 5; Plato born during festival *Mor.* 717D), Plynteria (*Alc.* 34. 2); [not securely datable] Adonia (*Nic.* 13. 11, *Alc.* 18. 5 with Dover’s n. in *Comm. on Thuc.* vol. IV, p. 271).

Besides these official cults of Athens Plutarch alludes to other matters of a cultic nature. He notes the special sacrifice offered by the Aiantid tribe after Plataea (*Arist.* 19. 6). There are perpetual fires at Delphi and Athens—the latter the lamp before Athena’s statue in the Parthenon—which have to be relighted with mirrors whenever they are allowed to go out (as, for example, by Sulla) (*Num.* 9. 5). He describes three sacred ploughings, at Skiron, at Raria near Eleusis, and the Bouzygian one at the base of the Acropolis (*Mor.* 144B). At *Mor.* 291A (cf. fr. 157. 28) he reports that no ivy is allowed inside Hera’s temple at Athens, but it is used in the Dionysiac festivals of Agrionia (cf. 299F, 717A) and Nuktelia (cf. 364F). Zeus Meilichios is called by the Athenians Maimaktes (*Mor.* 458B). The festival of Metageitnia is celebrated by former residents of Melite who moved to Diomeia (*Mor.* 601B–C). A “Muse festival,” perhaps private to members of the Academy, is given as the setting of Book IX of the *Quaest. conv.* (*Mor.* 736C). The Athenians hold the seventh of every month sacred as being the day on which Apollo was born; they carry laurel branches and deck the basket with garlands and hymn the god on that day (fr. 103. 10 dubium). At *Demet.* 40. 8 Plutarch reports that Demetrius personally conducted the Pythian Games at Athens, saying that Apollo was the founder of the Athenian race.

Myths

Plutarch notices the following myths directly or indirectly concerned with Athens. Castor and Pollux are called “Anakes” there (*Numa* 13. 6). The story of the contest between Poseidon and Athena for possession of the territory was invented by the kings of Athens in order to turn the Athenians away from seafaring to tillage of the soil (*Them.* 19. 3: Themistocles had to counteract this; the story is alluded to also at *Mor.* 489B and 740F). It was Celeus of Eleusis who first established a diurnal σύνοδος called “Prytaneion” (*Mor.* 667D). There is a passing reference to Ion at *Mor.* 1125D.

Legal Institutions

Plutarch says he saw remains of Solon's ἄξονες preserved in the Prytaneion (*Sol.* 25. 1). He knows that the ephebes take their oath in the sanctuary of Agraulos (*Alc.* 15. 7). In several places he alludes to the procedure of ostracism and twice he describes it in detail (*Them.* 22. 5, *Arist.* 7. 5–6). He knows of the ancestral (πάτριον) custom of selecting archons and thesmothetai by lot (*Per.* 9. 4, *Demet.* 46. 2; cf. *Mor.* 340C). He alludes to the law forbidding χορηγοί (who were allotted from the tribes: *Alex.* 29. 2) to use foreign χορευταί, and Demades' flouting of it (*Phoc.* 30. 6). He mentions the law prohibiting the cutting out of a sacred olive (*Mor.* 703C). He makes passing reference to the Prytaneion and Thesmotheteion (*Mor.* 714B; *Sol.* 25. 1 for the Prytaneion), and to presidency of the Areopagus and membership in the Amphictyonic Council, for which he says even old men were eligible (*Mor.* 749B). He remarks that Demosthenes' fine could not simply be remitted, "for it was unconstitutional for the people to abolish a penalty by an act of grace" (*Dem.* 27. 8). He notes the importance in his time of the στρατηγία, which was held three times by his teacher Ammonios (*Mor.* 813D). He tells his readers that members of the Areopagus were forbidden to write poetry (*Mor.* 348B). Large numbers of spectators were enabled to attend the theater even in Plutarch's day through distribution of the θεωρικόν (*Mor.* 122D–E). The Athenians buried their war-dead in δημόσιαι ταφαί (*Mor.* 350C).

Athenian democracy comes in for special notice. He reports Solon's eulogy of the Athenian system of government, in which the people "hearken to one herald and one archon, law" (*Mor.* 152D). In his essay on the three forms of government (of which Plutarchan authorship has been questioned, in my opinion wrongly) he singles out Athens as an example of a nation that has reached the apogee of her power and dominion over others under an "autonomous and unmixed democracy" (*Mor.* 826F). On the other hand he disapproves of senseless chauvinism and finds laughable the attitude that "there is a better moon at Athens than at Corinth" (*Mor.* 601C, from *De exilio*); the various local officials such as archons, διοικηταί and πρυτάνεις have to be forgone in exile, or transcended in a "cosmic" world-view like that of Socrates (601A). He notes that Antony was made an Athenian citizen and that he held the office of gymnasiarch (*Ant.* 33. 7). He names Anytus son of Anthemion as the man who reputedly first bribed a jury (*Cor.* 14. 6).

Plutarch devotes one of the *Greek Questions* to a discussion of why the girls of Bottiaea shout, as they dance, "Let's go to Athens!" (*Mor.* 298F–299A; cf. *Thes.* 16. 3). In olden times, he remarks, the Athenians called their dead "Demetrians" (*Mor.* 943B). From of old Athenians were the natural enemies of wolves, because they were pastors and not farmers (*Sol.* 23. 4; cf. *Dem.* 23. 6). They were not originally natural seafarers (*Thes.* 17. 6). They have an ancestral custom of dividing their days into "good,"

"bad," and "intermediate" (fr. 101. 5), and regularly choose a day near the conjunction of the sun and moon for marriages (fr. 105. 18; cf. the doubtful fr. 1 from *Alexandrian Proverbs*). Their gymnasium is consecrated to Apollo (*Mor.* 724C). Bitches were debarred from the Acropolis because they copulated openly (*Comp. Demet. et Ant.* 4. 2; cf. 290B from *Aitia Romana*).

The Theater at Athens

Plutarch was present at the Great Dionysia in the winter of 96–97; he says he attended the victory celebration (ἐπινίκια) when his friend Serapion won the dithyrambic competitions for the tribe Leontis.¹¹ At *De exilio* 604C he comments (with a tone of some disapproval) that the exile is too busy to Διονυσίοις ἐν ἅσται [sc. Athens] πανηγυρίζειν. At 710F he quotes an anonymous Spartan's remark about the extravagant costs of mounting theater productions and the excessive competitiveness of the actors and poets: "it was senseless of the Athenians [the Spartan remarked acidly] to sport in such earnest." There is another, similar disparagement from an unnamed Spartan at *glor. Athen.* 348F: "the Athenians erred greatly in expending such zeal (σπουδήν) on mere play,¹² i.e., wasting on the theater money that could have supported major embassies and campaigns." There are dismissive remarks to a similar effect elsewhere in the *Moralia*. At *apoph. Lac.* 230B Nicander is reported to have said to an anonymous Athenian who charged him with being "too opposed to leisure," "you're right, we don't σπουδάζομεν about casual matters or waste our σπουδή."¹³ At 477D Plutarch heaps scorn on οἱ πολλοί who eagerly await the Kronia, Diasia and Panathenaia and pay money to laugh at mimes and dancers. He remarks that on Cyprus the kings act as χορηγοί, whereas at Athens they are allotted from the tribes (*Alex.* 29. 2). He alludes to an Athenian law forbidding foreigners to be χορευταί and Demades' showy flouting of it by bringing into the theater the 1000-dr. fine for each foreigner he employed.¹⁴ At *Phoc.* 19. 1–2 he describes an occasion on which a χορηγός refused to accede to an actor's request for an extravagant retinue which the actor considered appropriate for the role he was playing. Elsewhere, he makes remarks of a more general kind on the nature of acting and "impersonation." Although they are not necessarily to be connected to specific performances, they suggest that Plutarch was a fairly frequent visitor to the theater. At

¹¹ *Mor.* 628A; see n. 5 above.

¹² Compare the anecdote Plutarch reports of how Solon chided Thespis after a performance for "telling such lies before so many people." When Thespis tried to defend himself on grounds that this was just "play," Solon silenced him by remarking that there was a risk that this "play" would be carried over into serious political business (*Sol.* 29).

¹³ Compare the Athenian stranger's statement at Plato, *Laws* 803C–D: "serious matters deserve our serious attention, but trivialities do not" (trans. T. J. Saunders).

¹⁴ *Phoc.* 30. 6; cf. p. 239 above.

Dem. 22. 5 he comments on actors who play kings or tyrants: "these men do not weep or laugh as their feelings dictate, but as the subject of the drama demands" (trans. Scott-Kilvert). In the *glor. Athen.* he makes a passing reference to actors "exhibiting the deeds of generals and kings, and merging themselves with their characters as tradition records them" (*Mor.* 345E, trans. F. C. Babbitt; in section 5 he expresses the view that tragedians like Sophocles did not do as much for Athens as the city's great generals).

Criticism of Athenian Democracy

Plutarch saw some dangers inherent in the Athenian system, particularly the evils of demagogy. His clever formulation of the changeable and impressionable nature of the Athenian δῆμος has already been cited.¹⁵ They were likely to be swept along and to overrule the more measured advice of a cautious general like Nicias (*Comp. Nic. et Crass.* 3). Nicias knew how ferocious the Athenian people could be to an unsuccessful commander, for Plutarch reports him as saying, after his defeat in Sicily, that he would rather risk death at the hands of his enemies than have to face his fellow-citizens (*Nic.* 22. 2–3; cf. *Thuc.* 7. 48. 4). Their willingness to follow—even blindly—a forceful leader like Themistocles is implied by the story of Themistocles' remark to his son who, Themistocles said, held greatest power over the Greeks: the Athenians gave orders to the Greeks, Themistocles gave orders to the Athenians, Themistocles' wife gave orders to him, and the boy gave orders to his mother (*Them.* 18. 7, *Cat. mai.* 8. 5, the doubtful *Mor.* 67C). Plutarch cites Solon's quip that he gave the Athenians not the best laws, but "the best that they would accept" (*Sol.* 15. 1–2). The following story may be unhistorical, but it is useful for pointing the moral which Plutarch wishes to draw. Aristides sought re-election to some magistracy, but his motive was to demonstrate to the Athenians how gullible they could be. He was purposely lax in not making some public officials give an accounting of their tenure of office. He then went before the people with the public rebuke: "it brings a man more reputation in your eyes if he gratifies criminals than if he protects public property" (*Arist.* 4; a similar remark attributed to Lycurgus at *Mor.* 541F and cf. 842A–B). Another story to illustrate how easily the wool could be pulled over the eyes of the Athenian δῆμος is told in the *Life of Alcibiades*. Pericles had been worrying about "handing in his accounts" after holding an office (by implication, the ἐπιμέλεια of the Parthenos-statue), and Alcibiades advised him to seek a way instead of not having to give an accounting to the people (*Alc.* 7. 3).

The Athenian *Lives* contain a fairly large number of anecdotes whose point is the fickleness and basic lack of common sense of the Athenian

¹⁵ *Mor.* 799C; see above p. 233.

electorate. For example, Phocion is reported to have rebuked the tiro orator Pytheas for pandering to the people and thus playing their νεώνητος, "new slave" (*Phoc.* 21. 1). Phocion was noted for his simplicity of life and a kind of showy abstemiousness that annoyed the Athenians; it was, Plutarch remarks, as if they considered him a living reprimand to their own extravagant customs, like expensive victory banquets (*Phoc.* 20. 5). Demosthenes castigated the Athenians with the remark, "I will be your adviser if you don't want it, but not your sycophant even if you do" (*Dem.* 14. 4). When in exile Demosthenes asked the goddess Athena with some bitterness how she could take delight in the "three harshest beasts—the owl, the serpent and the Athenian δῆμος" (*Dem.* 26. 6). The Athenians of the classical period arrogantly thought themselves invincible; they couldn't believe the report that their fleet had been destroyed in Sicily (*Nic.* 30. 1 = *Mor.* 509A). At *Mor.* 20C he quotes Melanthius' dictum that the Athenian state was saved by the constant quarrelling of its rhetors. Luckily, they didn't all crowd to the same side of the boat, so someone was always preventing a capsizing by drawing in the opposite direction.

Athens and Her Conquerors

Alexander said he would show the Athenians that he was a great man, not a παῖς or μειράκιον, as Demosthenes had called him (*Alex.* 11. 6), but he absolved Athens of all blame, saying she would have to rule Greece if anything happened to him (*Alex.* 12. 2 = *Phoc.* 17. 8). After the victory at the Granicus he sent three hundred shields to Athens (*Alex.* 16. 17), and at the Hydaspes he cried, "Athenians! Can you believe what danger I am undergoing to win glory in your eyes?" (*Alex.* 60. 6). When Athens sent envoys to Sulla to sue for peace they used various examples from ancient Athenian history, Theseus, Eumolpus and Athens' services in the Persian Wars; Sulla retorted that the Romans sent him not to be taught history (φιλομαθήσων) but to subdue the rebels (*Sul.* 13. 4). Pompey gave Athens fifty talents and was specially munificent to her philosophers (*Pomp.* 42. 5). Antony was dubbed "philathenaios" (*Ant.* 23. 2) and, as was noted above, held the office of gymnasiarch; the Athenians were especially fond of his wife Octavia.

Athens and Sparta

When Alcibiades was in the western Peloponnese urging that Patras build long walls to the sea, a native of the place remarked that it appeared they were to be swallowed up by the Athenians; Alcibiades replied, "Yes, but it will be little by little and starting at the feet, whereas the Spartans will swallow you whole and at one gulp" (*Alc.* 15. 6). Erasistratus son of Phaiax commented that the Spartans were better in public, the Athenians in private life (*Ages.* 15. 5). An Athenian was boasting to Antalcidas that his

countrymen had often driven the Spartans from the river Cephisus; Antalcidas remarked wryly that the Spartans had never driven the Athenians from the Eurotas (*Ages.* 31. 5 = *Mor.* 810F). Pleistoanax son of Pausanias said, in retort to a charge that the Spartans were ἀμαθεῖς, "we are the only Greeks who have learnt no evil from you Athenians" (*Lyc.* 20. 4).

*

Plutarch's admiration for Athens and appreciation of her achievements, which it has been my purpose to document, was not entirely unmitigated. He was sensitive to the snooty superiority shown by the Athenians to his fellow-countrymen and he seems pained to have to report that the Athenians "used to call us Boeotians 'thick and insensitive and stupid'" (*Mor.* 995E). Athenian citizenship might be a much-sought-for prize, and one awarded only rarely in the earlier period of her history, but some, at any rate, could keep it in perspective. Plutarch shows a certain delight in telling how the Stoic philosophers Zeno and Cleanthes refused the award, explaining that they might seem to be injuring their own cities were they to become Athenians (*Mor.* 1034A), and Panaetius of Rhodes refused a similar grant with the remark that "one city was enough for a sensible man" (fr. 86. 11).¹⁶

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¹⁶ I am grateful to members of the audience at the Athens Conference, especially Mrs. Judith Binder, for encouraging comments.

Nepos and Plutarch: From Latin to Greek Political Biography¹

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It is now almost a hundred years since the publication of Soltau's article on Nepos and Plutarch²—the only study, as far as I am aware, that deals exclusively with the two biographers. It will come as no surprise that Soltau's paper was devoted solely to Plutarchean *Quellenforschung*, written, as it was, in the heyday of that genre. (As a matter of fact it was well above par for the course). The present study aims at putting the relationship between the two writers in a broader context. While there is no need to discuss again³ those Plutarchean biographies where Nepos was used as a source it may well be worth the while to try and reconstruct the circumstances in which Plutarch came to rely on Nepos as well as the extent of that reliance; a better understanding of Plutarch's dependence on Nepos will help us to assess the extent of his innovation and achievement.

I

The assassination of Domitian on September 18th, 96 not only started a new era in the political history of the Roman world, an era "during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous,"⁴ but also was the commencement of a new period in the literature of the Empire, *ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet* (Tac. *H.* 1. 1). Tacitus was not alone: at the same time that he turned to denouncing the tyranny and to exalting the newly found *rara temporum felicitas* in the Life of his father-in-law Agricola, his Greek contemporary Plutarch engaged in his first work of historical relevance, the Lives of the Roman Emperors from Augustus to

¹ I wish to thank Dr. Deborah Levine Gera for her advice and criticism of this paper. Needless to say, the remaining faults are my own.

² W. Soltau, "Nepos und Plutarchos," *Jbb. cl. Phil.* 153 (1896) 123–31.

³ I have dealt with the issue in a different context in "Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*: The Choice of Heroes," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 95–99.

⁴ Gibbon, *Decline and Fall* ch. 3 (I. 70 Modern Libr. ed.).

Vitellius.⁵ In this choice Plutarch displayed both his preoccupation with biography, the chief source of his later fame, and his interest in Roman history.⁶ In fact the remarkable parallel between Plutarch and Tacitus goes beyond the coincidence that both started to work on historical material during the short reign of Nerva. Tacitus, after his first major work treating the Year of the Four Emperors and the Flavian dynasty, decided to cover the earlier part of the Principate in the *Annales*; in the event, while composing that masterpiece he may have felt compunction for not starting earlier than the accession of Tiberius.⁷ That Plutarch's acquaintance with Roman history was superficial and commonplace I have endeavoured to show in an analysis of his references to figures from Republican history in the *Moralia*.⁸ Thus it is not possible to know what gave him the impetus to write biographies of Republican personages: but it must have occurred if not during, at least very briefly after his work on the Emperors. Moreover, even in the series of the Parallel Lives the composition of biographies of persons from the remote past came at a late stage (*Thes.* 1):⁹ it is clear that Plutarch's historical interests were only gradually awakened.¹⁰

One should not exaggerate Plutarch's achievement in the series of Imperial biographies: on the one hand these Lives hardly merit their description as biographies¹¹ and on the other hand Plutarch was acquainted with histories of countries that took the form of biographical series.¹² Moreover, Plutarch may have had some prior experience with biographical writing. The single Lives composed perhaps early in Plutarch's life and known to us by title or a few fragments only were apparently not political biographies, though he may have toyed with the idea of the Parallel Lives or a related concept for some time.¹³

⁵ J. Geiger, "Zum Bild Julius Caesars in der römischen Kaiserzeit," *Historia* 24 (1975) 444 ff.; R. Syme, "Biographers of the Caesars," *MH* 37 (1980) 104 ff. = *RP* III 1251 ff.

⁶ On this see the valuable contribution of R. Flacelière, "Rome et ses Empereurs vus par Plutarque," *AC* 32 (1963) 28 ff.

⁷ *Ann.* 3. 24. 3; in the magisterial words of his most eminent commentator: "Before Tacitus had gone very far with the *Annales* he became conscious of his predicament—if not his mistake" (R. Syme, *Tacitus* [Oxford 1958] 370).

⁸ *Hermes* 109 (1981) 98 f.

⁹ Plutarch's relatively late interest in the figures of Hellenistic history (cf. *Hermes* 109 [1981] 88 ff.) provides another instance that demonstrates his progressing from better-known periods to relatively grey areas.

¹⁰ He could be influenced by such factors as the success of the series or his pleasure in it: see *Aem. Paul.* 1.

¹¹ Cf. Syme, *MH* 37 (1980) 104 = *RP* III 1251.

¹² For such series see Geiger, *Hermes* 109 (1981) 86 n. 5; for Plutarch's acquaintance with at least one such series see *Pomp.* 49 = *FGrH* 88 F 9 and Jacoby II C p. 221 on the nature of Timagenes' work.

¹³ We have no clues to the dates of the single Lives, but perhaps those at least that seem to reflect Plutarch's local interests may have been written at an early date. Possibly the *Scipio Africanus* was also undertaken shortly before the *Parallel Lives*: cf. Geiger, *Hermes* 109 (1981) 87.

The dawn of the new era was perhaps not quite as glorious and quite as immediately felt in distant Chaeronea as at the seat of the tyrant, still it must have been perceptible enough if it was to occasion now, at a relatively advanced age, the composition of the first major work of historical interest of our author. It is not my aim here to resume the controversy surrounding Plutarch's sources in the two extant Lives of Galba and Otho¹⁴ and even less so to speculate about the presumably non-extant sources of the non-extant Lives; yet certain conclusions as to the availability of material and Plutarch's manner and rate of work present themselves from our dating of the biographical series. It was perhaps completed by the end of the short reign of Nerva, but even so it must have been almost immediately afterwards that he started work on the great project of the Parallel Lives.

It has been suggested¹⁵ that the dedication to Sosius Senecio coincided with the latter's consulate in 99, leaving very short time indeed to plan and start work on the series. Whatever it was that gave Plutarch his first impetus towards a composition on such a grand scale we may assume that he must have formed a general idea and a plan of the work before he started its execution.

In all probability such a general plan would have included at least three ingredients: it must have been based on the cardinal idea of the Parallel Lives, viz. the juxtaposition of Greek and Roman statesmen and generals; it must have contained at least a preliminary list of the heroes whose lives were to be the subjects of the biographies; and it must have surmised a certain literary format of the biographies.

No doubt the synkrisis of individual Greek and Roman statesmen and generals on a more or less equal footing is the most impressive single feature of the series. These comparisons supply much of the characteristic flavour of the work and are certainly one of the important reasons for their great literary success.¹⁶ Of course Plutarch employed this literary technique also often in the *Moralia*,¹⁷ yet it never became, either in the other writings of Plutarch or in those of any other author of Antiquity, such a predominant literary feature as in the Parallel Lives. The question as to Plutarch's goals in these comparisons has been debated with some vigour;¹⁸ it seems to me that for our present purpose this question should be subordinated to the one concerning the process by which Plutarch arrived at his plan. In other

¹⁴ See B. Scardigli, *Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs. Ein Forschungsbericht* (München 1979) 152 ff. and eadem, "Scritti recenti sulle Vite di Plutarco," *Miscellanea Plutarchea (Quaderni del Giornale Filologico Ferrarese* 8 [Ferrara 1986]) 48 f., 53 f.

¹⁵ C. P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," *JRS* 56 (1966) 70.

¹⁶ For the latest contribution on this subject see C.B.R. Pelling, "Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives," *Miscellanea Plutarchea (Quaderni del Giornale Filologico Ferrarese* 8 [Ferrara 1986]) 84 ff.

¹⁷ J. Barthelmeß, "Recent Work on the *Moralia*," *ibid.* 61, has recently reminded us all of the basic unity of the *Lives* and the *Moralia*.

¹⁸ C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 103 ff.; cf. J. Geiger, *SCI* 1 (1974) 142 f.

words, I do not believe that Plutarch first defined his goals, whether literary, moralistic or political, and then sought the ways and means to execute them, but rather that only after the idea of the comparisons had occurred to him did he guide it in the direction most appropriate to his outlook. Now it has been suggested¹⁹ that Plutarch may have derived his idea from Nepos' juxtaposition of series of Greek (later Foreign) and Roman generals, a feature that must have been present also in the other books of the *De viris illustribus*.²⁰ Though this contention cannot be proven it is greatly enhanced by the facts that Nepos is the only writer who is known to have based a long series of Lives on synkrisis and that Plutarch must have become acquainted with Nepos' writings at a relatively early date.

It has been shown²¹ that North Italians predominated among Plutarch's Roman friends. Yet the link with Nepos was perhaps provided by a man whose own acquaintance with Plutarch is not directly attested. Four of Plutarch's friends were also friends of Pliny the Younger: Arulenus Rusticus and Avidius Quietus, remnants of the circle of Thrasea Paetus, who may have provided him with the latter's biography of Cato the Younger; C. Minicius Fundanus, a close friend of Pliny, is the principal speaker in the *De cohibenda ira*; and, lastly and most importantly Sosius Senecio, the addressee of the Parallel Lives as well as of the *Quaestiones convivales* and the *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* was a friend of Pliny. Thus the circumstantial evidence for Pliny's acquaintance with Plutarch seems to be complete.²² On the other hand Pliny mentions Nepos only once (*Ep.* 5. 3. 6), in a fleeting reference to those Romans who composed light poetry. Interestingly enough Nepos' poetical efforts are nowhere else mentioned in our extant sources—may one surmise that Pliny's reference reveals an intimate acquaintance with otherwise unknown details of the work of his North Italian compatriot? The massive use made of Nepos by the Elder Pliny and the interest of the latter's nephew in the work of his uncle would certainly support such a hypothesis.

Pliny or any other of Plutarch's North Italian friends may have suggested to Plutarch to read Nepos. Be this as it may, Plutarch's acquaintance with the work of Nepos is a fact. The references²³ leave no place for doubt of the use made by the Greek biographer of his Latin

¹⁹ L. E. Lord, "The Biographical Interests of Plutarch," *CJ* 22 (1926-27) 499; cf. A. J. Gossage, Plutarch in: *Latin Biography*, ed. T. A. Dorey, (London 1967) 75, n. 48.

²⁰ On Nepos' work see J. Geiger, *Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography* (Historia Einzelschriften 47 [Stuttgart 1985]) 84 ff.

²¹ Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 48 ff., esp. 58, provides all the essential references for what follows.

²² Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* 61 suggests that Pliny may have omitted Plutarch from his correspondence because the Greek was not well-connected enough. But it is more simple to assume that the omission is due to Plutarch not having visited Rome for some years before the start of Pliny's correspondence.

²³ *Marc.* 30; *comp. Pel. Marc.* 1 = *Marc.* 31; *Luc.* 43; *TiGr.* 21.

forerunner. It is not too far-fetched to assume that the acquaintance antedates, at least briefly, the inception of the work on the *Parallel Lives*. However, there still remains the difficulty that the structure of the *Parallel Lives*, viz. the comparison of individual statesmen and generals, is basically different from the comparison of groups as practised by Nepos. I shall return to this issue presently, but first I should like to say a few words on Plutarch's choice of heroes.

It has been mentioned above that Plutarch's knowledge of Roman history and acquaintance with its heroes, as mirrored in the *Moralia*, was restricted to commonplaces and the minimum of conventional education. However, even though we know (*Aem. Paul.* 1) that Plutarch did expand the series as it progressed he must have had some initial plan, a tentative list of heroes whose lives he intended to describe. I have suggested, and wish now to reaffirm the suggestion, that such a tentative list of Roman heroes was derived from Nepos' *De viris illustribus*, who thus served as Plutarch's first guide to Roman biography.²⁴

Up to this point I have been reiterating and to some extent confirming and expanding the connexions between Plutarch and Nepos as suggested by other scholars and by myself. Indeed the influence of Nepos on Plutarch is not to be underestimated. On the other hand if our emphasis has resulted in making light of the originality of Plutarch it is time now to redress the balance.

As I have stated, the general idea of the *Parallel Lives* may have been influenced by Nepos, and the list of Roman heroes to be treated may also have been derived from Nepos. However, besides the basic idea of comparisons and a general outline of the contents, a third ingredient, at least, is to be assumed in Plutarch's blueprint, viz. the literary format of the individual Lives—or rather books containing a pair each—and of the series as a whole. It is here that Plutarch's dependence on Nepos ends and his genius comes to full fruition. It must have been at a very early stage that Plutarch decided on the scale of his biographies, and it is this scale where the most obvious difference between him and Nepos can be seen.

Dare we guess that comparison of pairs of Lives rather than of whole series was a consequence of the size of Plutarch's biographies? Certainly a comparison such as Nepos' would not have been practicable after a number of book-length pairs such as Plutarch's. Size and literary format are

²⁴ I cannot discuss here the problem of the sources of the anonymous *De viris illustribus* found in the Aurelian corpus (see P. L. Schmidt in *RE Suppl.* 15. 1641 ff., disregarding his contention that what is known as Nepos is in fact Hyginus: J. Geiger, "Cornelius Nepos and the Authorship of the Book on Foreign Generals," *LCM* 7 (1982) 134 ff.; on the *elogia* of the forum of Augustus see M. M. Sage, "The Elogia of the Augustan Forum and the *De viris illustribus*," *Historia* 28 (1979). Unfortunately Sage in this and two other papers devoted to the *De viris illustribus* refuses to reexamine the question of the sources). If Nepos was a source the similarities between the lists of Plutarch and the *De viris illustribus* may be regarded as circumstantial evidence in favour of our hypothesis.

inseparably connected. Plutarch must have sensed at an early stage that the strait-jacket of short Lives, more or less on the scale of those of Nepos, would hardly provide the opportunity to develop characters such as envisaged by him. That literary works, not unlike living organisms, attained to the peak of their development only at an optimal size was a doctrine already established by Aristotle (*Poetics* 1450b35–1451a15). Indeed it is too often that modern commentators ignore or pay too little attention to this important aspect of literary genre.

There must be a certain correlation between the theme an author undertakes to treat and the literary genre employed by him. Plutarch's biographies seem to owe at least part of their success to their size—not only in relation to Nepos, but also to some of their modern mammothian counterparts. The insistence of modern literary criticism on the significant differences in genre between novel, short story, "short short story" etc. emphasizes, rather than otherwise, the importance of length for the various genres: taking the various lengths as a datum they seem suited to the expression of basically different literary forms.²⁵

II

There is no need to stress Plutarch's achievement as an author nor to emphasize again that his biographies should not be used as quarries that only provide stones to erect the edifices of Greek and Roman history. Nevertheless literary analyses of Plutarchean Lives are still few and far between. I shall devote the second part of this paper to a literary analysis, or, rather, the analysis of two important literary aspects of one of the most successful Lives, the *Cato minor*, with a view to demonstrate Plutarch's achievement and to show how this achievement was bound up with shaking off the fetters of the short, Nepos-sized, biographies.

Leo²⁶ established that at the outset of a Life, before the narration of the πράξεις of the hero proper, Plutarch assembles certain sets of information

²⁵ See e.g. R. J. Kilchenmann, *Die Kurzgeschichte. Form und Entwicklung*⁵ (Stuttgart etc. 1978); B. von Wiese, *Novelle*³ (Stuttgart 1967); V. Shaw, *The Short Story. A Critical Introduction* (London and New York 1983). It is perhaps not too fanciful to admit the analogy from biology. Apparently Aristotle's postulates have been vindicated by modern biology: though there is a certain correlation between the size of an animal and the size of its brain, so that larger mammals need larger brains simply to fulfil the same functions as small mammals, we may predicate the intelligence of a certain species by its deviation from the quotient postulated for it between body-size and brain. Man is more intelligent than other animals not because the size of its brain—elephants and whales have larger ones—but because it has the largest positive deviation from the expected brain-size for an animal of its dimensions: S. J. Gould, *Ever Since Darwin. Reflections in Natural History* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1986) 181 ff. Similarly, other characteristics are achieved at greatest effect at a certain body size.

²⁶ F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form* (Leipzig 1901) 180 ff.

divided into categories.²⁷ These categories include, in the present case, Cato's γένος, ἦθος, παιδεία, δίαίτα and λόγος. Yet after the analysis of these characteristics one realizes immediately that a large section of the first part of the Life, chs. 2–3, is left out of this analysis. Though Leo refers to this section briefly in saying that sometimes, as in the case of both Catos and of Alcibiades, characteristic anecdotes are told beforehand, the significance of these chapters goes far beyond that and is crucial to the structure of the whole Life. The two chapters are, on their face value, the narration of a number of anecdotes from the childhood of Cato. Yet these episodes are not merely "characteristic anecdotes told beforehand" but suggestive in their features of the central issues of the whole Life. There is no need here to repeat that Plutarch regarded characteristic deeds, even if of small significance in themselves, as the best way to expound the character of his heroes.²⁸ It is clear that these anecdotes are inserted in their place not only because they belong to Cato's childhood, but also because they reveal much about his ἦθος, which was ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐν πᾶσιν (1. 3). His steadfast character was bound to react over and over again in the same way in the same circumstances and have the same reactions; hence these childhood anecdotes are not merely characteristic stories about our hero, but become foreshadowings, subtle prefigurations of other, more important incidents in his life. Thus the themes of these episodes assume the force of leitmotifs, and in ever-recurring incidents of a familiar shape we are reminded of the main traits of the character of our hero.

In the first of the childhood anecdotes we are told (2. 1–5) how Poppaedi Silo, the Italian leader, when at Livius Drusus' home in Rome during the agitation of the Allies for citizenship, asked Cato, then four years old, to exert his influence with his uncle on behalf of the claims of the Italians. When the boy silently refused, Silo turned to menaces and threatened to throw him out of the window. After all this was of no avail he let him go and expressed to his friends his admiration for Cato's character.

This steadfastness of character and absence of fear of physical harm were time and again put to trial in later life, when the violent clashes of the Late Republic often converted the forum into a battle-field. Plutarch emphasises the courage of Cato, last to retreat even against the most formidably superior enemy: thus he defies Metellus Nepos and his gangs and bravely fights back until victory (27. 4–28. 5). He is last to retreat when Caesar's men maltreat Bibulus and his followers and drive them away from the forum (32. 4). When he offered single-handed resistance to Caesar's Campanian

²⁷ For the following cf. my dissertation *A Commentary on Plutarch's Cato minor* (Oxford 1971) and the Introduction to the forthcoming bilingual Italian edition and translation of the Life (Rizzoli, Milano).

²⁸ One of the most important utterances to this effect is contained in the *Cato minor* itself (24. 1).

Law he did not stop arguing and persuading even when led away to prison (33. 2). Cato is the last to retreat before the partisans of Pompey when they use force to stop Domitius from presenting himself as a candidate for the consular elections (41. 6-8). Lastly, Cato resists force used against him in his various attempts to stop the passing of the *lex Trebonia* (43. 2-7).

In the second of the childhood anecdotes (2. 6-8) young Cato, while taking part in the games at a birthday-party, is asked for help by a boy imprisoned in a chamber by an elder boy; Cato frees him and then, angrily departing, is escorted home by the other boys. The purpose of the anecdote is to show Cato's inherent sense of justice and righteousness, brought out again and again in the Life.

Among the many acts of justice related by Plutarch it will suffice to mention Cato's handling of the Treasury (17. 2-4), the story about the absolute trust in his uprightness even by his adversaries (21. 5-6), his choice as umpire to ensure the fairness of elections (44. 7-14 with a short digression on the virtue of δικαιοσύνη); his support for Favonius against foul play at elections (46. 2-3), and his saving the Uticans from mass-murder (58. 1). Small wonder that Cato becomes a by-name for uprightness (19. 7) and his membership on a jury is considered sufficient to ensure a fair and just trial (48. 9-10). His being escorted home by his playmates is often repeated in later life by his supporters: on the last day of his quaestorship he is escorted home by almost all the citizens, who approve of his conduct (18. 5); the senators accompany him when he is led away by Caesar to prison (33. 3); upon his return from Cyprus he is met by all the magistrates, priests, senate and a large part of the people (39. 1); when defeated at the praetorian elections he is escorted home by more people than all the successful candidates together (42. 7); and when arrested by Trebonius he is followed on the way by such a crowd that the tribune prefers to let him go (43. 6).

Two of the anecdotes told by Plutarch are dated to Sulla's dictatorship. When the aristocratic youth were performing the "Troia" under Sulla's regime the participants insisted on substituting Cato for their appointed leader (3. 1-2). Subsequently Plutarch is at pains to make Cato appear as a popular favourite, always deemed worthy of leadership, though of course his failure to obtain the highest offices of state could easily be suggestive of the contrary, as Plutarch himself must have been aware.²⁹ Cato receives from his soldiers while a military tribune δόξα καὶ χάρις καὶ ὑπερβάλλουσα τιμὴ καὶ φιλοφροσύνη (9. 8); there is a graphic description of the emotional scenes when he leaves them (12. 1). He is invited to stand for the tribuneship (20. 1); in the praetorian elections he would have headed the poll but for Pompey's machinations (42. 4); only Cato, of all the commanders, is able to arouse the soldiers before Dyrrhachium (54. 7-9); in Africa he

²⁹ Cf. *Phocion* 3. 1.

yields the command to Metellus Scipio, his superior in rank, although he is the popular favourite (57. 6); he is appointed commandant of Utica upon request of the inhabitants as well as of Scipio (58. 2); the council in Utica prefer to die with him than to escape by betraying his virtue (60. 2); the horsemen who escaped from Thapsus said that they did not need Juba to pay them and would not be afraid of Caesar if Cato were to lead them (63. 3); and his esteem in the eyes of the Uticans is shown by the lamentations and the honours they bestow on him after his death (71). His escort on many occasions is another series of examples of the favour he commanded.

Perhaps the most interesting and certainly the most important among the anecdotes of Cato's youth is the one where he, then fourteen years old, asks his tutor Sarpedon for a sword to slay Sulla and free the State from slavery (3. 3-7). *Libertas* and Cato's determination to fight for it is the leitmotif that goes through the whole of the Life, gaining strength as the fight for the survival of the Republic becomes more and more desperate, until Cato's self-immolation on the altar of *Libertas* ends his story in an all-powerful crescendo. Cato, who as a youth wanted to slay the tyrant Sulla, prefers to die rather than to receive mercy from the hands of the victorious tyrant Caesar. Characteristically, Cato already envisages the possibility of death in the fight for *Libertas* when Metellus Nepos returns to Rome to stand for the tribunate in 63 (20. 5); henceforth ἐλευθερία is the watchword that permeates all the political controversies in which Cato takes part; every struggle and fight of Cato from now on is a fight for Roman *Libertas*; Cato dies when there is no hope for *Libertas*, and there is no hope for *Libertas* when Cato dies. Even the epilogue carries on the story of *Libertas*, telling how Cato's son falls at Philippi in the cause of Freedom (73. 5) and his daughter commits suicide after the death of her husband Brutus the Liberator (73. 6).

The last episode in the series tells us about the brotherly love of Cato and Caepio and Caepio's admiration for his half-brother's σωφροσύνη and μετρίότης (3. 8-10). The story is to some extent out of the line with the preceding ones since its concern is with the δῖαιτα, the private conduct of the hero and not his public image and behaviour. Nevertheless the one is as much part of the biography as the other, and the episode told here is as characteristic of Cato's δῖαιτα in later life as were the foregoing anecdotes of his public life. Love for his brother, we are told, made him join the army in the war against Spartacus (8. 1), and his conduct at the untimely death of Caepio (11) is sufficient proof of this trait of his character. Indeed his reliance on family and marriage ties (with Silanus 21. 3; Lucullus 29. 6; Domitius 41. 3) may reveal something of the same feature. Last but not least Caepio's praise for Cato's σωφροσύνη and μετρίότης should be noted; here we should mention, besides the characteristics that Plutarch assembles under the category of δῖαιτα (5. 6-6. 7), his first campaign (with brother Caepio!) where his εὐταξία and ἀνδρία, reminiscent of his glorious

ancestor, are mentioned among the virtues as opposed to the μαλακία and τρυφή of his fellow soldiers (8. 2; cf. 3. 10); there is great emphasis on his modesty as military tribune (9. 4) and on his Asian journey (12. 3-4); the modest prizes he gives to the victors at the games (46. 4-5) and, of course, his conduct when leading his troops through the hardships of the African desert (56. 6-7).

So it happens that at the outset of the narration of Cato's career we have not only sufficient knowledge of his background, ἡθος, παιδεία, δίαίτια etc., but the events of the life themselves, the πράξεις of his career, from the beginning to the glorious end, present themselves to us with an ease that makes any explanations and interruptions in the flow of the narrative superfluous. Clearly such a highly sophisticated narrative technique, showing off Plutarch's artistry to its best advantage, could only be possible in a biography of a certain size, where recurrent leitmotifs had ample space for development.

I wish to conclude with a few remarks on Plutarch's technique of synkrisis in the *Cato minor*, the more so since it has been recently suggested³⁰ that it is of no importance in that Life. It will become evident that such a technique could have been developed by Plutarch only in biographies of the size contained in the Parallel Lives and must have been basically different from whatever comparisons were included in 'Nepos' works.

The *Phocion-Cato minor* is, together with the *Alexander-Caesar*, the *Themistocles-Camillus* and the *Pyrrhus-Marius*, one of the few pairs in the Parallel Lives that lack a formal synkrisis. Indeed the formal comparisons at the end of the books serve too often to point out the differences rather than the similarities between the two heroes. In our case it is again a technique of recurring motifs that binds the two Lives in this pair together—they are not compared κατὰ κοινὰς ὁμοιότητας but simply as good men devoted to the state (*Phoc.* 3. 6). The reason for linking them is their outstanding virtue:

"But the virtues of these men, even down to their ultimate and minute differences, show that their natures had the one and the same stamp, shape and general colour; they were an equal blend, so to speak, of severity and kindness, of caution and braveness, of solicitude for others and fearlessness for themselves, of the careful avoidance of baseness and, in like degree, the eager pursuit of justice."

It is important to remember that this outline is the most extensive direct characterization of the two heroes: in the Lives proper the

³⁰ Pelling, *op.cit.* [note 16], 83 f.; for earlier discussions see A. Stiefenhofer, "Zur Echtheitsfrage der biographischen Synkrisis Plutarchs," *Philologus* 73 (1914-16) 474 and especially H. Erbse, "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 404.

delineation of character is done by the usual means of the πράξεις of the men. Thus it is left to the reader³¹ to follow up and judge for himself to what extent Phocion and Cato conform in their actions to Plutarch's sketch.

The mixture of αὐστηρόν and φιλάνθρωπον in Phocion is apparent from the contradiction between his ἦθος and his countenance (5. 1); the Athenian people, when in need of a commander, would call upon one who was αὐστηρότατος and φρονιμώτατος (8. 3). Phocion, though harsh and stern, earns the surname of χρηστός (10. 4), and in the following section Plutarch discusses at length this mixture of austerity and kindness.

In Cato too austerity seemingly overcame kindness: hence the saying of Curio (14. 7–8). Cato seemed to be a by-word for austerity (19. 9), yet it is suggested that this austerity was outward, deemed suited for public business, while in private he behaved εὐνοϊκῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως (21. 10). Cato's legislation to provide cheap food for the populace is an act of φιλανθρωπία and μετριότης (29. 4); Cato's speech to the Uticans displays his ἀδεές, γενναῖον and φιλάνθρωπον (60. 1).

The combination of ἀσφαλές and ἀνδρεῖον is more easily apparent in Phocion, whose public career was in the first place that of a military leader. Phocion attached himself to the general Chabrias, whose boldness was not counterbalanced by caution, as was the case with Phocion (6. 1 ff.); on the whole, his entire art of war demonstrated the admirable balance of the two qualities, as can be seen e.g. from the battles chs. 13; 25. Cato on the other hand never had real opportunity to display his qualities as a general (and only for the general is caution becoming), yet on the occasion of his service in the slave-war his courage was among the qualities that were admired (8. 2).

The next shared quality of Phocion and Cato, their care for others mingled with fearlessness for their own person, is again and again demonstrated in their Lives: e.g. Phocion, always fearless for his own person, is worried about the resources of the city (23. 3), does everything possible to save his fellow-citizens (23. 1; cf 31. 2), and his chief concern when facing trial is not for himself, but for his fellow defendants (34. 8). Examples of Cato's fearlessness have been collected above, starting with his behaviour as a four-year-old; his care for others is extended to the Syracusans (53. 4) and to all cities subject to Rome and Roman citizens (53. 5–6); he saves the Uticans from mass-murder (58. 1), and during his last days constantly the fate of his friends and the inhabitants of Utica is before his eyes, while he prepares without fear for death.

Finally, the two share an avoidance of meanness and the pursuit of justice. The examples are too numerous to be collected here entirely; for Cato what has been assembled above should suffice. With Phocion the examples of his treatment of prisoners and allies (13. 7 ff.), and his own

³¹ As was Plutarch's wont to do: cf. Stiefenhofer, *op.cit.* 468.

relatives (22. 4) are characteristic of a man who, in true Socratic fashion, would prefer to suffer rather than inflict injustice (32. 6³²) and who was recognised after his death by the people as a patron and guardian of moderation and justice (38. 1). Phocion rejected all attempts to be bribed or influenced by money (21. 3-4; 18. 1; 30. 1), and it is Plutarch's belief that to attack Cato for αἰσχροκέρδεια is like accusing Heracles of cowardice (52. 8).

Thus on the whole Plutarch was successful in demonstrating the similarities of character between Phocion and Cato. Few will lament the absence of a formal synkrisis at the end of the book, which would hardly add significantly either to our historical knowledge or to our psychological understanding of Plutarch's characters by pointing out in antithetical form the minute differences of the fortunes and fates of the two heroes. On the other hand the transition between the two Lives of the book, making use of a μέν . . . δέ—clause, is a most skilful structural device. The last sentence of the *Phocion* draws the parallel between the deaths of Phocion and Socrates: it is left to the reader to draw the parallel between the deaths of Socrates and Cato, so often alluded to, but never expressly stated in the Life.

I think it should be clear by now that Plutarch's art of comparison is sometimes most dominant where it is only implied rather than given a separate section in the book. Most importantly for our subject, it is here that his relation to Nepos seems to be most typical: possibly he owed the idea of comparison to Nepos, but it was his literary genius that brought it to full fruition.

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³² Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 469c.

Aspects of Plutarch's Characterisation

CHRISTOPHER PELLING

1. Childhood and Development

Immediately we consider Plutarch's treatment of his heroes' childhood, we find ourselves confronting a strange paradox.¹ He is clearly most interested in childhood and education; indeed, it is the exclusive concern of several of his moral essays.² He has a quite elaborate theory of youthful development, drawing heavily on the Aristotelian ethic: our initial δυνάμεις render us capable of feeling and responding to specific πάθη, and our responses gradually constitute particular ἔξεις of habitual activity; these eventually evolve into settled ἤθη which inform our moral choices. All that comes out particularly clearly in the *De uirtute morali*. Naturally enough, he insists that moral development of character is the norm for all human beings, and that education has a peculiar value in moulding character and restraining passions.³ Naturally enough, too, in the *Lives* he makes a good deal of whatever childhood material he finds in his sources, often straining uncomfortably to extract unreasonably large consequences from slight anecdotes (*Sulla* is a good example of that). He also gives extensive space

¹ This paper overlaps closely with my essay on "Childhood and Personality in Greek Biography" (henceforth "Childhood"), to appear in *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature*, a collection of essays which I am editing for the Oxford University Press (1989): but the scope of that essay did not allow any extended treatment of individual *Lives*, nor any discussion of the distinguished analysis of Dihle. Some of the points are also treated in an essay on "Plutarch: Roman heroes and Greek Culture" (henceforth "Roman heroes"), to appear in *Philosophia Togata* (ed. J. Barnes and M. T. Griffin [Oxford 1989]). The present article is lightly annotated: further argument and exemplification of several points may be found in those papers. I apologise for this immodest ring of self-reference, and hope readers will not find the circle too vicious.

² Especially *De profectibus in uirtute*, *An uirtus doceri possit?*, and *De audiendis poetis*.

³ *Mor.* 392b-e, cf. e. g. 28d-e, 37d-e, 76d-e, 82b-c, 83e-f, 450f, 453a, 551c-552d, 584e. Inherited nature was of course important too, as those passages show. Cf. esp. C. J. Gill, "The Question of Character-development: Plutarch and Tacitus," *CQ* 33 (1983) 469-87. For education as a civilising and restraining force in the *Lives*, cf. esp. *Cor.* 1. 4-5, *Mar.* 2. 2-4, *Them.* 2. 7, *Numa* 26 (4). 10-12; B. Bucher-Isler, *Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plutarchs* (Noctes Romanae 13 [Bern and Stuttgart 1972]) 21, 24, 49, 67-8.

to education—to isolating the teachers of Pericles, for instance, or stressing Lucullus' or Cicero's early intellectual prowess. And there are times when he shrewdly points to the importance of *influences*, sometimes in ways which involve quite extensive psychological reconstruction: the effect on the young Cleomenes of his marriage to Agis' widow, for instance, when she would constantly describe to him those stirring events (*Ag.—Cl.* 22 [1. 3]); the influence on Marcellus of being brought up at a time when Rome was constantly at war, so that he had no time to indulge his supposed taste for Hellenic culture (*Marc.* 1); the impact on Theseus of the heroics of his kinsman Heracles (esp. *Thes.* 6. 8–8. 2, 11. 2); the effect on Coriolanus of his close and dominant mother (*Cor.* 4. 5–8). All this seems to bring Plutarch surprisingly close to the themes and interests of modern biography, with its taste for tracing influences and psychological development, and for bringing out and explaining individual differences.

And yet so often these interests of Plutarch seem to lead to peculiarly shallow and disappointing results. So often his treatment of childhood itself is banal and unpenetrating; so often we are left with very little idea of any evolution of the grown man; and, despite those few cases where he does go in for psychological reconstruction, so often he seems to regard *understanding* the development of his heroes as a surprisingly low priority. Why? It is not a shortage of material; true, he is reluctant to supplement it irresponsibly—but we can also often see him failing to analyse the material he does have, or to carry through the sort of reconstruction of which he was capable. Why *doesn't* he reconstruct how the elder Cato or Marius must have felt, when they first came from the country to join in smart city life? Or what it must have been like for an Artaxerxes or a Timoleon in the nursery, with such dominant and powerful brothers? Or what Agesilaus must have felt about his lameness, or Themistocles about his dubious parentage? Plutarch has the resources to make such reconstructions, and the interest in youthful development to encourage them: *Cleomenes* shows that, or *Theseus*, or *Coriolanus*; and in each case the *theme* is stressed enough—rusticity, or the brothers, or the physical disability, or the bastardy. Yet the psychological capital made of it is curiously disappointing, and we are not really led to any deeper *understanding* of the heroes or their development.

Albrecht Dihle offers a most interesting explanation in his *Studien zur griechischen Biographie* (Göttingen 1956), when he points to a difference between modern and ancient ideas of the personality.⁴ He suggests that modern writers postulate a large number of varied predispositions (*Anlagen*) in a personality: some are aroused and fostered by specific experiences, especially in childhood; others become stunted or atrophied; and we place especial weight on the *irrational* in describing these distinctive experiences,

⁴ Ch. 4, esp. pp. 76–81.

and the psychic drives which they encourage or deflect. Such an analysis need not put especial weight on the development of "the moral will" or "moral consciousness" (though it certainly need not deny that such a will or consciousness exists, with the function of ethically assessing and censoring a person's *Anlagen* and accommodating them with life's demands): still, a figure can often be represented as passive, a locus for the various predispositions and stimuli to fight it out. This modern picture does clearly posit a complex process of the development of personality, even if it finds little to say about the development of the moral will or consciousness. Plutarch, by contrast, is firmly in the Peripatetic tradition in stressing the moral will. It is that which controls the way in which one's original δυνάμεις respond to particular πάθη, ensuring that these are controlled and guided in such a way that a pattern of ethical conduct (ἔξις) is followed, which is gradually strengthened into a stable aspect of a person's character (ἦθος).⁵ The irrational is relevant to the portrait, but only in defining the quality of the πάθη and the δυνάμεις that enable us to respond to them; and it will be natural to concentrate less on the δυνάμεις or the πάθη themselves than on the rational moral will or consciousness that masters them, something that (again in Aristotelian fashion) will be visible in the adult's moral choices which those settled ἦθη inform. Thus the irrational typically remains at a level below that of the literary presentation, assumed as part of the individual's development but not explicitly traced. "It is evident," concludes Dihle, "that in so narrow a biographical psychology the modern conception of development has no place."

There is much to admire in this extremely subtle analysis.⁶ Dihle is certainly right to draw attention to our view of a person's complex blend of varied *Anlagen*, and his stress on Plutarch's conception of moral will is also illuminating: the development of such an undifferentiated moral will is very much the register in which education is treated, at least when it is successful—in the cases of *Aemilius*, for example, or *Brutus*, or even (with some qualifications) *Pericles*.⁷ Such a will should give one control of the πάθη (cf. esp. *Mor.* 77d–78e, 82b–c); and Dihle is right to suggest that there is more interest in emphasising the will than in the differentiated analysis of the πάθη themselves, even in cases where those πάθη are important to Plutarch's view of his central figure. But some qualifications should still be made.

First, Dihle's analysis of modern assumptions is closer to theoretical psychology than biographical practice. With some exceptions, especially

⁵ Cf. esp. *Mor.* 31b–c, 443d, 451b ff., 467b.

⁶ And reviewers of Dihle have been properly admiring: cf. esp. K. von Fritz, *Gnom.* 28 (1956) 329–31.

⁷ On *Aemilius* cf. "Roman heroes," pp. 215–16 and "Childhood", n. 60; on *Brutus*, "Roman heroes," pp. 222–28; on *Pericles*, "Childhood," section II.

the psychoanalytic school,⁸ modern biography does not especially concentrate on these *irrational* elements in childhood; it may include them, but the early display or development of rational traits tends to be much more stressed—particularly in political biography, where the comparison with Plutarch is sharpest, and where a certain gravity and respect for the subject normally inhibits too strong a stress on the irrational.⁹ Dihle's analysis is in fact as redolent of Proust as it is of Freud, and in many ways it suits the biographical or autobiographical novel better than biography itself: it is suggestive that Dihle's sole example is not a biography at all but the *Entwicklungsroman* "Grüne Heinrich."¹⁰ And even such novels do not characteristically analyse the predispositions which remain stunted or undeveloped, only those which prefigure important later traits; such an analysis is not far removed from the Peripatetic treatment of δυνάμεις and πάθη which interact to produce later characteristics. (Dihle reasonably observes that the interaction is now described rather differently. We tend to speak of a constant mutual interaction, with *Anlagen* refined and remoulded as a result of experiences; whereas the Peripatetic analysis would regard the δυνάμεις as a constant given, and the interaction as producing distinct ἔξεις and eventually ἥθη. But the difference is at least in part semantic).

Indeed, in many ways Plutarch stresses irrational πάθη more, not less, than his modern counterparts, at least when he is describing adult figures. This is particularly clear in cases such as *Marius*, *Coriolanus*, *Demetrius*, or *Antony*, where heroes are clearly bad at controlling their passions; but the phenomenon is in fact much more widespread. Time and again we find Plutarch analysing heroes' self-control, and finding them lacking: and we find this particularly frequently in cases where Hellenic education is in point.¹¹ Marcellus, for instance, had Hellenic tastes, and did his best to indulge them in a warlike period: but he was eventually destroyed by his inability to control his natural bellicosity. Cicero was extraordinarily educated, yet so often he showed himself unable to match up to the emotional demands of the political choices he had to make, and unworthily followed the instincts of his πάθη rather than his reason: in his poor showing in exile, for instance, or in his choice of sides in the civil war, or in his extravagant reaction to his daughter's death. Some people did better, for instance Aemilius, again a man with educated and Hellenic tastes, or Brutus and the younger Cato, both followers of Greek philosophy; others worse, particularly those whose education was lacking—Marius,

⁸ Most influentially Erikson's *Young Man Luther* (New York 1958), though ironically his book was published two years after Dihle's.

⁹ This emerges from the examples I discuss in "Childhood," section III.

¹⁰ Dihle, p. 76: this is also noted by Gill, art. cit. (above, n. 3), 471 n. 16.

¹¹ This point is extensively argued in "Roman heroes," whence the following examples are drawn, and in Part II of Simon Swain's Oxford D. Phil. thesis, "Plutarch and Rome: three studies" (1987).

Coriolanus—or whose Hellenism was defective, like the elder Cato. This link of the *πάθη* with education is unsurprising, given Plutarch's stress on education as the vital prerequisite for self-control: but this leads us back to the original paradox. Plutarch stresses these *πάθη* in later life, but does very little to trace the development of a hero's self-control in the crucial years of his youth. Admittedly, we do sometimes find something of the kind: Coriolanus' mother stimulating his pride, for instance, or Heracles setting Theseus alight with ambition. Nothing precluded such analysis; but the oddity is that it is so rare, when it is precisely what the interest in the *πάθη* and their linkage with youth and education would seem to demand. We still need an explanation, and the attitude to the irrational does not offer it: it instead makes the problem more pressing.

In fact it is questionable how far the Peripatetic *theory* of character illuminates this question. Indeed, that theory would seem to encourage treatment of character-development, with its emphasis on that development of *ἔξεις* and that gradual formation of *ἦθη*. Aristotle himself is very clear that both intellectual and moral virtues require development, though it is of a different kind in each case (*N. E.* 2. 1103a14 ff.); and children have their distinctive pleasures, which everyone likes to grow out of, and their distinctive values (*N. E.* 10. 117a1–4, 1176b21–33, cf. 3. 1119b5–7). It is utterly appropriate that he should end Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by giving us advice on how to manage our own development, and Book 10 by a more general treatment of education and its importance. If anything, it is Peripatetic *practice* that goes the other way—the failure of Theophrastus, for instance, to generate much interest in the background or development of individual figures: and indeed the same goes for Aristotle himself, in his typed sketches in *N.E.* 4 and in his stray biographical comments elsewhere.¹² In fact, Aristotle and Theophrastus seem to provide their own version of the paradox we have already noticed with Plutarch: a theory which implies a considerable preoccupation with education and development, but a curious absence of that preoccupation in practice.

But in their cases it is easier to see why; and this may give a hint for Plutarch too. Dihle himself very properly brings out what Theophrastus and Aristotle are trying to do in producing such stereotyped portraits.¹³ They are not suggesting that such types exhaust the definition of any individual human's personality, but rather providing a convenient shorthand portrait of a particular *ἦθος* which an individual may show, along, doubtless, with many other such *ἦθη*. And those typed figures need not even preclude a measure of development:¹⁴ it is simply that in such cases the development would not be very complex or interesting. Plutarch's figures, as again Dihle stresses, are much more individuated, even if (say) his Nicias owes

¹² For these cf. G. L. Huxley, "Aristotle's Interest in Biography," *GRBS* 15 (1974) 202–13.

¹³ Dihle, 71–73.

¹⁴ For Theophrastus cf. Gill, art. cit. (n. 3), 469 n. 4.

something to a Peripatetic typed δεισιδαίμων. His biographical insight is so much richer than anything we can confidently ascribe to the Peripatetics, and if he uses their categories he does so with much more discrimination and human insight. In these more complex cases we might consequently expect development to be more complex too, and at first sight it is still surprising that, in this most obvious area, we seem to have no advance at all. But something like the same explanation may still be the right one. Plutarch's figures may be more complex, but not, perhaps, in a way which needs to posit a particularly singular or interesting process of development.

Here we should follow a different hint of Dihle's account. So far we have been talking only of the complexity of the varied "predispositions" of a child: but just as important is the differing degree of complexity of traits in the formed, *adult* character, a point which Dihle has made a few pages earlier (72). Moderns love complex characters, and particularly love the idiosyncratic, paradoxical combination of unexpected traits—in Wilamowitz' words, "the contradictions that are found in every soul of any richness, and whose unification alone creates a person's individuality."¹⁵ Ancient authors were less wedded to such quirkiness. Critics often warn us not to expect the idiosyncratic in the characters of Greek Tragedy: the individuality of a Clytemnestra or a Philoctetes certainly remains, but it is an individuality of a different sort from ours.¹⁶ The same applies to Plutarch. His characters too are individuated, but they are what I have elsewhere called "integrated" characters:¹⁷ a man's qualities are brought into some sort of relation with one another, and every trait goes closely with the next. We are unsurprised if Antony is simple, passive, ingenuous, susceptible, soldierly, boisterous, yet also noble and often brilliant; or the younger Cato is high-principled and determined, rigid in his philosophy, scruffy (as philosophical beings often are), strange but bizarrely logical in the way he treats his women, and disablingly inflexible and insensitive in public life. These are not stereotypes, but the different qualities cluster very naturally: Wilamowitz would hardly speak of such combinations as "the *contradictions* . . . whose unification alone creates a person's individuality." Even an Alcibiades is not

¹⁵ *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik* 1 (1907), 1109 (= *Kleine Schriften* VI [Berlin and Amsterdam 1972] 124)—a fine, provocative passage, which is subjected to an extended critique in the concluding chapter to *Characterization and Individuality* (as in n. 1, above).

¹⁶ Cf. e. g. P. E. Easterling, "Character in Sophocles," *G & R* 24 (1977) 121, 124 (= E. Segal [ed.], *Oxford Readings in Greek Tragedy* [Oxford 1983] 138, 140–41); S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge 1986) 174. Exactly how that residual individuality is to be defined is a challenging question, addressed by several of the contributors to *Characterization and Individuality*.

¹⁷ Cf. "Childhood," section III, where I give an extended comparison with the more elaborate way in which Lytton Strachey treats childhood. For similar remarks cf. R. B. Rutherford, "The Philosophy of the *Odyssey*," *JHS* 106 (1986) 149–50 and n. 31; for a contrary view, N. Rudd, *Lines of Enquiry* (Cambridge 1976) 160–62.

manysided in a modern sense, any more than Homer's Odysseus: both can be described swiftly and adequately, and even in such cases every trait really predicts the next. One could even talk meaningfully of "a sort of person like" Antony, or Alexander, or even Alcibiades: one might not meet that "sort of person" very often, but at least their qualities group together so naturally that they *could* conceivably recur again in the same blend in another human being. Talk of "a sort of person like" Hamlet, or Prince André, or Hedda Gabler would seem distinctly more peculiar.

Such "integrated" characters leave distinctly less to be explained than, in the world of the idiosyncratic, we have come to expect. Today writers have to foreshadow or explain a considerable multiplicity of divergent traits, and are often striving to explain why such a *unique* combination could possibly have come about. With idiosyncratic characters, development is typically *problematic*. For Plutarch it is much simpler. A few childhood traits, broadly sketched, can suffice, not because the adult personality is going to show only those traits, but because any new adult traits will naturally complement the ones we know from childhood. The infant Cato is determined, humourless, and intense, and it is not difficult to see how these early traits group naturally with those which develop later, the political inflexibility, the philosophy, the bizarre treatment of his women. Nothing is surprising as the characterisation deepens, and nothing requires any particularly refined explanation. It is not that his characters are "static,"¹⁸ but their development is, for our tastes, curiously straightforward. Even in the cases of the uneducated or ill-controlled, he can allow the points to come out gradually throughout the *Life*, as he will be painting them with a very broad brush. If we wish, we will not find it difficult to infer what their childhood must have been like—but, however important their development may have been, it will not have been especially differentiated, or necessarily very arresting. Plutarch does not need to strain from the outset to extract every ounce of understanding, as so many of his modern counterparts do. There is so much less to understand.

Nor, finally, should we relate this "integration" to distinctively Peripatetic thought. Aristotle's ethical theory can leave it open for a character to show any number of distinct ἦθη, in any sort of relation to one another (though it is true that his virtuous man will not vary over so large a range). The assumptions in fact go much deeper: this integration is an almost universal ancient habit, and indeed one shown by many more recent civilisations as well as the Greek. It is very much our post-Romantic nineteenth-and twentieth-century culture which is the odd one out, with our particular taste for the idiosyncratic and the quirky.

¹⁸ On this see the thoughtful treatment of Gill, *art. cit.* (n. 3).

2. *Aratus* and "integrated" characters

It is still possible to claim that some ancient authors integrated more fully than others, and that Plutarch's integration was particularly thoroughgoing. The comparison with his contemporary Suetonius already suggests as much: Suetonius' style of presentation by categories is much better suited to bringing out a modern style of manysidedness, and the protean complexities of a Julius Caesar emerge more clearly from Suetonius' *Life* than from Plutarch's. Suetonius' *Augustus*, his *Claudius*, even his *Vespasian* are rather in the same mould. But a more telling comparison can be drawn from the case of Plutarch's *Aratus*. Polybius had commented on the man's varied character:

He had in general all the qualities that go to make a perfect man of affairs. He was a powerful speaker and a clear thinker and had the faculty of keeping his own counsel. In his power of dealing suavely with political opponents, of attaching friends to himself and forming fresh alliances he was second to none. He also had a marvellous gift for devising *coups de main*, stratagems, and ruses against the enemy, and for executing such with the utmost personal courage and endurance But this very same man, when he undertook field operations, was slow in conception, timid in performance, and devoid of personal courage. The consequence was that he filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and in this respect the enemy could always get the better of him. So true it is that there is something multiform (πολυειδής) in the nature not only of men's bodies, but of their minds, so that not merely in pursuits of a different class the same man has a talent for some and none for others, but often in the case of such pursuits as are similar the same man may be most intelligent and most dull, or most audacious and most cowardly. For instance some men are most bold in facing the charge of savage beasts in the chase but are poltroons when they meet an armed enemy . . . I say this in order that my readers may not refuse to trust my judgement, because in some cases I make contrary pronouncements regarding the conduct of the same men even when engaged in pursuits of a like nature.

(Polybius 4. 8. 1–9, 12, trans. Paton.)

That was a passage Plutarch knew;¹⁹ but, when he gave his own summary of the man's character at *Arat.* 10, the emphasis was subtly different.²⁰

¹⁹ Some influence of Polybius on *Aratus* is anyway clear (especially at 38. 12 and 47–48): cf. the commentaries of W. H. Porter (Dublin and Cork 1937), xv, xviii, and A. J. Koster (Leiden 1937), xvi–xvii, xxvi, li–liiii. But in this case we also find some odd verbal echoes, with Polybius' vocabulary or conceits transferred to Plutarch's own summary in *Arat.* 10 but exploited in slightly different contexts: ὑπαίθρος, for instance (Plb. 4. 8. 5 = *Arat.* 10. 4), or ἐπιβολαῖς (Plb. 4. 8. 5) = ἐπιβολώτατος (*Arat.* 10. 2), or ἐν ᾧ περ (Plb. 4. 8. 5) = ὅπως (*Arat.* 10. 4), as well as the odd emphasis on πραότης (Plb. 4. 8. 2, *Arat.* 10. 2) and the more natural one on εὐφροσύνη (Plb. 4. 8. 7 = *Arat.* 10. 5) or τόλμη (Plb. 4. 8. 3, 7 = *Arat.* 10. 3); the

Aratus was a natural politician, great-spirited, more attentive to the commonwealth than his own affairs, bitterly hating tyranny, and developing friendships and enmities to suit the public good. For this reason he seems to have been less consistent as a friend than generous and merciful as an enemy: he changed his tack in both directions according to his statesmanship, and the needs of the moment. His ambition was to bring states together into alliances; he was eager for a union, a theatre speaking with one voice—as eager for this as for any noble ideal. He was lacking in confidence and pessimistic about open warfare, but the sharpest of men when it came to guileful initiatives, or secret negotiations to bring cities and tyrants to his side. For this reason his enterprise brought many unexpected successes, but he also seems to have failed to gain many possible successes because of his caution. The sight of certain wild beasts, it seems, is acute at night but dulled in the day, with the moisture of the eye turning dry and insubstantial as it cannot bear contact with the light: and in just the same way there is a sort of human cleverness (δαινότης) and understanding (σύνεσις) which by its nature is easily perturbed in open and public encounters, but gains courage when it comes to secret, undercover initiatives. This sort of inconsistency is created in gifted people by a lack of philosophical training, for they produce virtue without knowledge as if it were a self-seeded fruit, with no cultivation . . .

Plutarch's Aratus is more clearly guided by his state's shifting needs, which prepares us for an underlying rationality that explains some of the surface inconsistencies: Polybius began the chapter on that note, but put it less sharply and pressed it less insistently. Plutarch's Aratus shows "caution" rather than Polybius' "cowardice" in open warfare (and the point recurs in Plutarch's later narrative, especially at 31. 2–4 and 35–36):²¹ that too sits more comfortably with the initiatives he *did* undertake, and the contrast becomes a more explicable one, the politician who prefers guile to the dangers of open fighting, who shows daring in one sphere but not in a *different one*. Polybius' formulation in fact captures the difference very clearly: his Aratus shows inconsistency in, explicitly, *the same sort of pursuits*; Plutarch's two spheres are more distinct. Polybius consequently

wild-beast image of *Arat.* 10. 4 also recalls the hunting parallel of *Pib.* 4. 8. 9. D. A. Russell observed a similar phenomenon in Plutarch's use of Dionysius in *Coriolanus*, and fairly concluded that "it is perfectly possible that, when he came to his own writing, whole stretches of Dionysius' not very memorable prose were running in his head" (*JRS* 53 [1963] 22 and n. 7): the same goes for Polybius' rather more memorable phrases here.

²⁰ Koster (as n. 19), xxxiv, is enthusiastic but perhaps a little over-simple: "at nobis . . . profitendum est, cum eadem fere de Arati moribus uterque scripserit (my italics), suavitatem quandam orationis et brevitatem nos magis delectare quam loquacitatem Polybii."

²¹ For the dispute cf. also 29. 7–8: but even there Plutarch notes only that others derided Aratus' cowardice, without explicitly endorsing the criticisms. The contrast of *Arat.* 35. 6 and the parallel narrative at *Ag.-Cl.* 25 (4). 9 is particularly suggestive. Aratus' caution is at least explicable, probably even approved, in *Arat.*, but derided in *Cleomenes*: such aspects as the smallness of Cleomenes' force are suppressed in the *Arat.* version.

directs more attention to Aratus' demeanour in covert *action*, stressing his endurance (κακοπάθεια) as well as his daring, and that sharpens the contrast with the battlefield cowardice, which is inexplicably so different: Plutarch concentrates more on the planning than the action, and the spheres are again more widely separate, one much more mental, one more physical. And the inconsistency that remains is also dealt with differently. Polybius regards it as an individual quirk of Aratus, and makes it a general truth of human nature that such quirks are often found—a very unusual emphasis for an ancient author. Plutarch rather stresses that the combination of such traits is a *regular* one, that this sort of differentiated δεινότης is not at all unnatural, and could easily recur. That, in the terms discussed above, is “integration”: Plutarch is stressing how regular the cluster of traits really is. We could readily find the cluster recurring in another person, and hence it would be natural to talk of “a sort of person like Aratus”: but like Plutarch's Aratus, not Polybius'.

The end of Plutarch's chapter confirms the relevance of childhood: “this sort of inconsistency is created in gifted people by a lack of philosophical training, for they produce virtue without knowledge as if it were a self-seeded fruit, with no cultivation.” The first point to notice is simply that Plutarch *can* generalise in that way: “this sort of inconsistency is produced . . .” It evidently happens all the time, and regularly for the same reasons. Polybius' generalisation rather took the form that “*any* sort of inconsistency can happen,” because humans are like that: if such inconsistency is to be explained, then different explanations will be needed in each case. Secondly, the sort of explanation Plutarch favours turns so very naturally to childhood; but, once again, for our tastes it is so shallow. What is there, or what is good, comes from education: what is absent or bad comes from the lack of it. He does not feel the need to differentiate exactly what Aratus learnt from any particular school or tutor; indeed, it is striking that in the chapters on Aratus' youth he said virtually nothing about education, leaving the point for this later development. As in Marius and even Marcellus, defective education seems important to understanding the hero: but in the early chapters of all these *Lives* Plutarch does not feel the need to trace the theme in any detail. For him, the phenomenon of this sort of δεινότης is so regular, and comes about for such uniform educational reasons, just like Marcellus' bellicosity or Marius' lack of self-control. It is so easy to work out what the crucial education must have been like, and there is so little that is individual to say. There is no problem in understanding how this Aratus became “the sort of person” he is. Had Polybius grasped the nettle of explaining his quirkier, more irregular blend of traits, the analysis of development would have had to be distinctly more differentiated.

That concluding stress on education may still seem surprisingly intrusive and unsubtle; but it is less surprising specifically in *Aratus*, where the moralism is often rather cruder and more explicit than in the *Parallel Lives* (cf. e.g. 9. 7, 19. 4, 25. 7, 26. 4–5, 30. 2, 38. 5–12, 44. 6). It is

indeed a very pedagogic *Life*, as the introduction makes clear: Plutarch is providing Polycrates with a model for his own two sons to imitate (1. 5–6), hoping that they will be inspired to emulate the virtues of their ancestor. But first they need to sit at their books: the emphasis on education suits the youthful audience, and indeed a similar point is made a few chapters later, when Antigonus' pleasures are sadly lacking in λογισμός, that distinctive attribute of the rational, educated man (17. 7). Not, of course, that Plutarch would wish the sons of Polycrates to go out and try to rebuild the Achaean League; or assert the independence of Hellas; or even emulate Aratus' peculiar knack for getting on with foreign kings—though the relevance of *that* to the present time might, in a cruder author, seem more immediate. But Plutarch is not so crude; and his political sense is much too acute for the assumption of such unsophisticated parallels between past and present. But there are still lessons of virtue and vice for history to teach to public men.²²

This peculiarly insistent moralism may prompt further suspicions about the “integration.” One effect of this form of characterisation is to reduce Aratus to more of a type; and it is natural to wonder if the typical nature of such a hero goes along with a certain sort of moralism, and certain taste for the exemplary. After all, Plutarch's Aratus has a much clearer paradigmatic relevance than Polybius': his brand of δεινότης and σύνεσις are represented as familiar human traits, familiar enough for us to be on the look out for them in ourselves and others, and to draw conclusions. Polycrates' sons could indeed find, or themselves develop into, “a sort of person like Aratus”: the more regular the combination of traits, the easier it is to extract morals, and the more generally applicable those morals will be. It would doubtless be a mistake to assume that the search for exemplariness is necessarily *primary*—that Plutarch consciously reduced a character's singularity in order to make it more straightforward to extract his morals for everyday life: integration came more naturally to him than so coldblooded an analysis would suggest. But one can at least suspect that the two tendencies reinforced one another, that integration encouraged or facilitated the extraction of morals, and the taste for morals reinforced the assumption of integration. And in the case of *Aratus* the moral can indeed be a straightforward, protreptic one. The sons of Polycrates should try to be like Aratus in some ways but not in others; and if they set to their education like good boys, they may prove worthy of their ancestral model, and in some way may even improve on him. The moral, like the character, is very straightforward.

²² *Mor.* 457a ff., 814a–c clarify his view on the moral lessons which history can teach contemporary politicians.

3. *Lysander*

Lysander is less straightforward, both in its characterisation and in its moralism: the character is much less clearly a type, and the extraction of morals becomes a more delicate business. But there are similarities too, for here again we have an "integrated" character, even if a more singular and elaborate one; here too we have an interest in childhood and childhood influences, but one which might seem curiously shallow; and here again this is largely because even so complex a character is not too difficult to understand. Plutarch was not straining all the time to penetrate a problematic character, as a modern biographer might. Other things mattered more.

The interest in childhood influences is immediately clear, and so is the concern to relate *Lysander* to the norms of Spartan behaviour:

2. 1 It is said that *Lysander's* father, *Aristocleitus*, did not belong to the royal family, though he was descended from the children of *Heracles*.
- 2 *Lysander* himself was brought up in poverty, and showed himself as amenable as any Spartan to training in the customs of his country: he showed too that he had a manly spirit and was indifferent to all pleasures, except for those which honoured and successful men win by their own glorious exploits—and indeed it is no disgrace for a young Spartan to yield to these. The Spartans expect their boys from the very first to be conscious of public opinion, to take any censure deeply to heart as well as to exult in praise, and anyone who remains indifferent or fails to respond to these sentiments is despised as an idle clod, utterly lacking in any ambition to excel. This kind of ambition and contentiousness (φιλότιμον . . . καὶ φιλόνικον), then, had been implanted in *Lysander* by his Spartan training, and it would be unfair to blame his natural disposition too much in this respect. On the other hand he seems to have displayed a gift for paying court to the powerful such as one would not expect in a Spartan, and to have been able to bear the arrogance of those in authority when it was necessary: that is a quality which some people regard as an important element in political shrewdness.
- 5 *Aristotle*, when he observes that great natures, such as those of *Socrates*, *Plato*, and *Heracles*, are especially prone to melancholy, notes that *Lysander* also became a prey to melancholy, not at first, but in his later years.
- 6 The most distinctive fact about his character, however, is that although he himself endured poverty honourably, and was never enslaved or even momentarily corrupted by money, he nevertheless filled his own country not merely with riches but with the craving for them, and he deprived *Sparta* of the admiration she had always enjoyed for her indifference to wealth. This came about because he brought immense quantities of gold and silver into *Sparta* after the war with
- 7 *Athens*, although he did not keep a single drachma for himself. On another occasion, when *Dionysius*, the tyrant of *Syracuse*, sent *Lysander's* daughters some luxurious *Sicilian* tunics, he refused them,

saying that he was afraid they would make his daughters look uglier.

- 8 A little later an ambassador was sent from the same city, Sparta, to the same ruler.²³ Dionysius presented the ambassador with two dresses and told him to choose whichever he preferred and take it back to his daughter: the ambassador answered that she could choose better herself, and took both dresses away with him.

(*Lysander 2*, translated Scott-Kilvert [adapted]).

One typical feature of Plutarch's technique is his progressive redefinition of character.²⁴ He tends to begin by presenting traits or themes rather crudely and bluntly, only later complementing and refining and adding the subtleties, and a character tends to become more singular as his *Life* progresses. The same technique is used here to define Lysander's relation to the conventions of his city. At first he is not an especially singular figure: indeed, his "ambition and contentiousness" (2. 4) are two of the most regular traits in Plutarch's repertoire;²⁵ and, for the moment, it is these characteristics which—perhaps surprisingly, at least in the case of "contentiousness"²⁶—are related to his Spartan education (2. 2–4). At this point the explicitly unspartan qualities are only his capacity to pay court to the powerful, and his curious attitude to money: Plutarch points the paradox that he was impervious to greed himself, but eventually filled Sparta with wealth, to her ultimate catastrophe. But the *Life* goes on to stress how the "ambition and contentiousness"—the Spartan traits—gave rise to a much wider range of unspartan behaviour, not just in paying court to foreign potentates, but also in Lysander's deviousness, his versatility and enterprise, his religious unscrupulousness (explicitly "unspartan" at 8. 5), and his shrewd but bloody exploitation of party divisions in foreign states in the interest of his own followers. Lysander understands and exploits unspartan qualities in others, whether enterprise or greed (3, 4. 6–7, 5. 5 ff., 13. 5 ff., 19. 4),²⁷ and ends as a very individual figure himself, vitally

²³ On the interpretation of this passage see D. Sansone and R. Renehan, *CP* 76 (1981) 202–07. Both rightly insist that Lysander must here be *contrasted* with a separate "ambassador." The text had hitherto been read as if Lysander himself was the ambassador, so that Plutarch would be contrasting his earlier and later behaviour: that would be clumsy Greek, leaving ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως particularly pointless, and incoherent in view of Lysander's later characterisation. I follow Renehan in assuming that no textual alteration is necessary to support the reinterpretation.

²⁴ On this technique cf. my commentary on *Antony* (Cambridge 1988) 12–13, 25, 42–43; and "Childhood," section II.

²⁵ Cf. Bucher-Isler (as n. 3), 11–13, 31, 41, and especially 58–59; D. A. Russell, "Plutarch, 'Alcibiades' 1–16," *PCPS* 12 (1966) 38.

²⁶ Cf. below, p. 272.

²⁷ There are times when close comparison with other sources reveals Plutarch's distinctive emphases. For instance, in ch. 3 he affords much more space than Xenophon or Diodorus to the seething entrepôt Ephesus, a very unspartan milieu which Lysander knows how to exploit; and at 4. 6–7 he puts more weight than his source Xenophon on the *consequences* of extracting the extra obol from Cyrus—the extensive desertions from the enemy fleet, seduced by that greed

different from the norms of his country—indeed, so unspartan that he even tries to subvert the whole constitution (24. 3–6, cf. 30. 3–5, *Sulla* 40[2]). He is contrasted with a series of foils who are much more predictable in their Spartan ways:²⁸ first the avaricious ambassador of 2. 8; then, more elaborately, the conventional Callicratidas at 5. 7–7. 1, with his simplicity, pride, and justice, “worthy of Sparta” as they are (7. 1); then the boorish Callibius, who does not know how to rule free men (15. 7–8); then Gylippus, who disgraces himself with his avarice (16–17. 1), and fits a different but equally familiar type, the Spartan abroad who *cannot* resist wealth; and finally Pausanias, with his lack of enterprise, style, or success.

In several ways, then, Plutarch gradually brings out the singular and paradoxical features of Lysander's character; it is central to his point to bring out how *un*stereotyped a Spartan this is, how he belies the normal expectations which are pointed by those stereotyped foils; and he ends as much less Spartan than that introduction at ch. 2 would suggest. And yet his traits still cluster very naturally, the resourcefulness, the capacity to exploit others, the deviousness, the unscrupulousness, and the bloodiness; and we can see how readily all these traits complement those which were introduced in the first chapter. The crucial ambition, φιλοτιμία, remains, and he duly rejoices in the honours (τιμαί) he is paid at 18. 4–19. 1; but that ambition comes to go closely with a rising contempt for others (at 19. 1 Plutarch explicitly connects the two qualities). This megalomaniac arrogance becomes a disabling weakness, especially at 22. 1–5; and—when it is crossed—it develops into the eventual melancholic wrathfulness which that early chapter had foreshadowed (2. 5, cf. 28. 1). The melancholia, wrath, and megalomania might have come as more of a surprise if the φιλοτιμία had not served as a linking theme: that, surely, is why he is at such pains to reintroduce the theme of the ambition in ch. 18, just before the contempt and wrath become so important to the narrative. With that firmly in our minds, nothing now seems too difficult or idiosyncratic; and we again see how even an unstereotyped, singular figure shows traits which cluster in a very “integrated,” unmodern way, and how Plutarch carefully controls his narrative in order to make the grouping more natural.²⁹

which Lysander so shrewdly knows how to generate. But only a very full commentary could pursue such points through the whole *Life*. Some of the necessary material, but little of the interpretation, is furnished in J. Smits' largely linguistic commentary (Amsterdam 1939).

²⁸ On this technique in *Lysander* cf. D. A. Russell, “On reading Plutarch's *Lives*,” *G & R* 13 (1966) 152–54.

²⁹ It is interesting here to note a slightly different emphasis in the *Synkrisis* (*Sulla* 40 [2]. 6), where Lysander is said to commit his outrages “on behalf of his friends,” to secure their power in the allied states. One can see how that interpretation *could* fit the facts as the *Lysander* narrative presents them: but it was not the tenor of the *Life* itself, where Lysander rather installs his friends in power in the ruthless interest of his own, and Sparta's, power. The narrative emphasis sits better with Lysander's other traits, whereas that of the *Synkrisis* would have left

Whether we quite have the psychological *understanding* we expect from a modern author is a different point. How far do we really grasp what turns Lysander into so individual a Spartan? It would be wrong, surely, to think that Plutarch traces much *development* in his character, except for that late growth of arrogance and melancholia. Ch. 2 certainly links the "ambition and contentiousness" to his education, and so posits a process of development in his youth; but we do not see that development in any depth, and thereafter Lysander does not really change from a Spartan into an unspartan, nor do we see how those initial Spartan traits change into counterparts which are less traditional and more subversive (interesting though such a portrayal might have been). After that general introduction in ch. 2, Lysander is fairly unspartan from the moment we see him, and the conventional Callicratidas is his foil as early as 5. 7–7. 6. This is not development, though this is equally a more unconventional figure than the introduction had led us to expect: it is rather the same technique of progressive redefinition, the use of an initial description which is deliberately inadequate and then gradually refined. And yet the only *explanations* of his character are given precisely in that initial description, where we are given only the faintest suggestions of the character we are later to see.

Even the attitude to wealth, explicitly marked at 2. 6–8 as an individual and unspartan trait, is explained rather disappointingly. It simply seems to be related to the poverty of his family background (a view which was clearly controversial, and one which Plutarch can only support by straining the slight evidence he had).³⁰ But that penury, as Plutarch presents it, only explains Lysander's capacity to do without wealth himself: it does not help us to understand why he developed so shrewd an ability to exploit the avarice of others, or why he so catastrophically kept sending wealth back home to Sparta. Given Plutarch's capacity for imaginative reconstruction, he might so easily have built a picture of Lysander's first reaction to seeing foreign luxury, a mixture perhaps of inner contempt and ruthless determination to exploit it for Sparta's interests.³¹ Plutarch could even have gone further: had he wanted to prefigure Lysander's later insensitivity, he

his character less "integrated"; ironically, the *Synkrisis* point is closer to the treatment afforded Agesilaus in his *Life*, where susceptibility to friends is an important theme. So too Lysander's Λακωνική διαίτα is more stressed in the *Synkrisis* (*Sulla* 41[3]. 2) than in the narrative: in the narrative we might have inferred it from his attitude to wealth, but too insistent a stress would have sat uneasily with the emphasis on his style in courting wealthy luxurious potentates, so different from that of a Callicratidas (5. 5–7. 1).

³⁰ For the controversy cf. e. g. 18. 3, Athen. 12. 543b, *Nep. Lys.* 4. Plutarch's presentation may be influenced by the comparison with the poor but noble Sulla, as Dr. O. D. Watkins has suggested to me.

³¹ Twentieth-century treatments of Russian moles in the British establishment offer suggestive parallels.

might have linked the contempt for wealth with a failure to grasp what it would really mean for Sparta; had he preferred to stress the self-seeking, he might rather have suggested a shrewd perception of exactly what wealth might mean, and of the possibilities of power it might leave for a person who remained impervious to its charms. Yet this style of reconstruction was not what he was here interested in, though other *Lives* suggest that it was well within his range: this peculiarly rich *Life* already had enough paradoxes and contrasts to satisfy his taste.

And what tasty paradoxes and contrasts were these? A further oddity of ch. 2 gives one clue. It might be natural enough to regard "ambition" or "love of honour," φιλοτιμία, as a product of the Spartan educational training; "contentiousness" certainly clusters closely with "ambition," but is a less expected Spartan trait. The beginning of *Agésilas* is suggestive here, for the qualities Agésilas inherits from the Spartan ἀγωγή are there his "common touch and kindness of manner" (1. 5), while *his* contentiousness is made a more individual feature (2. 1): that too is not a wholly cogent treatment ("kindness of manner," τὸ φιλάνθρωπον, does not really convince as a Spartan trait), but it certainly suggests a rather different view of the ἀγωγή from that of *Lysander*. Perhaps the reason is that in *Lysander* it will indeed be important to find these traits of ambition and contentiousness recurring in other Spartans, especially in Agésilas himself, men who had presumably suffered the same training. What is more, this will contribute decisively to Lysander's final reverses: for, singular though Lysander may be, it is a peculiar irony that he is finally destroyed when he encounters the same traits in others. His capacity to court (θεραπεύειν) foreign dynasts was always a strength, as 2. 4 stressed and as was immediately clear in his dealings with Cyrus (4. 1-6): but, when he returns to Asia Minor at 19. 1-2, he himself comes to play the dynast, and it is those who pay court to him (οἱ θεραπεύοντες, 19. 2) who inflame his ambition and his contempt. That is just the point where the reversals in his fortune begin to become important, and Plutarch stresses the distaste he aroused among conventional Spartans (19. 3, 19. 7 ff., though cf. already 14. 3).³² Then these same θεραπεύοντες are instrumental in provoking the discord between Lysander and Agésilas, when Agésilas is so irritated that no court is paid to him; Lysander himself has eventually to advise them to go and θεραπεύειν Agésilas instead (23. 5-11). Here of course it is Agésilas' own φιλοτιμία and contentiousness which is at play (cf. 23. 3); Lysander cannot control his own φιλοτιμία in response (23. 7); but by now, clearly, he is meeting his match. He similarly is outdone in deviousness by Pharnabazus (20: cf. especially 20. 2, πρὸς Κρήτα δ' ἄρα

³² The placing of the digressions on Spartan wealth, 17, and the *skualē*, 19. 8-12, is thought-provoking. The length of both may seem clumsy, but both in different ways stress elements of distinctive Spartan *tradition*: and it is precisely now that Lysander's unconventional traits are leaving him dangerously at odds with traditional Spartan sentiment.

... κρητίζων, and 20. 5, "οὐκ ἄρ' Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστὶν αἰμίλος μόνος"); and ephors and kings are showing themselves able to meddle in local party politics as well (21. 2–7). Lysander was unspartan enough; but, when he sets the tone, others can readily follow, and combine to generate his catastrophe. He duly dies, in battle: and in that battle a crucial role is played by 300 Thebans who had been accused of Laconising and were eager to prove their loyalty (28. 12). The local feudings which Lysander had always exploited so deftly come to play a strange role at the end.

The reversals combine to generate a *peripeteia* of peculiar neatness. It is indeed highly reminiscent of tragedy, where so often a figure's peculiar characteristics or strengths unleash forces which eventually destroy him, frequently with a chilling symmetry: one thinks of Oedipus, or Clytemnestra, or Ajax, or Hippolytus, or the Creon of *Antigone*.³³ It is no surprise, indeed, to find a fitting dominance of tragic imagery in the closing chapters of the *Life*. With Agesilaus in Asia, for instance, it is "like a tragedy," with Lysander as a chief actor playing a subordinate social role (23. 6); when Lysander begins his plot to subvert the constitution, he is ὥσπερ ἐν τραγωδίᾳ μηχανὴν αἴρων ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας (25. 2), adducing for his case a series of *prophecies and oracles*—themselves of course the stuff of tragedy; and finally "Lysander's part in the drama came to an end through the cowardice of one of his actors and accomplices" (26. 6), men who had earlier been described as his "fellow actors in the dramatic plot" (τοῦ μύθου συναγωνισταί, 26. 2).³⁴ After that, what more suitable setting for Lysander's death could there be than the birthplace of Dionysus, the god of tragedy himself (28. 7)? For indeed, as often in tragedy, we are surely aware of numinous powers at play as he meets his death, and that is particularly appropriate for one who had so often taken the names of the gods in vain: it is not, for instance, a casual coincidence that his death miraculously and paradoxically proves some ancient oracles true (29. 5–12). One final irony is that Lysander, for all his deviousness and megalomania, has usually promoted Sparta's interest with some sureness of touch: many for instance had been eager to see his return to Asia, rather than more of the virtuous Callicratidas (5. 7–8, 7. 2). Even as the rift with his country grows deeper, he is still alert to performing what service he can (23. 13); it is his domestic enemies whose meddling comes to endanger the city (21. 2–7). The charge was laid against Pausanias that he had taken the Athenian people when they were bridled by an oligarchy, and loosed them for further violence and arrogance: that increased Lysander's reputation as a man who had ruled in a powerful and individual style, but not to gratify others *nor*

³³ For the influence of tragedy on Plutarch see now J. M. Mossman, "Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch's *Alexander*," *JHS* 108 (1988) 83–93.

³⁴ Cf. Smits (as n. 27) ad loc. συναγωνιστής can itself be used more generally (cf. *LSJ* s.v. and Wytenbach's index), but hardly with τοῦ μύθου, or in this context of extended theatrical imagery.

theatrically (οὐδὲ θεατρικῶς), but in pursuit of Sparta's interests" (21. 7). Clearly, Lysander is not the only actor in this drama, nor is it only his tragedy. Torn by discord and corrupted by wealth, Sparta is a victim too.

This is a very fine and tightly structured *Life*, and its moralism is thought-provoking and profound. But few of its themes really depend on *understanding* Lysander's psychology, and one can see why Plutarch did not make this his priority. What is more, this is a different moralism from that of *Aratus*, and one which combines with an "integrated" character in a rather different way. Polycrates' children might be able to draw simple morals from Aratus' history for their own experience; but none of Plutarch's audience were likely to find themselves in any remotely similar circumstances to Lysander's, or feel tempted to behave in any remotely similar way. True, none would feel tempted to go and assert Greece's independence in the style of Aratus or Philopoemen either, but in those cases latter-day analogies could be found, and Polycrates' sons could still feel inspired to behave with circumspect worthiness of their Greek past. In the case of *Lysander* it is hard to see what even these latter-day analogies would be: after all, no reader would find his temperament chafing against Spartan discipline in any remotely parallel style, nor be tempted to turn himself into any equivalent of a melancholic or megalomaniac dynast. The moralism in such a case is of a different sort, rather closer to that of tragedy: this is a more descriptive moralism, pointing a truth of human experience rather than building a model for crude imitation or avoidance. Human nature can produce a figure like Lysander, even or especially in a city like Sparta; and figures like that tend to generate their own destruction, in tragically appropriate ways. For an audience brought up on "integrated" characters, the more tightly Lysander's traits would cluster, the more convincing they might find him: to that extent, the integration of his characterisation once again reinforces the moralism, though not in the sense that Plutarch's audience might really fear growing into Lysanders themselves, or finding one in other people. Indeed, Plutarch's readers might not find themselves behaving very differently at all after understanding Lysander's story. But they would find their grasp of the human experience enhanced: and, if a moralist could achieve that, he was achieving something very worthwhile.

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The Proems of Plutarch's *Lives*

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According to the proverb, "Well begun is half done." Plutarch certainly accepted this principle, for he lavished special care on the openings of his *Parallel Lives*. In this he was not unusual. Ever since Homer, artists had taken pains with the beginnings of their works. When rhetorical theory became the principal means of discussing literary organization, detailed rules were established governing the proper treatment of formal beginnings, or proems (προοίμια, Latin *exordia*). Other prose writers—philosophers, historians, technical writers—borrowed and adapted these theories for their own works. No writer, however, excels Plutarch in the variety, charm, and technical skill of his proems.

The very number of the proems in the *Parallel Lives*¹—more than twenty—makes them a proper subject for study for anyone interested in the form of ancient prose or its use of rhetorical principles. But they are of more than formal interest, since they also reveal the expectations and assumptions of Plutarch and his readers. In them Plutarch expresses his motivations and purposes, and several contain major statements on method. In addition, since proems are especially directed at gaining the interest of the reader, they implicitly reveal the nature of his audience: their social status, leisure activities, and intellectual interests. The proems to the *Lives* do not follow the model of other biographical proems, or of historical proems, although there are similarities of topic. In their variety and techniques they often remind one, as might be expected, of the essays of the *Moralia*. This study, after a summary account of earlier biographical proems, will explore the principal themes and techniques which Plutarch employs in the proems to the *Parallel Lives*, their relation to rhetorical theory, and some of the features which distinguish them from those of other writers.

¹ The appendix contains a brief discussion of the proems to the *Aratus*, *Artaxerxes*, and *Galba* (the *Otho* does not have one, being part of the same work as the *Galba*), which are not part of the *Parallel Lives*.

There are twenty-two extant pairs of lives: of these thirteen have formal proems.² The others may be said to use "informal" or integrated proems.³ The formal proems can be distinguished by the asyndeton which begins the body of the life; on a few occasions this is replaced by a logical particle.⁴ Informal proems are not separated in this way: the body of the life begins with δέ (δ' οὖν at *Sol.* 2. 1). References to the dedicatee of the *Lives*, *Sosius Senecio*, occur only in the formal proems, and the first person is regularly used only in them.⁵ Finally, the formal proems, with only two exceptions, carefully name the two persons who will be subjects of the pair of lives and end with a justification for the decision to compare these two lives.⁶ Informal proems are based on the standard opening topics of a biography: family, education, or physical appearance. The formal proems, instead, avoid these topics and explore a variety of topics suggested by the lives, and especially the purpose and method of Plutarch's work. The informal proems may be recognized as serving a proemial function by their use of techniques common to historical proems, especially a display of sources, as will be seen. Their role as proems is confirmed by the fact that similar passages do not usually appear in the second life of a pair.

The proems and the concluding comparisons (συγκρίσεις) mark the pair of lives as Plutarch's unit of composition, a book. Plutarch himself frequently refers to a pair as a separate unit.⁷ The length of this book was extremely flexible. The shortest, *Sertorius-Eumenes*, runs 46 Teubner pages, the longest, *Alexander-Caesar*, 186, four times as much, with the

² In the order of the Teubner edition, *Thes.-Rom.*, *Cim.-Luc.*, *Per.-Fab.*, *Nic.-Cras.*, *Dem.-Cic.*, *Phoc.-CatMin.*, *Dio-Brut.*, *Aem.-Tim.*, *Sert.-Eum.*, *Pel.-Marc.*, *Alex.-Caes.*, *Dem.-Ant.*, and *AgCl.-Grac.*

³ That is, *Sol.-Publ.*, *Them.-Cam.*, *Arist.-CatMaj.*, *Cor.-Alc.*, *Philop.-Flam.*, *Pyr.-Mar.*, *Lyc.-Num.*, *Lys.-Sul.*, and *Ages.-Pomp.* The *Ages.-Pomp.* has perhaps the weakest claim to having even an informal proem, but the treatment of Agesilaus' early life seems to fulfill that purpose. See below. Informal prefaces in Plutarch should be distinguished from the concealed preface or *insinuatio* (cf. Lausberg [cited n. 12], pp.150-51, #263-65; 160-61, #280-81, which is normally used when there is reason to think that the audience will resist a regular proem. Lucian seems to refer to something like this when, in reference to Xenophon's *Anabasis*, he speaks of δυνάμει τινὰ προοίμια (*How to Write History* 23).

⁴ *Per.* 3. 1 (γάρ), *Phoc.* 4. 1 (μὲν οὖν), *Demetr.* 2. 1 (τοίνυν), *Nic.* 2. 1 (οὖν).

⁵ The first person is found in informal proems only at *Lyc.* 1. 7 (πειρασόμεθα) and *Arist.* 1. 3 (καθ' ἡμᾶς).

⁶ The *Nicias* neither names Crassus nor justifies the selection of the pair; the *Alexander* omits the justification. Plutarch may speak of choosing one or the other life first, and then seeking a companion. The Roman life was chosen first in *Thes.-Rom.*, *Cim.-Luc.*, *Sert.-Eum.*, *AgCl.-Grac.* No precedence is indicated for *Per.-Fab.*, *Dem.-Cic.*, *Aem.-Tim.*, *Demetr.-Ant.*, *Phoc.-Cat.* (although Cato is introduced two chapters later than Phocion), *Pel.-Marc.*, or *Dio-Brut.*

⁷ Cf. *Dem.* 3. 1, *Per.* 2. 5, *Dio* 2. 7. It is thus a mistake to shift the order of lives in a pair, or to move the proem from one life to another, as was done by the Aldine edition, still followed in the Budé edition. Ephorus' use of proems to the books of his history are the first indication of a clear awareness of book-length units in a larger work. The histories of Herodotus and Thucydides and the *Republic* of Plato do not seem to have been divided by the author into book-length units.

average being about 97 pages.⁸ The extraordinary length of the *Alexander-Caesar* perhaps explains the loss of the beginning of the *Caesar*: the book would have been divided into two rolls, making the beginning of the second life vulnerable. Most of the pairs which can be identified as written early run below the average: the only exception is *Lysander-Sulla* at 100 pages. The three longest pairs, averaging 165 pages, were all written late.⁹ It is noteworthy that the Roman lives of these pairs are all drawn from the Civil War period, and average 90 pages in length.

It is clear from the proems that each book had a title, with the name of the author, since Plutarch did not indicate in the informal proems the second of the lives to be treated, and even neglects to mention Crassus in the formal preface of the *Nicias*. As has been pointed out by Pelling,¹⁰ the two lives should be read as a unit, in which the first life may establish themes or questions which are developed or resolved in the second. The body of the formal proems, as opposed to the indication and justification of the selection of heroes, may not relate to both lives, but only one: e.g., the first life in the *Nicias*, the second in the *Cimon*.

Before analyzing the proems of the *Parallel Lives*, it is useful to review the best preserved proems of pre-Plutarchean biography, in order to distinguish more precisely the achievement of Plutarch.

In the first half of the fourth century B.C. biography came into existence as a genre separate from both history and oratory. While much influenced by oral encomia, it shaped its own objectives in an intermediate ground between the epideictic oration of praise or blame and the historical narrative of men and events.¹¹

The earliest biographies, Xenophon's *Agésilas* and Isocrates' *Evagoras*, reflect two opposing conceptions of the role of a proem, although both consider their work an ἐπαινος, or encomium. Isocrates opens his *Evagoras* with an elaborate proem (1-11) on the importance of fame to great men and the difficulties of writing a suitable encomium in prose. The first period draws an extended contrast between the honors which Nicocles has performed for his father and the still more valuable gift of praise of the dead king's life and of the dangers he underwent. A proper account would make *Evagoras' arete* immortal. The second point is the value of encomia for contemporaries as encouragement to great action. Such emulation, Isocrates writes, is currently discouraged by the comparison with heroes of the past and by the envy of contemporaries: this deadening situation should be broken by those willing to change the world for the better. Isocrates is

⁸ These are rough counts, based on the latest Teubner edition. A more accurate count would use the TLG data base to calculate the length of each life.

⁹ *Alex.-Caes.*, 186 pp.; *Ages.-Pomp.* 156.5 pp.; *Demetr.-Ant.*, 152 pp.

¹⁰ C.B.R. Pelling, "Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives," in *Miscellanea Plutarchea* (Ferrara 1986) 83-96.

¹¹ On the emergence of biography in the fourth century, see especially A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

willing to be such a pathbreaker. Although the resources of poetry for an encomium in many ways are superior to those of prose, he will dare to be the first to attempt an essay of this nature.

As a student of Gorgias and for many years the leading teacher of rhetoric in Greece, Isocrates employs a number of standard techniques developed by orators and teachers of rhetoric and later codified in written handbooks, from Aristotle and Anaximenes of Lampsacus to Cicero and the rhetoricians of the empire. These rules were meant especially for judicial speeches, but were transferred, with such modifications as were necessary, to other kinds of prose works. Isocrates himself was a major participant in this phenomenon, since he regularly presented his works, including the *Evagoras*, as speeches, even when they were clearly intended for a reading public. With regard to the proem or opening section of a speech, the rhetoricians established that it must accomplish three goals: 1) render the judge or juror interested in the speech, 2) create in him a sense of goodwill toward the speaker, and 3) make him willing to learn from the speech. To use the later Latin terms, the proem should render the audience *attentus*, *benevolus*, and *docilis*.¹² This formula did not fit all speeches equally well, and Aristotle, for example, noted that particular emphases were necessary for an epideictic address as opposed to a judicial one. Even less did it apply to other prose forms, although the influence of rhetorical theory, because of its central role in the educational system, was omnipresent.¹³

In the *Evagoras*, Isocrates arouses the interest of his reader, the dead king's son Nicocles. He speaks feelingly of the son's piety toward his father and the father's desire for praise. At the same time he stresses the newness of the attempt at prose *epainos*. The same statements also invite goodwill, since Nicocles will naturally be well-disposed toward someone praising his father, and understanding is to be expected for a speaker attempting a new and difficult task. The emphasis on Isocrates' own decision to write, the risks he is taking, and his expectation of a noble

¹² The theory of proems is effectively presented, with many references to literary works, by H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik*² (München 1960) I, 150–63. See also R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht*² (1885, repr. 1963) 127 ff., and J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik* (München 1974) 64 ff. For Latin prefaces, see T. Janson, *Latin Prose Prefaces* (Stockholm 1964), E. Herkommer, *Die Topoi in den Proömien der römischen Geschichtswerke* (Stuttgart 1968), and M. Ruch, *Le préambule dans les oeuvres philosophiques de Cicéron* (Paris 1958). For a discussion of particular features in Latin proems, see M. Erren, *Einführung in die römische Kunstprosa* (Darmstadt 1983) 60–62, 66–89. I have not seen R. Böhme, *Das Proömium* (Bühl 1937).

¹³ Lucian, for example, when discussing the writing of history, notes that a historical proem need not work for the goodwill of the reader, since that is presumed. The historian will concentrate on arousing the attention of the reader, indicating the greatness, the necessity, the relevance, or the usefulness of the subject, and encourage his grasp of the material by a presentation of causes and a summary of major points (*How to Write History*, 53). Cf. G. Avenarius, *Lukian's Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung* (Meisenheim/Glan 1956) 113–18; H. Homeyer, *Lukian, Wie man Geschichte schreiben soll* (München 1965) 269–71.

accomplishment, involve the speaker with his subject and with his audience, while making an implied comparison with Evagoras' own benefactions. The use of comparisons and elaborate periods is appropriate to an epideictic proem, as later formulated in rhetorical treatises. There is little connection with the proems of Herodotus and Thucydides, with their emphasis on methods of handling sources and on accuracy, although Isocrates does note that the truth of an encomium of a contemporary is assured because the auditors are well-informed (5), a familiar, if illogical, *topos*.

Xenophon, instead, employs a very short four-line proem, simply stating that while it is difficult to write a eulogy in praise of a great man, it must be attempted, since it is not right for a man to lack praise for the sole reason that he was outstanding. He avoids both the historical *topoi* of method and accuracy and the rhetorical claims for attention and good will, although the simple statement of Agesilaus' greatness does serve to arouse the attention of the reader, and may be paralleled with the historians' claim for the greatness of their subject.¹⁴ The notion of inadequacy to the topic, however, is itself a rhetorical *topos*, especially suitable to speeches of praise, and is found, for example, in Thucydides' Funeral Oration. Despite the presence of these *topoi*, Xenophon appears to reject Isocrates' conscious rhetorical development of proemial themes.¹⁵

After Isocrates and Xenophon, the paucity of extant biographies forces a leap to the first century B.C.¹⁶ The proem to the *Life of Augustus Caesar* by Nicolaus of Damascus exists only in fragments found in the *Excerpta de virtutibus* (FGrHist 90 F 125–26), so that its overall effect cannot be known. Like Xenophon (although at greater length), he notes that the virtues of his subject have made his task more difficult. In narrating Augustus' deeds he will make it possible for all to know the truth. A new

¹⁴ Many of the *topoi* of historical proems are already found in Herodotus and Thucydides, who employ a formal introduction giving the title and author, justifying the present work, and indicating the method to be used—an updating of the *topos* of authority, replacing the Muse of epic with their investigation of differing accounts. Thucydides especially stresses the importance of his subject, in that his war is greater than any previous war. Later historians developed further the *topoi* of the use of sources and the importance of their subject and, under the influence of rhetorical theory and a changing notion of the function of history, introduced general discussions on the value and pleasure of history. Historical proems have attracted much discussion: among recent authors note D. Fehling, "Zur Funktion und Formgeschichte des Proömiums in der älteren griechischen Prosa" Δόρυμα: *Hans Diller zum 70. Geburtstag. Dauer und Überleben des antiken Geistes* (Athens 1975) 61–75, Donald Earl, "Prologue-form in Ancient Historiography," *ANRW* I. 2 (1972) 842–56, H. Erbse, "Über das Proömion (1–23) des Thukydides," *RhMus* 113 (1970) 43–69, A. D. Leeman, "Structure and Meaning in the Prologues of Tacitus," *YCS* 23 (1973) 169–208, P. A. Stadter, "Arrian's Extended Preface," *ICS* 6 (1981) 157–71.

¹⁵ This is not to take a stand on the relative priority of the two works. There is no external evidence, and the internal evidence cannot be considered probative in either direction. They were in any case written within a short time of each other.

¹⁶ The biography of Euripides by Satyrus, the only Hellenistic biographer of which sizeable fragments are preserved, does not include material from the proem.

feature is the *divisio*, which sets out the sections of the first part of the work, those particularly suited for a biography: origin (*genos*), nature (*physis*), parents, and rearing and education (*trophe* and *paideusis*). The fundamental theme seems to be the greatness of Augustus, which Nicolaus will attempt to present in the life. The list of benefactions and conquests both arouses interest in the reader and renders him *docilis* by giving a foretaste of the contents of the life. In the extant fragments, there is no special justification of the author's competence or of his method. Unfortunately, such comments if they existed would not have interested the excerptor.

The *Lives of outstanding generals* by Cornelius Nepos represents a change of method from earlier extant biographies, offering a collection of short lives rather than an isolated study of one person. Nepos precedes his collection with a formal proem, leaving the individual lives either without introduction or with a very short statement of the moral interest of the life.¹⁷ The proem, addressed to Atticus, attempts to justify *hoc genus scripturae*, arguing that it is useful to study great men of other nations, even though their customs and habits are often alien to Roman ways and expectations. As such it is an attempt to win the goodwill of the reader, who otherwise might be inclined to reject the book as un-Roman and useless for his own growth or recreation. Since Atticus himself was a philhellene, and would hardly have been scandalized, e.g., by the philosophical interests of Epaminondas, and since in general the educated Roman of this period was quite cosmopolitan, the problem could not be a real one. Nepos evidently is both employing a traditional *topos* of Roman self-sufficiency, similar to those employed by Cicero in his speeches and treatises, and at the same time suggesting the interest of these lives, that they record "exotic" customs. Nepos mentions his haste to complete his task, but is silent on questions of method, sources, or accuracy. The reader is expected to be interested because of what can be learned from these lives.

Since the beginning of the *Divus Julius* has been lost, it is uncertain whether Suetonius prefixed a proem to his *Lives of the Caesars*. The individual lives do not have proems, nor do those of the lives of the poets or other fragments. They represent a collection, like that of Nepos, but the lives are more tightly bound together both chronologically and thematically by the restriction of subject to the twelve Caesars from Julius to Domitian.

The *Agricola*, instead, opens with a powerful proem (1-3), in which Tacitus explores the implications for his own time of the act of recording the lives of distinguished men.¹⁸ Unlike Nepos or Suetonius, Tacitus does

¹⁷ Epaminondas 1. 1-4 is an exception, a longer statement excusing the subjects' "inappropriate" interests in music and philosophy. The lives with no introductory statement are Miltiades, Cimon, Conon, Dion, and Datames.

¹⁸ On the proem to the *Agricola*, see the sensitive analysis by A. D. Leeman in "Structure and Meaning in the Prologues of Tacitus," *YCS* 23 (1973) 169-208 at pp. 199-208. Cf. also K.

not see himself as chronicling the past, but as making a statement for his own time through a presentation of one man's life. The proem's most impressive feature is the denunciation of the repression under Domitian and the sense of disgust for the subservience of the ruling class, including Tacitus himself. Rhetorically, this is the appeal for the reader's goodwill *ab adiunctis*, that is, from the circumstances of writing. But because of its stress on the new opportunity to write, the denunciation also powerfully arouses the reader to expect in this work something long desired but previously unavailable. At the same time, Tacitus includes a number of elements applicable to biography in general. He begins with a succinct definition of the genre: *clarorum virorum facta moresque posteris tradere*.¹⁹ But his own experience has made him aware that remembering greatness is not simply a question of convincing others that these men are worthy of praise, or a presentation of exempla to imitate, but a statement of values in a world which may oppose or despise them, an act of freedom dangerous to a tyrant, impossible for a slave. The traditional purposes of biography, praise of virtue and invitation to emulation, in Tacitus' proem are radically politicized. Throughout there is the implication that Agricola is indeed worthy of this honor, and at the end Tacitus employs the *topos* of an apology for his lack of skill in presentation. Tacitus closes the proem with a union of typical items and his own distinctive viewpoint, combining the naming of his subject, the explanation of his relation to him, and his particular reason for writing with an ironic awareness of the audience: *hic interim liber honori Agricolae socii mei destinatus, professione pietatis aut laudatus erit aut excusatus*.

Since it contains so many features found in Plutarch, another proem to an individual life should be considered, even though it was written a century after Plutarch's *Lives*. The proem which introduces Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (1. 1–3) is perhaps the most elaborate preface to any ancient biography, befitting the extraordinary length of the life itself. After beginning with a digression on Pythagoras of Samos and his special relation to the gods,²⁰ Philostratus turns to the similar practices of his subject,

Büchner, "Das Proömium zum Agricola des Tacitus," *WS* 69 (1956) 325–43 = *Studien zur römischen Literatur* IV (Wiesbaden 1964) 23–42, L. Schmüdderich, "Das Proömium zu Tacitus' 'Agricola,'" *Die Altsprachliche Unterricht* 8, Heft 5 (1965) 31–37, and R. M. Ogilvie and I. Richmond, *Cornelii Taciti de Vita Agricolae* (Oxford 1967) 125–40.

¹⁹ The phrase is borrowed from Cato's *Origines*: cf. Ogilvie-Richmond *ad loc.*

²⁰ The introductory digression on Pythagoras is especially striking as a technique to arouse the reader's interest before introducing the actual subject of the life. Although apparently off the point, the transition to Apollonius is made smoothly. For parallels, see the very brief statement on the treatment of thieves and moneylenders at the beginning of Cato's *De agricultura*, or the account of Cicero's philosophical writings in *De divinatione* II, which seem more closely tied to the subject than the more elaborate excursus which introduces Sallust's *Catiline*.

Apollonius. He refers to Apollonius' many outstanding qualities, but notes that he has also been slandered as a *magos*, and defends him from that charge. Philostratus, in writing his biography, will not condone ignorance such as that shown by these attacks, but "be most precise (ἐξακριβῶσαι) both as to the times when Apollonius did or said something and to the habits of 'wisdom' by which he came to be considered δαιμόνιος and θεῖος." This statement on accuracy introduces a treatment of sources, which he asserts have been collected from many cities and temples, from the accounts of others and from Apollonius' own letters. A catalogue of sources follows this general statement. Philostratus has used the account of Damis of Nineveh, who studied with Apollonius and later wrote of his travels, opinions, discourses, and prophecies, the book of Maximus of Aegae on Apollonius' stay in Aegae, and the testament of Apollonius himself. He scorns as worthless the four books written by Moeragenes. The empress Julia Domna had provided the specific occasion for the biography, when she asked Philostratus to recast in a more elegant narrative (ἀπαγγελία) the memoirs of Damis, which although most interesting, had not been skillfully told. Philostratus complied, and by adding new sources created a new biography as an honor for the sage and to instruct lovers of learning.

Philostratus' use of rhetorical structures and techniques is obvious. The poem arouses the interest of the reader by comparing Apollonius favorably with Pythagoras and indicating Apollonius' wondrous practices and prophecies. By refuting the charges that Apollonius was a *magos*, the preface invites the reader's goodwill toward him, while the allusions to the patronage of Julia Domna, to the excellences of the sources used, and to the author's care with style create a good disposition toward the work itself. Finally, the hints as to Apollonius' life and activities prepare the reader to learn more about him. Note especially that Philostratus has integrated the historians' treatment of sources and accuracy into the *captatio benevolentiae*. According to rhetorical theory, the use of such material *ab adiunctis*, that is, from matters indirectly related to the topic, was especially suitable for epideictic rhetoric, a category which could include both history and biography.²¹

²¹ A variation of the same technique can be seen in the geographical excursus which introduce books II, III, and V of the life. On this use of the excursus and other features of a literary poem, see Erren, *Einführung*, 66–84.

The introduction to Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* appeals more simply and directly to its dedicatee, the future emperor Gordian, expecting his interest because of Gordian's relationship to Herodes Atticus and their previous conversations on the orators. Nevertheless the author reinforces that interest by noting that he has not given a detailed treatment, but only presented the features most important to understand the subjects' virtues and vices, successes and failures. Its purpose is to lighten the worries of a busy man, not to overwhelm him with factual detail. The avoidance of many standard features suggests that the work may not be biography at all: cf. C. P. Jones, in G. W. Bowersock, *Approaches to the Second Sophistic* (University Park, PA 1974) 11–12. On the dedication, see I. Avotins, "The Date and Recipient of the *Vitae Sophistarum* of Philostratus," *Hermes* 106 (1978) 242–47.

This brief review of biographical proems reveals both similarities and differences in emphasis. The biographical proem often emphasizes praise of the subject, a theme also found in historical prefaces, although rarely as a major item.²² The importance of praise, however, does not hold true of all biography: there is a radical difference between the biography of a single person (Agesilaus, Evagoras, Augustus, Agricola, Apollonius) and a set of biographies (Nepos, Suetonius, Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*). The major emphasis in the latter is not praise (although that may be a component) but the variety of persons and ways of life treated, and the pleasure to be drawn from learning about them. Philostratus is unusual in referring specifically to his sources in the proem to the *Apollonius*, presumably because this too was an account of the past, not a contemporary encomium, as are the other individual lives.²³ All employ proems which attempt to interest the reader in the work at hand.

When Plutarch's proems are considered in the light of those just reviewed, it becomes clear that he employs many of these same features to create a distinctive and flexible form which does not conform to any established pattern. The *Theseus* supplies an excellent example.²⁴

The proem to the *Theseus* opens with a striking comparison of the biographer to geographers preparing maps, which plays on the reader in several ways. The opening comparison, and the direct address to the dedicatee, Sosius Senecio, are standard rhetorical techniques meant to arouse the interest of the reader, the first purpose of a proem in rhetorical theory.²⁵ The special request to the "listeners" to accept his presentation of τὸ μῦθῶδες with goodwill (1. 5) addresses the second purpose, and the brief summary in chapter two of the common features of the lives of Theseus and Romulus the third, that is, to render the reader "ready to learn" (*docilis*), by giving him a foretaste of the subject. But the real focus of the proem is on Plutarch himself, and his relations to his subject and his reader. The elaborate introductory period,²⁶ with its vivid simile, turns on the discomfiture of the author in reaching a "territory" where there are no clear markings or guideposts. By sharing with the reader this discomfiture, this sense of venturing into uncharted lands, he invites the reader's

²² History stresses the importance of the particular subject being presented, whether a given war, a special period, or the history of a nation. The utility of the history is also important, although this varies from the broadest insight into human nature and the historical process to specific exempla of human action, "of what to avoid as bad, and imitate as good," as Livy says.

²³ A statement on method, justifying the new history, appears regularly in historical proems. Histories of the past concentrate on the use of good sources and the improvement over past accounts, in style and completeness.

²⁴ On the peculiar purposes and qualities of the *Theseus*, see F. J. Frost, "Plutarch and Theseus," *CB* 60 (1984) 65-71.

²⁵ For the use of comparisons, see H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik*² (München 1960) 155, #271 8, 8' citing Quintilian 4. 1. 70.

²⁶ For the use of periods in proems, see Lausberg, *Handbuch* p. 469, #947.

comprehension and sympathy, and forestalls the potential objection against the mythical element in this pair of lives. In the following sentence Plutarch expresses his determination to "purify" the mythical element, and give his account the appearance of history (ιστορίας ὄντιν, 1. 5), but asks the indulgence of the reader for those passages where the intractability of the material rejects any mixture of probability. The personification of τὸ μυθώδες is remarkable: the biographer would like it to be subject to reason (λόγῳ ὑπακούσαι), but it "rashly scorns the credible" (αὐθάδως τοῦ πιθανοῦ περιφρονῇ). The mythical is a wild beast, with a mind of its own, not easily tamed. Whereas in the well-known *Alexander*-proem Plutarch reminds his reader that he is writing biography, not history, here he stresses his affinity with the historian, working in areas "accessible to reasoned argument (ἐφικτὸν εἰκότι λόγῳ)" and "well-grounded on history clinging to facts" (βάσιμον ἱστορίᾳ πραγμάτων ἐχομένη).

But why does Plutarch choose to write on Romulus and Theseus at all? The answer comes in carefully phased stages: first Romulus is chosen, as already being quite close in time to Numa and Lycurgus, the most recent pair treated (all belong to the eighth century). Thinking of Rome's founder then suggests to Plutarch the founder of Athens, even though this man, Theseus, takes him back another five centuries, well into the mythical world prior to the Trojan war, populated with monsters and heroes, the τερατώδη καὶ τραγικά described by poets and mythographers, to which he had earlier alluded. While Romulus is the stuff of legend, it is only with Theseus that Plutarch truly enters the realm of myth, and it is immediately after mentioning him that Plutarch warns that the material is indomitable and invokes the goodwill of the reader. That done, the rest follows easily. Once the choice of subjects is accepted (indicated by δ' οὖν at 2. 1), Plutarch can go on to the other similarities with Romulus which justify the choice of Theseus. Note also in this proem the two "heroic" quotes from Aeschylus and the *Iliad*, which both ornament the passage and set the atmosphere for the heroic stories which will follow in the lives. This proem thus prepares the reader for the lives which follow by capturing his interest, winning agreement on the treatment of the subject, and creating a bond of interest and sympathy between the author and the reader. It sets the tone of mythical-heroic narrative, and invites the reader to share with the author the sense of exploring a strange land, where there is no reliable information. The *Theseus* represents a breakthrough into mythical time, beyond the frontier of history. The proem warns the reader of the danger, while assuring him of the conscientiousness of his guide.

Although concerned with a very particular problem, the proem to the *Theseus* is not unusual. The thirteen formal proems in the *Parallel Lives* each respond to the particular needs of a pair of lives, displaying similar patterns of themes and techniques.

The most frequent theme is Plutarch's purpose in writing the *Lives*. Simply stated, he intends to incite his readers to virtue, as he asserts most

clearly in the *Pericles*. There he argues that it is the duty of every person to focus and nourish his mind on the best objects, especially actions which derive from virtue, since those inspire one to noble imitation. His biographies of Pericles and Fabius will provide just such examples. In the *Aemilius*, Plutarch speaks of the lives as similar to a mirror, in that they provide an image by which one can order one's own life according to the virtues of those men. Again, they are like being a guest in someone's house, sharing their life. In this way one assumes a conscious control over one's mental images, expelling anything ignoble, and concentrating on the finest paradigms.²⁷ Negative examples can also serve an educative purpose, as Plutarch notes in the *Demetrius*. An awareness of human weakness should make the readers "be more zealous spectators and imitators of better lives" (1. 6).

Other proems explore the moral features of the *Lives* not simply as exempla, but by posing fundamental questions of the ethical life. The *Cimon* argues that the biographer must not give undue attention to the weaknesses of his subject, but emphasize his strengths, recording only enough of the imperfections as to insure a recognizable likeness.²⁸ The fact is, Plutarch notes, that human nature is imperfect, and no one is without failings.

Several proems focus on the dominant role of external factors in a man's life. Often the successes or failures of great men are not determined by their own qualities, but by circumstances over which they have no control. The proems to *Dio-Brutus* and *Eumenes-Sertorius* relate the final defeats of these men to their fortune: as Plutarch states in the former, τύχη must accompany φρόνησις and δικαιοσύνη. The accounts of parallel supernatural appearances to Dio and to Brutus before their deaths raise the question whether τὰ δαιμόνια shake the philosophical conviction of the wise man and challenge the whole notion and utility of conscious progress in virtuous living. In the *Sertorius*-proem, Plutarch considers "tyche flowing now here, now there in the infinity of time." The ostensible theme of the proem is historical coincidences, but there is a moral facet as well, since along with their similarities of character and life-stories, both Sertorius and Eumenes "met a violent and unjust tyche at the end."

Phocion and Cato Uticensis are men fighting not their personal tyche, but that of the times. Phocion was fighting with his arete the τύχαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Cato, according to Plutarch, "fought a great battle with tyche, which seized and threw down the republic through other men, but because of Cato and his arete the republic almost survived. Fortune won only with difficulty, and slowly, and after a long time" (*Phoc.* 1. 4, 3. 4). Cato, or

²⁷ Cf. also *Aratus* 1, where Plutarch commends consideration of noble ancestors as paradigms for one's own behavior.

²⁸ In practice, however, Plutarch devotes a surprising amount of attention to the faults of both Cimon and Lucullus, as has been shown by R. McComb in an unpublished paper.

rather Cato's *arete*, wrestled with *tyche*, and was almost able to conquer it. Two other heroes, Aemilius Paullus and Timoleon, shared both good personal choices and good fortune, so that the reader must ask "whether they succeeded more from good luck (εὐποτυμία) or intelligence (φρονήσσει)" (*Aem.* 1. 6).²⁹ The search for fame can also affect virtue. The proem to *Agis and Cleomenes* considers the relation between δόξα and ἀρετή: the discussion in chapter two could easily come from one of the *Moralia*. *Arete* is confirmed by praise, but "an excess of political ambition is destructive," since it leads to a *mania* and senselessness.

The proems thus arouse interest by posing an inquiry which Plutarch clearly considers most significant to his readers, the nature of *arete*, how it manifests itself, how it is affected by the differing circumstances in which it is expressed, and how it can be imitated.

The second major theme is the discussion of method, and is closely related to the moral purpose, since the method used in the lives is meant to bring out the *arete* of the heroes. Plutarch's statement of method in *Alexander 1* is well known: since he writes biographies, not histories, he will concentrate on small matters—jokes, sayings, anecdotes—which often reveal more of character than do great battles. His method, that is, is determined by the desire to explore the *ethos* of his subjects. Military campaigns and political decisions are relevant only in so far as they help the biographer toward this goal. The *Cimon* notes that a portrait should be accurate and not omit (as an encomium would) a person's faults, but also argues that excessive precision in presenting weaknesses of character is not suitable. Again, historical detail is relevant only in so far as it contributes to the portrait being painted. Yet the proem to the *Theseus* reveals Plutarch's uneasiness when he moves beyond the normal domains of history to the poetic and mythological, and reminds the reader that Plutarch wishes to base his lives on firm historical material. In fact, several of the formal proems are devoted to the questions of sources and accuracy in the *Lives*. In the *Nicias*, overwhelmed by the excellence of Thucydides' narrative, which he cannot improve upon in style or vividness, he nevertheless justifies his account by the additional decrees, dedications, and other material which he will include, and which he hopes will better illuminate Nicias' character. The *Demosthenes* notes the difficulty of working in Chaeronea, away from the libraries and learned conversation of a city like Athens, at a time when Plutarch needed to collect passages drawn from scattered foreign writers. Moreover, his knowledge of Latin is insufficient to attempt the kind of literary comparison which might be expected in a book on Demosthenes and Cicero (*Dem.* 2).³⁰ In fact, in the *Demosthenes* Plutarch cites over twenty

²⁹ The contrast of luck and virtue is a standard philosophical and rhetorical debating point: cf. Plutarch's *De fortuna Romanorum* and *De fortuna an virtute Alexandri*.

³⁰ Note Plutarch's comment at the end of the *Demosthenes*, "Now you have, Sosius, the life of Demosthenes, from what we have read or heard" (31. 7), and again at the beginning of the

sources, including historians, philosophers, comic poets, and orators, but for the *Cicero* he restricts himself chiefly to a few of Cicero's own works. According to Pelling, "the second half of *Cicero*, in particular, is scrappy and ill-informed."³¹ Later, when composing other Roman lives of the Civil War period, he would investigate the matter more thoroughly, revealing that despite his lament in the *Demosthenes* proem he had by that time been able to get access to other sources.³²

References to unusual or contradictory sources are also the most frequent means of augmenting the rhetorical effectiveness of the informal proems found in nine pairs of the *Parallel Lives*. As has been noted, in the openings of these nine lives, which lack formal proems, Plutarch adapts the common biographical categories of origin and family, education, and physical appearance to fulfill the standard proemial functions of arousing interest in his book and establishing goodwill toward the author. His consideration of the source problem in connection with one of these categories usually involves as well a question of character, and thus focuses once more on the *ethos* of his subject.

For example, the *Solon* opens with an abstruse quotation from Didymus giving a unique identification for Solon's father. Another quotation from Heraclides Ponticus introduces the question of Solon's relationship as kinsman and lover to Peisistratus, which is explored at some length. The discussion concludes with a reference to Peisistratus' relationship to Charmus and the statue of Eros in the Academy connected with that affair. The chapter combines the themes of special knowledge of sources, family history, and friendship, erotic or not, with a famous tyrant. In the opening chapter of the *Aristides-Cato Major* pair, Plutarch examines and systematically refutes the arguments of Demetrius of Phaleron concerning the wealth of Aristides' family. He is clearly trying to catch the reader's attention by deploying a variety of evidence: he quotes the inscription on the choregic tripod; he recalls the cases of Epaminondas and Plato, who were helped by their wealthy friends Pelopidas and Dion to pay for choruses; he cites the researches of Panaetius; he inserts his own knowledge of the ostracism of Pericles' counselor Damon and makes a passing mention of a variant found in Idomeneus; and finally, he gives his own sceptical judgement of Demetrius' motives. Plutarch converts what might have been a simple statement on Aristides' justice despite his relative poverty into an elaborate historical analysis. Thus he both emphasizes the importance of the notion of the just man's independence from money and

Comparison, "This is as much of what is worth recalling or what has been investigated concerning Demosthenes and Cicero as has come to our knowledge."

³¹ C.B.R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives," *JHS* 99 (1979) 74-96, at p. 75.

³² On the sources used in these later lives, see Pelling, "Plutarch's Method . . ." pp. 83-91.

draws the reader into his work by involving him in the scholarly disputes which had arisen around Aristides' archonship.

In a similar manner, in the proem to the *Themistocles* Plutarch explores Themistocles' humble parentage, from which he rose to such great heights, through the citation of an epigram, quotations from Phanias and Neanthes, a discussion of the Cynosarges gymnasium, and a reference to the shrine at Phyle mentioned by Simonides. In the three cases of Solon, Aristides, and Themistocles the category of origin and family has been elaborated to serve a proemial function, exploiting the wealth of sources that Plutarch had available.

Other lives employ different formulas. The *Pyrrhus* opens with an extended history of Pyrrhus' house, beginning not with Achilles, which might have been enough, but with the flood. The mythological references to Phaethon, Deucalion, and Pyrrha precede the heroic figures of Achilles, Neoptolemos and his wife Lanassa (granddaughter of Heracles). Finally, semi-historical times are reached with the first Hellenized king, Tharrupas, and his descendants. The graceful display of erudition (even to noting that Achilles receives divine honors in Epirus, under the name Aspetos) arouses the attention and interest of the reader. In addition, the barbarian interlude in the genealogy suggests a certain rawness in Pyrrhus' ambition, which is confirmed in the course of the life, and further paralleled in the companion figure of Marius.

For the *Lycurgus*, the theme of the informal proem must be the obscurity of the subject: "Concerning Lycurgus the lawgiver one can say absolutely nothing certain, since his origin, his journey abroad, his death, and especially his legislation are reported variously; the greatest differences are found with regard to the time when he lived." There follow a series of citations from Aristotle, Eratosthenes, Apollodorus, Timaeus, and Xenophon which illustrate the different positions taken on Lycurgus' lifetime. Finally, Plutarch contrasts the name the poet Simonides gives for Lycurgus' father, Prytanis, and the common account of his descent from Heracles, in which his father was Eunomos the son of Prytanis. The hope Plutarch expresses to "provide a narrative with as few contradictions and as many prominent witnesses as possible" (*Lyc.* 1. 7) is at risk from the beginning.

Plutarch exploits his own special knowledge of Delphi in the *Lysander*, which opens with a digression on the statue at the treasury of the Acanthians. This, he asserts, is a statue of Lysander, not of Brasidas, as commonly supposed. The reason for the error is the inscription on the treasury, "Brasidas and the Acanthians, from the Athenians." The statue shows Lysander to be a man tied to the old traditions of Lycurgan Sparta, with long hair and a noble beard. The hair style permits Plutarch to correct those, including Herodotus, who did not think that this was a custom deriving from Lycurgus, and at the same time to set the tone for his portrait

of Lysander as an upright man and preserver of the old ways. In this case the category of physical appearance has been adapted to serve as proem.³³

Three of the proems which discuss the method of the biographer may be seen as meeting potential objections to the works in question, a standard proemial function.³⁴ In the *Nicias*, Plutarch explains that he is not attempting to rival the brilliance of Thucydides' Sicilian narrative, while in the *Alexander* and *Theseus* he asks the indulgence of the reader, either for passing over so quickly famous battles and other historical set pieces, or for presenting material so patently fabulous.

Intimately related to the problem of moral growth and the development of virtue is the question of education. In two of the informal proems Plutarch uses the standard biographical topic of early training as the peg on which to hang his proem. The story of Cleandrus of Mantinea, who came as an exile to Megalopolis and became the guardian of Philopoemen after the death of his father, opens the *Philopoemen*. The young hero was trained by Cleandrus as Achilles was by Phoenix. Later the young man's education was completed with the knowledge of philosophy and freedom, learned from Ecdelus and Demophanes, men trained in the Academy and active in political affairs, the very men who freed Megalopolis of the tyrant Aristodemus, helped Aratus expel Nicocles tyrant of Sicyon, and reorganized the government of Cyrene. Inspired by their teaching and example, Philopoemen was ready to become "the last of the Greeks," the last fighter for Greek freedom. Education plays a different role in the *Coriolanus*: the hero was noble by nature (φύσις), but suffered from lack of training (παίδεια). Therefore the book opens with some of the illustrious figures of the Marcian gens, which indicate and assure Coriolanus' inborn nobility, but then focuses on the absence in his early years of proper formative influences, as a result of which he lacked also the measure and disposition which is necessary for greatness. The same lack of παίδεια was found also in the companion hero, Alcibiades, though in a quite different way. Finally, in the *Agessilaus*, which comes closest of all the lives to having no preface at all, Plutarch writes that thanks to being first a private citizen, Agessilaus came to ruling "having already been trained to rule," and so was uniquely able to be in tune with his subjects.³⁵

A standard theme of historical proems is the praise of history, both of its usefulness and the pleasure it brings. The praise of biography, and especially of the moral biography which he writes, is Plutarch's principal topic in the *Aemilius* proem and a major element of that of the *Pericles*,

³³ The proem of *Sertorius* also takes advantage of a physical feature, Sertorius' loss of one eye, to build its discussion of *tyche*.

³⁴ The figure, called πρόληψις or *anticipatio*, forms part of the *praeparatio* which begins in the proem. See Lausberg, pp. 424-25, #854-55 and Quintilian 9. 2. 16, 4. 1. 9.

³⁵ The first chapter of *Agessilaus*, which seems to fill the role of informal proem, is less than one page, as against the total for *Agessilaus-Pompey* of 156.5 pages.

both of which have already been discussed. In general, however, Plutarch in his proems prefers to express the value of biography indirectly through his statements of purpose and method.

In developing the themes of his proems, Plutarch employs rhetorical techniques to achieve the goals of attention and docility. He occasionally strives also for good will, but more often presumes that his reader is already well-disposed toward him and his work. The variety and sophistication of these techniques, and the success with which they are adapted to the individual lives, establishes Plutarch as a master of proemial style. Rhetoricians noted that the reader's interest might be aroused by *chreiai*, *gnomai*, comparisons, digressions, metaphors, and indirection—and Plutarch uses all of these, usually several in a given proem.³⁶ Thus in the *Pericles* Plutarch opens with a *chreia*, a short historical anecdote focusing on the words of (Augustus) Caesar, who asked, when he saw some foreigners fondling monkeys and puppies in their arms, "Don't their wives bear children?" Then Plutarch moves, via a consideration of τὸ φιλητικόν in humans, to an extended analogy between the proper objects of the senses and of the mind, an analogy enriched by comparisons with the occupations of dyeing, perfume-making, and sculpture. The thought is reinforced by additional *chreiai* from Ismenias the flute-player and Philip of Macedon. Finally, he concludes with a general *gnome* on the effect of τὸ καλόν in moving the soul to noble action.

The *chreia* is Plutarch's favorite opening technique, sometimes used as an authority, to reinforce the argument, as in the *Pericles*, sometimes as a foil for Plutarch's own opinions, as in the *Demosthenes*. There Plutarch begins by quoting the encomium of Alcibiades' Olympic victories, which asserted that for happiness a man needs first of all a famous city. Plutarch, however, rejects this, and affirms his own opinion that happiness depends most on character and interior condition. The use of *chreiai* is flexible, and leaves much room for variety. Other lives are introduced by related forms of traditional discourse, such as proverbs or fables. For example, the opening of the *Aratus* corrects one version of a proverb with an older one; *Agis-Cleomenes* begins with anonymous interpreters of the Ixion myth. Of the thirteen formal prefaces in the *Parallel Lives*, five begin with some form of *chreia*.³⁷

A different technique is found in opening of *Cimon-Lucullus*. The vivid short story of Damon, the descendant of a founding family of Chaeronea who killed a Roman officer and turned outlaw, is exceptional as

³⁶ Cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch*, pp. 155–56, #2718. A *chreia* is a saying ascribed to a famous person, whose authority guarantees the value of the statement, whereas a *gnome* or *sententia* is a general statement not tied to a particular historical figure. See Lausberg pp. 536–40, #1117–20 and pp. 431–34, #872–79.

³⁷ *Per.*, *Dem.*, *Phoc.*, *Dio.*, and *Pel.*, to which may be added *Sol.* from the informal proems, *Arat.* from the individual lives, and *Galba* from the *Lives of the Caesars*. Negatively cited *chreiai* are found in *Sol.*, *Phoc.*, *Arat.* and *Galba*.

an opening for one of the *Parallel Lives*.³⁸ However, this kind of short narrative is one form of digression, which is a common device in proems to arouse interest. Other examples include Philostratus' digression on Pythagoras at the beginning of the *Life of Apollonius*, as well as Sallust on the development of leadership in the *Catiline* or Cicero on his philosophical works in *De divinatione* II. Their purpose is to arouse the interest of the reader, and need not be connected with the work that follows, although Plutarch's story in the *Cimon* is in fact tied to the pair of lives it introduces, since Lucullus' testimony saved the city from Roman punishment for Damon's murders. The discussion of historical coincidences which opens the *Sertorius* serves a similar purpose. The first two chapters of *Agis-Cleomenes* discuss the relation of δόξα and ἀρετή, starting with an interpretation of the myth of Ixion which sees Ixion's fate as analogous to the situation of the φιλόδοξοι, who pursue δόξα as an εἶδωλον τῆς ἀρετῆς. Only in the third chapter does Plutarch turn to the particular case of the Gracchi, and then of the revolutionary Spartan kings. The *Demetrius* begins with a discussion of the manner in which persons understand through opposites, in the crafts and other skills, and then develops a comparison between the perceptions and crafts. The specific reference to the subjects of the pair of lives does not come until 1. 7-8. As has been seen, the *Aemilius* takes its start from the biographer's own delight in his work, and the usefulness he finds in it, while the *Theseus* begins with a comparison between biography and map-making.

The writing of proems was apparently a common school exercise. Even experienced writers could prepare collections of proems at leisure, so that they would be available to add to a new essay or treatise. In one letter to Atticus (16. 4. 4), Cicero admits shamefacedly that by mistake he had prefaced his newly composed *De gloria* with a proem from his private collection which had already been used for *Academics* III. He noticed the error only later when he was rereading the *Academics*. A major fault for a proem was that it could be attached to any work indiscriminately. Plutarch usually avoids this charge, taking some pains to integrate the theme of the proem to the pair of lives which follow. Nevertheless, some general proems, such as those of the *Aemilius* on biography or of the *Pericles* on the contemplation of virtuous deeds, would fit a number of lives. The preface to the *Alexander*, distinguishing biography from history, might equally have been applied to *Agessilaus-Pompey*, though it is true that the latter pair had received less treatment from historians.

Comparison of Plutarch's proems with those found in other biographical works reveals the variety of techniques and approaches he has employed. The format of the *Parallel Lives* required an exceptional number

³⁸ They are frequently found in the separate introductory pieces called *prolaliai* or *laliai* found in Lucian. A description of a beautiful object was also recommended as an opening: cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch* p. 155, #271 ε, α'.

of proems, and he took the opportunity to explore diverse modes of introducing his pairs of lives. Those essays of the *Moralia* which preceded the *Lives* would have given him practice in opening treatises on a broad spectrum of topics, and in fact the proems owe much to the philosophical and moral considerations so common in those essays. Many show the same technique of discussion by means of comparison and analogy, freely flowing between verse quotations, *chreiai*, and examples from the arts and natural sciences. Another sort of model was offered by histories with multiple books, each introduced by a proem, such as were found in Ephorus and are known from Diodorus. However, being part of a predetermined and structured whole, those prefaces would have a different function from the proems to pairs of lives written one at a time, the author adding to them as the fancy struck him. The treatment of method and emphasis on research in out of the way sources, although present in later historians, is rare for biography. Even Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, which makes a point of identifying and justifying the sources it employs, gives proportionately less weight to the question than has been found in Plutarch.

Throughout all the proems, formal and informal, the most distinctive feature is the way in which Plutarch uses them to establish his own *ethos*. Those with dedications to Sosius Senecio (*Dem.*, *Dio*, *Thes.*, *Aem.*, *AgCl.*) clearly are meant to express an air of friendship, intellectual pleasure, and high moral values. But the others continue that same warmth, the feeling of being in contact with an understanding and intellectually curious person, someone who is serious yet not stuffy, aware of life in all its manifestations, yet deliberately avoiding the unseemly and trying to present the best side of his subjects. Plutarch does not usually give his readers biographical details, as do, e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus or Appian (the proem to the *Demosthenes* is an exception). But he often unselfconsciously shares with them his feelings and assessments: his discomfiture at leaving the bounds of known history in the *Theseus*, his delight in writing biographies, which he sees as an aid to his own moral development (*Aem.*), his disdain for the profession of sculptor (*Per.* 2), and his fears that something might shake the calm of the philosopher (*Dio*).

What notion of the audience for these lives can be derived from these proems? His readers were male, upper-class, and leisured. They were distrustful of the populace and the errors of *hoi polloi* (*Phoc.* 2. 1, 8), scornful of dyers and perfumers (*Per.* 1. 5), and supportive of the Roman order, even though they recognized that individual Romans would misuse their authority. On this point the story of Damon in *Cimon* 1-2 is most revealing: although Damon comes from an old Chaeronean family and has been sexually harassed by a Roman officer, the sympathy of the narrative is with the town officials who outlaw him after he murders his tormentor. Lucullus is seen as the fair and honest Roman official who saves the city when the hostility of a neighboring Greek town might have destroyed it. Plutarch's readers were also politically active, and expected to learn from the

lives of statesmen and to imitate their virtues and avoid their errors in their own everyday affairs. Yet Plutarch never suggests, as is frequent in proems,³⁹ that his readers were hurried and had to be presented with important material as rapidly as possible.

Though involved in government, Plutarch's audience were also intellectuals, well-read and familiar with the science of their day. They enjoyed tragic quotations, were familiar with maps of strange places (*Thes.* 1), and with histories of Alexander the Great. They understood metaphors drawn from the philosophy of perception or astronomy (*Per.* 1. 3, *Phoc.* 2. 6). They admired Thucydides, but were wary of the fabulous (*Thes.* 1), and did not read for pleasure—or at least admit to reading—stories of scandal and sexual dalliance (*Demetr.* 1. 5). They were philosophically inclined and interested in moral growth (*Aem.* 1). While they admired writing as a means of understanding philosophical and ethical truths (*Per.* 2, *Aem.* 1), they considered the other arts on a different level, and their practitioners—flautists, sculptors—as low class, since what they produced, while beautiful, was fundamentally useless (*Per.* 1. 5–2. 1).

Such a portrait could easily match the dedicatee of the *Lives*, Sosius Senecio, or at least the way he would like to see himself. It would also match Plutarch himself, and this is perhaps one of the secrets of the *Lives*, that Plutarch envisions an audience so much like himself, not only interested in but sharing his feelings on moral improvement, duty, and the importance of philosophy in guiding one's life. If the reader did not actually live this way, he wished to. Plutarch does not write up to his audience, as a client to his patron or an inferior to a superior, nor down, as a teacher to his pupils, the expert to the uninitiated. Rather he establishes a relation of friendship and equality, in which he has pride of place because of his reading and devotion to higher ideals. Plutarch accepts that he is on the road to wisdom, but implies that his reader is too, and invites him to walk with him. It is this unpretentious and unquestioned unity of interests between author and reader, so apparent in the proems, which creates much of the charm and the power of the *Parallel Lives*.

This examination of the proems of the *Lives* should naturally lead to comparison with those of Plutarch's other essays, and of other works intended for a general readership, such as Seneca's letters or some of the essays of Galen. However, this attempt to set the lives in the context of belles-lettres in general must be set aside, as Plutarch would say, "for another essay." But even with this examination of Plutarch's proems, it is possible to appreciate the variety of techniques that he has employed, and the importance of a few major themes. The *ethos* of his heroes is central, meant to be an example and often an inspiration to his readers. The formation of character is complex, since, as the proems frequently assert,

³⁹ Cf. e.g. Nepos, or Philostratus' *Life of the Sophists*.

favorable or adverse circumstances and the training one receives can significantly shape even a virtuous man's career. Finally, the proems often demonstrate Plutarch's delight in employing a variety of sources, while keeping their focus on his primary goal, to understand the nature of the man, not merely to describe his deeds.

Appendix: The non-parallel *Lives*

Four of Plutarch's *Lives* do not belong to the set of *Parallel Lives*: *Aratus*, *Artaxerxes*, *Galba* and *Otho*. Of these the last two belong to another set, *Lives of the Emperors*. The proem of the *Galba* introduces a new book, which would have included the *Otho* and the lost life of Vitellius, thus concluding his series of the emperors. Suetonius also had combined the three emperors of 69 A.D. in one book. The *Otho* has no proem, but continues directly after the *Galba*, with the first day of the new emperor's reign.⁴⁰ *Otho* had already been introduced in the course of the former *Life*. Like the formal proems of the *Parallel Lives*, that of the *Galba* is set off by the asyndeton at 3. 1 from the body of the life. The life itself is concerned almost completely with the events of 68 and 69 (4. 3 to the end, 28 of 29 pages). The opening is provided by a *chreia*, which here introduces the theme of the corruption of the soldiery by money and pleasure. The theme is expanded with other *chreiai* by Aemilius Paullus and Plato, then applied to the particular case of the events after Nero's death. Another *chreia* introduces the comparison of the Romans with the sufferings of the Titans, and a comparison with the ten-month reign of the tyrant Polyphron emphasizes the disintegration at Rome, where four emperors ruled in a like period. The theme of corruption of the soldiery is reintroduced, this time specifically applied to Nymphidius Sabinus, who by his payments to the troops destroyed not only Nero, but also Galba. Finally, there is a *recusatio*, similar to that in the *Alexander*-proem: a detailed account belongs to πραγματική ιστορία, but Plutarch will not pass over the ἄξια λόγου of the actions and sufferings of the Caesars. Here, contrary to the *Alexander*, Plutarch does not say he is looking for *ethos*, or virtue and vice, and leaves quite vague what exactly he considers ἄξια λόγου and how much he thinks he should include of that which is not "actions and sufferings." The *Galba* is given a kind of epilogue in c. 29, in which Plutarch takes the sum of Galba's attempt to be emperor and suggests the strengths and weaknesses of his character. From this it appears that Plutarch's principal aim in fact has been to illuminate the character of the emperors, and what they did and suffered is used as indications of the character. In this the *Lives of the Emperors* were similar to the *Parallel Lives*, but did not (apparently) include the emphasis on education and life before the accession, which is so

⁴⁰ For a more detailed study of the proem to the *Galba* and its relation to the *Otho* see the paper of A. Georgiadou, No. 10 in this volume.

important in most of the *Lives*. Obviously, however, an *Augustus* or *Tiberius* would be much richer than a *Galba* or *Otho*.

The *Artoxerxes* does not have a formal proem, but the account of the family and of Artoxerxes' pre-accession name serves as an informal proem, moving the reader into the world of Persia and introducing two of Plutarch's major sources, Deinon and Ctesias (the third, Xenophon, will be mentioned in c. 4). However, other proemial themes are lacking. Plutarch does not say why he chose to write this life: was he considering a collection of Persian kings, similar to that of the Roman emperors? Or was he attracted because of the confluence of first-hand sources in Xenophon and Ctesias? The *Aratus*, on the other hand, has a full formal proem, marked off by the asyndeton which begins c. 2.⁴¹ The proem is divided into two parts, the general considerations on praising one's ancestors, and the particular statement of Plutarch's decision to write on Aratus and his reasons for it. The two are united by the references to the dedicatee, Polycrates, at 1. 1, 3, and 5.⁴² The proem opens with the quotation of a proverb, as quoted by Chrysippus, but then corrected according to the grammarian Dionysodorus. The point is that while some bad men substitute praise of their distinguished ancestors for their own good actions, it is right for good men also to praise their ancestors, using them as "homegrown examples" for their lives. This notion of *paradeigmata* which ties together the generations, leads naturally to Plutarch's desire to write the biography of the famous Aratus for the children of his friend, himself a descendant of Aratus, so that they can be nourished by these examples, and learn what they should imitate. The use of lives as sources of virtues to imitate is one of the fundamental objectives of the *Parallel Lives*: see especially the proems to *Pericles* and *Aemilius*, and in a negative sense, the *Demetrius*. The *sententia* which concludes the proem generalizes again the notion to the wider readership which Plutarch expects. At the very end of the *Life* (54. 8), however, Plutarch recalls the personal dedication, noting that the family of Aratus "survives in Sicyon and Pellene to our own day."

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⁴¹ See on the proem A. J. Koster, *Plutarchi Vita Arati* (Leiden 1937) XVII–XVIII, XXVIII–XXIX.

⁴² Polycrates is probably to be identified with the friend mentioned at *De Pyth. Or.* 409B and *Quaest. Conv.* 667E ff., and with the Helladarch Tib. Claudius Polycrates (*PIR*² C969, *SIG*³ 846): cf. C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 26, n. 41, 40.

Remarques à propos de l'usage des citations en matière de chronologie dans les *Vies*

FRANÇOISE FRAZIER

C'est en étudiant l'organisation du récit historique dans la *Vie de Nicias* qu'un passage de cette *Vie* a attiré mon attention sur le peu de rigueur chronologique montré par Plutarque lorsqu'il doit produire comme documents des textes littéraires, qui sont, pour l'essentiel, des oeuvres poétiques, vers d'Homère ou d'Hésiode, élégies, passages des comiques.¹

Parties d'une telle constatation, les remarques que je voudrais proposer s'attacheront surtout à la conception que Plutarque se fait de la chronologie et à l'intérêt, limité, qu'il lui porte. Il s'agit par là de mieux préciser la distance qui le sépare des historiens modernes, lors même qu'il semble recourir à une méthode documentaire voisine et d'adapter en conséquence nos propres études critiques.

Cela ne saurait mieux se faire qu'en s'appuyant sur quelques passages, narratifs ou descriptifs, des *Vies* où apparaissent nettement les rapports chronologiques entre époque du texte cité, époque des faits relatés et présent du narrateur; je me propose donc d'étudier de très près quelques extraits, essentiellement des *Vies de Solon* et de *Nicias* et, pour la commodité de l'exposé, et dans la mesure où leur texte grec n'est pas essentiel, je donnerai le texte des citations poétiques en traduction.²

Les citations n'étant ainsi qu'un moyen privilégié d'aborder les questions chronologiques, un seul point technique retiendra notre attention: le temps

¹ Homère: *Thes.* 25. 3 et 34. 1—voir aussi 20. 2; Hésiode: *Thes.* 3. 4, 16. 3 et 20. 1; *Sol.* 2. 6; Simonide: *Agés.* 1. 1—il serait aussi l'auteur des inscriptions citées in *Pel.* 1. 7; *Them.* 8. 5 et *Arist.* 19. 7—; Archiloque: *Thes.* 5. 3; Ion de Chios: *Thes.* 20. 2; les tragiques Mélanthios, auteur de vers de circonstance: *Cimon* 4. 1, 7 et 9, Euripide: *Thes.* 3. 4 et 15. 2, *Nic.* 9. 7 et *Alc.* 11. 3, Eschyle: *Them.* 14. 1; Critias pour une élégie: *Alc.* 33. 1; surtout les comiques, cités en bloc: *Arist.* 5. 8; *Demosth.* 9. 5—*Per.* 8. 4 et 24. 9 (ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις) et nommément, avec Aristophane: *Nic.* 4. 7 et 8. 3—4, *Alc.* 1. 7 et 16. 2—3, *Per.* 26. 4 et 30. 4, *Cim.* 16. 5—voir aussi *Ant.* 70. 1; Cratinos: *Sol.* 25. 2, *Per.* 3. 5, 13. 8, 13. 10 et 24. 9, *Cim.* 10. 4; Eupolis: *Per.* 3. 7 et 24. 10; *Alc.* 13. 2; *Nic.* 4. 6, *Cim.* 15. 4; Télécliclès: *Per.* 3. 6 et 16. 2, *Nic.* 4. 5; Phrynichos: *Nic.* 4. 8; Archippos: *Alc.* 1. 8; Hermippos: *Per.* 33. 8; Platon le Comique: *Per.* 4. 4, *Them.* 32. 6, *Nic.* 11. 6—7, *Alc.* 13. 9—voir aussi *Ant.* 70. 1; Ménandre: *Alex.* 17. 7 et Philippiès: *Demetr.* 12. 7.

² Selon la traduction de R. Flacelière dans la C.U.F.

du verbe, déclaratif comme φάναι, λέγειν, ou plus démonstratif comme μαρτυρεῖν, ἐμφαίνειν ou δηλοῦν, qui introduit la citation. On constate une large majorité de présents; vient ensuite le parfait, temps qui maintient un certain rapport avec le présent du narrateur en produisant le texte comme le résultat toujours actuel et existant d'une rédaction ou d'une énonciation passée. Au contraire l'aoriste qui replacerait la production du texte dans son cadre historique est rarissime: je n'en ai relevé que deux cas, l'attaque de Philippiens contre son ennemi, le flatteur de Démétrios, Stratoclès; la rédaction de certaines lettres, preuves de son intérêt pour ses amis par Alexandre;³ dans le dernier cas surtout, il est clair que Plutarque a voulu insister sur l'action même du roi se donnant la peine d'écrire à ses amis: d'où l'emploi exceptionnel de l'aoriste.

En général cependant, grâce à cet emploi massif de présents ou de parfaits, le texte cité se trouve détaché de la continuité narrative; il est un élément à part, toujours accessible dans le présent et vérifiable, au même titre que les inscriptions, monuments, décrets que Plutarque se plaît à mettre en avant. Sa pratique alors ne diffère guère en apparence du souci de documentation de l'historien moderne, mais cette similitude ne résiste pas à l'examen.

En premier lieu, un historien moderne—sauf à être historien de la littérature—ne voit guère dans le texte littéraire qu'un moyen d'éclairer la situation historique qu'il analyse en y retrouvant, par exemple, un reflet des préoccupations de l'époque. Chez Plutarque, en revanche, les relations entre texte littéraire et récit historique paraissent fonctionner dans les deux sens: le récit peut être appuyé par la citation, mais le texte peut aussi recevoir une certaine lumière du récit.

Un exemple particulièrement significatif, entre autres,⁴ se lit dans la *Vie de Périclès*; ayant évoqué le marquage des prisonniers athéniens par les Samiens et des prisonniers samiens par les Athéniens—qui avaient imprimé une Samienne sur leur front—, Plutarque ajoute (*Per.* 26. 4):

C'est à ces marques, dit-on, qu'Aristophane a fait allusion en disant: "Ce peuple de Samos, comme il est riche en signes!"

Πρὸς ταῦτα τὰ στίγματα λέγουσι καὶ τὸ Ἀριστοφάνειον ἦνιχθαι.

Tò Ἀριστοφάνειον, sans référence même à la comédie d'où il est extrait, confère au vers une sorte d'existence propre; il se suffit à lui-même comme vers "énigmatique" et le verbe ἦνιχθαι, employé ici, est très courant dans l'interprétation littéraire. Tout se passe donc comme si, en annexe au récit

³ *Demetr.* 26. 5 et *Alex.* 41. 3; il est intéressant de comparer ce passage de la *Vie d'Alexandre* où Plutarque insiste sur la marque de dévouement que constitue le fait même d'écrire et introduit tous les exemples par ἔγραψε avec le début du chapitre suivant où, s'attachant au contenu des lettres, il recourt désormais au présent θαυμάσαι δ' αὐτὸν ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ μέχρι τοιοῦτων ἐπιστολῶν τοῖς φίλοις ἐσχόλαζεν· οἷα γράφει . . .

⁴ Voir aussi *Cim.* 10. 4—avec le ἔοικε qui dénonce l'effort exégétique—; 15. 4; *Alex.* 17. 7.

du siège de Samos, Plutarque se faisait ici l'écho de débats littéraires sur un vers difficile: ce que paraît confirmer l'emploi de λέγονσι.

De ce glissement de la narration vers la critique littéraire, on trouverait un autre exemple très intéressant dans le récit de l'intervention de Solon dans l'affaire de Salamine que je n'évoquerai que rapidement. Le Sage a composé une élogie pour convaincre ses concitoyens et l'a apprise par coeur, puis—le texte grec mérite d'être cité (*Sol.* 8. 2): ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ κήρυκος λίθον ἐν ᾧδῃ διεξῆλθε τὴν ἐλεγείαν ἧς ἐστὶν ἀρχή. Suivent deux vers qui ne nous intéressent pas directement. Par le biais de cette citation, on glisse de l'énonciation passée διεξῆλθε à l'éternel présent du texte ἐστι;⁵ le commentaire qui suit la citation est plus évident encore. Plutarque ajoute: τοῦτο τὸ ποίημα Σαλαμὶς ἐπιγέγραπται.

Le verbe traduit sans ambiguïté le passage du poème récité par Solon au texte écrit qu'a pu lire Plutarque qui donne son appréciation esthétique: καὶ στίχων ἑκατὸν ἐστὶ, χαριέντως πάνυ πεποιημένον. Après quoi il renoue avec le fil du récit par un τότε dé.

Dans de tels cas,⁶ la citation n'est plus vraiment, ou du moins plus seulement un document. Sa valeur propre d'oeuvre littéraire prend le dessus; le texte devient une sorte de monument et la question de la chronologie tombe d'elle-même, puisque la citation suspend en fait le récit en une sorte de parenthèse littéraire intemporelle.

Cette attitude d'érudit méritait d'être signalée, même rapidement, mais c'est sur l'usage documentaire des citations que je voudrais insister à travers deux exemples, dont le texte de la *Vie de Nicias* qui a suscité mon intérêt.

Il s'agit du chapitre 8 de cette *Vie*. Au chapitre précédent, Plutarque a raconté la séance au cours de laquelle Nicias a cédé le commandement à Cléon. La victoire de celui-ci est mentionnée en quelques mots et le biographe s'attarde sur le discrédit que valut à Nicias ce désistement. Le fait est d'abord nettement posé: ce fut pour Nicias la cause d'une grande impopularité. Est donnée ensuite l'explication morale de cette réprobation:

⁵ On peut même hésiter sur l'interprétation du membre de phrase final τὴν ἐλεγείαν ἧς ἐστὶν ἀρχή et comprendre—soit "il récita l'élogie en question, son élogie, dont voici le début" en considérant que l'article défini vient de ce que l'élogie a déjà été mentionnée auparavant (ἐλεγεία συνθεῖς); la relative est alors une pure introduction, assez lâche;—soit "il récita l'élogie dont le début est" en faisant de l'article une sorte d'appel du relatif et en donnant à la relative une valeur pleinement déterminative; les deux vers permettent alors, éventuellement, au lecteur de repérer de quelle oeuvre de Solon il s'agit. C'est ainsi que semblent avoir compris B. Perrin dans la Loeb ("the elegy which begins") et le plus récent traducteur, N. Manfredini ("l'élegia di cui questo è l'inizio"). R. Flacelière en revanche penche pour la première solution—mais se laisse aller à fausser le temps de la relative—en traduisant "il chanta toute son élogie qui commençait ainsi." Dans ce cas, le glissement ne se fait qu'avec la relative ajoutée comme présentation; dans l'autre interprétation c'est tout le groupe objet qui sort déjà du narratif.

⁶ Voir aussi *Thes.* 20. 1–2 (vers supprimés et ajoutés chez Hésiode et Homère); *Demosth.* 9. 5–6 (exégèse d'une raillerie: sens général ou particulier); *Mari.* 11. 10 (origine de la *Nekyia*).

Il n'avait pas jeté son bouclier, mais il semblait avoir commis une action pire et plus honteuse en renonçant volontairement par lâcheté à rester à la tête de l'expédition et en abandonnant à son adversaire l'occasion d'une si grande victoire, tandis qu'il se démettait lui-même de son commandement.

C'est à ce point qu'interviennent les citations d'Aristophane:

Aussi Aristophane le raille-t-il une fois de plus, lorsqu'il dit dans les *Oiseaux*: "Non, ce n'est pas pour nous le moment de dormir, ni de temporiser, par Zeus, comme Nicias!" et qu'il écrit dans les *Laboureurs*: "Je veux labourer. —Eh bien, qui t'en empêche? —Vous. J'offre mille drachmes pour être dispensé des magistratures. —Nous acceptons: Cela fait deux mille drachmes avec celles de Nicias."

Considérons d'abord la phrase d'introduction, au présent comme de coutume: *Σκώπει δ' αὐτὸν εἰς ταῦτα πάλιν* 'Αριστοφάνης . . . λέγων . . . Le *πάλιν* ne peut guère renvoyer qu'à une citation précédente du même auteur, au chapitre 4, où le vers 358 des *Cavaliers* a été utilisé pour illustrer la pusillanimité de Nicias terrorisé par Cléon.⁷ Par hasard, il se trouve que les *Cavaliers* sont vraiment antérieurs aux *Oiseaux*—encore que, si l'on suit Plutarque et la chronologie que suppose son récit, les pièces se rapprochent singulièrement, puisque les *Cavaliers* ont été joués au lendemain de Sphactérie, en 424, comme sembleraient l'avoir été les *Oiseaux*.

En effet le *εἰς ταῦτα*, rendu par un vague "aussi" dans la traduction de R.Flacelière, est beaucoup plus précis et renvoie clairement à la dérobade de Nicias. Il est impossible d'arguer d'un caractère général de cette raillerie des *Oiseaux*: Plutarque la donne, sans doute possible, comme suscitée par Sphactérie et là où le bât nous blesse, c'est que ces événements datent de 425 quand la pièce est de 414: onze ans de réflexion font une plaisanterie bien réchauffée! Plutarque commet donc une erreur chronologique. Une erreur sporadique ne prêterait pas à conséquence et, surtout, ne permettrait pas de tirer de conclusion. Mais, si l'on regarde les autres citations documentaires d'Aristophane,⁸ on retrouve exactement le même phénomène.

⁷ *Nic.* 4. 7. Plutarque y attribue à tort à Cléon une réplique du charcutier, Agoracritos. G. Marasco voudrait voir dans cette confusion (*Vita di Nicia* [Roma 1977] 15) une confirmation de l'hypothèse selon laquelle toutes ces citations littéraires seraient de seconde main. Cela ne me paraît guère convaincant: en quoi est-il plus vraisemblable que l'erreur se soit trouvée dans la source de Plutarque et que Plutarque, qui connaissait la pièce, n'ait pas songé à la rectifier? On peut tout aussi bien penser que Plutarque, qui travaillait surtout de mémoire—et en particulier pour des citations de ce genre, ses notes devant principalement concerner les faits—a été trahi par elle; c'était d'autant plus aisé que, dans leur affrontement verbal, Cléon et Agoracritos disent sensiblement la même chose, le second se contentant de surenchérir sur le premier; il pouvait en outre être tentant de mentionner plutôt l'homme politique réel, que le récit allait mettre ensuite face à Nicias, qu'un personnage de fantaisie.

⁸ *Cim.* 16. 8; *Per.* 8. 4, 26. 4 et 30. 4; *Nic.* 4. 7 et 8. 3-4; *Alc.* 1. 7 et 16. 2; *Ant.* 70. 1 contient une référence sans citation; *Them.* 19. 4 reprend une expression portant jugement sur l'action de Thémistocle.

Deux exemples, particulièrement nets, peuvent être cités. Dans la *Vie d'Alcibiade*, le héros, à la veille de l'expédition de Sicile où il imposera ses vues sur celles de Nicias, atteint un sommet de gloire et Plutarque s'arrête pour peindre les sentiments mêlés éprouvés à son endroit par ses concitoyens. Ses brillantes qualités politiques et militaires les emplissent d'admiration, mais ses scandales privés les dégoûtent et les indignent. Plutarque recourt alors aux *Grenouilles* (*Alc.* 16. 3):

Les dispositions du peuple à son égard, Aristophane ne les a pas mal décrites quand il a dit: "Il l'aime, il le déteste et pourtant veut l'avoir." Et, avec plus de sévérité encore, dans cette allusion: "Surtout, ne pas nourrir un lion dans la ville, mais, si on le nourrit, se prêter à ses moeurs."

La difficulté pour nous, c'est que ces vers—les vers 1425 et 1432–33 des *Grenouilles*—ont été inspirés à Aristophane par le grand débat autour du rappel d'Alcibiade en 405: encore une fois dix ans après l'époque où en est le récit.

Plus curieux encore pour nous—car, on pourrait, à la limite, dire que les Athéniens ont toujours eu la même opinion d'Alcibiade, tout au long de sa carrière—est un passage de la discussion, au demeurant fort embarrassée, de la responsabilité de Périclès dans le déclenchement de la guerre du Péloponnèse. A cette occasion sont développés les démêlés avec Mégare. Le héraut athénien ayant été tué en chemin, Athènes durcit encore sa position. Mais, écrit Plutarque (*Per.* 30. 4):

Les Mégariens, niant l'assassinat d'Anthémocritos [le héraut], rejettent la responsabilité sur Aspasia et Périclès en citant ces vers célèbres et populaires des *Acharniens*:

"De jeunes Athéniens, après s'être enivrés, en jouant au cottabe

Pour enlever la courtisane Simaetha se rendent à Mégare.

Alors les Mégariens, furieux et pareils à des coqs de combat,

Pour venger cet affront, s'en vont chez Aspasia ravir deux courtisanes."

De quels Mégeriens Plutarque parle-t-il? S'il pense à des contemporains de Périclès —et l'irruption d'un présent de narration pour souligner leur riposte est d'autant moins étonnante que celle des Athéniens à l'assassinat d'Anthémocritos vient d'être introduite par un *γράφει κατ' αὐτῶν ψήφισμα Χαρίνο*s—alors, l'anachronisme qui préside à la reconstitution de ce débat est flagrant, puisqu'il leur prête comme argument un historique fantaisiste tiré d'une pièce de 425 av. J. C. Si en revanche, ce qui peut sembler plus vraisemblable, il s'agit d'écrivains mégariens postérieurs, le présent introduisant banalement une citation dont la seule originalité est d'être au deuxième degré, la désinvolture vis à vis de la chronologie n'est pas moins patente, puisque Plutarque saute sans crier gare du décret de 431 av. J. C. à une époque totalement indéterminée. Dans les deux cas, il écrase la perspective temporelle et avance les arguments des deux camps, tels qu'ils ont été élaborés au cours du temps, mais comme s'ils étaient contemporains.

Ce faisant, il traite les thèses de chacun comme des sortes de données intemporelles qu'on peut insérer sans difficulté dans une discussion des responsabilités, sans prendre garde qu'elles ne coïncident pas avec le point du récit où il en est arrivé.

Au vu de tous ces textes, il faut admettre que nos calculs des dates, nos interrogations pour savoir si tel texte postérieur reflète néanmoins l'opinion de l'époque n'intéressent pas Plutarque alors qu'il lui serait sans doute possible, s'il le voulait, de déterminer la date des pièces. Les manuscrits d'Aristophane portaient en effet à l'époque des didascalies indiquant sous quel archontat la pièce avait été jouée⁹ et Plutarque fait référence dans les *Vies*¹⁰ aux listes officielles des archontes. Mais il ne songe pas à de telles recherches. Il attend du texte qu'il lui livre un argument ou un jugement adapté à son propos et peu importe à quel moment précis a été rédigé ce qui fonctionne désormais comme une sorte d'élément moral intemporel.

Quand on a bien compris cette indifférence totale du biographe à la précision chronologique, on s'aperçoit par là même qu'il devient inutile de l'accuser ou de le défendre d'avoir commis des "erreurs" historiques: simplement ce qui est erreur pour nous ne l'est pas pour lui et il n'y a rien à ajouter à cela.

En le défendant même, on peut aboutir parfois à des résultats curieux, comme le montre l'édition commentée de G. Maresco, à propos de notre chapitre 8 de la *Vie de Nicias* où l'on passe d'une justification du biographe à une mise en cause de l'actualité des pièces d'Aristophane! Un tel saut mérite qu'on s'y attarde quelque peu.

La citation des *Oiseaux* gêne suffisamment l'éditeur italien pour qu'il y revienne deux fois. Dans sa note au texte, il se contente de suggérer que seule la date de la pièce a pu faire songer à rapporter à l'expédition de Sicile une pique qui dénonçait un trait habituel de Nicias; mais on peut très bien l'interpréter autrement: à preuve ce que fait Plutarque.¹¹ Un éditeur doit certes essayer de bien comprendre son auteur, mais de là à lui manifester une telle confiance. . .

Le point est à nouveau soulevé, avec un peu plus de détails dans un appendice consacré au Nicias d'Aristophane. G. Marasco pose en principe que les *Oiseaux* sont une pièce apolitique et qu'il ne saurait donc y avoir d'allusions à l'expédition de Sicile. Après quoi il n'a plus de problème et peut écrire:

⁹ Je dois cette indication à l'obligeance de M. Chantry.

¹⁰ *Arist.* 5. 9-10.

¹¹ *Ed. cit.* n. 3, 96: "Poichè la commedia è del 414, l'accento è stato, da alcuni, riferito alla tattica temporeggiatrice di Nicia in Sicilia. Tuttavia la tendenza a temporeggiare era una caratteristica dello stratego, che gli spettatori conoscevano bene e che si era esplicata in varie occasioni. Lo stesso Plutarcho, del resto, riferisce chiaramente il verso al comportamento di Nicia nell'episodio di Sfacteria e tale conclusione appare accettabile."

Ces prémisses posées, il n'est pas nécessaire de voir dans les allusions au personnage de Nicias une référence précise à sa conduite en Sicile; ces vers ne doivent pas être nécessairement rapportés à la tactique temporisatrice de Nicias en Sicile; c'était en effet une habitude du stratège, bien connue des spectateurs et qui s'était manifestée en diverses occasions. C'est pourquoi on ne doit pas considérer comme une erreur le fait que Plutarque rapporte ces vers au comportement du stratège dans l'épisode de Sphactérie.

Et il rejette en bloc, dans une note sèche, l'opinion contraire, émise pourtant par un spécialiste du théâtre, R. Goossens.

Cette opinion se trouve exposée dans un article de l'*Antiquité classique* de 1946, dont le titre "Autour de l'expédition de Sicile" oriente déjà l'interprétation des allusions des *Oiseaux*. R. Goossens insiste d'abord sur les méfaits du préjugé d'apolitisme attaché à cette pièce, responsable du refus de comprendre les railleries d'Aristophane comme visant les affaires de Sicile: cette attitude est, trente ans plus tard, toujours celle de G. Maresco.¹² La temporisation moquée pourrait très bien être celle que Plutarque reproche aussi à Nicias au lendemain de sa brillante victoire de Dascôn—le texte se trouve au chapitre 16 de la *Vie*¹³—. Ayant invoqué aussi les analyses concordantes des modernes, G. Glotz et J. Hatzfeld, qui voient dans ce début d'expédition une suite d'atermolements et de fausses manœuvres, le savant poursuit à propos du vers qui nous intéresse:

Cette allusion maligne n'a jamais embarrassé aucun commentateur. Car rien n'est plus connu que cette faiblesse de Nicias; nos sources antiques sont unanimes à le lui reprocher. Mais ici encore il convient de se souvenir que la comédie ancienne, dans sa partie satirique, emprunte tous ses effets à l'actualité la plus immédiate.

Il n'est pas question de discuter ici ce présupposé, mais de montrer comment une citation faite à contre-temps par Plutarque dégénère en débat sur l'apolitisme des *Oiseaux* et, plus largement, sur l'actualité des attaques dans la Comédie ancienne;¹⁴ questions passionnantes, mais qui n'ont rien à voir

¹² Apolitisme et inactualité sont remis en question par J.C. Carrière in *Le carnaval et la politique* (Paris 1979) p. 105 et n. 67, pp. 116–17; voir aussi E. Lévy *Athènes devant la défaite de 404: Histoire d'une crise idéologique*, BEFAR 225 (Paris 1976) 125–26.

¹³ *Nic.* 16.8: "La victoire éclatante qu'il avait remportée ne lui servit à rien, car, bien vite, quelques jours après, il se retira à Naxos pour y passer la mauvaise saison. Il dépensait beaucoup pour une si grande armée et n'obtenait que de minces résultats auprès de quelques Siciliens qui se ralliaient à lui. . . . Tout le monde alors blâmait Nicias qui, à force de réfléchir, de temporiser et de prendre des sûretés, laissait passer les occasions d'agir."

¹⁴ Il est à noter qu'on trouve la même hésitation dans les scolies (contrairement à ce que dit R. Goossens qui ne paraît pas connaître les scolies de R et de V). Ces deux manuscrits donnent en effet une interprétation d'actualité "ὅς ἀνεβάλλετο ἀπελθεῖν εἰς Σικελίαν"; ailleurs, on trouve une interprétation générale "ὅτι βραδὺς ἦν περὶ τὰς ἐξόδους. καὶ ὥς οἱ διαβάλλοντες οὐχὶ προνοητικὸς ἦν, ἀλλ' ἀμελετής. Τινὲς δὲ φασὶ τὸ προνοητικὸν καὶ μὴ προπετές. τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι." Il n'est d'ailleurs pas sûr que des scolies, datant au plus tôt de l'époque hellénistique, nous livrent l'explication exacte des allusions d'actualité.

avec Plutarque. Une fois mis au jour son usage "achronologique" des citations, il est clair que les spécialistes d'Aristophane n'ont aucune lumière à attendre de lui et surtout, que les spécialistes de Plutarque n'ont pas à gaspiller leur énergie à le défendre d'avoir enfreint des règles chronologiques ignorées de son époque, en empiétant de surcroît sur le terrain de leurs collègues, spécialistes de la comédie.

A côté de cette citation des *Oiseaux* qui nous a occupés si longuement, on trouve encore, dans ce chapitre 8, une citation des *Laboureurs*. Pour cette pièce perdue, les choses se présentent différemment, puisque sa date est inconnue. Mais, précisément, ce fragment joue un grand rôle dans l'établissement de celle-ci et il semble bien que, peu ou prou, les critiques se laissent influencer par Plutarque. L'auteur fondamental sur cette question est Bergk dans l'édition Meineke (II. 2., p. 983 sqq.). Le savant allemand reconnaît avoir longtemps hésité pour savoir si la dérobadie de Nicias visait Sphactérie—comme dit Plutarque—ou la Sicile—ce que suggère le rapprochement avec les *Oiseaux*—. Pour trancher, il ne s'appuie que sur Aristophane: ce qu'on sait de l'argument de la pièce la rapproche des *Acharniens* ou de la *Paix*,¹⁵ donc la situe loin de l'époque de l'expédition de Sicile.¹⁶ Mais, quand il en vient à chercher une date précise, parmi les années disponibles, il rejette sans hésiter l'année 422¹⁷ pour s'arrêter sur les Dionysies de 424 au motif que "la pièce n'a pas pu être jouée très longtemps après Sphactérie": ce qui revient à faire confiance à Plutarque. Il a peut-être en effet raison, mais il peut tout aussi bien avoir tort. L'allusion au don d'une somme d'argent dans le texte ne convient pas pour Sphactérie et a laissé perplexes tous les commentateurs: il se peut qu'elle s'explique par l'intrigue de la pièce; il se peut aussi qu'elle vise un autre fait ignoré de nous. Là encore, je ne suis pas en mesure de trancher; je ne peux que suggérer aux spécialistes de ne pas trop se fier à Plutarque dans ce genre de questions.

L'indifférence à l'exactitude chronologique, patente chez lui, ne doit cependant pas être confondue avec un désintérêt total pour tout ce qui est chronologique. On trouve un certain intérêt, si limité soit-il, une certaine vision de celle-ci qu'un second passage, tiré de la présentation de Solon, va nous aider à déterminer.

¹⁵ Voir les derniers éditeurs des fragments, Austin et Kassel (vol. III. 2 [1984]), qui rappellent que certains ont même voulu, à tort, faire de cette pièce une seconde version de la *Paix*.

¹⁶ "De tempore autem, quo fabula acta esse videatur, diu dubius haesitavi, nunc vero omnino contendo scriptam esse non ita multo post expeditionem ad Sphacteriam. Namque, fr. I Nicias cunctabundus animus ridetur ita a poeta, ut illum insigne aliquod verecundiae documentum edidisse necesse sit; atque de Sicula quidem expeditione cogites cave, nam aliae prorsus similes comoediae in illud cadunt tempus, itaque potius referenda est fabula ad illud tempus, quo Nicias Cleoni imperium cessit isque Sphacteriam expugnavit."

¹⁷ Plus prudents, Austin et Kassel gardent cette possibilité et ne tranchent pas entre les Dionysies de 424 ou de 422.

Au chapitre 2, Plutarque traite de l'état de fortune du Sage. Quasi ruiné par les générosités de son père, il dut se lancer dans le commerce. Vie chrématistique et commerce n'ayant pas bonne presse, il est cependant des auteurs pour attribuer ses voyages à son goût de la connaissance (πολυπειρία καὶ ἱστορία) et non à la recherche du gain (χρηματισμός). Plutarque creuse alors ces mobiles: il établit rapidement l'amour de la science grâce à la célèbre citation "Je vieillis en apprenant toujours," puis en vient aux rapports avec l'argent. C'est le passage qui nous intéresse:

La richesse ne l'éblouissait pas et il dit que sont également riches

"celui qui possède des masses

D'argent et d'or, des champs fertiles en froment,

Des chevaux, des mulets, et celui qui n'a rien

Que sa vigueur—bon estomac, bons flancs, bons pieds—

Puis, le moment venu, la beauté d'un garçon

Ou d'une femme: ainsi son bonheur est parfait."

Cette mise en balance de biens matériels et non matériels—qui rappelle la hiérarchie du septième *skolion* attique¹⁸—est donc regardée, par le biographe comme l'expression d'une opinion personnelle, conformément à la méthode classique dite "de Chamailéon" en vigueur dans toutes les biographies d'écrivains.¹⁹ Elle convient parfaitement à un homme pour qui l'argent n'a pas une importance capitale. Mais, à ce point, lui revient un autre texte où il est question d'argent et il poursuit:

Mais ailleurs il dit:

"Je veux avoir de l'or, mais non pas l'acquérir

Injustement: après viendrait le châtement."

Les textes semblent se contredire dans l'optique qui est celle de Plutarque. On pourrait songer à résoudre cette contradiction en regardant le contexte, littéraire ou historique, dans lequel ils ont été écrits: mais, c'est encore raisonner en moderne. Pour Plutarque, les textes ainsi isolés sont en soi l'expression d'une certaine vérité générale: relative dévalorisation de l'argent pour le premier, valorisation pour le second—et attaché qu'il est à voir ce que pense Solon de la richesse, il n'insiste pas non plus sur le point essentiel: la justice dans l'acquisition des biens. A y regarder de plus près, ce n'est pas même la contradiction qui le gêne, mais le seul contenu du second texte. Si le premier correspond parfaitement au détachement exigé de

¹⁸ Sur les tables des valeurs, on trouvera des indications intéressantes dans l'article de A.J. Festugière, "Les trois vies," repris in *Etudes de philosophie grecque* (Paris, Vrin 1971), en part. p. 119 sqq. "I. Préhistoire et genèse de la tradition des trois vies."

¹⁹ Sur cette méthode, voir G. Arrighetti, "Fra erudizione e biografia," *St. cl. or.* XXVI (1977) 13–67 et surtout M. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (Baltimore and London 1981); cette méthode d'exploitation des textes des poètes à des fins biographiques est préfigurée par le passage consacré à Solon par Aristote dans la *Constitution des Athéniens*, ainsi que l'a dès longtemps remarqué F. Leo.

l'homme de bien, il faut justifier le désir d'acquérir des biens exprimé dans le second; ce que Plutarque fait en deux temps.

Une règle morale s'efforce d'abord d'établir le juste milieu entre dédain du nécessaire et recherche du superflu que doit trouver l'*agathos kai politikos aner*.²⁰ Puis est avancé un argument historique: l'honorabilité dont jouissait à l'époque le travail—et donc le commerce—prouvée par le vers 311 des *Travaux et des Jours*. Plutarque rappelle:

En ce temps-là "travailler n'avait rien de honteux," comme dit Hésiode, et l'exercice d'un métier n'entraînait aucune discrimination.

Cette insistance sur l'absence de discrimination, note R. Flacelière, vient peut-être de ce que dans "l'aristocratique Béotie" natale de Plutarque, il existait des préjugés tenaces, au point que, selon Aristote,²¹ était exclu des fonctions publiques tout homme n'ayant pas cessé son activité lucrative depuis plus de dix ans.

Cet état d'esprit influence peut-être la reconstruction du passé à laquelle se livre Plutarque qui en fait un négatif du présent; en tout cas, il est net qu'Hésiode figure ici comme le représentant de la mentalité d'autrefois, sans plus de précision, et il est fort aventureux de suggérer à partir de cette citation que "Plutarque semble placer Hésiode à l'époque de Solon, bien que le poète des *Travaux* paraisse avoir vécu vers le milieu du VIII^e siècle." En écrivant cela, R. Flacelière montre bien comment même les spécialistes les plus éminents peuvent parfois se laisser aller à appliquer nos propres méthodes à Plutarque, cherchant des dates précises là où il se contente d'approximations.²²

Qu'Hésiode soit bien à ses yeux le représentant d'une sagesse ancienne aux contours chronologiques des plus flous (ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις), on le voit aussi dans la *Vie de Thésée*, quand est évoquée la figure du sage Pitthée, grand-père du héros (*Thes.* 3. 2-3):

Il acquit la plus grande réputation en se montrant l'homme le plus savant et le plus sage qui fût de son temps. Cette sagesse était, semble-t-il, du même genre et du même caractère que celle qui permit à Hésiode d'écrire ce qui surtout fit sa gloire: les sentences que renferme son poème des *Travaux*.

Et de préciser que, selon Aristote, une de ces sentences serait même reprise de Pitthée. Avec ou sans cet emprunt, Hésiode fournit un point de repère commode pour définir une sagesse gnômique, essentiellement morale, qui était celle des temps anciens et qui règne toujours à l'époque de Solon. Si

²⁰ Sur cette question chère à Plutarque, voir la *Comparaison d'Aristide et de Caton l'Ancien* et *Per.* 16. 7.

²¹ *Pol.* 3. 3. 4, 1278 a 25 cité pas R. Flacelière, C.U.F. II, n; 1, p. 12.

²² Dans la dernière édition de la *Vie de Solon*, L. Piccirelli (Verona 1977) 117 dénonce sans détour l'assertion de R. Flacelière comme erronée, mais, très curieusement, fait de cette évocation de la mentalité d'époque l'expression du sentiment de Plutarque ("per Plutarcho, che si basa sull'autorità di Esiodo [Op. 311], nessun lavoro è degradante . . .").

l'on continue la lecture de la *Vie de Solon*, Plutarque explique en effet au chapitre 3:

[§ 6] Il eut, comme la plupart des sages de son temps, une prédilection particulière pour cette partie de la philosophie qui a trait à la morale et à la politique alors que, dans les sciences physiques, il se montre d'une simplicité par trop archaïque.

Et, après une nouvelle citation illustrant cette simplicité, il poursuit:

[§ 8] Il semble, en somme, que seule la *sophia* de Thalès poussa alors par la théorie au-delà de l'utilité pratique, tandis que c'est à leur mérite politique que les autres durent leur renom de *sophia*.

Cet élargissement du point de vue fait apparaître deux formes de *sophia*, inscrites dans une certaine perspective historique. Il semble que prédomine d'abord une sagesse éprise d'utilité et privilégiant le politique—celle de Pithée, d'Hésiode, de Solon et de la plupart de ses contemporains—; puis se développa une forme appuyée sur la *théôria* et attachée à la connaissance des phénomènes physiques dont Thalès fut un précurseur. Se dessine ainsi une certaine vision de l'histoire de la philosophie dont on trouve çà et là des éléments dans les *Vies*.

Ainsi Mnésiphilos de Phréarres, maître de Thémistocle, est-il présenté comme "n'étant ni un rhéteur, ni l'un de ces philosophes qu'on appelle physiciens, mais faisant profession de ce qu'on nommait alors *sophia* et qui était en réalité l'habileté politique et l'intelligence pratique, conservées fidèlement par lui comme une doctrine héritée de Solon" (*Them.* 2. 6).

Cette sagesse politique, précise-t-il encore dans la *Vie de Périclès* [4. 2] pour Damon, dans la *Vie de Lycurgue* [4. 2-4] pour le Crétois Thalès, d'aucuns l'ont dissimulée d'abord sous le nom de musique: dans ces passages, l'influence de l'historique de Protagoras dans le dialogue du même nom ne fait guère de doute.²³

Probablement influencée par Platon et transmise dans les écoles, une certaine vision de l'histoire de la philosophie peut ainsi être reconstituée avec une première sagesse politique et gnômique, éventuellement dissimulée sous un autre nom, puis le développement de l'intérêt pour les phénomènes physiques et de la *théôria* qui acquit définitivement droit de cité avec le divin Platon, comme l'explique la digression sur la connaissance des éclipses dans la *Vie de Nicias*.²⁴

²³ *Prot.* 316 d-e: "Pour moi, j'ose affirmer que la profession de sophiste est ancienne, mais ceux qui la pratiquaient dans les premiers temps, craignant la défaveur qui s'y attache, la pratiquaient sous le déguisement ou le voile de la poésie, comme Homère, Hésiode, Simonide ou des mystères et des oracles . . . J'ai remarqué que quelques-uns même l'abritaient derrière la gymnastique . . . ; c'est sous le manteau de la musique que votre Agathocles, ce grand sophiste, s'est caché . . ." (traduction E. Chambry).

²⁴ *Nic.* 23. 2 sqq.: "Le premier de tous à avoir traité par écrit des phases de la lune avec beaucoup de netteté et de hardiesse, à savoir Anaxagore, n'était pas lui-même bien ancien à cette

Il n'est pas surprenant de voir Platon marquer le grand tournant de la philosophie; il est plus piquant de le voir figurer dans notre chapitre de la *Vie de Solon* au nombre de ceux qui montrent qu'à l'époque le commerce n'était pas déshonorant—puisque'il vendit de l'huile en Egypte—, aux côtés de gens aussi divers que Protis, fondateur de Marseille, Thalès et Hippocrate le mathématicien. Cette collection hétéroclite de personnages d'époques variées censés illustrer la mentalité ancienne et parmi lesquels Platon fait tache, montre bien comment l'esprit de Plutarque fonctionne par grandes idées générales: il s'agit de montrer l'honorabilité du commerce, et oubliant qu'il l'a circonscrite ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις, il énumère tous les hommes illustres qui l'ont pratiqué, descendant même jusqu'à Platon; s'agit-il de dessiner l'évolution des connaissances et de la sagesse, il se contente de grandes lignes sans repères chronologiques avec de vagues τότε ou ὁψέ.

Ainsi, si datations et synchronismes peuvent sporadiquement l'intéresser quand il s'agit de personnages—à preuve les réflexions sur l'impossibilité d'après les tables chronologiques d'une rencontre entre Solon et Crésus,²⁵—de telles considérations ne s'étendent ni aux faits ni aux textes cités. Plutarque exploite ces derniers,²⁶ sans considération de temps, pour appuyer une idée générale, par exemple "Solon n'aimait pas l'argent" ou pour illustrer les conséquences d'un acte, comme l'impopularité de la dérobade de Nicias. Parfois même il semble s'intéresser plus à la citation en soi qu'à ce qu'elle peut apporter au récit: c'est ce que j'ai proposé d'appeler la "citation-monument." Monument ou document, le texte cité est, en tout état de cause, hors du temps; toujours disponible dans le présent, il est prêt à s'inscrire dans la biographie au moment *narrativement* opportun, qui ne coïncide pas nécessairement avec le moment historique de sa composition. Cette désinvolture chronologique de Plutarque, qui rappelle la pratique des citations des rhéteurs, dénaturant sans scrupule des extraits de poètes pour les faire entrer dans leurs vues au mépris du sens propre des passages dans leur contexte et dans leur époque, cette désinvolture si étrangère à nos propres conceptions ne doit jamais être perdue de vue par le commentateur moderne: sa vigilance se relâchant, il risque en effet de se laisser emporter tout naturellement à des inductions chronologiques hasardeuses ou à des

date et son ouvrage . . . était encore secret et circulait entre un petit nombre d'initiés . . . En effet, on ne supportait guère les physiciens ni ceux qu'on appelait les météorologues, parce qu'en rapportant tout à des causes dépourvues de raison, à des forces aveugles et à des événements nécessaires, ils sapient la puissance divine . . . Plus tard, la doctrine de Platon, qui reçut un vif éclat de la conduite de ce grand homme, et aussi du fait qu'elle subordonnait aux principes divins et souverains le déterminisme du monde physique, dissipa les préventions contre ces études et ouvrit à tous la voie des sciences."

²⁵ *Sol.* 27. 1; voir aussi *Them.* 2. 5 et 27. 1–2; *Per.* 27. 4; *Numa* 1 et *Lyc.* 1.

²⁶ Même pour les faits, Plutarque ne s'embarrasse pas toujours de chronologie et tend à les prendre isolément à l'appui de tel ou tel trait du personnage, comme je m'attache à le montrer dans la thèse que je prépare actuellement sur les rapports entre morale et histoire dans les *Vies*.

discussions stériles. L'oeuvre de Plutarque est assez riche et vaste pour qu'on évite le plus possible de telles déperditions d'énergie et qu'on s'attache à "étudier Plutarque lui-même dans ses *Vies*," selon le conseil de Wilamowitz sur lequel R. Flacelière a choisi de terminer l'introduction générale à son édition des *Vies*: qu'il me soit permis de parachever cet hommage en faisant mienne sa conclusion.

Paris

Notes on Plutarch: *Pericles and Fabius*

DAVID SANSONE

Per. 1. 1 Ξένους τινὰς ἐν Ῥώμῃ πλουσίους κυνῶν ἔκγονα καὶ πιθήκων ἐν τοῖς κόλποις περιφέροντας καὶ ἀγαπῶντας ἰδὼν ὁ Καῖσαρ ὡς ἔοικεν ἠρώτησεν εἰ παιδία παρ' αὐτοῖς οὐ τίκτουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες

Most of Plutarch's commentators fail to indicate that this anecdote is preserved also in Athenaeus (518f = FGrH 234 F 8). In a discussion of the luxury-loving ways of the Sybarites, the author of the *Deipnosophistae* says πρὸς οὓς καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις Μασσανάσσης ὁ τῶν Μαυρουσίων βασιλεὺς ἀπεκρίνατο, ὡς φησι Πτολεμαῖος ἐν ὀγδόῃ Ὑπομνημάτων, ζητοῦσιν συνωνεῖσθαι πιθήκους, 'παρ' ὑμῖν, ὧ οὔτοι, αἱ γυναῖκες οὐ τίκτουσιν παιδία;' From the obscurity and precision of Athenaeus' reference and the contrasting vagueness (Julius Caesar or Caesar Augustus?) of Plutarch's, it appears at first sight as though Plutarch has carelessly ascribed to "Caesar" an incident that in fact belongs with the king of the Numidians. But this cannot be the whole truth. In the first place, there were no longer any Sybarites in the third century, when Massanassa was born. (This troubled only Cobet, whose marginalia include the note, "apparet aliquid excidisse in hanc sententiam καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις (ὀρθῶς ἂν τις εἴποι ὁ ξείνοισι τισί);" cf. S. P. Peppink, *Observationes in Athenaei Deipnosophistas* 1 [Leiden 1936] 1 and 69.) In the second place, it is possible to find other instances in which Athenaeus has apparently lifted material from Plutarch without acknowledgement, modified it in such a manner as to disguise his borrowing and, in some cases, attributed the material to a more obscure source. It is hoped that the following selection may inspire another scholar to investigate this matter more thoroughly: at 576d Athenaeus attributes to a certain Zenophanes, to whose existence he is our only witness, information concerning Cyrus' concubine Aspasia which he could readily find at Plut. *Per.* 24. 11. At 419a he recounts, on the authority of an otherwise unknown Megacles, an anecdote that Plutarch (*Cat. mai.* 2. 2) derived probably from the writings of Cato. At 44b-c Athenaeus attributes to "Aristotle or Theophrastus" the story of a certain Philinus who ate and drank nothing but milk, which is merely a confused version of what Athenaeus found at Plut. *mor.* 660e (see K. Hubert in *XAPITEΣ Friedrich Leo zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht* [Berlin

1911] 171 n. 1).

Per. 7. 7 ὁ δὲ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ (Sauppe: τοῦ δήμου codd.), τὸ συνεχὲς
φεύγων καὶ τὸν κόρον, οἷον ἐκ διαλειμμάτων
ἐπλησίαζεν . . .

The word οἷον seems to have caused troubles for the commentators. Amyot did not translate it and Koraes wished to delete it as superfluous. (Not Cobet; "Cob." in Ziegler's apparatus is a misprint for "Cor.") The note in the school commentary by Siefert and Blass reads, "das οἷον auf den ganzen Ausdruck und nicht etwa bloß auf ἐκ διαλειμμ.," which is neither helpful nor even intelligible. Only Schaefer has seen that ἐκ διαλειμμάτων is a technical expression and that it belongs to medical terminology. (For οἷον excusing metaphors, see *Alex.* 11. 2, *Cor.* 21. 2, *Flam.* 2. 2, *Mar.* 45. 4, *Marc.* 22. 5, *Per.* 8. 1, *Pyrrh.* 3. 6.) The expression occurs some hundred times in the medical writers and only very rarely elsewhere (*Epicur. Epist.* 3. 131, *Jos. Ant.* 1. 330, *D. L.* 10. 131, *Luc. de Domo* 8). But Schaefer misleads by noting that "morbi dicuntur ἐκ διαλειμμάτων ingruere." For, while the expression is used in this way by the medical writers, it is also used by them to refer to the gradual application of various treatments (e.g., *Galen* 6. 426. 6, 758. 8, 7. 942. 4, 10. 371. 9, 977. 3, 12. 413. 10, 13. 169. 10 Kühn, *Aetius Iatric.* 2. 96 [= 186. 5 Olivieri]), and this is surely a more appropriate association here. Plutarch portrays Pericles as the skillful physician, who supplies remedies at just the right time and in the appropriate quantities. Compare 15. 1 μιμούμενος ἀτεχνῶς ἱατρὸν ποικίλῳ νοσήματι καὶ μακρῷ κατὰ καιρὸν μὲν ἡδονὰς ἀβλαβεῖς, κατὰ καιρὸν δὲ δηγμοὺς καὶ φάρμακα προσφέροντα σωτήρια and 34. 5 καθάπερ [πρὸς] ἱατρὸν ἢ πατέρα τῇ νόσῳ παραφρονήσαντες ἀδικεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν. This notion of the statesman as physician (which shows up in the *Lives* also at *Agis* 31. 7, *Brut.* 55. 2, *Cam.* 9. 3, *Dion* 37. 7, *Lyc.* 4. 4 and *Marc.* 24. 2) is Platonic; cf. Dodds on *Pl. Gorg.* 503d5–505b12 (and add *Gorg.* 521a). For Plutarch's interest in medicine, see F. Fuhrmann, *Les images de Plutarque* (Paris 1964) 41–43.

Per. 9. 1 ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνου φασὶ τὸν δῆμον
ἐπὶ κληρουχίας καὶ θεωρικὰ καὶ μισθῶν διανομὰς
προαχθῆναι, κακῶς ἐθισθέντα καὶ γενόμενον πολυτελῆ
καὶ ἀκόλαστον . . .

The Budé translation reads, "il lui donna de mauvaises habitudes." Similarly Perrin ("thereby falling into bad habits") and Scott-Kilvert ("they fell into bad habits"). But there seems to be no parallel for κακῶς ἐθισθέντα in this meaning. The closest is apparently *mor.* 532c οὕτως ἐθισθεῖς, but the preceding ἐθιστέον . . . καλεῖν shows that an infinitive is to be supplied. Although Plutarch does occasionally use ἐθίζω absolutely with the meaning "habituate" (*Phil.* 14. 4, *mor.* 18b, 329a,

616b, 982e), the following passages rather suggest that κακῶς refers to the disapproval expressed by the "many others" and that Plutarch originally included an infinitive dependent upon ἐθισθέντα: *Cor.* 11. 6 καλῶς ἐθίζοντες . . . ἡγεῖσθαι, *Sol.* 18. 6 ὀρθῶς ἐθίζοντος . . . συναισθάνεσθαι, *mor.* 41b ὀρθῶς πάνυ καὶ πολιτικῶς ἐθίζοντες . . . ἄγεσθαι, 132e ἐθιζόμενοι καλῶς μὴ ζητεῖν, 528f ὀρθῶς ἐθίζων . . . δεδιέναι, 534a κακῶς ἐθίζει . . . ἀμύνεσθαι. The general meaning of the infinitive is suggested by the passage that Plutarch clearly had in mind, *Pl. Gorg.* 515e Περικλέα πεπονημένον Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα. Perhaps something like μαλακίζεσθαι or, better, καθῆσθαι has dropped out before καί.

Per. 11. 1 οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοί, μέγιστον μὲν ἤδη τὸν Περικλέα καὶ πρόσθεν ὀρώντες γεγονότα τῶν πολιτῶν, βουλόμενοι δ' ὅμως εἶναι τινα τὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντιτασσόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀμβλύνοντα . . .

What is the force of the article before πρὸς αὐτόν? The sentence would read as well or better without it and, indeed, most translators behave as though it did not exist. It does exist, however, at least in the manuscripts, and some account must be taken of it. Holden simply refers to Goodwin *SMT* §825, which states that "the participle with the article may be used substantively, like any adjective." But why should Plutarch wish to refer to "the man opposed to him" rather than simply "some man"? (The use of the article with the *future* participle, e. g. *Fab.* 3. 7, 16. 6, 18. 1, *Flam.* 7. 1, *Phil.* 12. 2, *Them.* 19. 2, to refer to an indefinite person or persons is not comparable; if it were, there would be no need of *τινα* here.) Amyot sensed the difficulty and translated, "voulans qu'il y eust quelcun de leur part" (reading *τινα* τῶν πρὸς αὐτῶν?). Similarly Bryan, perhaps influenced by Amyot, commented, "malim *τινα* αὐτῶν, aliquem ex suo numero." But it seems otiose to specify that the aristocrats wanted "one of their own" to oppose Pericles. I think it more likely that τὸν represents the ending of some adjective, the beginning of which has fallen out. If Plutarch had written *τινα* δυνατὸν πρὸς αὐτόν, the corruption would be readily explained (ΔΥΝΑ ≈ ΤΙΝΑ) and the sense excellent. The aristocratic party wished that there be some man of influence opposing him (for ἀντιτ. πρὸς + acc., cf. *Arist.* 1. 2), and so they chose Thucydides, the son-in-law or brother-in-law of Cimon, as Pericles' antagonist.

Per. 28. 5 ἐδεξιοῦντο καὶ στεφάνοις ἀνέδουν καὶ ταινίαις ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴν νικηφόρον

Surprisingly, commentators do not cite what is surely the source of this anecdote, *Thuc.* 4. 121. 1 τὸν Βρασίδαν τά τ' ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν . . . ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐταίνιουν τε

καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ. But it is not simply the case that Plutarch took Thucydides' anecdote about Brasidas and transferred it to Pericles. The same anecdote had already been applied (by Theopompus?) to Alcibiades: Nepos, *Alc.* 6. 3 *omnes illum prosequerantur et id quod numquam antea usu venerat nisi Olympiae victoribus coronis aureis* (laureis Westermann) *taeniisque* (Muretus: *aeneisque* codd.) *vulgo donabatur*; Plut. *Alc.* 32. 3 πρὸς ἐκεῖνον συντρέχοντες ἐβόων, ἡσπάζοντο, παρέπεμπον, ἐστεφάνουν προσιόντες, perhaps under the influence of Plato's portrait (*Symp.* 212d–e) of Alcibiades at Agathon's symposium: ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐστεφανωμένον αὐτὸν κιττοῦ τέ τινι στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἰῶν, καὶ ταινίας ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς. According to Ephorus (D. S. 13. 68. 3), the Athenian generals returning to Athens in 408 B.C. crowned their own triremes, which practice Duris attributed to Alcibiades: Athen. 535c (also Eustath. *ad Il.* 16. 419–20 = 3. 876. 20–21 van der Valk) ἐστεφάνωσε τὰς Ἀττικὰς τριήρεις θαλλῶ καὶ μίτραις καὶ ταινίαις.

Per. 28. 6 'ταῦτ', ἔφη, 'θαυμαστά, Περικλείς, καὶ ἄξια στεφάνων, ὅς . . .'

According to Holden, "ὅς is used as if (ταῦτά) σου had preceded." But, although he is usually keen to provide parallels for grammatical constructions, he gives none here, and Reiske was perhaps right to introduce an antecedent for the relative pronoun. He supplied σοῦ τὰ before θαυμαστά. Ziegler modified Reiske's conjecture and wrote θαυμαστά (σου). But Reiske's proposal is unidiomatic, and Ziegler's can be nothing more than a mere guess, for it is not immediately apparent why σου should have dropped out. Much more attractive, both from the point of view of sense and from that of palaeographical likelihood, would be θαυμαστὰ (τὰ σά). For the relative referring to the noun implied in a possessive pronoun, see [Aesch.] *PV* 752–53 τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἄθλους φέροις, ὅτῳ, *Soph.* *OT* 1193–96 τὸν σὸν δαίμονα, τὸν σόν, ᾧ τλᾶμον Οἰδιπόδα, . . . ὅστις, *OC* 730–31 τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου, ὃν, *Xen. Cyr.* 5. 2. 15 οἰκία . . . ἡ ὑμετέρα . . ., οἷ, *Isocr. Panath.* 191 τῆς δ' ἡμετέρας (sc. πόλεως) ἔτι βασιλευμένης, ἐφ' ὧν. In the end, however, the manuscript reading can likely be defended. For the relative pronoun, without antecedent expressed, introducing a relative clause with causal force, see the passages cited by Jebb on *Soph. OC* 263.

Per. 31. 4 τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς χειρός, ἀνατεινούσης δόρυ πρὸ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ Περικλέους . . .

Scott-Kilvert translates, quite correctly, "The position of the hand, which holds a spear in front of Pericles' face . . ." But the hand in question is that of Pericles, and τοῦ Περικλέους is as unwelcome in Greek as "Pericles'" is in English. The words should be deleted. They entered the text either from an interlinear notation by a reader or from τοῦ Περικλέους

εἰκόνα immediately above.

Fab. 4. 6 εὐξάτο τοῖς θεοῖς ἐνιαυτοῦ μὲν αἰγῶν καὶ συῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ βοῶν ἐπιγονήν, ὅσῃν Ἰταλίας ὄρη καὶ πεδία καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ λειμῶνες εἰς ὥραν ἐσομένην θρέψουσι, καταθύσειν ἅπαντα (UMA: ἅπαντας S).

Clearly the reading of S is a mere error. But is ἅπαντα, which all editors print, possible Greek? The only construction for it is in some adverbial capacity. (It cannot be internal accusative, like πολλὰ καταθύσαντες *Caes.* 63. 12, as that would leave no construction for ἐπιγονήν.) And so the Budé translation renders, “il promet de l’immoler entièrement.” But this is an odd way of saying something for which there exists, in any case, a perfectly clear expression (namely ὀλοκαυτεῖν; in *Plut.* only *mor.* 694b), for one would expect the adverb to be πάντως. Both sense and grammar would seem to require ἅπασαν. For the pattern ὅσος-clause + verb + form of πᾶς, see *Cim.* 10. 7 ὅσα ὦραι καλὰ φέρουσι χρῆσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἅπαντα, *Phil.* 16. 5 ὅσοι δ’ ἦσαν ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων ἀποδεδειγμένοι πολῖται τῆς Σπάρτης, μετώκιζεν ἅπαντας and *Pomp.* 30. 1 ὅσης Λεύκολλος ἄρχει χώρας καὶ δυνάμεως, Πομπήιον παραλαβόντα πᾶσαν. Plutarch elsewhere has rather lengthy ὅσος-clauses followed by forms of πᾶς referring to the antecedent; cf. *Ages.* 19. 2, *Caes.* 48. 3, *Eum.* 10. 2, *Thes.* 35. 3 and especially *mor.* 325e ὅσα γῆ φέρει καὶ θάλασσα καὶ νῆσοι καὶ ἡπειροὶ καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ δένδρα καὶ ζῶα καὶ πεδία καὶ ὄρη καὶ μέταλλα, πάντων ἀπαρχάς.

Fab. 6. 6 βοῦς . . . ἐκέλευσε συλλαβόντες ἀναδῆσαι δᾶδα πρὸς ἕκαστον κέρας ἢ λύγων ἢ φρυγάνων αὖων φάκελον.

A. J. Kronenberg (*Mnem.* 1 [1934] 162) notes, “Et ipsa res suadet ut corrigamus καὶ λύγων et Livii historia XXII 16, 7: ‘faces undique ex agris conlectae fascisque virgarum atque aridi sarmenti praeligantur cornibus boum.’ Saepius in mss. confunduntur καὶ et ἢ.” Livy, the sense of the passage and palaeographical considerations would be equally well satisfied if we wrote instead καὶ φρυγάνων. For the corruption, see *Cato mai.* 9. 12, 23. 5 (καὶ UA: ἢ S), 20. 10 (ἢ S: καὶ UA) and especially 13. 5 (ἢ τάξις καὶ S: ἢ τάξις ἢ UA).

Fab. 7. 7 ταῦτ’ ἀκούσας ὁ Φάβιος τὴν μὲν ὀργὴν ἔφερε πρῶως τῶν πολιτῶν, χρήματα δ’ οὐκ ἔχων, διαψεύσασθαι δὲ τὸν Ἀννίβαν καὶ προέσθαι τοὺς πολίτας οὐχ ὑπομένων
...

It is awkward for τῶν πολιτῶν and τοὺς πολίτας to refer, in the same sentence, to different groups. For it was not “the citizens” whom Fabius could not bear to betray, but the legionaries captured by Hannibal (cf. *Cato min.* 30. 5 ὅμηρα δ’ οὐ προήσεται). One possibility would be to read τοὺς

ὀπλίτας (for this easy corruption, see e. g., Jos. *Vit.* 372). Cassius Dio fr. 57. 35 Boissvain, however, appears to confirm the correctness of the word πολίτας, but suggests that it needs to be somehow qualified: ὁ Φάβιος τοὺς πολίτας (τοὺς Bekker) ἐν ταῖς πρὶν μάχαις ζῶντας τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρα ἀντ' ἄνδρὸς ἐκομίσατο. (Cf. *Fab.* 7. 5 ἄνδρα μὲν ἀνδρὶ λύεσθαι τῶν ἀλικομένων.) Read, therefore, τοὺς (ἀλόντας) πολίτας, *vel sim.*

Fab. 9. 1 θόρυβος διῆξε τοῦ δήμου πολὺς

For the expression, cf. *Pomp.* 68. 3 πανικοί τινες θόρυβοι διάττοντες ἐξανέστησαν αὐτόν. One would have thought that the simple genitive with διῆξε was impossible in prose—it is certainly unexampled in Plutarch—but for Jos. *BJ* 6. 298 φάλαγγες ἔνοπλοι διάττουςαι τῶν νεφῶν.

Fab. 20. 6 εὗρεν ἔρωτι παιδίσκης κατεχόμενον τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ κινδυνεύοντα μακρὰς ὁδοὺς ἐκάστοτε, φοιτῶντα πρὸς ἐκείνην ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου.

Ziegler seems to have been the first to punctuate after ἐκάστοτε. Earlier editors had omitted punctuation, perhaps because they did not feel confident that they knew whether the adverb went with what precedes or with what follows. While Ziegler is to be commended for refusing to sit on the fence, he has, I think, come down on the wrong side. The adverb, which means "on several occasions," goes with φοιτῶντα, as at *Ages.* 7. 1 ὄχλου φοιτῶντος ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐκάστοτε and *mor.* 543a τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἔφασκεν αὐτῷ φοιτῶσαν εἰς ὅσιν ἐκάστοτε τοὺς νόμους ὑφηγεῖσθαι.

Fab. 21. 3 αἰσχρὸν δὲ μετ' ἀνάγκης οὐδέν

Although reference to Euripides is not explicitly made, this should be added to the testimonia to Eur. fr. 757. 9 Nauck (= *Hypsipyle* fr. 60. 96a Bond), which Plutarch elsewhere cites in the form δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς (*mor.* 111a, 117d; cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 4. 7. 53 [= p. 273. 4 Stählin]), but which is quoted by Stobaeus as οὐκ αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς (*Ecl.* 3. 29. 56).

Fab. 22. 5 ἐνταῦθα μέντοι δοκεῖ φιλοτιμίας ἥττων γενέσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ Βρεττίους πρῶτους ἀποσφάττειν ἐκέλευσεν, ὥς μὴ προδοσίᾳ τὴν πόλιν ἔχων φανερὸς γένοιτο.

What Fabius feared was not the revelation that he *held* the city through treachery, but that he *had captured* it through treachery. See 21. 1 τὴν δὲ Ταραντίνων πόλιν ἔσχεν ἐαλωκυῖαν ἐκ προδοσίας. Two possibilities readily suggest themselves, σχών and ἐλών. The former is unlikely, as the aorist participle of (uncompounded) ἔχω is rare in Plutarch, occurring only at *Nic.* 13. 11 and *mor.* 1071f. By contrast, the aorist participle of αἰρέω is found nearly forty times in Plutarch in the masculine nominative singular

alone, often with the name of a city as the direct object (*Alc.* 20. 2, *Alex.* 9. 1, 17. 2, *Ant.* 3. 7, *Arat.* 36. 3, *Cor.* 29. 1, *Crass.* 2. 4, 6. 6, *Dion* 29. 6, *Luc.* 46. 1, *Lys.* 9. 5, *Marc.* 24. 3, *Rom.* 24. 4, *Sulla* 43. 5, *Tim.* 22. 4, *mor.* 97c, 183b, 195f, 199c, 201e, 816a). At *mor.* 195f the reference is precisely to Fabius' capture of Tarentum, and at *Cat. mai.* 2. 3 we read Φαβίου δὲ Μαξίμου τὴν Ταραντίνων πόλιν ἐλόντος. For the corruption, compare *Arist.* 23. 1 παρελόμενος] παρεχόμενος S, *Dion* 29. 6 ἐλὼν] ἔχων Q, *mor.* 57b ἐλὼν Courier: ἔχων codd., *Aesch. Ag.* 1288 εἶλον Musgrave: εἶχον codd.

Fab. 23. 2 ὥσπερ ἀθλητῆς ἀγαθὸς ἐπαγωνιζόμενος τῷ Ἀννίβᾳ καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπολυόμενος αὐτοῦ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ ἅμματα καὶ λαβὰς οὐκέτι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχούσας τόνον.

The expression ἀπολυόμενος αὐτοῦ τὰς πράξεις is odd, and the translations ("déjoué facilement toutes les tentatives" Budé, "baffling all his undertakings" Perrin, "frustrating his opponent's moves" Scott-Kilvert) give unexampled meanings to either ἀπολυόμενος or πράξεις. The meaning of the former should be "extricating himself from," as is clear from *C. Gracch.* 15. 5 τὰς περιβολὰς ἀπολυσάμενος αὐτῆς and from the wrestling metaphor in which this is embedded. For the latter we need a word meaning something like "attacks, onslaughts," preferably one that is appropriate to the athletic context. Such a word is προσράξεις. As often, a rare word has been corrupted into a common one. Plutarch does not elsewhere use the word, but he has σύρραξις (*Ages.* 18. 3, *Caes.* 44. 8, *Eum.* 7. 5, *Mar.* 26. 10, *mor.* 339b) and the verbs συρράσσειν (*Pel.* 17. 6) and καταρράσσειν (*Caes.* 44. 6). Pollux (*Onom.* 3. 155) lists ῥάσσειν among technical wrestling terms. For this use of the verb and its compounds, see P. Von der Mühl, *Mus. Helv.* 21 (1964) 51–53. The uncompounded noun ῥάξις occurs nowhere outside of Buck and Petersen's *Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives*, where it is attributed to Plutarch (p. 602), as a result of a misunderstanding of the entry in Stephanus' *Thesaurus*, which reads, "ῥάξις, εως, ἥ, ὅθεν σύρραξις, Conflictus acierum. Bud. ex Plut."

Fab. 29(2). 3 Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ὡς Περικλῆς προέγνων καὶ προεῖπεν ἐτελεύτησεν ὁ πόλεμος.

Perhaps ὥσ(περ) Περικλῆς. Cf. *Per.* 34. 4 ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ Περικλῆς προηγόρευσεν, *Arist.* 19. 1 ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προεσήμνηε τὸ Ἀμφιάρεω μαντεῖον, *Hdt.* 1. 86. 5 πάντα ἀποβεβήκοι τῇ περ ἐκείνος εἶπε, 8. 86 οἶόν περ ἀπέβη, *Xen. Ages.* 1. 29 ὥσπερ προεῖπεν, *Jos. Ant.* 16. 81 τὸ δ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐνόησεν ἀπέβη. The loss of -περ before Περ- is understandable and can, in fact, be paralleled in the manuscripts of Plutarch. At *Cor.* 12. 5, manuscripts U and A have ὥσπερ περίσσωμα (or -ττ-) while N reads ὥσπερ εἰ σῶμα. At *mor.* 417b the same phrase is transmitted in the manuscripts of Plutarch, but those of Eusebius, who quotes this passage at *Praep. Evang.* 5. 4. 3, have (according to Mras'

edition) ὡς περίττωμα. The same corruption is found at Xen. An. 1.5. 3, where some manuscripts read ὡς πέρδικες for ὡσπερ πέρδικες, and at D. H. Amm. 8, where the manuscripts give ὡς Περικλῆς in a quotation from Arist. Rhet. 1411a2, the manuscripts of which read ὡσπερ Περικλῆς.

Fab. 30(3). 2 ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀριστοκρατικοὺς εἰς φυγὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦστρακον ἐκπεσόντας.

The only possible syntax for τοῦστρακον is following εἰς. But "banished into exile and ostracism" is nonsense. Read with Sauppe (*Philol.* 54 [1895] 575) ἐμπεσόντας, "being subjected to exile and ostracism through his agency." At Them. 10. 10 the manuscripts are divided between ἐκπεσεῖν and ἐμπεσεῖν. Here, given the context, it was inevitable that ἐμ- be corrupted to ἐκ-. For the meaning, compare Alc. 13. 9 οὐδεὶς ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν κολασμὸν (sc. τὸν ἐξοστρακισμόν!), Crass. 1. 5 εἰς τὴν ὑποψίαν ἐκείνην ἐνέπεσε, Demosth. 31. 4 εἰς αἰτίαν ἄφυκτον ἐμπεσόντα, Rom. 27. 3 εἰς ὑποψίαν καὶ διαβολὴν ἐνέπεσε, mor. 855d εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν ἐμπίπτειν κατάραν, Demosth. 18. 292 δι' ἑμ' εἰς πράγματα φάσκων ἐμπεσεῖν τὴν πόλιν, LXX Is. 10. 4 τοῦ μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς ἐπαγωγὴν, Polyb. 20. 11. 10 εἰς ὑποψίας καὶ διαβολὰς ἐμπεσόντων, 21. 5. 3 εἰς τὴν ἄλυσιν ἐνέπεσον (cf. also 15. 21. 5, 22. 13. 9, 32. 2. 8, 39. 7. 7).¹

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Is Plutarch Fair to Nikias?*

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It is almost generally admitted that Plutarch was of a kindly and well-meaning nature, and that, owing to this, he had a tendency to look sympathetically at historical figures, bring into relief the good aspects of a man's character rather than the bad ones, and treat with leniency and understanding the weaknesses and shortcomings of his heroes.¹ Acknowledged exceptions, although not on moral but on philosophical or philological grounds, are his fierce attacks against the Stoics and the Epicureans and, above all, his treatise on the malignity of Herodotus. The aim of this paper is to indicate a similar exception of this kind, which occurs in the *Lives* and concerns Plutarch's unexpectedly severe judgement on Nikias, and to try to give some explanation for it.

Plutarch's prejudice against Nikias is perhaps most evident in the *Comparison* with Crassus, but several unfavorable judgements and innuendos can be also discerned in the *Life* proper. This does not mean that Plutarch never praises Nikias nor that he altogether rejects him. It only means that, contrary to his usual tendency (in other *Lives*) of stressing the

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¹Cf. R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times* (London 1967) 147: "It was a mind essentially kindly, unwilling to think ill of anyone, tolerant . . ."; F. H. Sandbach, "Plutarch" in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* XI (1936) 700: "He was deeply interested in people and always ready . . . to find good in them"; A. J. Gossage, "Plutarch" in *Latin Biography*, ed. T. A. Dorey (London 1967) 56: "Plutarch is more clearly concerned to present a character in a good light and to reject evidence suggestive of blemishes"; and H. A. Holden in the Introduction of his *Nikias* (Cambridge 1887) XLIII speaks of Plutarch's "all-absorbing desire to exhibit his hero in the most favorable light."

good qualities of his heroes, in this *Life* he appears to try to bring into relief the faults of Nikias.²

In the second chapter Plutarch mentions Aristotle's opinion that Nikias was one of the three best Athenian politicians, as far as their goodwill towards the people was concerned,³ and then proceeds to explain why the demos, although they had their own champion, Kleon, also favored and supported Nikias. The reason, according to Plutarch, was not only Kleon's rapacity and effrontery,⁴ but mainly Nikias' own political conduct, which, by being neither harsh nor offensive but, on the contrary, blended with some circumspection, gave the impression that he actually feared the multitude.⁵ Moreover, Plutarch continues, Nikias was by nature timid and pessimistic (2. 5: ἀθαρσῆς καὶ δύσελπις), although in war he managed to hide his cowardice thanks to his good fortune; for on the whole he was a successful general (*ib.*: ἐν μὲν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀπέκρυπτεν εὐτυχίᾳ τὴν δειλίαν· κατώρθου γὰρ ὁμαλῶς στρατηγῶν—(cf. also p. 4 below). In other words, Plutarch tells us here that Nikias' achievements on the battlefield were not the result of any ability but rather of his good fortune, which, moreover, concealed his innate cowardice. Thucydides, however, whom Plutarch greatly respects and follows closely in this *Life*, says absolutely nothing to this effect.⁶

Another manifestation of Nikias' cowardice, according to Plutarch, was his pusillanimity in political life and his sensitiveness regarding slanders (2. 6: τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ψοφοδεὲς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συκοφάντας εὐθορύβητον αὐτοῦ). In order to avoid a calumny, Nikias would buy the prospective slanderer off, says Plutarch, and in general his cowardice was a source of revenue for scoundrels (4. 3: καὶ ὅλως πρόσδοδος ἦν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τε πονηροῖς ἢ δειλίᾳ). These characteristics, Plutarch observes, made him popular with the masses, since they betrayed his fear of the demos, but they also occasioned humiliating remarks on the part of the comic poets with whom, however, Plutarch appears to agree.⁷

Chapter 3 deals with Nikias' magnificent choral and gymnastic exhibitions, his lavish donations and various other offerings to the Athenian

² This has been already noted by Westlake, *NT* 64: "Plutarch's tone is more critical in the *Nicias* than in most *Lives*."

³ The other two are Thucydides, son of Milesias, and Theramenes (*Ath. pol.* 28. 5).

⁴ *Nik.* 2. 2: ἀντίταγμα ποιουμένων αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν Κλέωνος βδελυρίαν καὶ τὸ λῆμα . . . 2. 3: ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὴν πλεονεξίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἱταμότητα καὶ τὸ θράσος ὁρῶντες . . . οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν Νικίαν ἐπήγοντο.

⁵ *Nik.* 2. 4: Καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἦν αὐστηρὸν οὐδ' ἐπαχθὲς ἄγαν αὐτοῦ τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' εὐλαβεῖα τινὶ μεμιγμένον, αὐτῷ τῷ δεδιέναι δοκοῦντι τοὺς πολλοὺς δημαγωγῶν.

⁶ See also below pp. 4–5. For Nikias' military abilities see *HCT*, vol. IV 462, and for Plutarch's admiration of Thucydides cf. *Nik.* 1. 1. Yet, as Westlake remarks (*NT* 64), many of Plutarch's inferences from Thucydides' account are unfavorable (cf. n. 2 above).

⁷ *Nik.* 4. 8: Ὑποδηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Φρόνιχος τὸ ἀθαρσὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ καταπεπληγμένον ἐν τούτοις: Ἦν γὰρ πολίτης ἀγαθός, ὡς εὖ οἶδ' ἐγώ, / κούχ' ὑποταγεῖς ἐβάδιζεν, ὥσπερ Νικίας. See also earlier *ib.* 4. 4–7.

people. Plutarch appears to recount the relevant details with certain admiration, but the way he introduces us to Nikias' munificence is somewhat disparaging. For he thinks fit to remember Perikles here and say that he, leading the Athenians by means of real excellence and powerful eloquence (3. 1: ἀπό τ' ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς καὶ λόγου δυνάμεως τὴν πόλιν ἄγων), had no need to resort to such artifices in order to win them over. Nikias, by contrast, lacking these qualities⁸ but being excessively rich, employed his wealth to secure popular favor (*ib.*: Νικίας δὲ τοῦτοις μὲν λειπόμενος, οὐσίᾳ δὲ προέχων, ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐδημαγώγει).

A brief consideration of Plutarch's characterization of Perikles reveals his bias from another angle. In the *Life* of Perikles he relates without comment that Perikles, as a young man, was exceedingly fearful of the multitude (*Per.* 7. 1: νέος μὲν ὢν σφόδρα τὸν δῆμον εὐλαβεῖτο). Nor does he find there any wrong with Perikles' policies to counterbalance Kimon's popularity, policies involving assumed manners and simulation which he obviously criticizes in Nikias. For Perikles, although relatively rich and of a brilliant lineage, espoused the cause of the poor and the many instead of that of the few and the rich, and this, Plutarch himself says, was contrary to his nature which was anything but popular (*Per.* 7. 3: παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἥκιστα δημοτικὴν οὔσαν). Yet, being inferior to Kimon in wealth, by means of which the latter supposedly allured the populace, Perikles resorted to the distribution of public money (*Per.* 9. 2). Plutarch relates all this, but neither in the *Life* of Perikles nor in the *Life* of Kimon does he make any negative comment on the use of wealth for winning public favor. He does so, however, in a rather less appropriate context (for Nikias' generosity did not serve only his political ambitions; it was partly due to his piety, as we shall see), namely in the *Life* of Nikias. Thus he reduces Nikias' munificence to an artifice for winning public support as opposed to the real excellence of Perikles, who had no need to assume any "persuasive mannerisms" with the multitude.

Next, Plutarch characterizes Nikias' munificence as ostentatious and vulgar (4. 1: πολὺ τὸ . . . πανηγυρικὸν καὶ ἀγοραῖον), but he also adds that, judging from his character and manners, one could attribute it to his reverent piety (εὐσεβείας ἐπακολούθημα). This piety, however, he then tries to disparage by quoting a certain Pasiphon, whom he never mentions again in all his writings, who had written that Nikias would sacrifice every day to the gods and keep a personal diviner in his house, only ostensibly to consult him about public affairs; in reality he employed him for making inquiries about his own private matters, especially in connection with his silver mines at Laurion.

On account of his fear of informers Nikias avoided social intercourse and familiar gatherings; his public duties undoubtedly took much of his

⁸ Cf. also *Moralia* 802D.

time, but, even if he had no public business, he still stayed at home to avoid people (5. 2: δυσπρόσοδος ἦν καὶ δυσέντευκτος, οἰκουρῶν καὶ κατακεκλειμένος). This reminds us again of the way of life which Perikles had adopted,⁹ possibly on the advice of Anaxagoras, whom Plutarch admires. Here, however, the man who helped Nikias to acquire a similar dignity, a certain Hiero, is rather slightly said to have supported him by representing him to the people as one who labored busily for the sake of the city.¹⁰

The early military activity of Nikias is also presented in a rather unfavorable light. For Nikias, according to Plutarch, seeing that the eminent and powerful commanders were finally discredited by the people, despite their successes, tried to avoid major and difficult commands and was content with generalships of secondary importance. But even in these his chief aim was safety and therefore he was most successful, of course (6. 2: ὅπου δ' αὐτὸς στρατεύοιτο τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἐχόμενος καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθῶν, ὡς εἰκός . . .).¹¹ Moreover, Plutarch continues, all these successes Nikias would not ascribe to his own abilities or valor but to fortune and the divine powers, so as to escape envy. Yet, if we go to Thucydides for the details of these commands, we shall nowhere find any role played by fortune in Nikias' successes, while one of them at least, namely the expedition against Korinth in 425, is described in terms of a significant enterprise, and the clash between the two armies as strongly contested.¹² It should also be noted that in other *Lives* Plutarch praises the commander who ascribes his victories to fortune or the divine powers, and commends this kind of modesty, both of which he carefully avoids doing in the case of Nikias.¹³

The Sphakteria episode is another instance where Plutarch finds serious fault with Nikias. What he did, he says, by stepping voluntarily out of office appeared more disgraceful than casting away his shield, because he

⁹ Cf. *Perikles* 7. 5 f.

¹⁰ The phraseology of the passages concerned speaks for itself. *Per.* 4. 6: 'Ο δὲ πλεῖστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος καὶ μάλιστα περιθείς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἥθους, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν. *Nik.* 5. 3: Καὶ ὁ μάλιστα ταῦτα συντραφεῶν καὶ συμπεριτιθείς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ δόξαν Ἰέρων ἦν . . . προσποιούμενος δ' υἱὸς εἶναι Διονυσίου τοῦ Χαλκοῦ προσαγορευθέντος. The συντραφεῶν of the second passage clearly points to a deliberate pose for the sake of "a public relations exercise," as A.W.H. Adkins puts it ("The Arete of Nikias: Thucydides 7. 86," *GRBS* 16 [1975] 389 n. 38). The same insinuation is evident, I think, in 5. 2, where Nikias' friends, trying to excuse his seclusion, would say to those who were in waiting at his door that Nikias was even then busy with public affairs (. . . ὡς καὶ τότε Νικίου πρὸς δημοσίας χρείας . . . ὄντος—Note the use of ὡς).

¹¹ But why a cautious general should be necessarily successful Plutarch does not bother to explain.

¹² Cf. *Thuc.* 4. 42–44, esp. 43. 2: καὶ ἦν ἡ μάχη καρτερὰ καὶ ἐν χερσὶ πᾶσα.

¹³ Cf. *Sulla* 6. 5–9, 34. 3–4; *Timol.* 36. 5, and also *Moralia* 322E, 542E–543A.

was thought to have abandoned his command¹⁴ out of cowardice, thus giving his political opponent the opportunity of a spectacular achievement. Moreover, Plutarch continues, Kleon's success, enhancing, as was natural, his reputation and influence in the city, caused no little harm to the Athenians (chs. 7 and 8). Thucydides, however, has not a single word against Nicias in relation to this affair,¹⁵ and it is perhaps rather unlikely that Plutarch would have found such a condemnation of Nicias in another historian.¹⁶ As a matter of fact, Thucydides believed that Kleon's boastful promise to capture or slay on the spot the Spartans of Sphakteria was mad (μανιώδης, cf. 4. 39. 3), and confesses that his success was totally unexpected (4. 40. 1: Παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν

¹⁴ Gomme (*HCT* v. III 468) rightly remarks that from Thucydides' narrative we cannot know if Nicias had any command at Pylos; and he suggests that the words τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς (*Thuc.* 4. 28.3) mean only that "if reinforcements were to be sent, Nicias, as strategos, would have good claim to their command."

¹⁵ Cf. J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, transl. Ph. Thody (Oxford 1963) 181 n. 5: "Thucydides is constantly sympathetic towards Nicias . . . In the episode itself one can see how he differs from those who tried to criticize Nicias for his 'desertion'." By contrast, Westlake (*NT* 60) thinks that "Thucydides must have recognized that his account would expose Nicias to damaging charges." And on the whole Westlake regards the prevailing belief among modern scholars that Thucydides "treats Nicias too indulgently" as highly disputable. Cf. his *IT* 182 and 185. Gomme later noted *ad loc.* (*HCT* v. III 469): "The light-hearted dereliction of duty by Nicias, though not concealed, is not explicitly condemned." Nicias, however, is neither explicitly nor implicitly condemned (cf. also Westlake, *IT* 88) and, as a matter of fact, Thucydides counts him among the wise Athenians in 4. 28. 5 (see n. 18 below). So the charge of dereliction of duty is perhaps too severe and, besides, somewhat contradictory to Gomme's own suggestion in the previous note. On the other hand, Holden believed (XLIII) that Nicias' temporary discredit, "because of his resignation in favour of Kleon, is probably an inference of Plutarch's own from allusions in the contemporary poets." This may well be so, but would Nicias have been discredited, if Kleon had failed? What might have occasioned Nicias' disrepute was not his resignation it itself, but rather Kleon's unexpected success (see further pp. 5–6).

¹⁶ As a matter of fact, whether he did or not is of little importance; for even if he did, it was his own decision to accept the condemnation and repeat it (contrast his usual tendency in Gossage's quotation, n. 1 above). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in connection with the Sphakteria incident Diodorus makes no mention at all of Nicias (cf. 12. 63). Besides, there is no need to believe that Philistus and Timaeus were biased against Nicias, as some scholars imply (e.g. Westlake, *NT* 63 and 64 nn. 1 and 3). The fragments to which they refer are rather irrelevant, while Pausanias' information (1. 29. 12), going back to Philistus, that Nicias' name was deliberately omitted from the casualty list at Athens because he had surrendered himself (see p. 330 below), shows, if true, the feelings of the Athenian authorities and not of Philistus (cf. also Westlake, *NT* 64 n. 5). In my view, since Nicias' opposition to the expedition was well-known, it is more likely that the Sicilian historians were less hostile to him. Cf. Diodorus (and that also means Ephorus to some extent) 12. 83. 5 and esp. 13. 27. 3–4.

πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς "Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο).¹⁷ So, we are allowed, I think, to surmise that Thucydides himself must have sided with those sensible Athenians (Nikias undoubtedly among them) who, by trusting this particular generalship to Kleon, looked forward to his being killed.¹⁸ But regardless of what Thucydides says or might have thought, one is also allowed to suppose that Nikias gave up the command because he wanted either to humiliate Kleon by calling his bluff or, taking into account the stalemate at Sphakteria, to give him an opportunity to try his own way for the sake of the city.¹⁹ The fact that Kleon's unexpected success increased his political influence, owing to which he subsequently made havoc in the political life of Athens,²⁰ is a judgement *a posteriori*, and Plutarch himself

¹⁷ As a matter of fact, this refers to the unexpected surrender of the Spartans, which, however, vindicated Kleon. Some modern scholars give the debate over Pylos in the Athenian assembly another dimension. Connor (116–17), for example, revives an older view (cf. G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* [Gotha 1893–1904], v. III 1101 n. 2) and suggests that Kleon was collaborating with Demosthenes, the commander at Pylos, and deliberately provoked Nikias by questioning his manliness (Thuc. 4. 27. 5: εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεῦσσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ), in order to cause his resignation and take over himself (but see *HCT* v. III 471 and n. 14 above. Against Busolt cf. also Westlake, *IT* 72 n.1). But then, why should Kleon have needlessly made his bragging promise once Nikias had resigned and the command was given to him according to his plan? For Connor, Kleon's behavior supports his suggestion, but, if he is right, *μανιώδης* seems to describe better Kleon's behavior rather than the contents of his promise. On the other hand, Grote (v. V 264 ff.) expresses his surprise for this characterization on the part of Thucydides and accuses him of bias against Kleon. On this see also Gomme, "Thucydides and Kleon," *Ἑλληνικά* 13 (1954) 1–10 and A. G. Woodhead, "Thucydides' portrait of Cleon," *Mnemosyne* 13 (1960) 290 and esp. 316. Cf. also Westlake, *IT* 60 ff., esp. 70 f.

¹⁸ Thuc. 4. 28. 5: Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένους δ' ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἐτέρου τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγῆσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμῃς Λακεδαιμονίου σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι. The ultimate meaning of ἀπαλλαγῆσεσθαι here is that the Athenians expected that Kleon would be killed during the operations at Pylos. Cf. Aristoph. *Equit.* 973–76: ἡδιστον φάος ἡμέρας / ἔσται τοῖσι παροῦσι καὶ / τοῖσι δεῦρ' ἀφικνουμένοις / ἦν Κλέων ἀπόληται.

¹⁹ Cf. *Nik.* 7. 4: καὶ μὴ θρασύνεσθαι λόγοις ἀκινδύνοις, ἀλλ' ἔργον τι τῇ πόλει παρασεῖν ἄξιον σπουδῆς. For Grote (255–56), however, Nikias appears in this occasion so "deplorably timid, ignorant and reckless of the public interest," seeking only to ruin his political adversary, that he forces Kleon "into the supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail, so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers and the destinies of the state." Woodhead also (*op. cit.* 313 f.) finds Nikias' conduct here "highly reprehensible," but other scholars take a milder view. Westlake, *NT* 60: "He was perhaps guilty rather of miscalculation than of disloyalty to the state;" and Westlake's opinion on the peace efforts of Nikias, namely that nothing suggests that he "was deliberately sacrificing Athenian interests in order to further his own" (*IT* 95), is, I think, equally valid here. For a judicious defence of Nikias' conduct see A. B. West, "Pericles' Political Heirs," *CP* 19 (1924) 212–14.

²⁰ Grote (v. V 360 ff.), of course, does not agree with the picture of Kleon as a sinister demagogue, which rests upon the partial evidence of Thucydides and Aristophanes. Cf. also n. 44 below.

explicitly disapproves of such judgements, as we shall see in the *Comparison* with Crassus (p. 329 below).

The peace of Nikias provided, among other things, the exchange of strongholds, cities and prisoners of war, and the party to restore its gains first was to be decided by lot. Nikias now, says Plutarch, on the authority of Theophrastus, secretly bought up the lot, so that the Lacedaemonians would restore first (10. 1). Plutarch makes no comment on this act of Nikias, which, although somewhat dishonest, is indicative of his patriotism, and one tends to believe that this omission is due to moral grounds; but, once more, when we come to the *Comparison* (3. 4), we see that Plutarch does not object to political bribery, and in fact he indirectly praises Themistokles for buying off a worthless man from office at a time of emergency.²¹ The prejudice against Nikias, although the emphasis is somewhat different in the *Comparison*, is again evident.

Furthermore, Plutarch finds fault with Nikias in the way he conducted the Sicilian expedition right from the beginning. Nikias, he tells us, was wise to oppose the expedition,²² but, once he had failed to dissuade the Athenians or to be relieved of the command, he should have put aside his caution and hesitation and attacked the enemy at once. Now, to what extent a general can act contrary to what he believes to be strategically right is rather debatable, but then the question arises, why did Nikias accept the command under these circumstances? In my opinion, Thucydides' account shows that Nikias was practically trapped by the hard—as he thought—pre-conditions, which he himself had set to the Athenians for the realization of the expedition.²³ So, when the Athenians agreed to meet these conditions, Nikias could no longer go back on his word.²⁴ As for his plan—much

²¹ See also *Themist.* 6. 1–2.

²² *Nik.* 14. 1: Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐναντιωθῆναι ψηφισομένη τῇ στρατείᾳ τὸν Νικίαν . . . ἀνδρὸς ἦν χρηστοῦ καὶ σώφρονος. That the Sicilian expedition was a mistake, if with some qualification, is also Thucydides' opinion. See 2. 65. 11 (ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς) and cf. de Romilly (*op. cit.* n. 15) 205–09.

²³ Cf. *Thuc.* 6. 19. 2: Καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνοὺς ὅτι . . . παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ' ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτοὺς . . . See also 6. 24. 1 and cf. Westlake, *IT* 172. Nikias employs in fact, as Connor points out (166), a technique well known from ancient rhetorical books. If one cannot prevent an action by arguing it is wrong, shameful etc., he can try to prevent it by arguing that it is too laborious and costly (cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1421b24). That Nikias undertook this generalship against his will is also evident in the *Alkibiades* 18. 1 (ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἄκων μὲν ἡρέθη στρατηγός, οὐχ ἥκιστα τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ διὰ τὸν συνάρχοντα φεύγων) and *Moralia* 802D (. . . ἀλλ' ὥχετο βίᾳ φερόμενος εἰς Σικελίαν καὶ συνεκτραχηλιζόμενος). Cf. also *Thuc.* 6. 8. 4: Καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἀκούσιος μὲν ἡρημένος ἄρχειν. Yet G. de Sanctis believed (*Riv. di Fil. Class.* 7 [1929] 433 ff. = *Problemi di storia antica*, [Bari 1932] 109 ff.; cf. H. A. Murray, "Two Notes on the Evaluation of Nikias in Thucydides," *BICS* 8 [1961] 42) that Nikias was the real instigator of the expedition, because he wanted to "restore himself to favour and to cloak his political bungling!"

²⁴ Had he done so, he would have rightly been regarded as worse than Kleon, who also had not retreated, when trapped in his boasting. (See p. 5 and nn. 15 and 17 above).

scorned by later authors and modern scholars—first to make only a display of his fleet and then sail back to Athens, one should note that Thucydides, who relates in detail the plans of Nikias, Lamachos and Alkibiades, makes, at that point, no comment in favor of or against any of them.²⁵

In any case, Nikias' misgivings and his hesitation to attack the Syracusans at once are thought to have abated the enthusiasm of his men and boosted the courage of the enemy.²⁶ Yet, one might again wonder whether Nikias' procrastination was not owing merely to caution or timidity, but also to the fact that, after the recall of Alkibiades, Nikias tacitly decided to put into operation, albeit in a modified form, the plan of the former, on which Lamachos had also agreed.²⁷ Now, according to Alkibiades' plan, the Athenians should first rob the Syracusans of their allies by making the latter defect to their side, and then march against Syracuse itself.²⁸ That plan also involved some sort of delay, but at the same time it increased the safety of the Athenian troops, a factor to which Nikias attached, as we have seen (p. 4 above), supreme importance.

But, despite all his caution and hesitation, when Nikias moved his armament against Syracuse, he showed such excellent generalship, seizing strategic places, routing the invincible cavalry of the enemy, beating the Syracusans in many skirmishes and nearly cutting off their city from its hinterland despite his malady, that Plutarch feels somewhat forced to admit that the Athenians would have defeated the Syracusans many more times, if the gods or fortune had not opposed them at the very pinnacle of their

²⁵ Cf. Thuc. 6. 47–49. Nikias' proposal conformed to their typical orders from the Assembly (47: πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινούντα πάση τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ' ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμφθησαν), but also provided for some action, if need be (καὶ παραμείναντας Σελινουντίους ἢ βία ἢ ξυμβάσει διαλλάξαι αὐτοῖς), a detail suppressed by Plutarch. According to him, Nikias' plan αὐτίκα τε τὴν γνώμην ὑπεξέλυσε καὶ κατέβαλε τὸ φρόνημα τῶν ἀνδρῶν (Nik. 14. 3), which R. Flacelière (*Vies* VII, Budé, p. 292) rightly regards as "un jugement sèvere sur Nicias." (Cf. Westlake, *NT* 64). Perhaps Plutarch was in favor of Lamachos' plan (Nik. 14. 2: ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἔδει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμφύοντα καὶ προσκείμενον ἐλέγχειν τὴν τύχην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγώνων) and so was Thucydides. Cf. 7. 42. 3: ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερὸς, ὥς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις . . . ὑπερώφη (cf. also Nik. 15. 3). But this again is a judgement *a posteriori*. Finally, Westlake notes (*NT* 62 and n. 1) that Lamachos' plan "is favored—perhaps erroneously—by most modern scholars." Cf. also Grote, v. VI 28 ff. One last remark: Demosthenes, leading the second, supporting force to Sicily, did not choose to linger and undergo what had happened to Nikias. He attacked the enemy as soon as he arrived and was heavily defeated (cf. next page and n. 31).

²⁶ Cf. Nik. 14. 2 (previous note) and 15. 3: ἀπωτάτω τῶν πολεμίων ἐκπεριπλέων Σικελίαν θάρσος ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς.

²⁷ Cf. Thuc. 6. 50. 1: Λάμαχος μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὅμως προσέθετο καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ. See also Alkibiades 20. 2.

²⁸ Thuc. 6. 62 shows, I think, that Nikias was in fact following a plan that combined his own ideas with those of Alkibiades. See also 6. 71. 2, 74–88 and cf. *HCT* v. IV 339 and Westlake, *IT* 179 and 182.

power.²⁹ Is not this judgement somewhat inconsistent with Plutarch's earlier evaluation of Nikias' strategic qualities and efficiency?³⁰

Ch. 22 deals with the aftermath of the unsuccessful Athenian assault on Epipolai. Plutarch says nothing at all against Demosthenes, who, acting contrary to Nikias' advice, had led two thousand Athenians to slaughter,³¹ but openly suggests that Nikias' refusal to leave Sicily in time (when everyone appeared to wish for departure)³² was chiefly owing to his fear of his compatriots in Athens.³³ Thucydides, it is true, also refers to the apprehensions of Nikias regarding the malignant accusations which he would have to face on his return,³⁴ but he also mentions three more reasons

²⁹ Cf. *Nik.* chs. 16–17 and esp. 17. 4: οὐκ ὀκτῶ δὲ νίκας, ἀλλὰ πλείονας ἂν τις εὖροι Συρακοσίους νενικημένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν, πρὶν ἐκ θεῶν ὄντως ἢ τύχης ἀντίστασιν τινα γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπὶ πλείστον αἰρομένοις δυνάμειος.

³⁰ In *Nik.* 16. 9, Plutarch adopts the generally admitted view that Nikias' greatest fault was his excessive indecision, dilatoriness and caution, on account of which he missed the proper time for action (ἐπεὶ τὰς γε πράξεις οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐμέμψατο τοῦ ἀνδρός. 'Ορμήσας γὰρ τὴν ἐνεργὸς καὶ δραστήριος, ὀρμησάι δὲ μελλήτης καὶ ἄτολμος—see also 18. 5–6). This comment also includes complimentary elements (cf. previous note and *Comp.* 5. 1), but, on the whole, Plutarch's opinion of Nikias' military competence is unfavorable and sometimes even derisive. See esp. 14. 2–4, 15. 3, *Comp.* 3. 5, 4. 3 (οὐ Σκάνδειαν, οὐ Μένδην ἐκκοπτέον οὐδὲ φεύγοντας Αἰγινήτας ἀπολελοιπότες τὴν ἐαυτῶν ὥσπερ ὄρνιθας εἰς ἐτέραν χώραν ἀποκεκρυσμένους ἐκθηρατέον). As for his dilatoriness Connor (199 n. 39) rightly notes that some of "Nicias' delays were not primarily of his own choosing, but were forced upon him by circumstances." For his earlier career see pp. 4–5 above, and for a brief appreciation of Nikias' military efficiency see *HCT* v. IV 462.

³¹ *Nik.* 21. 3: τοῦ Δημοσθένους εὐθὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις κελεύοντος . . . ἐδεῖτο μὴδὲν ἀπεγνωσμένως πράττειν μὴδ' ἀνοήτως. Cf. also Thuc. 7. 43. 1: οὐκέτι ἐδόκει διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ πείσας τὸν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπενόει, τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐποιεῖτο. Because Thucydides does not explicitly mention whether Nikias raised any objections, Westlake affirms (*IT* 197 n. 2) that Plutarch, or his source, has taken liberties here with the facts, by transferring to this conference details from the conference after the defeat at Epipolai. This claim is not well-grounded; in my view, the πείσας in the text of Thucydides makes it more likely that Nikias had raised objections. See also Diodorus 13. 11. 3.

³² According to Diodorus (13. 12. 3), however, the military council which Nikias and Demosthenes convened was divided: Τῶν δὲ εἰς τὸ συμβούλιον παρελημμένων οἱ μὲν τῷ Δημοσθένει συγκατέθεντο περὶ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς, οἱ δὲ τῷ Νικίᾳ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἀπαφαινότο.

³³ *Nik.* 22. 2: 'Ο δὲ Νικίας χαλεπῶς ἤκουε τὴν φυγὴν καὶ τὸν ἀπόπλουν, οὐ τῷ μὴ δεδινάει τοὺς Συρακοσίους, ἀλλὰ τῷ μᾶλλον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων δίκας καὶ συκοφαντίας φοβεῖσθαι.

³⁴ Thuc. 7. 48. 3–4 and esp. 4: Οὐκ οὖν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε . . . ἀδίκως ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ. (Cf. Plut. *Fab.* 14. 7). From this K. J. Dover (*Thucydides Book VIII* [Oxford 1965] 41,—see also *HCT* v. IV 426) infers that Nikias would rather sacrifice the rest of the Athenian force and put his country in moral peril than face trial in Athens and risk execution; and he suggests that what underlay Nikias' obstinacy was, perhaps, "a perverse spite" (against the Athenian demos, by implication). Dover has surpassed even Grote here, who accused Nikias only of "guilty fatuity" and "childish credulity" (v. VI 145), but his inference and condemnation are not in line with the subsequent conduct of Nikias and his surrender to Gylippus (p. 330 f. below). Or would it have been difficult for him, one might ask, not to return to Athens, if he

for Nikias' unexpected insistence on remaining, at which Plutarch barely hints (cf. 22. 4). First, Nikias did not want an open vote for departure, because, if the enemy got wind of their decision, their very departure would be at risk;³⁵ secondly, because he believed that, despite the sorry situation of the Athenian army, the besieged Syracusans were even worse off;³⁶ and thirdly, because, according to his intelligence information, some of the Syracusans were almost ready to surrender to the Athenians.³⁷ All this information may have been deliberately false, of course,³⁸ but even then one could perhaps charge Nikias with misjudgement, or even credulity, but not with selfishness and cowardice.³⁹

Finally, owing to an epidemic among the Athenians, Nikias decided to remove their camp. But as they were ready to depart, there occurred an eclipse of the moon by night. Nikias, says Plutarch, along with the ignorant and superstitious, was terrified by the event (23. 1), and, as he happened to be without an expert soothsayer at that time (23. 7), he decided, and persuaded the Athenians, to wait for another full period of the moon before they departed (23. 9: ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἄλλην ἔπεισε σελήνης ἀναμένειν περίοδον). Thucydides' account shows once more Plutarch's prejudice. For, according to him, it is not Nikias and the ignorant and superstitious but the majority of the Athenians who urge the generals to halt the departure, and it is not Nikias but the diviners who enjoin the twenty-seven days delay.⁴⁰

wanted to save his skin? Other scholars are not so absolute in their judgement and take more into account Thucydides' evidence in 7. 48–49. Cf. de Romilly, *Thucydide VI–VII* (Budé) 170 and Westlake, *IT* 198 f.

³⁵ Cf. Thuc. 7. 48. 1. Westlake (*IT* 199) shrewdly remarks here: "as well as being a safeguard against detection by the enemy, the absence of an open vote would hamper the prosecution if, after returning to Athens, any of the generals were impeached there."

³⁶ Cf. Thuc. 7. 48. 2, 5 (Τὰ τε Συρακοσίων ἔφη ὅμως ἔτι ἥσσω τῶν σφετέρων εἶναι); 49. 1. See also *Nik.* 21. 4 and cf. de Romilly, n. 34 above.

³⁷ Thuc. 48. 2: Καὶ ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις βουλευόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ πράγματα ἐνδοῦναι, ἐπεκηρυκεύετο ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ εἶα ἀπανίστασθαι. See also *Nik.* 21. 5.

³⁸ Cf. Flacelière (n. 25) 298: "car certains de ses informateurs peut-être le trompaient." Dover (n. 34) 40 is sure that this was the case and speaks of a "fifth column" among the Syracusans.

³⁹ Cf. Grote, v. VI 145: "Childish as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it as real." On the cowardice charge see n. 34 above and cf. Nikias' own claim in Thuc. 6. 9. 2: καὶ ἥσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ ἔμηντοῦ σώματι ὀρρωδῶ. See also Connor, p. 163.

⁴⁰ Thuc. 7. 50. 4: Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἳ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθῦμιον ποιοῦμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας . . . οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλευσασθαι ἐπὶ ἔφῃ πρὶν, ὡς οἱ μάντις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρεῖς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μείναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κληθεῖν. Similar is the testimony of Diodorus 13. 12. 6: Διόπερ ὁ Νικίας . . . συνεκάλεσε τοὺς μάντις. Τούτων δ' ἀποφηνάμενων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς εἰθισμένας τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναβαλέσθαι τὸν ἔκπλουν . . . Yet, despite these explicit statements, Westlake asserts (*NT* 63) that "it cannot be held that the greater part of the army is

Passing now to the *Comparison* with Crassus, we see that Nikias comes out superior in most of the headings under which Plutarch chooses to compare the two men, but this superiority is curtailed by several remarks to the detriment of Nikias. For example, although it is acknowledged that Nikias, by contrast to Crassus' military inadequacy, was a successful general and the Athenians kept electing him to office, even against his will, because they trusted his reasonableness and wisdom,⁴¹ it is also added that, if wrong must be done, one should abandon justice for something great, such as the conquest of the East, and not for something trivial, such as raiding small towns and chasing their fleeing inhabitants (*Comp.* 4. 3; cf. n. 30).^{41a} Moreover, says Plutarch, one also has to take into account what would have happened had Crassus managed to fulfill his purpose. For, certainly, it is not fair to praise Alexander's expedition and, at the same time, blame Crassus. Those who do that make a judgement *a posteriori*, which is wrong (4. 4: οὐκ εὖ τὰ πρῶτα κρίνουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων).⁴²

In other instances the bias against Nikias is more evident. E.g., Nikias' political career and achievements are recognized as more important (2. 7), but after all, says Plutarch, Crassus had to vie with such great men as Pompey and Caesar, while Nikias contended with inferior opponents such as Kleon and Hyperbolos.⁴³ One cannot help noting here that Hyperbolos is rather irrelevant in connection with Nikias, the important figure of

associated with Nikias in his superstitious fears in order to lessen his responsibility." For, as Dover points out (*HCT*, v. IV 429), "Thucydides' criticism of Nikias is not that he was more superstitious than the men whom he commanded but that as an educated man in a responsible position he should have paid less attention to seers." Connor (194 n. 27), however, is right in making the point that "confronted with this mood in the army and the interpretation of the soothsayers, no Athenian commander would find it easy to urge an immediate retreat." I should add that in promptly condemning Nikias for his overscrupulous regard for religious omens, modern scholars tend to judge him in terms of their own enlightened times. Yet, the Spartans, who had a similar regard for omens, are not less respected because of this.

⁴¹ *Comp.* 3. 6: Ἐκεῖνο μέντοι μεγάλης ἐπικεικίας σημεῖον, ὅτι δυσχεραίνοντα τὸ πολεμεῖν αἰεὶ καὶ φεύγοντα τὸ στρατηγεῖν οὐκ ἐπαύοντο χειροτονοῦντες ὡς ἐμπειρότατον καὶ βέλτιστον. See also 5. 1-2 and cf. *Alkib.* 13. 1: καὶ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου . . . στρατηγὸν ἄριστον εἶναι δοκοῦντα . . . Murray (*op. cit.* n. 23 above, 35), however, following G. F. Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides* (Würzburg 1938) 49-51, believes that, according to Thucydides, Nikias neglected or lacked ξύνεσις. But Westlake (*IT* 210) convincingly argues against this and finds nothing in Thucydides suggesting that "he believed Nikias to have been lacking in intelligence."

^{41a} Note, however, that the Euripidean lines to which Plutarch appeals here (*Phoen.* 524 f.: εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι / κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν), he explicitly condemns in *Moralia* 18D-E and 125D.

⁴² But this is exactly what Plutarch himself, Thucydides and most scholars do when they condemn Nikias' conduct of war in Sicily. See p. 6 and n. 25 above.

⁴³ *Comp.* 2. 4: ὁ δὲ Κράσσος ὑψηλὸς περὶ γε ταῦτα καὶ μεγαλόφρων, οὐ πρὸς Κλέωνας οὐδ' Ὑπερβόλους . . . τοῦ ἀγῶνος ὄντος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν Καίσαρος λαμπρότητα καὶ τρεῖς τοῦ Πομπηίου θριάμβους . . .

Alkibiades, his main political opponent, is not mentioned, and Kleon, regardless of his moral foibles, was in no way deficient in political shrewdness or military capacities.⁴⁴

Nikias, says Plutarch, should not have given in to Kleon's presumptuousness and put a base man into office; neither should Crassus have risked so much in the war against Spartacus. But Crassus, after all, had the legitimate ambition to finish the slave war himself, lest Pompey should come and rob him of his glory, whereas Nikias had no excuse for surrendering office to Kleon. He did not step down from a promising or easy command, but fearing the dangers, which that particular generalship involved, he preferred to betray the common interest in order to secure his personal safety.⁴⁵ This, I think, is a very severe and unfair judgement. In the first place, Thucydides neither says nor hints at anything against Nikias in relation to this affair (see p. 5 and n. 15 above); but also in the *Life* proper we can nowhere find Nikias showing such interest in his personal safety at the expense of the common good. On the contrary, his first priority always appears to be the public interest and the safety of his men.⁴⁶

Finally, Plutarch's prejudice against Nikias culminates, perhaps, in the way he relates and interprets the deaths of the two men. Crassus' death, he tells us, was less blameworthy (ἀμεμπτότερος), for he did not surrender himself, nor was he cheated by the enemy (5. 4: οὐ παραδοὺς ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲ δεθεὶς οὐδὲ φενακισθεὶς). Nikias, on the contrary, hoping to be saved in an inglorious way put himself into the hands of his enemies, thus making his death a greater disgrace (*ib.*: ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀκλεοῦς ἐλπίδι σωτηρίας ὑποπεσὼν τοῖς πολεμίοις, αἰσχίονα ἑαυτῷ τὸν θάνατον ἐποίησεν). Neither of these interpretations is endorsed by the facts, while the contradiction with the details in the *Life* of Nikias is most glaring. Crassus, it is true (as Plutarch tells us, that is), had not believed in the sudden conciliatory proposals of the Parthians and was certain of their fraud (cf. *Cras.* 31. 2), but, being forced by his soldiers to accept them, he

⁴⁴ Cf. Connor 116: "Cleon, whatever his faults, was clearly a clever and skillful politician." See also Woodhead (*op. cit.* n. 17 above, 290, and also 304, about his military competence) and Grote (n. 20 above).

⁴⁵ Cf. *Comp.* 3. 1-6 and esp. 3. 3 (Οὐ γὰρ ἐλπίδας οὐδὲ ῥαστώνην ἐχούσης ἐξέστη τῷ ἐχθρῷ φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ κίνδυνον ὑφορώμενος ἐν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ μέγαν, ἠγάπησε τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν ἀσφαλεὶ θέμενος προσέσθαι τὸ κοινόν) and 3. 5 ('Ο δ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ Μίνωαν καὶ Κύθηρα καὶ Μηλίους τοὺς ταλαιπώρους φυλάττων στρατηγόν, εἰ (δὲ) δέοι μάχεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀποδυόμενος τὴν χλαμύδα καὶ . . . στρατηγίαν ἐμπειρίας ἄκρας δεομένην παραδιδούς, οὐ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προίεται δόξαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν. But see nn. 19 and 39 above).

⁴⁶ Cf. *Nik.* 6. 2 (p. 4 above), 10. 1 (p. 325 above), his vindicated disbelief in the prospects of financial aid from Segesta (Thuc. 6. 12. 1, 22, 46. 2) and the terms under which he surrendered to Gylippus. See also de Romilly (n. 34 above) and Westlake, *IT* 206 and 207 (n. 48 below).

did surrender himself all the same.⁴⁷ On the other hand, Nikias surrenders to Gylippus only when the Athenian retreat becomes a savage carnage for his desperate men, and it is clear that he begs his mercy not for himself, but for the rest of his army (27. 5: "Ἐλεος ὑμᾶς, ὦ Γύλιππε, λαβέτω νικῶντας, ἐμοῦ μὲν μηδεὶς . . . τῶν δ' ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων . . .").⁴⁸

In view of Plutarch's severe judgement on Nikias, as the preceding pages have tried to show, and also taking into account the scarcely commendable *Life* of Crassus, I would suggest that the *Nikias-Crassus* pair was amongst those that were intended to portray examples to be avoided rather than imitated.⁴⁹ These examples Plutarch wrote towards the end of the whole series, so that, as he himself says, the reader of his biographies might not be left, in his quest for virtue, without accounts of the bad and blameworthy.⁵⁰ Now, examples of vice *par excellence* are the *Lives* of Demetrius and Antony, but, in a wider context of uncommendable or less commendable characters, one can also include the pairs *Alkibiades-Coriolanus* and *Pyrrhus-Marius*. This suggestion is supported, perhaps, by the relative chronology of the *Lives* as established by C. P. Jones; for, according to Jones's arrangement, the *Nikias-Crassus* pair along with the other three just mentioned are amongst the very last of Plutarch's biographies.⁵¹ This arrangement and the chronological consequences it entails could also account for Plutarch's different standpoint regarding the importance of ἀσφάλεια and εὐλάβεια in the *Lives* of Perikles and

⁴⁷ Cf. *Crassus* 30–31. His last words to his closest officers are indeed tragic in their irony. 30. 5: ὁρᾶτε τῆς ἐμῆς ὁδοῦ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ σύνιστε παρόντες, ὡς αἰσχρὰ πάσῳ καὶ βίαια, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις λέγετε σωθέντες, ὡς Κράσσος ἀπατηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, οὐκ ἐκδοθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπόλετο. But, the actual circumstances—according to Plutarch's account—in which Crassus was killed and the subsequent humiliation of his body (31. 5–7) makes, perhaps, his death more disgraceful than that of Nikias.

⁴⁸ Cf. also Thuc. 7. 85. 1: Νικίας Γυλίππῳ ἐαυτὸν παραδίδωσι, πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις· καὶ ἐαυτῷ μὲν χρῆσασθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ὅ, τι βούλονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους στρατιώτας παύσασθαι φονεύοντας. This is further "evidence of his unselfish devotion to the men under his command" (Westlake, *IT* 207; cf. Connor 204), but his motive in choosing to surrender to Gylippus has been suspected. Westlake again (1. c.) rightly justifies Nikias. "That he tried to seize a possible chance of saving his own life when his death could not benefit the Athenians would be judged by many to be a pardonable, even sensible action. Had he lived, he would surely have made efforts to persuade the Syracusans to mitigate their inhuman treatment of the Athenian prisoners."

⁴⁹ In view of the character and the career of Crassus, the very fact that Plutarch chose him to pair with Nikias shows, perhaps, that he regarded Nikias as something of a failure.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Demetrius* 1. 6: οὕτω μοι δοκοῦμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς προθυμότεροι τῶν βελτιόνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ μιμηταὶ βίων, εἰ μὴδὲ τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγομένων ἀνιστορήτως ἔχοιμεν.

⁵¹ "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," *JRS* 56 (1966) 68.

Fabius, where cautiousness and regard for safety are clearly praised;⁵² but the *Perikles–Fabius* pair, being the tenth of his biographies (*Per.* 2. 5), stands almost in the middle of the whole series and therefore must have been written several years earlier than the *Nikias–Crassus* pair.⁵³

As for the points unexpectedly accredited to Crassus in the *Comparison*, I think that they must be attributed to Plutarch's deliberate effort to maintain some balance between the two men, a feature characterizing nearly all his *Comparisons*.⁵⁴ For, as a matter of fact, Nikias emerges superior to Crassus on almost every score. The way he acquired and—especially—used his wealth was not so discreditable, but even commendable in many respects (cf. *Comp.* ch. 1); his political conduct was more dignified, despite his timidity and cautiousness, and his political achievements, notably the peace bearing his name, more praiseworthy (2. 1–3, 7); his military capacities and successes far more important (3. 6, 5. 1–2); even his religious fearfulness, although responsible for some of his political mistakes (notably his failure to extricate in time the Athenian force from Sicily, p. 327 f. above), is regarded as preferable to Crassus' lack of respect for traditional beliefs and practices.⁵⁵ Plutarch comes to the end of his *Comparison*, and the only points he has accredited to Crassus—namely that he dared to contend with greater political opponents, and that his ambition to conquer the East was not blameworthy (2. 4, 4)—are minimal and doubtful. He has said many things against Nikias, of course (esp. 3. 1–5), by which he tried to detract from his superiority, but the scales nonetheless incline clearly to Nikias' side. At this point, it seems to me, Plutarch felt obliged to write something distinctly in favor of Crassus and against Nikias, but the only thing left for comparison was the way the two men died. So Plutarch

⁵² See esp. *Perikles* 18. 1 ('Εν ταῖς στρατηγίαις εὐδοκίμει μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, οὔτε μάχης ἐχούσης πολλὴν ἀδηλότητα καὶ κίνδυνον ἐκουσίως ἀπτόμενος, οὔτε τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ παραβάλλεσθαι χρησαμένους τύχῃ λαμπρᾷ καὶ θαυμασθέντας ὡς μεγάλους ζηλῶν καὶ μιμούμενος στρατηγούς) and contrast *Nik.* 6. 2 (p. 4 above). See also *Per.* 8. 6 and *Fab.* 1. 6 (οὐσαν . . . εὐβουλίαν δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν), 5, 17. 7.

⁵³ It should be added, though, that in the case of Plutarch a long lapse of time cannot always be postulated to explain divergences in his approach and attitude, as is indeed the case in other authors. Plutarch, however, is a particularly multifarious and unconventional writer, and the interpretation of his material depends each time on the particular purpose he wants to serve. As C.B.R. Pelling, "Plutarch's adaptation of his source-material," *JHS* 100 (1980) 131, puts it: "In each *Life* Plutarch selected the interpretation which suited the run of his argument." Cf. also Gossage (*op. cit.* n. 1 above) 55–56 and n. 55 below.

⁵⁴ Cf. Barrow (*op. cit.* n. 1 above) 59: "Plutarch is at pains to give each hero his due; indeed he sometimes seems anxious to make the score equal." See also A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London 1974) 236 ff.

⁵⁵ *Comp.* 5. 3: ἐπιεικέστερον δὲ τοῦ παρανόμου καὶ αὐθάδους τὸ μετὰ δόξης παλαιᾶς καὶ συνήθους δι' εὐλάβειαν ἀμαρτανόμενον. But in the *De Superst.* 169A Plutarch says that it might have been better for Nikias to have committed suicide than to cause the death of so many people and meet himself an inglorious end on account of his superstition. Cf. n. 53 above.

proceeds to enhance Crassus and belittle Nikias by straining the evidence and even contradicting himself. The *Comparison* closes with the statement that Crassus' death was less reproachable and that of Nikias more disgraceful, because the latter surrendered himself to the enemy, whereas the former did not (5. 4). The factual evidence is, as we have seen (p. 330 f.), totally against this interpretation, but the desired balance between the two men has somehow been restored.

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Plutarch's *Philopoemen* and *Flaminius*

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I

As a promoter of Hellenic culture and a participant in Greek politics, as well as a friend of important men at Rome, Plutarch had good reason to address present day relations between the cities of Greece and the Roman state (in *De exil.*, *An seni resp. ger. sit*, *Praec. ger. reip.*). But how did he see their past relations? Roman involvement in Greece is touched on in a number of the *Roman Lives* (for example, *Luc.*, *Sul.*). But in one pair, *Phil.-Flam.*, Plutarch had to portray the attitudes of Greece and Rome to one another more extensively at the very time that Roman power was beginning to deprive Greece of her liberty. This pair gains special vitality from the unique appearance of one hero in the *Life* of the other, and the like structure demands careful attention to similarities and differences which Plutarch has introduced in the careers of the two subjects. In the following pages I explore *Phil.* and *Flam.* individually, and then consider them as a pair.

Phil. 1-5 are introductory chapters where Plutarch typically outlines his hero's character and aims, and brings out the important themes of benefaction, ambition, and contentiousness which recur through the narrative.¹

Philopoemen's political life begins in c. 5 "when he was thirty years of age." After winning fame at Sellasia (6. 7, 7. 1), he never looks back.² His policy is contrasted with that of Aratus in c. 8. Aratus had achieved the political unity of the Achaean League at the price of using προστάταις ἐπεισάκτοις (8. 6), Macedonians,³ "whereas Philopoemen . . . increased

Translations have been based on the Loeb edition by B. Perrin (London/Cambridge Mass. 1921).

¹ Benefaction: 1. 5, 11. 3-4, 15. 2, 21. 12, *synk.* 1. 1. Φιλοτιμία: 3. 1, 6. 10, 7. 5, 9. 13, 13. 1; for the idea, cf. 4. 10, 7. 1, 11. 2-3, 13. 5; at 9. 7 φιλοτιμία is used of the Achaeans, at 15. 1 of Flaminius. Φιλονικία: 3. 1 bis, 17. 7, *synk.* 1. 4, 1. 7; for the idea, cf. 13. 8, 16. 3; φιλονικία is used of Greece at 18. 3.

² Cf. 7. 3, 7. 9, 12. 1, 14. 1, 15. 1, 19. 1, 21. 9-11, *synk.* 2. 2.

³ Cf. *Arat.* 16. 4 (Macedon is an ἐπακτὸν ἀρχὴν . . . ἀλλόφυλον), *Ag./Cleom.* 37. 7.

not only the power but also the will of the Achaeans, who were accustomed to winning under him and to being successful in most of their contests."⁴

Their main success came at the battle of Mantinea against the Spartan tyrant Machanidas (c. 10). As a consequence of this Philopoemen put on a military display of the winning force at the Nemean Games in the following summer of 206 B.C.,⁵ and we are told (at 11. 3 sq.) that, "just as they made their entrance Pylades the citharode happened to be singing the opening verse of the *Persians* of Timotheus, 'Glorious the crown of freedom which he fashioneth for Hellas,' [§ 4] whereupon . . . all the spectators turned their eyes on Philopoemen and applauded him joyfully. For in their hopes the Greeks were recovering their ancient prestige [ἀξίωμα], and in their will they were getting very close to the spirit of their past."⁶

Philopoemen is inspired by Greek sentiment, especially ἐλευθερία, and though he is not comparable with Flamininus in the scale of his benefactions (*synkrisis* 1. 1), he is a benefactor of Greece. His εὐεργεσίαι are not only material, but are also spiritual. This is explicit in the record of the Nemean Games. It is no coincidence that Flamininus' announcement of the total liberation of Greece at the Isthmian and Nemean Games occurs more or less at the same point in his *Life*. It is the most important common theme of the pair, and one most dear to Plutarch who several times laments the Greeks' loss of liberty to the Hellenistic kings.⁷

Philopoemen is (*Phil.* 1. 6 sq.) "a late-begotten child [ὀψίγονος] which Hellas bore in old age as a successor to the ἀρεταί of her ancient commanders . . . and a certain Roman . . . called him 'last of the Greeks.'"⁸ At *De amic. mult.* 94a Plutarch says we ought to ask for one true and dear friend among our others who is, as Homer puts it, τηλύγετός τις καὶ ὀψίγονος. Philopoemen is loved by Greece, and is a loyal and true friend to her. In c. 1 we learn that he was imbued with Hellenism from his early years. Kleandros, the friend of Philopoemen's deceased father, brought him up "rather as Homer says Achilles was reared by Phoenix, so that from the very outset his character took on a noble and kingly form and growth" (1. 2). Later he came under the care of the philosopher politicians Ekdelos and Demophanes: "they certainly counted the education of Philopoemen among their other deeds, thinking that by means of philosophy they had turned out a man who was a κοινὸν ὄφελος to Greece" (1. 5).

⁴ Cf. Polybius ii. 40. 2: (Philopoemen) ἀγωνιστὴν δὲ καὶ τελεσιουργόν.

⁵ Cf. R. Errington, *Philopoemen* (Oxford 1968) 250.

⁶ Cf. Dio of Prusa xxxi *Rhodian* 157, τὸ κοινὸν ἀξίωμα of Hellas.

⁷ Cf. *Phil.* 15. 2, *Demosth.* 19. 1, *Phoc.* 1. 4, *Ag./Cleom.* 37. 1.

⁸ Cf. Arat. 24. 2. As J. Deininger, *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217–86 v. Chr.* (Berlin 1971) 125, notes, there is nothing in the tradition to indicate the appellation is "cynical" (Errington [*op. cit.*, n. 5], 218)—Plutarch certainly did not take it that way (cf. *Brut.* 44. 2: "[Brutus] called Cassius the last man among the Romans, implying that it was no longer possible for a spirit so great to arise in the city").

One of Plutarch's sources for *Phil.* was probably the encomium written in three books by Polybius (see Polybius x. 21). There is no cause to look elsewhere for the early biographical details. But it is not merely due to Polybius' interest that these have been introduced strongly in the first chapter of Plutarch's *Life*. Education was plainly important to Plutarch, and heroes' possession of Hellenic παιδεία may entail respect for Greece.⁹ The notes on Philopoemen's upbringing serve the purpose of emphasizing his commitment to Hellenic thought and to the idea that the right sort of education may relate to the right sort of action.

The values inculcated into Philopoemen make it natural that he opposed Rome's advancing power in Greece. The presentation of the advance and of Philopoemen's opposition is interesting. There is nothing in the *Life* about Flamininus' complete liberation of Hellas. In c. 14 Philopoemen returns from Crete to find Philip defeated. Here there could have been a note on the liberation of the Greeks, which would not have been entirely irrelevant. Instead we straight away have a clash between Philopoemen and Flamininus. The nature of the discord is rivalry (on Flamininus' part) about who benefited Greece more. Philopoemen, on putting down Nabis, is highly honoured by the Greeks and thus secretly upsets Flamininus, who is φιλότιμος (15. 1) and thought he should have received more honour than Philopoemen because he had freed those parts of Greece which were subject to Macedon. In *Phil.* the spotlight is on Philopoemen (τιμώμενος ἐκπρεπῶς); the implication is that the honours paid to him surpass those paid to Flamininus (at *Flam.* 13. 2—the same incident—Philopoemen gets equal honour, which annoys Flamininus just as much). It does seem that Plutarch is keen in *Phil.* to stress Philopoemen's genuine popularity with the Greeks (1. 6, 11. 4, 15. 1; cf. 10. 13); note how honours often come in the sequence of liberating wars against tyrants (Machanidas, Nabis; cf. his glory in the battle of Sellasia against Cleomenes). Flamininus receives gratitude—that is something different.¹⁰

Chapters 16 and 17 are particularly important for Philopoemen's attitude to Rome. In 16 he warns Diophanes, the Achaean general for 191 B.C., not to provoke trouble in the Peloponnese, "when Antiochus and the Romans are hovering with so many armies," then prevents Diophanes and Flamininus from reaching Sparta. Plutarch does not approve of this, labelling it "an act which was not lawful, still less produced by just principles"; but there is a degree of admiration when he hails it as "great and prompted by a great spirit." In 17 we hear of Philopoemen's opinions on the war against Antiochus: he begrudged the Romans their victory because of Antiochus' sloth and luxury. "When the Romans," Plutarch continues

⁹ Cf. *Luc.* 1. 4–8, 7. 4–7, 20. 1–6, *Cim.* 1–2; *Marc.* 1. 2–3, 19. 6, 20. 1, 21. 7; *Aem.* 2. 6, 28; I discuss this matter along with the general importance Plutarch attached to education, especially for Roman heroes, in an article to appear in *JHS*.

¹⁰ Cf. *Luc.* 23. 3 where Lucullus enjoys real popularity and good-will among the Greeks.

(17. 2 sq.), "had conquered Antiochus, they were already becoming more closely involved with Greek affairs, and were encompassing the Achaeans in their power as the demagogues inclined to their support. Their strength, with the help of the δαίμων, was growing great in all areas, and the end was near to which fate decreed the fortune [of Greece] must come in its due cycle. Here, Philopoemen, like a good helmsman contending against high seas, was on some subjects compelled to give in and yield to the times. But in most he continued his opposition by attempting to draw those who were powerful in speech or action in the direction of freedom."

This most important statement about Philopoemen's opposition to Rome covers the years following the defeat of Antiochus, for which no detailed narrative is given. It is interesting that Plutarch does portray Philopoemen opposing the Romans in this period, for it is unclear how Polybius treated his attitude. Certainly in his defence of Philopoemen before Mummius at Corinth in 146 B.C. Polybius concentrated on Philopoemen's policy at the time of the wars against Philip and Antiochus, and perhaps deliberately skirted over the period between Antiochus' defeat and Philopoemen's death, the period of clashes of policy with Rome.¹¹ There are, though, some traces of opposition activity in the general assessment of Philopoemen at xxiv. 11. 1-13. 10, the comparison and contrast with Aristainos. The occasion for this posthumous (cf. xxiii. 12) evaluation is probably the embassy of Kallikrates to Rome in 181 B.C. (xxiv. 8. 1-10. 15). The patriotic, though contrasting, views of Philopoemen and Aristainos are no doubt intended to show the basic consensus of earlier Achaean politicians, since Polybius says that Kallikrates' prompting was the first occasion when Rome was invited to think of self-interest in Greek affairs (xxiv. 10. 2 sq.).¹² Plutarch knew that Polybius had chosen to understand Rome's methods too late (*Phil.* 17. 2), and he clearly believed that Philopoemen's resistance to Rome was more than a rumour (Polybius xxiv. 13. 10).

Plutarch's departure from Polybius on these matters may explain his different positioning of the contrast between Philopoemen and Aristainos (17. 4). His context suggests the League synod of 191 B.C. (cf. Livy xxxvi. 35. 7), since he cites as an example of Philopoemen's independence his resistance to the requests of Flamininus and M'. Acilius to restore the Spartan exiles (17. 6-7). It may be that Plutarch has inserted the contrast haphazardly,¹³ but more probably the positioning is deliberate, and the opportunity is taken to use the contrast between the two Achaean politicians

¹¹ F. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. iii (Oxford 1979) 732; cf. Errington [*op. cit.*, n. 5] 222.

¹² Naturally Polybius saw that Rome's involvement in Greece had already become much closer as a result of the wars against Philip and Antiochus (xxiv. 11. 3).

¹³ Cf. Walbank [*op. cit.*, n. 11] 264.

to flesh out the increasing emergence of Philopoemen's contentiousness against Rome.

The following chapters (18–21) deal with Philopoemen's death fighting Deinokrates of Messene. The theme of Greek freedom and Roman encroachment is not relevant, for the whole action concentrates on Philopoemen the man and his death. In the final chapter of the *Life* Plutarch does return to this major theme, albeit from a different angle. At 21. 10 he records that many statues of Philopoemen were set up in the cities, and then mentions a proposal by a Roman following the sack of Corinth that the statues be destroyed, since Philopoemen was an enemy of Rome. After some debate Mummius and his staff decide not to allow the honours to be destroyed, "although he [Philopoemen] had made considerable opposition to Flamininus and Acilius. These judges distinguished, it would seem, between virtue and necessity, and between honour and advantage. They rightly and properly considered it was always the case that benefactors ought to receive reward and gratitude from their beneficiaries, and good men honour from the good."¹⁴ The final message of the *Life* hails the justice of Mummius and his commissioners in upholding the statues of Philopoemen despite his opposition to Rome. These later Romans recognize that Philopoemen's opposition did not stem from idle reasons. Plutarch is happy to agree with them.

So, at the beginning of the *Life* Philopoemen is the inheritor and promoter of the Greeks' antique virtues (1. 6); at the end it is for virtue and nobility that he receives posthumous commendation from Rome.

II

The reader or hearer would approach *Flam.* with Rome's later vindication of Philopoemen (and Plutarch's agreement) in the forefront of his mind. *Flam.* follows the form of *Phil.* In c. 1 the main points of the hero's character are laid out. Plutarch comments on Flamininus' preference for doing favours rather than receiving them, and on his general stance as a benefactor (1. 2). This is the most important theme of the *Life*.¹⁵ Going with it is the idea of the liberator.¹⁶ There is a further link with Flamininus' desire for φιλοτιμία

¹⁴ Cf. *Pel.-Marc. synk.* 3. 10, *De cap. ex inim. util.* 91a.

¹⁵ Benefaction: 12. 6, 12. 8, 13. 3, 15. 3, 15. 6–9, 16. 4, *synk.* 1. 1, 3. 4; cf. Nero at 12. 13.

¹⁶ Liberation: 5. 8, 10. 5 sqq., 12. 6, 12. 11.

and δόξα. Φιλοτιμία is stressed heavily.¹⁷ Love of δόξα is also prominent.¹⁸

Hellenic sympathies are clearly important in the presentation of Flamininus (cf. 2. 3, 5. 6–8). However, Plutarch has nothing comparable to the notes on Philopoemen (cf. 1. 4—Flamininus' παιδεία consisted of τὰ στρατιωτικά). The cause is Plutarch's awareness that Greek educational methods at Rome were not freely available at this time, together with a lack of material from which to reconstruct,¹⁹ and the omission does not undermine Flamininus' Hellenic outlook.

Plutarch begins the narrative by bringing out Flamininus' energy and motivation, his youth (2. 2 "he was not yet thirty years of age," the same age as Philopoemen when first active, *Phil.* 5. 1), and his diplomacy (2. 3). This was the first time, Plutarch says, that Greece was brought into close contact with Romans, and unless their commander had been "a naturally good man who employed words instead of war . . . and laid the greatest stress on what was just, [Greece] would not so easily have welcomed an ἀλλόφυλον ἀρχήν in the place of those she was accustomed to." Plutarch adds (2. 5),

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτοῦ δηλοῦται.

This statement—or its equivalent—is on several occasions to be found near the beginning of a text and/or after remarks of an introductory nature, asking the reader or hearer to examine the truth of what has been said from what follows.²⁰ Here we are invited to judge from the narrative not so much of the character of Flamininus, but of the methods by which Greece came to accept foreign dominion.

Plutarch comments on Greek views at 5. 6 sqq.: "they had heard the Macedonians say that a commander of a barbarian army was marching against them subduing and enslaving everything through force of arms. Then, when they met a man who was young in years, humane in appearance, a Hellene in voice and language, and a lover of true honour, they were amazed and charmed . . . (5. 8) and then at last it became quite clear even to the partisans of Philip that the Romans had come to wage war not on the Greeks, but on the Macedonians on behalf of the Greeks."

¹⁷ Φιλοτιμία: 1. 3, 3. 3, 5. 3, 7. 2 ἰσχυρῶς, 9. 5, 17. 2—against Philopoemen, 20. 1, *synk.* 1. 4; cf. 12. 11–12; it is used at 6. 5 of Attalus, 7. 4 of the Romans and Macedonians; the related concepts of φιλονικία and ζηλοτυπία are used of Flamininus at 13. 2 (φιλονικία is used also of Greece at 11. 6).

¹⁸ Love of δόξα: 1. 3 bis, 7. 2, 13. 2, 20. 2, 21. 1, *synk.* 2. 2; cf. 16. 5–7, 17. 1; it occurs at 15. 2, 21. 10 in a different sense applied to others.

¹⁹ The result is seen in Flamininus' surrender in later years to unseasonable ambition (controlled by education, *De virt. mor.* 452d).

²⁰ Cf. *Mar.* 2. 4; *Aratus* 10. 5; *Per.* 2. 5, 9. 1; *Cim.* 3. 3; *Ag./Cleom.* 2. 9; *Phoc.* 3. 9; *Quaest. con.* vii intro. 697e.

At 2. 5 Plutarch had described the Roman hegemony as an ἀλλόφυλος ἀρχή (cf. 11. 7). The same expression is applied to Macedon at *Arat.* 16. 4. However, Rome and Macedon are not to be equated, for Macedon was an unwelcome power. Indeed, its interference in the Peloponnese at the invitation of Aratus was tantamount to the barbarization of the area (id. 38. 6–7, *Ag./Cleom.* 37.7). Thus it is that Plutarch is keen to emphasize that Rome is not in any way βάρβαρος (*Flam.* 5. 6), and that far from coming to enslave Greece, the Romans had come to liberate her from Macedon (5. 8).

In keeping with this presentation, Flamininus' duplicity in the embassy sent after the conference of Nicaea²¹ is held to be due to his being φιλότιμος . . . ισχυρῶς and concerned for his δόξα (7. 2), and there is no hint that he was ready to betray the Greeks.²² Plutarch is in no doubt that Flamininus would have made peace had a successor been appointed, but there seems to be no criticism of his motives so far as Greece is concerned, perhaps because Flamininus did make a very satisfactory peace for the Greeks a little later (9. 8).

The central chapters (10 and 11) of the *Life* are perhaps the most important. In 10 Plutarch records the proclamation at the Isthmian Games in 196 B.C.²³ In 11 he records the resulting opinions of the Greeks, contrasting Flamininus favourably with "men like Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias, and Alcibiades," and pointing out that most of the Greeks' wars had been against themselves, whereas "ἀλλόφυλοι ἄνδρες who were thought to have only slight sparks and insignificant traces of a common remote ancestry . . . had undergone the greatest dangers and hardships to rescue Greece and set her free from harsh despots and tyrants" (11. 7). The thoughts put into the mouths of others are Plutarch's own.²⁴ Parallel versions in Polybius and Livy both have comments on the Roman action of liberating Greece (xviii. 46. 13–15; xxxiii. 33. 5–8). Their remarks are about Rome, her ideals, power, and virtue. There is, especially in Livy, an element of romance. Plutarch is different: he dwells on Greece, and on the distinctively Greek flaws of φιλονικία and the inability to live in peace.²⁵

²¹ The conference has been alluded to at 5. 8 (the relation between conference and embassy is obscured by the anachronistic accession of Boeotia in c. 6). C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 95, holds that Flamininus' peace offer to Philip at 5. 8 is that made at the river Aous rather than at Nicaea; a comparison of Plutarch's narrative with that of Livy shows that this is not so.

²² On Flamininus' aims at Nicaea, see E. Badian, *Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Philhellenism and Realpolitik* (Cincinnati 1970) 40 sqq.

²³ This is made more dramatic by the return of the "fetters of Greece"—Demetrias, Chalcis, (Acro-)Corinth—before the announcement; cf. Polybius xviii. 45. 12, Livy xxxiv. 50. 8, 51. 1–4.

²⁴ Cf. e. g., *Phoc.* 28. 3, *Pomp.* 70, *Sul.* 12. 9–14.

²⁵ See C.B.R. Pelling, "Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives," *Miscellanea Plutarchea* (Ferrara 1986) 83–96, 85.

In c. 12 Flamininus proclaims the freedom of Greece again at the Nemean Games. The proclamation in fact took place after the war against Nabis in 195 B.C., not before, as here, and concerned the Argives only (Livy xxxiv. 41). Plutarch is eager to restate Flamininus' commitment to liberation, and to hail his policy of instilling εὐνομία, ὁμόνοια, and φιλοφροσύνη into the Greek cities (12. 6), reminding us of Aratus at *Phil.* 8. 3 (ὁμόνοια καὶ πολιτεία). At *Flam.* 12. 8 Plutarch comments in his own right on Greek attitudes towards Rome: "in the case of Flamininus and the Romans the gratitude of the Greeks for the benefits they received led not only to expressions of praise, but also to confidence among all men and to power δικαίως." The Romans had acted justly, and hence the Greeks came over to them (cf. 5. 4–6). "The result was that within a short time—and perhaps God was lending a helping hand—everything became ὑπήκοα to them. But he [Flamininus] himself took most pride in the liberation of Hellas" (12. 10–11).

Compare with this *Phil.* 11. 4 and 17. 2–3 (Philopoemen at the Nemean Games; his opposition to increasing Roman power). In *Flam.* the Greeks are grateful to Flamininus and the Romans, but the latter have no genuine popularity. They had restored to the Greeks their freedom, but unlike Philopoemen they had not been able to restore to them their παλαιὸν ἀξίωμα (*Phil.* 11. 4). Rome's actions in Greece on behalf of Greece could be presented as liberation or domination. In *Phil.* there is nothing of the former, and 17. 2 sq. emphasizes the latter. Philopoemen is presented as struggling against forces outside his control in the manner of Phocion or Cato Minor (*Phoc.* 1–3). In *Flam.* the tone is one of liberation and gratitude. The Greeks voluntarily join the Romans. The Romans treat the Greeks with respect, and the policy of liberation is conscious (2; 11. 7).²⁶ Even the rôle of the divine is open to doubt (12. 10), as it is not at *Phil.* 17. 2.

The presentation accords carefully with the manner most suitable for either *Life*. It is difficult to gauge Plutarch's own view. At *Flam.* 12. 13 he notes that in his own time Nero had, like Flamininus, chosen Corinth to proclaim the Greeks "free and autonomous." Nero's grant of freedom in 67 A.D. (*SIG*³ 814) must have made an impression on the Greeks, spiritually and economically. It was an event which had stuck in Plutarch's mind (cf. *De sera num. vind.* 568a); but it seems likely that its abrogation by Vespasian (Pausanias vii. 17. 4) was remembered by him also (and accounts in part for his strong dislike of that emperor, *Amat.* 771c). His narration of the first declaration of liberty in 196 B.C. is not "naïve and uncritical."²⁷ He is aware of the expediency at the back of Flamininus' policy. Note again how unromanticized the philhellenism is—it stems partly from Flamininus'

²⁶ Plutarch's failure to give a cause of Rome's war against Philip (i. e. his alliance with Hannibal) makes its intervention seem all the more noble.

²⁷ A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London 1974) 129.

own personal desire to be a benefactor and to receive honour, partly from Roman awareness of the best way of making an ἀλλόφυλος ἀρχή acceptable to Greece (2. 5). Plutarch realizes Greek failings and appreciates Roman benefits, but he is not interested in rehearsing Roman propaganda about idealized liberation. He knew that it was only a little later that the Romans came to control everything in Greece and the Greek East (*Phil.* 17. 2; *Flam.* 12. 10), just as he knew very well that the proclamation of Nero was only of temporary effect.²⁸ We should distinguish Flamininus himself from Rome—as Plutarch does: showing typical care for his hero he deliberately states that Flamininus continued to take pride in his liberation (12. 11).

This concern to preserve Flamininus' claims to be the liberator of Greece is noticeable also in the narration of the war against Antiochus and even in the peace made with the tyrant Nabis (13–16). In c. 17 Plutarch goes on to summarize his hero's attitude to the Greeks in a series of apophthegms. These are designed to illustrate his character before the narration of his activities at Rome (18–21).

I turn now to consider the characterization of the two men together.

III

That the presentation of liberation or domination differs in each *Life* is partly due to the need to distinguish the heroes. Yet this is not the whole story—it does seem that Plutarch is also distinguishing and presenting discrete interpretations of the historical events, for the characteristics of the two men are quite similar.

Sufficient work has been done in recent years to make it clear that Plutarch envisages a common base between his heroes and demonstrably incorporates common themes in either half of the paired *Lives*.²⁹ There is no cause to see *Phil.*–*Flam.* as exceptional in this respect. In this pair Plutarch's moral/ethical interests focus on φιλοτιμία with its neighbouring traits of φιλονικία and φιλοδοξία. He might seem to have characterized Flamininus with the more neutral quality of φιλοτιμία, and Philopoemen with the ostensibly worse quality of φιλονικία, especially in the *synkrisis*.³⁰ At *Phil.* 3. 1 Philopoemen is typified by φιλονικία and ὀργή, qualities not really brought out in the following narrative.³¹ But the

²⁸ The methods of Roman control (invitation by factions and demagogues—*Flam.* 12. 9–10, *Phil.* 17. 2) were familiar to him from the present too (*Praec. ger. reip.* 814e sqq.).

²⁹ Cf. H. Erbse, "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 398–424; P. A. Stadter, "Plutarch's Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 77–85; J. Geiger, "Plutarch's Parallel Lives: the Choice of Heroes," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 85–104; Pelling [*op. cit.*, n. 25].

³⁰ Cf. Pelling [*op. cit.*, n. 25] 84–89; generally Wardman [*op. cit.*, n. 27] 115–24. The distinction between φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία is the basis of a very different approach to *Phil.*–*Flam.* in an as yet unpublished paper by Joseph Walsh.

³¹ Φιλονικία occurs 3. 1 bis, 17. 7; ὀργή occurs 3. 1 bis, 17. 5.

primary quality at 3. 1 is τὸ φιλότιμον. This was "not altogether free of φιλονικία nor devoid of ὀργή." What Plutarch says here is that φιλονικία was a facet of Philopoemen's ambition, not that it was permanently displayed (the same is true of anger). Similarly, when he adds that Philopoemen could not always "remain true" (ἐμμένειν) to Epaminondas' πρᾶον, βαθύ, and φιλάνθρωπον, he does not mean that these statesmanlike qualities were entirely unknown to him (cf. 16. 1-3), but that he had a soldierly rather than a political ἀρετή. Plutarch does not deny Polybius' testimony to Philopoemen's political skills (xxiii. 12. 8-9).

With Flamininus φιλοτιμία is again the key element in the character and lies behind his good and bad points. He is in fact (1. 3) φιλοτιμώτατος. He is also (ib.) φιλοδοξώτατος. Rather than combining τὸ φιλότιμον with τὸ φιλόκαλον as one ought (*De cap. ex inim. util.* 92d), Flamininus' φιλοτιμία is associated with δόξα. This is its aim when it goes to the bad, especially towards the end of his life (7. 2, 20. 1, 21. 1),³² and δόξα is the counterpart of Philopoemen's φιλονικία (at 13. 2 δόξα is linked with φιλονικία and ζηλοτυπία).

There are a number of passages which demonstrate that for Plutarch φιλονικία, φιλοτιμία, and even φιλοδοξία were really very similar. Both φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία may be good³³ as well as bad,³⁴ and the pursuit of δόξα naturally has points of contact with the other two terms.³⁵

There are naturally differences between Philopoemen and Flamininus, but they share as their leading characteristic φιλοτιμία and its associated traits. This characterization is far stronger and more obvious than anything in the tradition. Consider Philopoemen. In Livy there is nothing on his ambition or contentiousness against the Romans. Philopoemen is praised for his military ability (xxxv. 26. 10, 28. 1), and held to excel all of his time in *prudencia* and *auctoritas* (xxxv. 25. 7). Only an excerpt from Polybius testifying to his having been φιλοδοξήσας in politics (xxiii. 12. 8; cf. similarly 14. 1 of Scipio; in Plutarch's treatment it is of course Flamininus who must pursue glory) and other passages indicating a readiness to dispute with fellow-politicians or with Rome (xxii. 19, xxiii. 5. 13-18, xxiv. 11. 6-8, 13. 1-10) offer a clue.

³² Cf. *Sul.* 7. 2: φιλοτιμία and δοξομανία are the "ageless passions."

³³ Cf. *De virt. mor.* 452b: lawgivers have included φιλοτιμία (and ζήλος) in constitutions, i. e. at Sparta; *Ages.* 5. 5 (ὑπέκκαυμα τῆς ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλότιμον), *Lys.* 2. 4.

³⁴ Cf. *Ages.* 5. 7 ("excessive φιλονικία . . . entail great dangers"), *Ag./Cleom.* 2. 3 (perils of excessive πολιτικαὶ φιλοτιμίαι), *Arist.-Cat. synk.* 5. 4 (φιλοτιμία is "troublesome and highly productive of envy"), *Praec. ger. reip.* (dangers of public φιλονικία: e. g. 819b, 825a, 825e; of public φιλοτιμία: 819f-820f, 825f).

³⁵ Cf. esp. *Ag./Cleom.* 1-2; for 1. 2 (the erroneous identification of glory with virtue), cf. *Coriol.* 4. 5, and note that the only mention of Flamininus' ἀρετή is in the context of his love of glory (*Flam.* 1. 3).

Again, Flaminius is not associated with rank ambition and craving for fame. For example, his ambition is given great play in *Flam.* 7 (cf. 7. 2 ἰσχυρῶς), which concerns his aim of proroguing his command. Compare Polybius and Livy. Polybius may attribute some duplicity to Flaminius concerning his private conversation with Philip on the second day of the conference at Nicaea (xviii. 8. 8); nothing is made obvious though. Perhaps the Livian version (xxxii. 32. 6–8) lends itself more readily to identifying a leading characteristic, which Plutarch exaggerates; cf. similar worries of Flaminius about the war with Nabis (xxxiv. 33. 14). On another occasion, however, Plutarch deliberately departs from Livy: Flaminius' φιλοτιμία emerges for him most strongly in the embassy to Prusias at the end of the *Life*, whereas Livy makes fear of Hannibal a principal reason for the embassy (Plutarch notes this at *Flam.* 21. 14), imputes no base motives to him, and in the final sentence of Hannibal's speech—omitted in Plutarch's translation at 20. 10–11—speaks of Flaminius' mission as official (xxxix. 51. 11).

What emerges from this is the deliberate introduction of similar traits for the two heroes. We have the common technique where Plutarch explores a certain characteristic and shows the strengths and weaknesses it may bring out in a man. Given this, is it significant with regard to Philopoemen that one of Plutarch's criticisms of the Greek generals of old at *Flam.* 11. 6 concerns their φιλονικία? Since both Philopoemen and Flaminius have closely related defects in their ambitious natures, including contentiousness, it is unlikely that Plutarch is here stigmatizing Philopoemen. Nevertheless, in the *Praec. ger. reip.* he does recommend avoiding the strife and discord of previous generations of politicians, and at 825d–f he singles out φιλονικία and ὀργή. Philopoemen is linked with these in his *Life*, and as he is the "last of the Greeks" (1. 7), will have similarities with earlier leaders. But, as we have seen, he is not so crudely damned by Plutarch. And although it is stated at *Flam.* 11. 5 that past leaders did not know how to use their successes πρὸς χάριν εὐγενῇ καὶ τὸ καλόν, at *Phil.* 21. 12 χάρις and τὸ καλόν are among the qualities Plutarch says the Roman judges "correctly and fittingly" ascribed to Philopoemen. It is difficult to resist the view that the last of the Greeks was in fact seen by Plutarch as a genuine benefactor of his country and an inheritor of her ancient virtues rather than vices (1. 6; cf. Polybius xxiii. 12. 3). Plutarch was fully aware that the supremacy of one Greek state entailed the downfall of another—that is why he never exalts the Athenian and Spartan hegemonies. Yet it produced great men. Among individuals, after Timoleon (cf. *Tim.* 29. 5–6, 35, 36. 1–4, 37. 4–6, 39. 7) it is perhaps Philopoemen who is represented as benefiting Greece as far as possible.

Consideration must now be given to the *synkrisis*. Can we detect a preference for one hero over the other? Philopoemen is apparently condemned for φιλονικία in *synkrisis* 1. Why is this so? Simply because this section is about ἀμαρτήματα, not overall character. It is true that

hardly anything is made of Flamininus' faults. On the other hand, Plutarch has been dwelling on Flamininus' failings in cc. 18–21 of his *Life*. We should bear in mind that the *synkriseis* are often not rigorously organized in terms of the space allotted to each hero. So, in c. 3 it is Philopoemen who receives greater treatment than Flamininus, but here to his credit. Really Plutarch is not saying that Philopoemen was a worse man than Flamininus.

One might say that the *synkrisis* has more on Philopoemen than Flamininus. This may be due to the lack of balance and organization common in these pieces. Equally, it may be that Plutarch found Philopoemen a more sympathetic character. Flamininus' status as Greece's most important benefactor is unrivalled. But it is not what Plutarch is most concerned with. In the final section he brings together a principal theme of the *Phil.* (Philopoemen's independence) and the theme he promised to spotlight at *Flam.* 2. 5 (Roman involvement in Greece). At 3. 4 we are told,

Γενναῖα μὲν οὖν Τίτου τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπιεικὴ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα, γενναιότερα δὲ Φιλοποίμενος τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους σκληρὰ καὶ φιλελεύθερα· ῥῆον γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς δεομένοις ἢ λυπεῖν ἀντιτείνοντα τοὺς δυνατωτέρους (cf. *Flam.* 1. 3, *Phil.* 17. 3).

Philopoemen is an object of genuine admiration and affection in Plutarch's portrait. Even the end of the *Life* (cc. 18 sqq.)—where he might appear especially quarrelsome—really shows him in a good light. As a mature and elderly statesman his spirit of contention has diminished, and he is looking forward to a quiet old age, mirroring the waning power of Greece (18. 2); Flamininus' later years at Rome are marred by bad statesmanship (19. 7) and immaturity (20. 2). Remember *Phil.* 21. 12, where the reader or listener learns that Philopoemen's benefactions were never made for himself. Coming immediately after this to *Flam.* he finds out that the Roman's benefactions were not altruistic and stemmed from a love of ambition (1. 3). Thus though praised at *synkrisis* 3. 4, Flamininus' benefactions are less γενναῖα than Philopoemen's opposition.

The Roman benefited Greece, but the Greek attempted to preserve her freedom (*Phil.* 11. 4, 17. 3). Flamininus was "better" for Greece, and—granted—a better example for inter-Greek relations of any age (but not for political relations in general). Philopoemen's ways were those which caused Greece's downfall. But when Plutarch claims they were γενναιότερα, can we deny that he allows himself to be ruled by his heart more than by his head and that he is here expressing his profound admiration?

"The difference [between Philopoemen and Flamininus]," Plutarch continues (3. 5), "is, now they have been examined, hard to define." It is not clear whether he is referring here to the circumstances of their lives or to their characteristics. One could argue both ways. In support of the first view is the fact that they were after all contemporaries and involved to a

large extent in the same theatre of operations. And yet their contacts in the *Lives* are not extensive. They did many different things. Differing circumstances are distinguished in the *synkrisis* (cf. 2. 2, 4; 3. 1). It is better to take Plutarch as thinking in terms of character, for we have seen that the leading characteristics of the two men, that is φιλοτιμία or φιλονικία, are really very similar in his eyes. How, then, are these heroes to be distinguished? "Consider if we have not arbitrated fairly by awarding the Hellene the crown for military and strategic expertise, and the Roman that for justice and goodness of heart" (3. 5). Roman involvement in Greece provides the rationale for this decision.³⁶ Throughout the pair Flamininus is presented as liberator and benefactor, and in particular is commended for his justness—all of this in his dealings with Greece (cf. *Flam.* 2. 5, 11. 4, 12. 6), for neither justice nor χρηστότης are shown in his domestic politics or in his action against Hannibal. Philopoemen has been a fighter all his life. Most of his military worth was proved against Greeks and was "not happy" for that reason (*synkrisis* 2. 3); but is it not particularly in his resistance to Rome that he is praiseworthy for his fighting spirit (*Phil.* 16. 3; 17. 3, 7) and for which even the Romans commend him (21. 12)? If this is so, we may say that against an historical background of increasing Roman involvement in Greece and declining Greek independence, the qualities Flamininus is attributed at 3. 5 are in no way impaired, while those of Philopoemen are excused and enhanced.

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³⁶ Note *Lys.—Sul. synk.* 5. 6 where Sulla is preferred for military skills, Lysander for moral qualities; further, *Ag./Cleom.—Grac. synk.* 5. 7.

The *Lives of the Caesars* and Plutarch's other *Lives*¹

ARISTOULA GEORGIADOU

The *Lives of Galba and Otho* have, in general, drawn very little attention from scholars, unlike other *Lives*. It seems that originally they were a part of a series of biographical sketches running from Augustus to Vitellius. Only these two now survive of the eight *Lives* of the Caesars which are mentioned in the Lamprias Catalogue. Consequently, observations and suggestions about the lost *Lives* can only be speculative.²

How are we to regard the *Lives of Galba and Otho*? Where do they stand in relation to the *Parallel Lives*? I shall attempt to answer these questions by focusing in this paper on a few prominent features of these two *Lives*.

Let us first examine Plutarch's programmatic statement at the beginning of the *Life of Galba* and then compare it with similar statements which appear in other *Lives*. After a few sentences summing up the character of the times, he breaks off, reminding himself that a detailed account of such events would belong to a full, systematic history, whereas he must confine himself to what the Caesars did and suffered.³ So, he makes it clear from the beginning that he is leaving the narration of details to formal history, but that he will not pass over what is worth mentioning in the actions and experiences of the emperors. Likewise, he says in

¹ A slightly different version of this paper was delivered at the International Conference of the Plutarch Society, in Athens, in the Summer of 1987, entitled "Short Lives, Short Reigns: the *Lives of Galba and Otho*." I am indebted to Dr David Lammour and Professors J. Geiger, D. Sansone, Ph. A. Stadter, who read the article in manuscript and offered several helpful suggestions.

² Apart from Plutarch, accounts of the brief reigns of these two emperors are also given by Suetonius, Tacitus (*Hist.* i. 1–ii. 49) and Dio Cassius (64. 1–15). For the dating of these two *Lives* see J. Geiger, "Zum Bild Julius Caesars in der römischen Kaiserzeit," *Historia* Band 24, Heft 3 (1975) 444–53 and R. Syme, "Biographers of the Caesars," *Museum Helveticum* 37 (1980) 104–28, esp. pp. 104–11.

³ *Galba* 2. 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γενομένων ἀπαγγέλλειν ἀκριβῶς τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας ἐστίν, ὅσα δὲ ἄξια λόγου τοῖς τῶν Καيسάρων ἔργοις καὶ πάθεσι συμπέτωκεν, οὐδὲ ἐμοὶ προσήκει παρελθεῖν.

Pompey 8. 7: "Pompey's early deeds were extraordinary in themselves, but were buried by the multitude and magnitude of his later wars and contests, and I am afraid to revive them, lest by lingering too long upon his first ventures, I should leave myself no room for those achievements and experiences (ἔργων καὶ παθημάτων) of the man which were the greatest, and most illustrative of his character (ἦθος)."⁴ So far, what makes this programmatic statement look slightly different from the one set forth in the *Life of Galba* is Plutarch's explicit emphasis on character, the matter which interested him most in his biographies. Again, in the *Life of Nicias* 1. 5: "I cannot pass over the actions narrated by Thucydides and Philistus, because the temper and disposition (τρόπον καὶ διάθεσιν) of Nicias, hidden under his many great sufferings (παθῶν), are involved in them. I have touched on them briefly, relating only the bare essentials, in order not to appear completely careless and lazy, but I have tried to collect other details which have escaped most writers . . . in doing that, I am not gathering a mass of useless information, but passing on the means of observing a man's character and temperament (ἦθους καὶ τρόπου)."⁵ So, in both *Pompey* and *Nicias* Plutarch's method is to eliminate some actions in favour of others, in order to draw out information about the character from these events. He feels no responsibility whatsoever to give a continuous history of events—this the reader can easily find elsewhere. His interest is focused on ἦθος, because he hopes that his readers may be led by examples of virtue to become better themselves.⁶ Now, Plutarch in his statement of purpose in *Galba* mentions nothing about providing his readers with material which might illustrate the ἦθος and τρόπος of the Caesars. However, he does say that he will not omit such incidents as are worthy of mention in the ἔργοις καὶ πάθεσιν of the Caesars.⁷ Ἔργα καὶ πάθη are also the key-words in the other two programmatic statements, and it is through these that Plutarch illustrates the character of his figures. While Plutarch disclaims in *Galba* the composition of πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, he does not admit that he is writing mere *Lives*,⁸ as he clearly states in the *Life of Alexander* 1. 1-2 ,

⁴ . . . οὕτως ὥς ἔπραξε τότε πράξεις ὁ Πομπήιος, αὐτὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰς ὑπερφυνεῖς οὖσας, πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τῶν ὕστερον ἀγώνων καὶ πολέμων κατακεχωσμένας, ἐδεδίδεν κινεῖν, μὴ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα πολλῆς διατριβῆς γενομένης τῶν μεγίστων καὶ μάλιστα δηλούντων τὸ ἦθος ἔργων καὶ παθημάτων τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπολειφθῶμεν.

⁵ ὥς γοῦν Θουκυδίδης ἐξήνεγκε πράξεις καὶ Φίλιστος ἐπεὶ παρελθεῖν οὐκ ἔστι, μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἀποκαλυπτομένην περιεχούσας, ἐπιδραμῶν βραχέως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἀμελὴς δοκῶ καὶ ἀργὸς εἶναι, τὰ διαφεύγοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . πεπείραμαι συναγαγεῖν, οὐ τὴν ἄχρηστον ἀθροίζων ἱστορίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς κατανόησιν ἡθους καὶ τρόπου παραδιδούς.

⁶ See C. Pelling, "Plutarch's Adaptation of his Source-material," *JHS* 100 (1980) 127-39, esp. p. 135.

⁷ *Galba* 2. 5 (quoted in n. 3).

⁸ See E. G. Hardy, *Plutarch's Lives of Galba and Otho* (London 1890) xii; also *Fabius Maximus* 16. 5.

where he says "I do not tell of all the famous actions of these men (i.e. Alexander and Caesar), but in epitome for the most part . . . for it is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives."⁹

I believe that Plutarch is at pains to define the exact nature of this series of *Lives*, and not without reason. He is not prepared to give a history of the whole empire during the specific period he has chosen, as Tacitus promises to at the beginning of the first book of the *Histories* (1–4), but will rather select only those events which are directly or indirectly related to the personal fortunes of the emperors, that is the ἔργα καὶ πάθη of the Caesars. In this connection, it is informative to examine to what extent his judgements and reflections about the events and persons involved in them reveal the general didactic and moralizing attitude seen in other *Lives*. Also, to what extent, if at all, is he prepared to change in practice his theoretical outlook of biographical writing in this series of historiographical sketches, represented only by the *Galba* and *Otho*?

Plutarch's moralizing introduction in the *Life of Galba* 1. 1–2. 1 closely resembles the introductory chapters of many of the *Parallel Lives*, which open with one or more moral concepts and then¹⁰ describe the heroes in accordance with the concept, as far as possible.¹¹ So, from the very beginning, the familiar Plutarchian moral tone and didactic tendencies, so strongly present in the other *Lives*, establish some connections in terms of structure and attitude between these two *Lives* and all the others. Also, it has to be noted that this moralizing preface appears, when it occurs, only in the first *Life* of the pair, and is usually followed by, or includes within it, one or more comparisons,¹² which serve to concentrate and direct the moral

⁹ . . . ἐὰν μὴ πάντα μηδὲ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐξειργασμένως τι τῶν περιβοήτων ἀπαγγέλλωμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιτέμνοντες τὰ πλεῖστα, μὴ συκοφαντεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν ἀλλὰ βίους . . .

¹⁰ See *Aratus* 1. 1–4; *Agis* 1. 1–2. 6; *Demetrius* 1. 1–6; *Sertorius* 1. 1–7; *Phocion* 1–2; *Demosthenes* 1–2; *Alexander* 1; *Dion* 1; *Aem. Paulus* 1; *Pelopidas* 1. 1–2. 8; *Pericles* 1. 1–2. 4; *Nicias* 1; *Cimon* 2. 2–5; *Theseus* 1.

¹¹ A. J. Gossage, "Plutarch" in *Latin Biography* (London 1967) ed. T. A. Dorey, pp. 45–77.

¹² *Demosth.* 3. 1–5 (Demosthenes is compared with Cicero); *Pelopidas* 3–4: Pelopidas is compared with Epaminondas and both are contrasted with other famous political pairs: Themistocles-Aristides/Cimon-Pericles/Nicias-Alcibiades; *Agis* 2. 7–11 (Agis and Cleomenes are compared with the Gracchi); *Philopoemen* 3. 1 (Philopoemen is compared with Epaminondas); *Demetrius* 1. 7–8 (Demetrius is compared with Anthony); *Pyrrhus* 8. 2 (Pyrrhus is compared with Scipio and Hannibal); *Sertorius* 1. 8 (Sertorius is compared with Philip, Antigonos and Hannibal); *Phocion* 3. 7–8 (Phocion is compared with Cato in virtue, Alcibiades with Epaminondas in bravery, Themistocles with Aristides in wisdom, Numa with Agesilaus in justice; [again in *Phocion* 38. 5 Phocion is compared with Socrates in justice]); *Fabius Maximus* 1. 9 (his maxims are compared with those of Thucydides, *ibid* 9. 2 the fate of Minucius is compared with the one of the son of Manlius Torquatus; Fabius Maximus is compared with Flaminius, Minucius, Varro, Marcellus, Scipio); *Per.* 5. 3 and 7. 3 (Pericles is compared with Cimon; *ibid* 18. 2–3 he is compared with Tolmides, in 6. 2–3 and 8. 4 with Thucydides); there is also a series of comparisons in *Per.* 16. 3 between Pericles and Ephialtes, Leocrates, Myronides, Cimon, Tolmides and Thucydides).

reflections that are the primary purpose of Plutarchan biography.¹³ Why the above mentioned features, i.e. the preface and comparisons of moralizing nature, appear only in the first *Life* of each pair of *Lives* can be explained by Plutarch's desire to draw immediately the attention of the readers to the basic didactic purposes which, presumably, made him choose these specific *Lives*. To go back to the *Lives of Galba and Otho*, we see that the same features reappear in them: the moralizing preface occurs in the first *Life* of the pair, and includes a series of moralistic precepts about how the army should behave according to Iphicrates, Aemilius Paulus and Plato (*Galba* 1. 1-3), as opposed to what was actually happening during the reign of Nero and after his death. There follows a comparison between the brief reign of Alexander, the king of Pherae (*Galba* 1. 6-7), and the reigns of the four emperors: Nero, Galba, Otho and Vitellius (1. 8-9).

The *Lives of Galba and Otho* were not originally conceived as a pair, like the Pairs of the *Parallel Lives*. However, although they were probably designed to be read one after the other, like a series of interdependent annalistic narrations, they present some similarities, perhaps superficial, to the other *Lives*, as far as their overall structure is concerned.

The compositional device of σύγκρισις occurs very frequently in the *Lives*.¹⁴ As D. A. Russell remarks, "either character or circumstance may be the basis of a synkrisis; similar events affecting dissimilar persons and similar persons reacting to contrasting events alike provide a suitable field for the exercise . . ."¹⁵ Plutarch, in his *Life of Galba*, uses a series of comparisons as the starting-point of his narration of events. The syncritical technique, however, is not limited to the preface, but appears again and again throughout the *Life of Galba*,¹⁶ throwing the main characters into relief and displaying both their virtues and their limitations.¹⁷ In the *Life of*

¹³ For the structural function of the προοίμιον and the formal σύγκρισις in the *Lives* of Plutarch see H. Erbse, "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 398-424; see also C.B.R. Pelling, "Synkrisis in Plutarch's *Lives*," *Giornale Filologico Ferrarese, Miscellanea Plutarchea*, v. 8 (Ferrara 1986) 83-96.

¹⁴ Titles of Plutarch's works appearing in the Lamprias Catalogue attest to his strong tendencies to compare and classify: Πότερον Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόλεμον ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἐνδοξότεροι, Συγκρίσεως Ἀριστοφάνους καὶ Μενάνδρου ἐπιτομή, Περὶ τοῦ πότερον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ χρησιμώτερον, Πότερα τῶν ζώων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα, Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν Πυρρωνείων καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν, Πότερον ὁ περισσὸς ἀριθμὸς ἢ ὁ ἄρτιος ἀμείνων, Στωϊκῶν καὶ Ἐπικουρεῶν ἐκλογαὶ καὶ ἔλεγχοι, Πότερον τὰ ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος πάθη χεῖρονα, Αἰτίαι Ῥωμαϊκαί, Αἰτίαι βαρβαρικαί, Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί.

¹⁵ D. A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1973) 114.

¹⁶ See 16. 1-3, where the policies of Galba and Nero are compared; in 16. 4 Galba is compared with Vinus; in 19. 2 Otho is compared with Paris; in 19. 4-5 Otho is compared with Nero; in 20. 3-6 Otho with Vinus; in 22. 7 Flaccus Hordeonius is compared with Galba; in 29. 1-5 we have the general concluding comparison between Galba and Nero and in 29. 4-5, Galba's idea of commanding Tigellinus and Nymphidius is compared to Scipio's, Fabricius' and Camillus' leadership of the Romans of their time.

¹⁷ D. A. Russell, "On Reading Plutarch's *Lives*," *G & R* 13 (1966) 139-54, pp. 150-51.

Otho we notice again the same feature, though to a lesser degree,¹⁸ because the *Life of Otho* is much richer in the narration of military events and factual instruction in general, and more meager in appraisal of characters than the *Life of Galba*,¹⁹ in which the description of acts illuminating the person's character are both many and lengthy.²⁰ It is Plutarch's moral emphasis and deep interest in the study of character in the *Life of Galba* which establish, more than anything else, strong connecting links between this particular *Life* and the others. And it is for this reason, I believe, that Plutarch's programmatic statement at the beginning of the *Life of Galba* actually applies with more consistency to the *Life of Otho* than to the *Life of Galba*.²¹

At this point, reference should be made to the concluding comparisons which form a kind of an epilogue to these two *Lives*. It is very likely that these two *Lives* were written singly and without parallels, like the *Aratus* and *Artaxerxes*, though they formed a group, unlike those. Formal parallels were not needed, anyway, since the primary purpose in writing the *Lives of the Caesars* was to narrate the events which were related to the ἔργα καὶ πάθη of the Caesars. Yet, Plutarch, carried away by his desire to draw moralistic lessons from these two *Lives*, as well, and thus to illustrate more graphically his heroes' characters, uses the procedure of σύγκρισις here, as he does later, in his *Parallel Lives*, but makes it undergo a kind of metamorphosis: he incorporates at the end of each *Life* an "internal" σύγκρισις, which makes up for the absence of the formal σύγκρισις seen in the other *Lives*. So, in *Galba* 29. 4 Galba's fate is compared with Nero's, and in *Otho* 18. 2 Otho's life and conduct are compared with Nero's. These two comparisons are not entirely unexpected, as both Galba and Otho are compared with Nero on other occasions: in *Galba* 16. 1–4 Galba's policy is juxtaposed to Nero's in a lengthy passage, and in *Galba* 19. 1–5, Otho's lavish prodigality in his private life is likened to Nero's similar habits. It is

¹⁸ In *Otho* 4. 34–36 Otho and Vitellius are compared; also in 9. 5 three pairs of public persons are brought together: Sulla-Marius, Caesar-Pompey and Vitellius-Otho; in 12. 4 the legion of Otho is compared with that of Vitellius.

¹⁹ *Otho* 3. 1; 4. 3; 9. 2; 9. 4.

²⁰ The portrayal of Galba's character is given in 3. 2–3, 4. 1, 5. 2, 6. 4, 15. 2, 15. 4, 16. 1–3, 17. 2, 21. 1, 27. 2, 29. 1–4; Otho's character in 19. 2–5, 20. 1–4, 21. 2, 23. 3–4, 25. 1; Vitellius' character in 22. 5; Piso's in 23. 2–3; Verginius Rufus' in 6. 1–3, 10. 1–3; Tigellinus' in 2. 1, 8. 2, 13. 2, 17. 2–5, 19. 1, 23. 4, 29. 3; Nymphidius Sabinus' in 1. 5, 8. 1–5, 9. 1–4; Clodius Macer's in 6. 2; Vinus' in 11. 2–12. 3, 17. 1, 17. 3–4; Clodius Celsus' in 13. 4; Flaccus Hordeonius' in 22. 5.

²¹ I only partly agree with C. P. Jones' emphasis on Plutarch's ethical interest in both *Lives*, because, as I have already shown, most moral characterizations and ethical reflexions regarding Galba and Otho are included in the *Life of Galba* and not in the *Life of Otho*; see also Jones (above, n. 8), pp. 73–74.

with these two final, internal comparisons, which play the role of an informal σύγκρισις, that Plutarch brings the two *Lives* to an end.²²

Additionally, what makes these two *Lives* look unlike the other *Lives* is their strong interdependency. They are interlocked in such a marked way, that it is, in fact, impossible to understand the *Life of Otho* without constantly referring to the *Life of Galba*. For instance, all the information about Otho, his lineage, his connections with Nero, Galba, Vinius and other political figures, his early military career, his conspiracy against Galba, and the events which led to his proclamation as emperor by the army, are narrated in the *Life of Galba*. Plutarch, beginning the *Life of Otho*, plunges *in medias res*, after Otho's proclamation as emperor. By doing so, Plutarch stays in line with his programmatic statement, that he will only be concerned with the ἔργα καὶ πάθη of the Caesars, which implies, I believe, that only the period during which the Caesars held their office will be covered by the author. Plutarch makes no effort whatsoever to sum up the most crucial incidents concerning Otho at the beginning of the *Life*, and thus to introduce us more gently to the reign of the new emperor. He does not even spare a few words to explain how the new emperor came into power. He silently sends us back to the previous *Life*. Any reiterations and reminders in the *Life of Otho* would only make it look just like one of the other *Lives*.

The *Life of Vitellius* must have also been composed in the wake of the *Life of Otho*. We see, for example, that, in the *Life of Galba*, Galba is the center of attention, but the spotlight is often turned on Otho, and, to a lesser degree, on Vitellius.²³ In the *Life of Otho* the same pattern is followed: Plutarch focuses his attention primarily on Otho, but, at the same time, Vitellius' personality and pre-imperial activities are, on occasion, appropriately highlighted.²⁴ So, Plutarch constantly reminds his readers of the future development of events and tactfully introduces, well in advance, the emperors who will succeed Galba: in the *Life of Galba*, Otho and Vitellius are introduced, and in the *Life of Otho*, Vitellius and Vespasian.²⁵ Accordingly, I would suggest that the *Lives of Otho* and *Vitellius* were also interconnected, in a manner resembling what we have seen in the *Lives of Galba* and *Otho*.

A similar feature of interdependency between *Lives* can be traced in the *Lives of Tiberius* and *Gaius Gracchus*, which, however form a double *Life*

²² It is entirely possible that the other *Lives* of the Caesars, now lost, also concluded with similar general comparisons of each emperor's character, fate and conduct of affairs with that of his immediate predecessor.

²³ *Galba* 22. 5; 22. 7; 27. 5.

²⁴ In *Galba* 22. 7 Vitellius accepts the title "Germanicus," but not "Caesar"; in *Otho* 4. 1 there were rumors that Vitellius had assumed the dignity and power of emperor; in *Otho* 13. 7, after the defeat of Otho's army at Bedriacum, the army took an oath to support Vitellius and went over his side.

²⁵ *Otho* 4. 5.

and not two separate ones. All the initial information about Gaius is given in the *Life of Tiberius* 1. 8–3. 3 and, when Plutarch starts the *Life of Gaius*, he picks up the thread of events from where he left it in the *Life of Tiberius*. Thus, Plutarch can by no means claim to present in the *Life of Gaius Gracchus* an all-rounded portrait of Gaius, or in the *Life of Otho* a full portrait of Otho.

Another feature, which is directly related to the device of interdependency, is the brevity of the two *Lives* and particularly of the *Life of Otho*. The absence of features which occur regularly in other *Lives* accounts for the striking shortness of the *Life of Otho*. References to Otho's personality, early military career and private life all occur in the *Life of Galba*. Also, the usual details of the boyhood and education of both men are completely absent from the two *Lives*. Finally, Plutarch focuses primarily on the events immediately preceding the death of Nero in 68 A.D. and up to the death of Otho in 69 A.D. This very short period offers fewer opportunities for expansions and digressions than the rest of the *Lives*, in which Plutarch could take the whole life-span of his protagonists into consideration. It is true that the *Life of Galba* is much more eventful and informative than the *Life of Otho*, as persons and circumstances had to be adequately presented in this *Life* before the more factual and annalistic narration of events takes the leading role in the *Life of Otho*.

Finally, I should like to mention one more feature common to nearly all of Plutarch's *Lives*, that of Plutarch's polarized attitude towards the individuals' physical appearance.²⁶ His descriptions of physique fall within two clearly defined and opposed categories, which reflect an attitude of polarization: beautiful, graceful, symmetrical and generally idealized features are opposed to asymmetrical and "defective" ones. He speaks, for instance, of Pyrrhus' "awful mouth defect," or of Sulla's "fearful facial expression with coarse red blotches," of Fabius Maximus' "wart on the upper lip" or of Philopoemen's "waist which is out of proportion with the rest of the body," of Sertorius' one eye, of Demosthenes' "lean and sickly body," of Pericles' "oddly shaped head," of Galba's "baldness and wrinkled face," of Otho's "weakness and effeminacy of the body,"²⁷ or of Flaccus "who was physically incapacitated by acute gout" (*Galba* 18. 8).²⁸ It is not accidental that Plutarch selects from among all the features of an individual only those which may produce a certain dramatic effect with their "peculiarity" or "ugliness." No doubt he bears in mind that such features are better impressed upon the readers' memory. It is not accidental either that

²⁶ Plutarch's physiognomical descriptions in his *Lives* are treated in a greater detail in my unpublished paper "Ἰδέα and the theory of Physiognomy in Plutarch's *Lives*."

²⁷ *Galba* 25. 2.

²⁸ *Pyrrhus* 3. 6; *Sulla* 2. 1; *F. Maximus* 1. 4; *Philopoemen* 2. 3; *Sertorius* 1. 8; *Demosthenes* 4. 4–5; *Pericles* 3. 3; *Galba* 13. 6.

three such statements occur in the *Life of Galba*, which is more concerned with matters of personality and character than the *Life of Otho*.

In conclusion, then, the *Lives of Galba and Otho* are both similar to, and different from, the corpus of *Parallel Lives*. In his introductory remarks, Plutarch's comments suggest that the *Lives of Galba and Otho* will be more given to facts than to moral instruction. This would appear to mark a significant divergence from his practice in the *Parallel Lives*. As we have seen, however, Plutarch does not fully adhere to his statement of intent: the *Life of Otho* is indeed different from the *Parallel Lives*. The *Life of Galba*, however, with its moralizing preface, its series of comparisons, its self-contained development, its emphasis on ethics and character and its use of physiognomy in the service of morality, is clearly a less distant relative of the *Parallel Lives*.

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Plutarch and Platonist Orthodoxy*

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The question of the place of Plutarch within the Platonic School is still a live one, but it has changed its nature somewhat in recent years, especially in view of the successful demolition of the Platonic Academy as an institution in his day,¹ and the inevitable fall-out from that in terms of positing a coherent doctrinal tradition within Platonism. The removal of the actual institution which might maintain (or propound) orthodoxy does not in itself, it would seem, dispose of the general concept of a Platonic orthodoxy, the alternatives to which are necessarily "heresy" or "eclecticism." Plutarch in his day has been accused of both of these deviations. The concept of orthodoxy itself, then, and the standing of Plutarch within the Platonic School, both still merit examination.

Plutarch's position in the Platonist tradition cannot be properly evaluated, however, it seems to me, so long as the notion of an "orthodox" Platonism is maintained, whether propounded by an official Platonic Academy, or not. Heinrich Dörrie, in an article published in 1971,² before Lynch and Glucker had published their books (with which, however, he would not necessarily have agreed),³ distorts the position of Plutarch by postulating something that he calls "Schulplatonismus," which he sees represented by such figures as Taurus in Athens, and Albinus in Smyrna (Plutarch's teacher Ammonius he is not too sure about, *op. cit.* p. 36, n. 1). But in fact we have no indication that there was in Athens at this time—let

*This article originated in a talk to be given to the Plutarch Conference held in Athens in June 1987, but not delivered then. It will appear also, in slightly different form, as an essay, "Orthodoxy and Eclecticism in Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism," in *The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. J. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1988) 103–25.

¹ I refer to the works of John Lynch, *Aristotle's School* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1972), and John Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, (Göttingen 1978).

² "Die Stellung Plutarchs im Platonismus seiner Zeit," in *Philomathes: Studies and Essays in Memory of Philip Merlan*, ed. R. Palmer and R. Hamerton-Kelly (The Hague 1971) 36–56.

³ We will see before long what he felt about this, when the later volumes of his history of Platonism, *Der Platonismus in Antike* (Vol. I, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt 1987), appear.

us say, 70 to 120 A.D.—anything like a “regular” Platonic School for Plutarch to be contrasted with.⁴

John Glucker has done us the great service of “re-drawing the map” of Middle Platonism,⁵ showing that what we are dealing with in the period after about 80 B.C. is no more than a series of individual teachers, in various centres, including Athens, but also Alexandria and the great cities of Asia Minor, identified as Platonists, and bound to the tradition (and to varying extents to each other) through their own teachers, who were in turn dependent on their teachers. To this extent only did the “Golden Chain” of Platonic philosophy continue during this period. Individual philosophers knew whether they were Platonists or not. So did their pupils, and so did the general public. The ancient Mediterranean intellectual élite was a small world, by modern standards.

It is strange, therefore, that Glucker should boggle,⁶ even to the extent that he does, at certain admittedly troublesome remarks which Plutarch makes about the Academy in the course of his writings.⁷ In a well-known passage of the dialogue *On the E at Delphi* (387F), for example, Plutarch describes himself as “devoting myself to mathematics with the greatest enthusiasm, although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim ‘Nothing to Excess’, when once I had come to be in the Academy (ἐν Ἀκαδημαίᾳ γινόμενος).” This to me certainly indicates a recognition by Plutarch of a period in his intellectual development when he would not have described himself as being in the Academic tradition, but rather, perhaps—to judge from the context—as a Pythagorean. The context, after all, is that one Eustrophus of Athens (whom Plutarch seems here to claim as a particular associate⁸), utters a very Pythagorean encomium (388E), first, of Number in general (as the basis and first principle of all things divine and human), and then of the number Five in particular, to which Plutarch himself assents enthusiastically (εἶπον οὖν κάλλιστα τὸν Εὐστροφὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ λύειν τὴν ἀπορίαν, 387F).

⁴ The Epicurean, and *perhaps* the Stoic, Schools seem to have survived into the second century A.D. (evidence usefully assembled by Glucker, *op. cit.* pp. 364–73), but there is no comparable trace of a definitive Platonic (or Peripatetic) School. Rather, there were, if anything, a multiplicity of them (in Athens, Alexandria, Smyrna, and so on), each with their own *diadochoi*, possessing a precarious continuity for a generation or so, and not aspiring to any *exclusive* orthodoxy, though naturally all feeling themselves to be part of the intellectual “succession.”

⁵ To borrow a phrase of his from his review of my book *The Middle Platonists* in *CR* 30 (1980) 58.

⁶ *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, ch. 6, 256–80.

⁷ Particularly, *De. E* 387F; *Def. Or.* 431A; *De Sera* 549E; *Quaest. Conv.* IX 12, 741C; *De Facie* 922F.

⁸ This I take to be the significance of the rather coy statement (388F) ταῦτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔλεγεν οὐ παίζων ὁ Εὐστροφος, ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τηνικαῦτα προσεκέμην τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμπαθῶς, κ.τ.λ.

Now Glucker takes the phrase ἐν Ἀκαδημαίᾳ γενόμενος to mean that at the time of this conversation Plutarch, although already a pupil of Ammonius, did not regard himself as yet being "in the Academy." Since he, like me, does not wish to postulate a philosophic institution of that name, he is forced to the desperate suggestion—which, as he says (p. 271), he offers "not without compunction"—that somehow Plutarch means by this, joining the Academy as a *gymnasium*, in connection with serving as an ephebe (which foreigners could certainly do early in the next century, at least), and that a reverence for the more sceptical traditions of the Academy could have resulted from this.

But I do not see that the phrase must be construed in such a way as to imply that Plutarch did not then yet see himself as "in the Academy." The force of the participle may after all be quasi-concessive, i.e. "although I was destined soon to pay all honour to the maxim 'Nothing to Excess', *seeing as I had now joined the Academy*," or "such as was proper for one who had joined the Academy." It is plain, after all, from Ammonius' own remarks that he regards Pythagorean numerology with considerable irony. Plutarch, as a new member of "the Academy," has not at this stage (66–67 A.D.) yet moderated his youthful enthusiasm for it.

I must apologise for dwelling so long on such a detail, in what is after all almost a private argument with my good friend Glucker, but this is a potentially troublesome passage, which, yet, correctly interpreted (as I hope it now has been), is of considerable interest for our picture of Plutarch's intellectual development and standing within Platonism.

One other aspect of this passage (and of some others, such as those listed in n. 7 above) is important, however, and that is Plutarch's attitude to Academic scepticism. As we know, later Platonists, after Antiochus of Ascalon, could, and did, take one of two possible attitudes to the New Academy and its philosophical methods. The one was to condemn it as a deviation from true Platonism, a view propounded forcefully by Antiochus himself, in his dialogue *Sosus*⁹ (and doubtless elsewhere), and developed eloquently and amusingly by Numenius in his polemical treatise *On the Unfaithfulness of the Academy to Plato*;¹⁰ the other was to accept the view of Antiochus' predecessor Philo of Larisa that the Academic tradition was one and unbroken, with at most a difference of emphasis manifested in the New Academy.¹¹ This was certainly the line taken by Cicero, and also by

⁹ As reported in Cicero, *Acad. Pr.* 11 ff.

¹⁰ Frr. 23–28 Des Places.

¹¹ Philo himself is possibly the source of what is no doubt a pious fiction, certainly widespread in later Platonism (cf. Sextus Emp. *PH* I 234), that "The New Academy had a habit of concealing their opinions, and did not usually disclose them to anyone except those that had lived with them right up to old age" (Aug. *Contr. Acad.* 3. 20. 43, quoting a lost part of Cicero's *Academica*).

Plutarch, though in neither case does this make them sceptics to any serious degree.¹²

Undoubtedly Plutarch had an interest, and a sympathetic interest, in the New Academy. The works of his that would exhibit this most clearly, unfortunately, are all lost, but from their titles we can learn a certain amount. *On the Unity of the Academy since Plato* (Lamprias Cat. 63) places him firmly in the tradition of Philo of Larisa; *On the Difference between the Pyrrhonians and the Academics* (ibid. 64) presumably argued that the Academy had a positive doctrine behind its scepticism, or at least that their scepticism was not complete.¹³ On the other hand, the essays *That there is no such thing as Understanding* (συνιέναι) (158) and *Whether he who suspends judgement* (ὁ ἐπέχων) *on everything is condemned to inaction* (210) sound distinctly sympathetic to Scepticism, and that *On Pyrrho's Ten Tropes* (158) probably was so also.

In the surviving works, too, we have a number of passages indicating that Plutarch accepted a view of the Platonic tradition which included the New Academy. At *De Facie* 922F, for example, he allows the Stoic Pharnaces to reproach his brother Lamprias as follows:

"Here we are faced with that stock manoeuvre (τὸ περιαικτόν) of the Academy; on each occasion that they engage in discourse with others they will not offer any accounting of their own assertions but must keep their interlocutors on the defensive lest they become the prosecutors."

Lamprias has just been satirising the Stoic theory of the moon's substance. Such complaints go back, of course, to the interlocutors of Socrates,¹⁴ but we may still take this, I think, as a good indication that Plutarch recognises New Academic methods of argument as a proper part of a Platonist's armoury.

On the other hand, Lamprias goes on to present a positive theory as to the moon's composition, which serves to show that Plutarch draws on the "Socratic" tradition of *elenchus* primarily as a weapon in inter-school controversy, not as an integral part of this philosophical method, which was predominantly expository and dogmatic.

He makes use of the Academic tradition of "suspending judgement" also, I suspect, when he wants to save himself the trouble of going into questions of physical philosophy deeper than he wants to (very much like Cicero before him). An instance of this is his remark at the end of his short

¹² For Cicero, see now the useful discussion of Stephen Gersh, in *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*, Vol. I, 58–63, and for Plutarch, Phillip de Lacy's "Plutarch and the Academic Sceptics," *CJ* 49 (1953–54), 79–85.

¹³ As against Aenesidemus, for example, who certainly wished to claim Plato and probably the New Academics, as Sceptics. We find the counterpart to this essay in Sextus Empiricus *P. H.* I. 220–35, his chapter "How Scepticism Differs from the Academic Philosophy."

¹⁴ E.g. Thrasymachus in *Rep.* I 366C, and Hippias in *Xen. Mem.* IV 4. 9.

essay *On the Principle of Cold* (955A)—addressed, significantly enough, to the sophist Favorinus, who professed Academic scepticism:

“Compare these statements, Favorinus, with the pronouncements of others, and if these notions of mine are neither deficient nor much superior in plausibility (πιθανότης) to those of others, say farewell to dogmas (δόξαι), being convinced as you are that it is more philosophical to suspend judgement (ἐπέχειν) when the truth is obscure than to come to conclusions (συγκατατίθεσθαι).”

(Trans. Helmbold, slightly emended)

All this, however, concerns Plutarch's attitude to Scepticism and the allied question of the unity of the Academy. There is a good deal more to the problem of orthodoxy than that, and it is to some of these other areas that we must now turn.

The only place where we find Plutarch setting himself explicitly against what could be regarded as the “orthodox” Platonist position is in his treatise *On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, and it is interesting to observe how he phrases his opposition. Pace Dörrie (*op. cit.* p. 48), he does not present himself as taking on a Platonist “establishment.” He recognises that he is going against the views of all, or at least “the most highly regarded” (οἱ δοκιμώτατοι ἄνδρες, 1012D), of previous commentators, but he does not view those commentators as a homogeneous group. Though all choose to deny that the world was created at a point in time (1013A), some are followers of Xenocrates' view, and others of that of Crantor, while others, like Eudorus, seek to reconcile both views, and he deals with each of them in turn. Nor does he speak here as an outsider attacking the establishment, but as the true interpreter of Plato's doctrine correcting the mistakes of predecessors: “Such being the whole of what they say . . . to me they both seem to be utterly mistaken about Plato's opinion, if a standard of plausibility is to be used, not in promotion of one's own doctrines, but with a desire to say something that agrees with Plato” (1013B, trans. Cherniss).

It may seem to us that promoting his own doctrines in the guise of an exegesis of the *Timaeus* is precisely what Plutarch himself is doing, but that is not, plainly, how he sees it. Elsewhere, in his treatise *On Moral Virtue*, though his position of hospitality to Aristotelian ethical doctrine might be considered almost as controversial, we find no suggestion that he has any consciousness of this. His polemic is all with outsiders, chiefly the Stoics. And yet there is much that is peculiar in his doctrine here.

One of Plutarch's most distinctive doctrines, apart from his well-known dualism (though closely involved with it), is his view of the soul as essentially (ἀντὶ καθ' ἑαυτήν) non-rational (*Proc. an.* 1014DE), and distinct from intellect. It is this essential soul that he sees in the “nature divided about bodies” of *Timaeus* 35A, and in the “maleficent soul” of *Laws*

10, and it is the cornerstone of his theory in the *Proc. an.* It also figures in the treatise *On Moral Virtue*.¹⁵

At the outset (440D), Plutarch raises the question, "what is the essential nature (*ousia*) of moral virtue, and how does it arise; and whether that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason (*logos*), or merely shares in one alien to it; and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of things which are mingled with something better, or rather, whether it is said to participate in the potency (*dynamis*) of the ruling element through submitting to its administration and governance."

Here, admittedly, he speaks of a part (*morion*) of the soul, rather than of soul in general, but it becomes plain presently that what he has in mind is not really the lower or "passionate" soul in the traditional Platonic sense, so much as soul distinct from intellect. A little further on, in the course of his introductory survey of previous opinion, he criticizes those, particularly the Stoics, who assume intellect and soul to be a unity:

"It seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is truly two-fold and composite. For that other two-fold nature of ours they have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and body."

Pythagoras, on the other hand, and above all Plato, recognized "that there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, like an alien body, is mingled and joined with reason (*logos*) by some compulsion of nature."¹⁶ Here he speaks, rather misleadingly, of the two-fold nature of "the very soul within itself," but we can take it, I think, that he is using "soul" in a loose sense, as those who have not discerned the true situation would use it. The truth, as we see, is that there are three entities, body, soul, and *nous* (intellect) and this trichotomy leaves soul as essentially and of itself *alogos*, non-rational, though having a part which is receptive of reason (441F ff.).

In the *Virt. mor.*, it must be admitted, Plutarch obscures the doctrine which he presents very plainly in the *Proc. an.*, by speaking, for the most part, of the "non-rational part" (*alogon meros*) of the soul, rather than the soul itself, as opposed to *nous*, and it is possible that he has not yet fully clarified his position in his own mind (if, as I assume, the *Virt. mor.* is earlier than the *Proc. an.*), but he says enough, I think, to show that this

¹⁵ Plutarch's doctrine of the soul has recently been excellently set out in the useful study of Werner Deuse, *Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre* (Wiesbaden 1983) 12-47, though Deuse does not pay as much attention to the *Virt. mor.* as he should have, confining himself largely to *Proc. an.* and *De Is. et Osir.*

¹⁶ Helmbold's Loeb trans., slightly emended.

remarkable doctrine was already in his mind.¹⁷ What is interesting for our present purpose is that he shows no consciousness of "unorthodoxy" on this point, as he does on the matter of the temporal creation of the world (though, as I have said earlier, "unorthodoxy" is not quite the right word).

The other notable aspect of the treatise *On Moral Virtue*, of course, is its wholehearted adoption of Aristotelian doctrine, derived directly from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, chiefly Books 2. 5–7 (On the Mean) and 6 (on *Akrasia*), with some influence also from the *De anima*.¹⁸ This can be labelled eclecticism, but I do not see that that term is very useful. It is clear from his presentation of Aristotle's position at 442B–C that Plutarch regards him as substantially adopting Plato's doctrine of the soul (except that he "later" assigned the "spirited" part (*thymoeides*) unequivocally to the irrational part of the soul—a development which Plutarch does not quarrel with). This enables Plutarch to present, for instance, the theory of the Mean (in 444C–445A) unhesitatingly as Platonic doctrine.

Although the chief source of his doctrine here, as I have said, is *Nicomachean Ethics* 2. 5–7, there are some elements observable, modifying the Aristotelian position, which, once again, might misleadingly be termed "eclectic." First of all, Aristotle describes Virtue as a *hexis* or state (1106b36), but Plutarch, at 444F, describes it as a "movement" (*kinesis*) and "power" (*dynamis*) concerned with the management of the irrational, and doing this by fine tuning and harmonising of its discordant excesses (cf. 444E, 445C). This seems a Pythagorizing turn of phrase, and that, together with the laudatory mention of Pythagoras in the doxography (441E), points to a Pythagorean element in the mix which Plutarch is presenting to us. This Pythagoreanism can be shown with fair certainty to be mediated through Posidonius, by a comparison with Galen, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 4. 7. 39 (p. 290 De Lacy) and 5. 6. 43 (p. 334 De Lacy),¹⁹ but Plutarch's interest in Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism is well enough attested apart from this²⁰ to make it probable that he is not simply dependent on Posidonius here. Further, the activity of virtue is described as a "harmonising" (*synharmoga*) of the irrational by the rational soul in a

¹⁷ Even in the midst of his exposition of the doctrine in the *De facie* (943D) he refers to those who have made τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ παθητικόν orderly and amenable to their λόγος, using traditional terminology.

¹⁸ See on this the useful discussion of D. Babut, in pp. 44–54 of the Introduction to his edition of the work, *Plutarque, De la vertu éthique* (Paris 1969). He refutes satisfactorily earlier attempts to postulate Posidonius or Andronicus of Rhodes as intermediaries for the doctrine of this part of the work, though the anti-Stoic polemic of the second part (from 446E on) does show dependence on Posidonius (as reported in Galen, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 4). His view, with which I concur, is that Plutarch read Aristotle for himself, though he was doubtless acquainted with later Peripatetic works as well.

¹⁹ Quoted by Babut in his notes *ad loc.*

²⁰ E.g. *Is. et Osir.* 360D; 384A; *Proc. an.* 1027F; 1020E ff. *Quaest. conv.* 8.7 and 8; *De. E* 388C, etc.

variety of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha,²¹ which indicates a tendency in many of these works to claim Aristotelian ethical theory for Pythagoras. Metopos' treatise *On Virtue* (pp. 116–21 Thesleff) is a good example of this (he also produces the formulation, found at the beginning of *Virt. mor.* (440D), that the passions are the “matter” (*hyle*) of ethical virtue, p. 119. 8). While not being necessarily *dependent* on any of these intermediate sources for his interpretation of Aristotle, therefore, Plutarch was doubtless aware of most of them.

If this is eclecticism, it is certainly not mindless eclecticism. It is based on a view of the history of philosophy, mistaken perhaps, but perfectly coherent, which sees Plato as a follower of Pythagoras, and Aristotle as essentially still a Platonist, and a consistent ethical position being held by all three. As to the doctrine of the distinctness of soul and intellect, which does not, as I say, receive clear articulation in this treatise, but comes out clearly in the dialogues *On the Face of the Moon* (943A ff.), and *On the Daemon of Socrates* (591D ff.), as well as in the *Proc. an.*, that is a piece of “unorthodoxy,” on the origins of which I have speculated elsewhere, though without definite conclusions,²² but it is one for which Plutarch is at pains to find Platonic antecedents (e.g. *Tim.* 30B; 90A, *Phaedr.* 247C; *Laws* 12, 961D; 966D–E), and which, as I have said, he does not regard as setting him in opposition to any official Platonic tradition.²³ In summary, Plutarch may be a bit of a maverick, but he does not view himself as such (except perhaps in the matter of temporal creation), and I can see no evidence of any contemporary “Schulplatonismus” from which he can be said to deviate.

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²¹ Archytas, Π. νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης, p. 33. 17, Thesleff (*Pythagorean Texts*); Metopos, Π. ἀρετῆς, p. 119. 27; Theages Π. ἀρετῆς, p. 190. 1 ff.

²² *The Middle Platonists* 211–14. A similar distinction is made in some treatises of the *Corpus Hermeticum* (notably I and X), and it is analogous to the distinction in Gnostic thought between soul and *pneuma*, but I am uncertain what to conclude from this. Attributing the doctrine to Posidonius, in default of any hard evidence, is a once easy option no longer open, I think.

²³ At *De facie* 943A, he criticises οἱ πολλοί for wrongly believing man to be composed of just two parts, but these “many” need not be regarded as any set of philosophers, never mind Platonist philosophers.

Plutarch's Portrait of Socrates

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Since the recent studies of K. Döring, it is clear that there was a renewal of interest in the person of Socrates in the first and second centuries A.D.¹ Such an interest is reflected, for example, by Dio of Prusa's speeches on Socrates (*Or.* 54 and 55), and by frequent references to him in the works of Seneca and of Epictetus. Indeed, as Döring observed in *Exemplum Socratis*, a study of Socrates' influence on the Cynic-Stoic popular philosophy of the early Empire, Plutarch was influenced by and contributed much to his contemporaries' concerns with Socrates,² writing at least three works on Socrates, two of which are lost: *A Defense of Socrates* ('Απολογία ὑπὲρ Σωκράτους), and *On the Condemnation of Socrates* (Περὶ τῆς Σωκράτους ψηφίσεως).³ A third work, *On the Sign of Socrates* (Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου or *De genio Socratis*) is still extant, and has recently received great attention.⁴ Moreover, the first of the *Platonic Questions*

¹ K. Döring, "Sokrates bei Epiktet" in *Studia Platonica. Festschrift für Hermann Gundert* (Amsterdam 1974) 195–226. See also his *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum* = *Hermes Einzelschriften* 42 (Wiesbaden 1979). For the importance of Socrates in later Greek thought, see also W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Pt. I, Vol. III: *Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur* (Munich 1940) 276–77.

² Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 9–11, briefly mentions aspects of Plutarch's treatment of Socrates, but he is mainly concerned with Seneca, Epictetus, and Dio of Prusa, and has little on Plutarch.

³ These are No. 189 and No. 190 respectively in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue of Plutarch's works, on which see K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart 1964) 60–64 = s.v. "Plutarchos," *RE* 21. 1 (1951) cols. 696–702.

⁴ For example, by A. Corlu, *Plutarque, Le démon de Socrate* (Paris 1970); A. Aloni, "Osservazioni sul *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco," *Museon Criticum* = *Quaderni dell' Istituto di Filologia classica dell' Università di Bologna* 10–12 (1977) 233–41, and A. Aloni, "Ricerche sulla forma letteraria del *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco," *Acme* 33 (1980) 45–112; M. Riley, "The Purpose and Unity of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*," *GRBS* (1977) 257–73; D. Babut, "Le dialogue de Plutarque *Sur le démon de Socrate*. Essai d'interprétation," *BAGB* (1984) 51–76; K. Döring, "Plutarch und das Daimonion des Sokrates (Plut., *de genio Socratis* Kap. 202–04)," *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984) 376–92; and P. Desideri, "Il *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco: Un esempio di 'storiografia tragica,'" *Athenaeum: Studi periodici di Pavia* 62 (1984) 569–85. A. Barigazzi is currently completing a study of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*, a version of which was presented at a conference of the International Plutarch Society held in Athens, June, 1987 [see *infra*, No. 14].

(Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα, 999C–1000E) deals with the problem of why god commanded Socrates to act as midwife to others, but prevented him from himself begetting.⁵

Speculation on Plutarch's lost treatises is futile. Possibly they were directed against Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates* (Κατηγορία Σωκράτους), but as Döring noted, this matter "entzieht sich unserer Kenntnis."⁶ Yet the extant *De genio Socratis*, and numerous references to Socrates in the *Moralia* and *Lives*, deserve attention, and contribute much toward a reconstruction of Plutarch's portrait of Socrates. Hence, this study's purpose is to present a comprehensive and detailed examination of Plutarch's treatment of Socrates, in which problems concerning Plutarch's sources and reasons for referring to Socrates are considered. It is hoped that such a study provides insights into an era when Socrates was once more in vogue, and illuminates Plutarch's own thinking as a representative of the Academy.⁷

For the moment, source questions require brief consideration: Plutarch knew the works of Plato and of Xenophon quite well.⁸ That these two authors' accounts of Socrates were almost definitive for later antiquity, was stressed by G. C. Field and others,⁹ and Plutarch's derivation of many

⁵ For an excellent introduction to *Quaest. Plat.*, see H. Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia* XIII, Pt. I in the Loeb Classical Library, (Cambridge, Mass. 1976) 2–17. The text, translation, and notes are also quite valuable. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are from the Loeb Classical Library volumes, hereafter *LCL*.

⁶ Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 2, note 5. For more on Polycrates, see chap. 4 of A. H. Chroust, *Socrates, Man and Myth* (London 1957), E. R. Dodds, *Plato, Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 28 ff., and W.K.C. Guthrie, *Socrates* (Cambridge 1971) 11 ff. = *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Pt. 2, Vol. III (Cambridge 1969) 311 ff., hereafter *HGPH*.

⁷ See Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 7–8. For the so-called Old Academy, there is no extant evidence of Socrates' importance. Beginning with Arcesilaus, however, there is evidence for interest in Socrates' disclaimer to knowledge and his use of the *elenchus*. Plutarch represented so-called Middle Platonism, on which see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 184–230.

⁸ For Plutarch's knowledge of Plato, see the still valuable study of R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Menasha, Wisconsin 1916), and the many references in W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations*, APA Monograph 19 (Oxford 1959) 56–63. For Xenophon, *ibid.*, 75–76, and Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 286 = *RE* 21.1, col. 923, who affirms that Plutarch knew the writings of Xenophon (whom he considered a philosopher) "wirklich gut und gründlich."

⁹ See G. C. Field, "Socrates and Plato in post-Aristotelian Tradition," *CQ* 18 (1924) 127 ff. Aristotle and Aristophanes are often considered sources for the historical Socrates. Aristotle, however, probably relied on Plato, Xenophon, and other Socratics for his information, and Aristophanes was not concerned with impartial examination of Socrates. For a judicious account of Aristotle and the comic poets, see Guthrie, *Socrates*, 35–37 = *HGPH*, 355–57. A useful treatment of Aristotle as a source for Socrates is T. Deman, *Le témoignage d'Aristote sur Socrate* (Paris 1942), who collected Aristotle's texts on Socrates, and who gave a summary (11–21) of previous scholarship on Socrates.

reports on Socrates from Plato's dialogues is beyond reasonable doubt. There are, for example, likely references to the *Apology* at 1116F and 1117E; to the *Phaedo* at 16C, 17F, 499B, 607F, 934F, and 975B; to the *Symposium* at 632B, 707A, 710C, 823D, and 1117E; to the *Theaetetus* at 999C ff., and to the *Meno* at 93B.¹⁰ Moreover, in combining historical narrative with philosophical discussion in *De gen. Socr.*, Plutarch used the *Phaedo* as a model, and various parallels between both works have often been noticed.¹¹ Plutarch also relied on Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Memorabilia* as sources, e.g., the former at 124E, 130F, 401C, 630A, 632B, 709E, 711E, and the latter at 124D, 328E, 513D, and 661F. In addition to works of Plato and of Xenophon, Plutarch was familiar with Aristotle's "Platonic writings" (see 118C, most likely a reference to Aristotle's *On Philosophy*),¹² Demetrius of Phalerum's *Socrates* (see *Aristid.* 1. 2 and 27. 3),¹³ and with Panaetius' *Socrates* (*Aristid.* 1 and 27. 3). In this latter work Panaetius apparently denied that Socrates had a second wife, and it was perhaps due to Panaetius' influence that Socrates as a thinker who "brought philosophy down from the skies" (see *Cic. Tusc.* 5. 4. 10) became a popular belief.¹⁴ Plutarch's other sources, e.g., at 486E, 512F, and 516C, are unknown, but the majority of his reports remain traceable to Plato and Xenophon.

That Plutarch's interest in Socrates was more than biographical, is well illustrated by a passage in *Quaestiones convivales* VIII.1 (717B ff.), where he states that "on the sixth of Thargelion we celebrated the birthday of Socrates, and on the seventh that of Plato." These dates also furnished Plutarch and his company with their topics: days on which some eminent persons were born, and stories of births from divine parents. Later in the symposium, Florus,¹⁵ a friend of Plutarch very familiar with the

¹⁰ See the notes on these passages in the appropriate *LCL* volumes. References to Socrates and Plato's *Apology* are also in the probably spurious *Letter of Condolence to Apollonius* (*Consolatio ad Apollonium*). On this work, see Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 158–65 = *RE* 21. 1 cols. 794–802.

¹¹ See, for example, Riley, *GRBS* 18 (1977) 258, or R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, Vol. II (Leipzig 1895) 148–51.

¹² See R. Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes* = *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 7 (1955) 282–83.

¹³ On Demetrius and Peripatetic interest in Socrates, see Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 4–5 and Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte*, 276.

¹⁴ See Guthrie, *Socrates*, 98 = *HGPH*, 418, M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. I (Göttingen 1947), and Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte*, 239. According to Plutarch, the story that Socrates had a second wife, Myrto, was doubted by Panaetius (*Aristid.* 27).

¹⁵ On Florus, see Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 51–52 = *RE* 21. 1, cols. 687–88, and J. C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 49. According to Jones, Florus "exhibits the same antiquarian tastes that had amused Vespasian long ago." It was through Florus that Plutarch obtained Roman citizenship.

philosophies of Plato and of Aristotle, claims that Apollo by Socrates' agency (διὰ Σωκράτους) made Plato heal greater ailments and illnesses than those cured by Asclepius (717D-E). For Plutarch himself, philosophy had practical results, and he did not believe that it consisted of *ex cathedra* pronouncements, or of learned commentaries. Philosophy involved all of daily life, and at *An seni republ. ger. sit.* 796D, he writes:

Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out benches or seat himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for conversing or promenading with his pupils, but jested with them, when it so happened, and drank with them, served in the army, or lounged in the market-place with some of them, and finally was imprisoned, and drank the poison. He was the first to show that life at all times and in all parts, in all experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy.

(H. N. Fowler's translation)

The above passage demonstrates well Plutarch's concern for ethics or practical morality, and his conviction that philosophy is, above all, the art of living well.¹⁶ Similar views about Socrates are expressed at *Quaest. Plat.* 999E, *De curios.* 516C, and *Adv. Col.* 1117D-E. These passages reflect not only a "Zeitgeist," but also Plutarch's personal beliefs, beliefs often formed or held in opposition to rival philosophical schools. A clear illustration of this phenomenon is the *Adversus Colotem*. In order to understand Plutarch's polemic against Colotes, it must be remembered that Plutarch was probably a life-long opponent of Epicureanism, and that Socrates was much maligned by the Epicureans, e.g., by Zeno of Sidon, who considered Socrates *scurra Atticus*,¹⁷ and by Colotes in his "On the Point that Conformity to the Views of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes it Impossible to Live."¹⁸ When beginning his defense of the philosophers attacked by Colotes, Plutarch specifically mentions the "insolent rudeness" of Colotes' critique of Socrates (1108B). As R. Westman noticed, Colotes' attack on Socrates was enough "einen überzeugten Sokrates-Verehrer vor den Kopf zu stoßen."¹⁹ After Plutarch's

¹⁶ D. Babut calls attention to Plutarch's interest in practical philosophy, an interest which is among "des traits communs dès l'époque hellénistique," *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 276 f.

¹⁷ R. Flacelière's thesis that there was an evolution in Plutarch's attitude toward Epicureanism seems untenable. For his views, see "Plutarque et l'épicurisme," *Epicurea, in memoriam Hectoris Bignone*, (Genoa 1959) 197-215, and for criticism, see H. Adam, *Plutarch's Schrift non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum = Studien zur antiken Philosophie* 4 (Amsterdam 1974) 3. For the Epicurean attack on Socrates, see Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Pt. I, Vol. III, 276, and Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, especially 60-66 and 274-75.

¹⁸ The translation of the title is that of the LCL, on which see B. Einarson and P. De Lacy, *Plutarch's Moralia* XIV (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 153 ff. The probably definitive study of this work is R. Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*.

¹⁹ Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, 123.

initial remark that Colotes' manner of "presenting Socrates with 'grass' and asking how comes it that he puts his food in his mouth and not in his ear," might cause laughter when thinking of Socrates' "gentleness and kindness" (πραότητα καὶ χάριν),²⁰ he discusses Colotes' charges in detail, providing more information about Colotes' book than in any other section of *Adv. Col.* (see 1116E–19C). Plutarch considers three matters in Colotes' treatment of Socrates: 1) the famous Delphic oracle in which Socrates was declared the wisest of mortals (1116E–17C); 2) Socrates' belief that sense perception is not accurate or trustworthy (1117D–18B; and 3) Socrates' inquiry into the nature of human beings (τί ἄνθρωπός ἐστι), and the famous Delphic inscription "know yourself" (1118C–19C).²¹

Each of Colotes' charges is met by Plutarch with polemics against the Epicureans. For example, Colotes' accusation that Chaerephon's report on the Delphic oracle is nothing but "a cheap and sophistical tale" (τὸ τελέως σοφιστικὸν καὶ φορτικὸν διήγημα, 1116F) is rebutted as follows: if this was a cheap sophist's trick, then adulation of Epicurus by his followers is equally cheap and sophistical. *Tu quoque* criticism is also in Plutarch's response to Colotes' attack on Socrates' views of sense perception, which are discussed at some length. Plutarch concludes: "of these matters Colotes will give us an occasion to speak again" (1118B–C), presumably in his account of the Cyrenaics and the Academy of Arcesilaus at 1120F–21E and 1123B–24B.²²

Plutarch was angered by Colotes' "blasphemies" of Socrates (1117E), and Colotes' critique of Socrates' alleged scepticism especially disturbed him. Now some of Colotes' criticisms of Socrates are similar to those directed against Arcesilaus (see 1121F ff.), and hence there is reason for thinking that Colotes' treatment of Socrates as a Sceptic was partially influenced by Arcesilaus' views, and that Colotes' general accusation that the philosophers made life impossible, is a variant of his attack on the Academic Sceptics.²³

Little is known about Arcesilaus, who was probably scholarch of the Academy when attacked by Colotes,²⁴ but Plutarch reports that sophists contemporary with Arcesilaus accused him of foisting his scepticism on Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, and Heraclitus (see 1121F–22A).²⁵ Hence, in

²⁰ Einarson and De Lacy, *LCL* XIV, 195, translate the phrase as "unruffled wit" (1108B).

²¹ Each of Colotes' charges is discussed in detail by Westman who plausibly observes that Colotes derived his information about Socrates from Plato's dialogues. Yet Colotes apparently realized that Plato sometimes used Socrates as a spokesman for his own views. See Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, 63, note 1.

²² On Plutarch's defense of Arcesilaus, *ibid.*, 76–79, and 293–294.

²³ See the remarks of Einarson and De Lacy, *LCL* XIV, 153–57.

²⁴ See Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, 77, note 3; *LCL* XIV, 154, note a; and Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 9.

²⁵ The "sophists" were probably the Theodoreans and Bion. See *LCL* XIV, 277, note e. See also Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, 294.

treating Socrates as a Sceptic, Colotes seems to agree with an Academic tradition possibly going back to Arcesilaus (cf. Cic. *Acad. post.* 1. 4. 15–18). In any case, Colotes attacked Socrates for denying the “plain evidence of the senses” (see 1117F), and for considering sense perception unreliable.

Was the basis for Colotes' polemic, then, a Sceptic interpretation of Socrates, and does *Adversus Colotem*, together with other works of Plutarch, show that Plutarch himself was an Academic Sceptic? This composite question can probably be answered in the negative.²⁶ First, in defending Arcesilaus against the charge of foisting his own belief about “the impossibility of infallible apprehension on Socrates,” Plutarch asserts at 1122A that Socrates and other thinkers did not need such an interpretation, and “we are thankful to Colotes and everyone who shows that the Academic reasoning came to Arcesilaus as an ancient tradition (ἀνῶθεν ἦκειν εἰς Ἀρκεσίλαον).” Second, Plato's tremendous influence on Plutarch cannot be overlooked, and is far more important than that of any other thinker. For example, at *De aud. poet.* 17 D–F Plutarch argues that the poetic art is not concerned with truth, and that truth about divine matters is very hard to obtain, as Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Socrates realized.²⁷ In support of his mention of Socrates, Plutarch probably relies on Plato's *Phaedo* (69D). Also at *Quaest. Plat.* 999E–F Plutarch emphasizes Socrates' aversion to dogmatism:

So Socrates with his refutatory discourse (τὸν ἐλεγκτικὸν λόγον) like a purgative medicine by maintaining nothing claimed the credence of others when he refuted them, and he got the greater hold on them because he seemed to be seeking the truth along with them, not himself to be defending an opinion of his own.

(H. Cherniss's translation)

A similar opinion about Socrates is expressed at *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* 72A, where Plutarch states that Socrates quietly took young men to task, “not assuming he himself was exempted from ignorance, but thinking that he along with them had to study virtue, and to seek for truth.”²⁸ Moreover, the idea of Socrates as someone who treated not the body, but purged “the ulcerous and corrupted soul” is found at *Quaest. Plat.* 1000C. As Cherniss noted, the source for this latter view of Socrates is Plato's *Sophist* 230c–231b, and inspiration for the first of Plutarch's

²⁶ J. Schroeter's belief that Plutarch was a Sceptic, *Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis* (Greifswald 1911), has been well argued against by P. De Lacy, “Plutarch and the Academic Sceptics,” *CJ* 49 (1953–54) 79–85.

²⁷ Schroeter cites this passage, *Plutarchs Stellung*, 24, as an example of Plutarch's scepticism, but Plutarch is thinking of the Socrates of Plato's *Phaedo*. Earlier in *De aud. poet.* (at 16C), Plutarch relies on the *Phaedo* when he reports that Socrates took up poetry and put Aesop's fables into verses.

²⁸ See also *Adv. Col.* 1117D, and Cherniss, *LCL* XIII, Pt. I, 22, note c.

Quaest. Plat. is clearly Plato's *Theaetetus*.²⁹ Nothing thus far indicates that Plutarch's portrait of Socrates was based on anything other than Plato's works.

Returning to *Adv. Col.* and to Colotes' polemic against Socrates: when Colotes attacked Socrates for denying the reliability of sense perception, he was probably not thinking of Socrates' often expressed conviction that he knew nothing. According to R. Westman, Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge was "allgemein und prinzipiell," whereas Colotes attacked a specific δόξα on sense perception's reliability.³⁰ Possibly Colotes thought of Socrates' critique of knowledge as sense perception in the *Theaetetus* (151e–186e), or still more likely, of *Phaedo* 83a, where Socrates claims that lovers of knowledge realize that "the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit (ἀπάτης)." In brief, there are no good reasons to look beyond Plato's writings either for Colotes' attack on Socrates, or for Plutarch's views on Socrates. Plutarch himself was not an Academic Skeptic, and his portrayal of Socrates goes back mainly to Plato, and not to Arcesilaus.

Any interpretation of Socrates as an Academic or theoretical Skeptic should also take account of Plutarch's other remarks on Socrates. At *Adv. Col.* 1117A he is called "a zealot (θεόληπτος, lit. 'inspired' or 'possessed') for virtue," and Plutarch later mentions the importance of Socrates' teaching for preservation of human society (1124D). Again, at 1126B Plutarch commends Socrates' refusal to escape from prison,³¹ and his adherence to Athens' decrees. Other incidents in Socrates' public life cited at *Adv. Col.* 1117D are also in Plutarch's *Alcibiades* (7. 4–6). In brief, Socrates not only conversed with his fellow citizens (see also *De latenter viv.* 1128F) and cast doubt on sense perception: he was a thinker with an active role in his community, and a seeker after virtue.

This latter aspect of Plutarch's portrait also appears in *Alcibiades*.³² Though Socrates competed with others for Alcibiades' affection, he somehow mastered (ἐκράτει) him to the extent that he respected only Socrates (6. 1). Whenever Socrates found Alcibiades full of debauchery and vanity (Θρύψεως καὶ χαννότητος), he influenced him with his talk, and Alcibiades learned ever more about his lack of virtue (6. 4). At Potidaea, Socrates was Alcibiades' "tent-mate and comrade-in-action," and defended the wounded man. Plutarch most likely draws on Plato's *Symposium*³³ to portray Socrates in his *Alcibiades* as a person of action: he campaigned at

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 19 and 22, note a.

³⁰ Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, 62 ff.

³¹ Plutarch's words on Socrates' refusal to escape, "klingen," according to Westmann, "wie ein Nachhall von Xen. *Mem.* 4. 4. 4," *Plutarch gegen Kolotes*, 274–75.

³² For a very readable account of the *Alcibiades*, see D. A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1972) 117–29.

³³ *Ibid.*, 118.

Potidaea and at Delium (7. 4), and he was generally a restraint to the ambitious Alcibiades.

After narrating these incidents, Plutarch mentions Socrates only once more in *Alcibiades*, before the disastrous Sicilian expedition (17. 4):

Socrates the philosopher, however, and Meton the astrologer, are said to have had no hopes that any good would come to the city from this expedition; Socrates, as it is likely, because he got an inkling of the future from the divine guide (τοῦ δαίμονίου) who was his familiar. . .

(B. Perrin's translation)

Some fourteen years after this expedition, both Socrates and Alcibiades were dead.³⁴

A contrast like that between the ambitious, dissolute Alcibiades and the serene, self-controlled Socrates is at *De tranq.* 466D–67C, where Plutarch briefly compares Socrates with the legendary Phaethon. In this “central passage” of *De tranq. an.*, Plutarch claims that reason and wisdom (τὸ φρονεῖν) produce contentment whatever life's circumstances may be.³⁵ A series of paired examples (παραδείγματα) supports this thesis: Alexander contrasted with Crates, Agamemnon with Diogenes, and Socrates with Phaethon. In each pair, the difference between contentment and discontent depends on reason and wisdom, and the philosopher is meant to be the more fortunate: Socrates conversed philosophically with friends in prison, whereas Phaethon, gone to heaven, wept “because no one would deliver to him his father's horses and chariots.”³⁶ Alcibiades' discontented life is not unlike Phaethon's, and in both cases Socrates exemplified the life of reason and reflection.

The friendship or love between Socrates and Alcibiades introduces a common theme of Middle Platonic literature: that of Eros, and especially Socrates' ἐρωτική τέχνη.³⁷ For not only in the *Alcibiades*, but also in the *Amatorius* (primarily chaps. 13–21),³⁸ and in *Quaest. Plat.* 1. 4 (1000D–E),

³⁴ In Plutarch's “comparison” (σύγκρισις) of Alcibiades and Coriolanus, not a word is mentioned about Socrates.

³⁵ See D. A. Russell, *Plutarch*, 24–25.

³⁶ The pairing of Socrates and Phaethon may be Plutarch's own, but as D. A. Russell noted (*ibid.* 24–25) Socrates and Phaethon also appear as examples of wisdom and folly in *De exilio* 607F. Perhaps the contrast was an “inherited commonplace.”

³⁷ See *De Pythiae oraculis* 406A, where it is remarked that “it is not righteous nor honourable to say that the Academy and Socrates and Plato's congregation were loveless, for we may read their amatory discourses (λόγοις ἐρωτικοῖς).” See also Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 10–11, who notes that Plutarch's friend Favorinus composed a work on Socrates and his ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης.

³⁸ Commenting on Plutarch's views on love, A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London 1974) 61, writes: “In the *Amatorius*, however, which is Plutarch's version of Plato's *Symposium*, the writer does expressly idealize love between man and woman as preferable to a pederastic relationship. There is some disagreement here between the Plutarch of the *Lives* and the

Plutarch deals with Socrates' "amatory art." In this latter work, Plutarch discusses Socrates' role as midwife, and asserts that Socrates' view of wisdom (σοφία), or what "he called passion for the divine and intelligible" ((τὴν) περὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ νοητὸν ἐρωτικήν), is for mortals not a matter of procreation or of discovery, but of reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις). Plutarch also claims that Socrates taught nothing, but by arousing perplexities in young men, he helped them to deliver their "innate conceptions" (ἐμφυτοὶ νοήσεις).³⁹ Socrates called this procedure "obstetric skill" (μαιωτικήν τέχνην). Platonic views of Socrates are obviously in Plutarch's mind, for explicit reference to the *Theaetetus* is at the beginning of *Quaest. Plat.* 1 (997D), and Socrates' beliefs about "wisdom," and the power of Eros are traceable to the *Republic* and *Symposium*.

Plutarch's *Amatorius*, one of his "loveliest creations," treats the concept of Eros at great length.⁴⁰ Without detailed analysis of the dialogue, the following observations seem sufficient. Plutarch's view of Eros in the *Amat.* is basically that of the *Phaedrus*, where Socrates claims that Eros "is a god or something divine" (θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον, 242d-e). Hence, Plutarch's insistence on Eros' divinity (756A-63F) differs from the view of Eros in the *Symposium*, where Diotima claims that Eros is not a god, but a *daimon*, or a being intermediate between gods and mortals.⁴¹ Second, Eros' function, according to Plutarch at 764E-66B and 766E-67B, is to guide souls of lovers by recollection (ἀνάμνησις) to Beauty "pure and genuine" (καθαρὸν καὶ ἀψευδές . . . κάλλος, 765A). Differences between the sun and Eros are noted: The sun is visible, Eros is intelligible; the sun directs attention away from intelligibles to sensibles, whereas Eros does the opposite (764D-E). In brief, in these sections of the *Amat.* Plutarch works with material taken from Plato, especially the *Phaedrus* (Socrates' palinode in 244a-57b), and the *Symposium* (the Diotima-Socrates passage, 201d-12a). Yet Plutarch does not merely borrow from Plato—he mingles his own thoughts with those of his master, e.g., the "quite un-Platonic" references to fair women and their importance in awakening the soul to beauty (766E ff.).⁴²

Plutarch of the *Moralia*; yet it is probably true to say that both in the *Lives* and in the *Amatorius* his main target is pedreastic sexual indulgence."

³⁹ The conceptions are not "inbred" as they were for the Stoics. See Cherniss, *LCL* XIII, Pt. I, 28, note c.

⁴⁰ The phrase is Ziegler's who writes, *Plutarchos*, 159 = *RE* 21. 1, col. 796, that the *Amat.* "... zu seinen schönsten Schöpfungen zählt und auch kompositionell, in der Verschlingung der novellistischen Handlung mit der Erörterung des durch sie gelieferten Themas, besonders gelungen ist."

⁴¹ I am especially indebted to H. Martin Jr.'s discussion for this and other observations on the *Amatorius*. See his "Plutarch, Plato, and Eros" *CB* 60 (1984) 82-88.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 84.

In the *Amatorius* and *Quaestiones Platonicae* passages noted above, emphasis is on Eros' role in "recollection" (ἀνάμνησις) of the eternal Forms. Despite this similarity, the works are very different in genre, and in their treatment of Socrates. In *Quaest. Plat.* I, Socrates' role as midwife is the focus of the inquiry, whereas in the *Amat.* Socrates is mentioned only once at (762D) in connection with Anytus' friendship with Alcibiades and his prosecution of Socrates.⁴³ Given the works' different natures, Plutarch's reticence about Socrates in the *Amat.* may not be surprising. But it is possible to go further, as H. Martin, Jr. has argued.

The *Amatorius* opens with conversation between Plutarch's son Autobulus and Flavian.⁴⁴ Autobulus had agreed to narrate a dialogue learned from his father (748E ff.), and within this narrative Plutarch himself assumes the role of main speaker. Commenting on Plutarch in the *Amat.*, H. Martin, Jr. wrote:

... by casting himself as his own spokesman in the *Amatorius*, a role Plato has reserved for Socrates in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, Plutarch is thereby presenting himself as Socrates' successor...⁴⁵

Martin's remark is persuasive. It calls attention to Socrates and Plato as Plutarch's spiritual ancestors, and explains his avoidance of Socrates' name other than at 762D. In brief, the *Amatorius* is an important work for Plutarch's understanding of the Platonic-Socratic concept of Eros.

Another popular subject of Middle Platonic literature was Socrates' *daimonion*; e.g., Apuleius' *De deo Socratis*, esp. chaps. 17–20, and Maximus of Tyre's lectures (Διαλέξεις), 8 and 9, represent interest in this phenomenon. There was apparently a "Dämonisierung" in the religious and philosophical beliefs of the early principate,⁴⁶ and so, not surprisingly, Plutarch devoted *De genio Socratis* to this topic. But his interest in Socrates' *daimonion* was not confined to this treatise. In *Quaest. Plat.* I (999D–E and 1000D), Plutarch refers to Socrates' "divine sign,"⁴⁷ and his references will be considered after examination of *De gen. Socr.*

In addition to A. Corlu's work on *De gen. Socr.* (1970), two other studies especially helpful for understanding this dialogue are those of M. Riley and D. Babut, both concerned with problems of the unity and purpose of *De gen. Socr.*⁴⁸ They seem agreed that the dialogue's true subject is neither the liberation of Thebes, nor the nature of Socrates' *daimonion*.

⁴³ As Wardman noted, *Plutarch's Lives*, 202–04, Plutarch says little either in the extant *Moralia* or *Lives* about Socrates' trial. In *Nicias* 23, for example, he mentions Protagoras' exile and Anaxagoras' imprisonment, and "for good measure in his illustration he throws in the trial of Socrates."

⁴⁴ On Flavian, see Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 39–40 = RE 21. 1, cols. 675–76.

⁴⁵ Martin, *CB* 60 (1984) 87.

⁴⁶ See Döring, *Exemplum Socratis*, 11.

⁴⁷ See Cherniss, *LCL* XIII, Pt. I, 21, note c.

⁴⁸ See note 4 of this study for bibliographical details.

Rather a main concern of *De gen. Socr.* is the relationship between the "practical life" (πρακτικὸς βίος) and the "contemplative" or "theoretical" life (θεωρητικὸς βίος). Beyond this point, their interpretations diverge. Riley saw tension between the two kinds of life "resolved completely in Socrates," who "was the only man who could combine both the role of the complete philosopher . . . and the role of the active citizen."⁴⁹ In bridging the "gap" between these roles, Socrates' *daimonion* had decisive influence, for "Socrates displayed concretely the type of soul that a *daimon* could guide."⁵⁰ Babut, however, found in *De gen. Socr.* a fundamental opposition between the practical and contemplative lives, and regarded Socrates not as combining them, but as the "divine" man, the pure philosopher who, like Epameinondas, "refuse les compromissions de l'action politique."⁵¹

Both scholars perhaps overstated their positions, and review of Plutarch's portrayal of Socrates in *De gen. Socr.* is in order. First mention of Socrates is at 588B, where Galaxidorus responds to Theanor's dependence on a divine sign (δαίμόνιον) as an example of "humbug and superstition" (τύφος καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας). For him, philosophy is a matter of reason without recourse to divination and visions; Socrates is the true philosopher who avoided "humbug."⁵²

The seer Theocritus objects, and cites Socrates' own *daimonion* as proof of divine guidance. His ensuing exchange with Galaxidorus is interrupted by Polymnis, who reports that some believed Socrates' divine sign was a sneeze which encouraged or prevented action contingent on its occurrence (581A–B).⁵³ Polymnis disbelieves this explanation, because Socrates' actions and convictions were not those of one guided by sneezes or voices, but "by a higher authority and principle to noble conduct" (581D).

While discussing Socrates' sign, Polymnis mentions some biographical particulars: Socrates' life-long poverty,⁵⁴ his safe retreat from Delium in response to his *daimonion*,⁵⁵ his prediction of Athenian failure in Sicily, his refusal to escape from prison, and his fearlessness toward death. These biographical details are probably important, as will be seen, for Plutarch's portrayal of Socrates in *De gen. Socr.*

⁴⁹ Riley, *GRBS* 18 (1977) 268–69.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁵¹ Babut, *BAGB* (1984) 72–73.

⁵² Galaxidorus probably offers only a partial view of Socrates. For Galaxidorus, and all persons of the dialogue, see Corlu, *Le démon de Socrate*, 13–22. Galaxidorus is discussed in 18–19 *et passim*. It is interesting to note that "humbug" (τύφος) appears in Plutarch's other descriptions of Socrates. The term was used by the Cynics, and may represent Cynic influence. See I. Nachov, "Der Mensch in der Philosophie der Kyniker," in *Der Mensch als Mass der Dinge*, ed. R. Müller (Berlin 1976) 375 and 380.

⁵³ On this view attributed to Terpsion of Megara, see Corlu, *Le démon de Socrate*, 50.

⁵⁴ Socrates' poverty is mentioned elsewhere by Plutarch, e.g. at 84F of *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus*.

⁵⁵ Together with Alcibiades and Laches.

Galaxidorus then expresses interest in Simmias' views on Socrates, and briefly rebuts Polymnis by asserting that experts in divination see great significance in minor signs such as sneezes, just as readers learn about wars and rulers from the alphabet's letters, which mean nothing to illiterates. A sign can have divine origin; it is an instrument of a god used to communicate with mortals (581F–82C).

Discussion of Socrates' *daimonion* ends temporarily with the entrance of the mysterious visitor, Theanor.⁵⁶ At 588B it resumes with Simmias' interpretation of Socrates' sign. For him, this was a voice (φωνή) from the divine realm, and a guide in life (ἡγεμόνα πρὸς τὸν βίον, 589F). Socrates' intellect (νοῦς) and soul were guided by a superior intellect and more divine soul (ὑπὸ νοῦ κρείσσονος . . . καὶ ψυχῆς θειοτέρας, 589B), and so Socrates did not need to interpret the "symbols" of human speech in order to have contact with the divine.

Simmias then relates the experiences of Timarchus, also Socrates' disciple, in Trophonius' cave at Lebadeia.⁵⁷ Briefly, after a vision of the cosmos, Timarchus hears a voice describing the nature of *daimones* and of human souls (591D–92E). Every soul has a higher part which many call intellect or mind (νοῦς), but which should really be called the *daimon* (591E). "Daimonic" influence on human souls is as follows. There are souls so immersed in the body and distracted by passions, that they pay almost no attention to their *daimones*. Timarchus sees them moving about confusedly (591D). Other souls are partly submerged in the body and give their *daimones* some control, but move in jerks, since their *daimones* must occasionally pull on the reins guiding them (591E–92B). Still other souls obey their *daimones* from birth, and are inspired (θεοκλυτούμενον, 592C), or become obedient because of their nurture and education (διὰ τροφήν καὶ παιδευσιν, 592A).

After Simmias' report of Timarchus' vision, Theanor gives a somewhat different account of *daimones*.⁵⁸ He explains how the gods guide the best mortals directly "by language expressed in symbols" (λόγῳ διὰ συμβόλων, 593B). Other mortals are guided by the signs and omens from which divination arises. According to Theanor, *daimones* are souls released from the cycle of rebirth and who assist mortals near their cycle's end, just as athletes help their successors (593D–94D). And for Theanor, Socrates' soul has almost reached its goal.

Despite the complexities and obscurities of Simmias' and Theanor's speeches, the following observations seem apposite. First, Socrates' soul, like that of Hermodorus of Clazomenae (592C), was born inspired, and remained obedient to its *daimon's* guidance. Both Socrates and Hermodorus

⁵⁶ On Theanor, see especially Corlu, *Le démon de Socrate*, 20–22.

⁵⁷ For a clear summary of Timarchus' vision, See Riley, *GRBS* 18 (1977) 264 ff.

⁵⁸ Riley, *ibid.*, 266 remarks that the accounts of Simmias and Theanor are "both equally exact or inexact."

were persons to whom, according to Simmias, *daimones* spoke directly. The character (ἡθος) of each was "calm and undisturbed" (ἀθόρυβον καὶ νήνεμον, 589D). And the souls of those with understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν, 591F), Timarchus sees as floating on high, not submerged in the body, or concerned with earthly affairs.

Now Polymnis had previously sketched Socrates as such a person, mentioning his poverty and courage toward death (581C ff.), and one theme of *De gen. Socr.* is restraint of the passions, and the importance of philosophical training. At 584A Epameinondas claims no disgust at poverty, and later argues (584E ff.) that desires or passions must be subdued by reason (ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κολαζομένης). Similarly, in Simmias' report of Timarchus' vision, *daimones* beat the soul until subdued (κολαζομένη) like a tame animal (592B).

Philosophy provides training needed to overcome the desires, and Polymnis gave Epameinondas the "best upbringing" in philosophy (585D), a goal of which is freedom from passion (ἀπαθής, 588D, applied by Simmias to Socrates), or an undisturbed and calm character (589D). Socrates and Epameinondas are thus similar in being above human desires, and the latter, often considered a "Boeotian Socrates,"⁵⁹ had received a "distinguished and exceptional education" (παιδείας διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς, 576D). In Simmias' account, Socrates also belongs to human beings who are "divine and exceptional" (θεῖοις καὶ περιττοῖς ἀνδράσι, 589C),⁶⁰ and who alone receive direct messages from *daimones*. At 593B Theanor mentions mortals distinguished with "a peculiar and exceptional schooling" (ιδίᾳς τινὸς καὶ περιττῆς παιδαγωγίας). As Babut noted, the term "exceptional" (περιττός) seems significant in *De gen. Socr.*⁶¹ Like Socrates, Epameinondas also belongs to exceptional persons guided through life by their *daimones*. They are among the few, select mortals to whom divinity manifests itself directly (cf. 593C).

Moreover, the long discussion between Epameinondas and Theanor on poverty and the value of riches (chaps. 13–14), emphasizes not only Epameinondas' moral character, but also the parallels between him and Socrates. For the poverty espoused by Epameinondas was an important part of Polymnis' description of Socrates at 581C: Socrates freely "remained poor throughout his life, when he could have had money which the donors would have been delighted and thankful to see him accept."

Hence, in *De gen. Socr.* Plutarch sketches portraits of "divine" persons such as Socrates, Epameinondas, and Theanor. Their moral or spiritual superiority was due to direct contact with the divine world, and to their freedom from physical desires. But there are also humans totally enslaved

⁵⁹ See Babut, *BAGB* (1984) 57.

⁶⁰ At *Adv. Col.* 1119C Plutarch concludes his defense of Socrates and mentions Epicurus' attack on the gods and "godlike men" (θεῖοις ἀνδράσι).

⁶¹ Babut, *BAGB* (1984) 57.

by their passions, and who like, Thebes' tyrannical rulers (see 578B), are blind to signs warning them of a dire fate. Between these extremes are Thebes' liberators, who lack freedom from their passions despite their courage and other moral qualities. That this "tripartition de l'humanité" exists in *De gen. Socr.*, has been noticed by Babut.⁶² But his critique of Riley and others who see Socrates as the philosopher and citizen, a figure reconciling the theoretical and practical lives, is less convincing. Babut seems to forget Polymnis' description of Socrates (at 581D-E) when he writes that he is never presented as "un homme d'action ni même comme un citoyen."⁶³ Moreover, if there is opposition between theory and practice in Plutarch's view of Socrates in *De gen. Socr.*, it is not reflected in other works, e.g., in *Adv. Col.*, *An seni respubl. ger. sit.* (769D), or *Quaest. Plat.* I, where Plutarch refers to Socrates' examination of others as a way of freeing them from "humbug" (τύφος, 999E), almost Galaxidorus' view of Socrates in *De gen. Socr.* Socrates is the critic of human opinions, not a contemplative thinker. Plutarch emphasizes divine influence on Socrates in *De gen. Socr.*, but this does not prevent him from being a friend to Alcibiades and others involved in Athenian affairs.

In sum, the following matters seem certain: first, Socrates' divine sign and the liberation of Thebes are two main subjects of *De gen. Socr.*, though their exact relationship in Plutarch's mind remains uncertain. Second, the importance of philosophical education and restraint of the passions is stressed, and both Socrates and Epameinondas are similar in demeanor and guided by their *daimones*. Moreover, in the dialogue's philosophical sections, Plutarch's account of *daimones* is not unlike those of *De sera num. vin.* (563E-68A) and of *De facie in orb. lun.* (942C-45D).⁶⁴ Third, whatever the purpose(s) of *De gen. Socr.* may have been, Plutarch tells an exciting story of political intrigue and revolution, the tension which is often relieved or increased by discussion of Socrates' divine sign. Despite the obscurities of *De gen. Socr.*, the views of Riley and others seem convincing: Socrates is not a pure or theoretical philosopher, but one who combined philosophical thinking with civic duty and responsibility to others, and who unlike many human beings was led through life by his *daimon*.

Thus far, examination of Plutarch's portrait of Socrates has shown considerable indebtedness to Plato. But both in *De gen. Socr.* and *Quaest. Plat.* I there appear to be divergences from Plato's account of Socrates'

⁶² *Ibid.*, 69.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 71, note 6. His criticism of Riley, who considered Socrates' prediction of disaster in Sicily as political, is niggling. Babut says it is not political, because "Plutarque prend soin de préciser qu'elle est fait en privé, à quelques amis." The retreat at Delium is not quite explained by Babut.

⁶⁴ See Riley, *GRBS* 18 (1977) 264, note 16. Socrates is mentioned only once in *De fac. in orb. lun.* (at 923F) where there is brief reference to Socrates' myth about the earth in the *Phaedo* 1106 ff. See Cherniss, *LCL* XII, 140, note a.

daimonion. According to Plato (*Ap.* 31D), Socrates' sign always held him back from what he thought of doing, and never urged him forward (ἀεὶ ἀποπρέπει . . . , προπρέπει δὲ οὐποτε . . . ; cf. *Phdr.* 242C). At *Quaest. Plat.* 999E, however, Plutarch refers to a "divine and spiritual cause" which guided or instructed (ὡφηγῆσατο) Socrates to examine others. Cherniss noted that ὡφηγῆσατο cannot be used of the sign described by Plato's Socrates, and referred to Polymnis at *De gen. Socr.* 581B, according to whom Socrates *daimonion* either deterred or prompted him (. . . κωλύον ἢ κελεύον).⁶⁵ Such a description of Socrates' sign seems more consonant with Xenophon's reports, namely, that Socrates' inner voice always told him what he should or should not do (*Mem.* 4. 3. 12; 1. 1. 4; *Apol.* 12–13).⁶⁶ Yet even in Plato's account, Socrates' sign did not always oppose or stop him from a course of action (*Ap.* 40B), and even gave him some mantic powers (*Phdr.* 242C). In view, however, of Xenophon as a likely source for other reports of Plutarch on Socrates, it is quite possible that his description of Socrates' *daimonion* was also influenced by Xenophon.

Another example of Xenophon's influence on Plutarch is at *De cap. ex inim. util.* 90E, where in this originally extempore address⁶⁷ Plutarch states that Socrates bore with Xanthippe "who was irascible and acrimonious," for he thought that if he got along well with her, he would succeed in getting along with others. The source for Xanthippe's bad temper was probably Xenophon (*Mem.* 2. 2. 7), who reports her son's complaints about her nasty disposition, and who in the *Sym.* (2. 10) has Antisthenes ask Socrates why if he believed women to be as teachable as men, he had not trained Xanthippe, but continued to live with "the most troublesome woman of all time."⁶⁸ Other examples of Xenophon as Plutarch's source for Socrates can be cited; e.g., at *De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 124D–E Plutarch relates Socrates' advice against eating or drinking things which cause us to eat or drink when not hungry or thirsty, and adds that Socrates considered dancing a pleasant exercise. These reports are most likely based on Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1. 3. 6 and *Symposium* 2. 17–20, respectively.⁶⁹ Xenophon is often a source for Plutarch's or his friends' remarks on Socrates in *Quaestiones convivales*, and at 629E Xenophon is called "the Socratic." Given the nature of Plutarch's own *Quaest. conviv.*, it is not surprising to discover likely references to Xenophon's *Symposium*,⁷⁰ e.g., at 632A and 711A, and some material in *Quaest. conviv.* is found elsewhere in Plutarch's

⁶⁵ See Cherniss, *LCL* XIII, Pt. I, 21, note c.

⁶⁶ See E. Edelstein, *Xenophontisches und platonisches Bild des Sokrates* (Berlin 1935) 18. Her chapter on "Vergleich des xenophontischen und platonischen Sokratesbildes," 63–77, remains especially worthwhile.

⁶⁷ See Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 167 = *RE* 21.1, col. 804

⁶⁸ On Xanthippe, see Guthrie, *Socrates*, 63.

⁶⁹ See notes a and c in *LCL* II, 228.

⁷⁰ See, for example, F. Fuhrmann, *Plutarque, Oeuvres morales*, IX, Pt. I (Paris 1972), p. XXI

works, e.g., Socrates' advice against dishes tempting to eat when not hungry (661F, 124D-E, 513C, and 521E) or his praise of the dance (711D, 124E, and 130E).⁷¹

Before concluding, it is important to return to Plutarch's remarks on Socrates in the *Lives*. A. Wardman noted that "Socrates appears in the *Lives* only in passing references," and nowhere does Plutarch deal with the charge that Socrates corrupted the young.⁷² Wardman's observation emphasizes the fact that Socrates' trial received almost no attention in the extant *Lives* or *Moralia*. Perhaps Wardman is correct in claiming that Plutarch considered the charge of corrupting the youth not "worth refuting in detail."⁷³ At the end of *Phocion* (38. 2), Plutarch suggests that the Athenians realized their error in killing Phocion was as serious as the execution of Socrates. Most likely, Socrates' trial and execution were treated in detail by Plutarch in his lost *Defense of Socrates* and *On the Condemnation of Socrates*, mentioned earlier in this study.

It is now time to conclude this attempted reconstruction of Plutarch's portrait of Socrates. If Schmid, Döring, and others are correct, Plutarch's works very much reflect his era's renewed interest in Socrates. Plutarch wrote in a tradition established by Plato and Xenophon, both of whom admired Socrates. Plutarch was not, however, bound by this tradition, and responded to it creatively by composing several works in which he transformed inherited material for his own purposes, among which were rebuttal of Epicureanism (*Adv. Col.*), the creation of an historical "Novelle" (*De gen. Socr.*),⁷⁴ and an unusual treatment of the Platonic concept of Eros (*Amat.*).

That Plutarch's primary sources were Plato and Xenophon is certain. He was, of course, extremely well read, and probably also used works of Aristotle, Demetrius of Phalerum, and Panaetius. With access to these and possibly other sources on Socrates, he makes many anecdotal references to Socrates throughout the *Moralia* and *Lives*. His main emphasis, however, is on Socrates as a "divine" man who followed his *daimon* throughout life (*De gen. Socr.*), performed his duties as an Athenian (*De gen. Socr.* and *Adv. Col.*), challenged his fellow citizens to reflect, while acting as a midwife (*Quaest. Plat.*), and who was somewhat sceptical about human beliefs and sense perception. Perhaps Plutarch regarded himself as Socrates' successor (*Amat.*). Certainly there is evidence for thinking that Plutarch, like some of his contemporaries, considered Socrates a model or paradigm for the best human life. Socrates followed his *daimon*, and led a busy life

⁷¹ It is quite likely that Plutarch makes use of his *hypomnēmata* in these passages. On his *hypomnēmata*, see Cherniss, *LCL* XIII, Pt. II, 398 ff.

⁷² Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 202.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 202.

⁷⁴ See Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 205 = RE 21. 1, col. 841.

while maintaining self-control and the capacity for quiet reflection. Plutarch's own life was not wholly different.⁷⁵

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⁷⁵ I wish to thank Hubert Martin, Jr., University of Kentucky, and Philip A. Stadter, University of North Carolina, for reading an earlier version of this paper, and making suggestions for improvement.

La part du rationalisme dans la religion de Plutarque: l'exemple du *De genio Socratis*¹

DANIEL BABUT

Un trait qui retient particulièrement l'attention dans le dialogue *Sur le démon de Socrate* est que nous y sont présentés deux portraits nettement différenciés, voire opposés, du personnage de Socrate. Il y a en effet d'un côté le Socrate philosophe et rationaliste, ennemi déclaré de la superstition dont Pythagore, Empédocle et leurs émules ont "infecté" la philosophie, tandis que lui-même s'est toujours efforcé, selon la formule d'un des participants à la discussion, de "faire appel à la sobre raison dans la recherche de la vérité" (λόγω νήφοντι² μετιέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 580C 6³). Mais il y a aussi le Socrate qui entretient une relation spéciale avec la Divinité, par le truchement du fameux "démon," à l'exemple, cette fois, de Pythagoriciens tels Lysis (cf. 579F, 596A), et conformément à la doctrine exposée au chapitre 24 par un autre Pythagoricien, Théanor. D'après Simmias, un des personnages principaux du dialogue, souvent tenu pour un porte-parole de l'auteur, un oracle aurait prescrit au père de Socrate, quand ce dernier était encore enfant, de le laisser suivre ses impulsions sans contrainte, "parce qu'à coup sûr l'enfant avait en lui-même, pour se conduire dans la vie, un guide qui valait mieux que mille maîtres et mille pédagogues."⁴ Aussi a-t-on pu soutenir que le dialogue semblait "flotter" entre deux interprétations, "mystique" et "rationaliste," du personnage, celles-ci s'appuyant,

¹ Sur l'interprétation d'ensemble de cette oeuvre, voir mon article du *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé* (BAGB), 1984, 1, 51-76, avec la bibliographie (ajouter maintenant P. Desideri, "Il *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco, un esempio di 'storiografia tragica'?", *Athenaeum* 62 (1984) 569-85; K. Döring, "Plutarch und das Daimonion des Sokrates," *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984) 376-92; et la contribution d'A. Barigazzi au Congrès de l'International Plutarch Society, Athènes, 26-29 juin 1987, publiée dans le présent numéro de cette revue.

² L'expression, que l'on retrouve dans la bouche du Stoïcien Philippe de Pruse dans *Quaest. conv.* 710F 2 (Minar), rappelle celle d'Épicure dans la *Lettre à Ménécée*, 132 (νήφων λογισμός). Voir mon étude sur *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 251, avec note 5. Sur l'origine et l'histoire de la métaphore, cf. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Stuttgart 1913 = 1956) 132 (ajouter Platon, *Philèbe*, 61 c [Diès], κρήνην νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον).

³ Toutes les références au *De genio* renvoient à l'édition de J. Hani, Paris, C.U.F., 1980 (*Oeuvres morales*, VIII, traités 42-45).

⁴ 589E-F, traduction Hani.

respectivement, sur "le merveilleux pouvoir du démon de Socrate" et sur "la sagesse qui caractérise le philosophe athénien."⁵

On observera par ailleurs qu'il est difficile de résoudre le problème en supposant que seule l'une de ces deux interprétations—en l'occurrence la première, celle que développent, dans le dialogue, Simmias et Théanor—serait prise à son compte par l'auteur, l'autre ne représentant que le point de vue personnel d'un personnage dont le rôle semble moins important, Galaxidôros.⁶ Et cela pour deux raisons. D'abord parce qu'il est arbitraire de faire de Galaxidôros, champion, dans notre dialogue, du Socrate rationaliste et anti-pythagoricien, un simple "faire-valoir" de Simmias et Théanor, dont la thèse ne serait exposée que pour être ensuite rejetée et dépassée par ceux qui interviennent après lui dans la discussion.⁷ Ensuite parce que l'on aperçoit le même genre d'opposition entre une explication rationnelle et une explication surnaturelle des faits dans l'autre partie du *De genio*, c'est-à-dire dans la narration historique des événements ayant abouti à la libération de Thèbes en 379, narration qui fait contrepoint, dans la construction de l'ensemble, aux discussions philosophiques sur la nature du démon de Socrate.⁸ La libération de Thèbes semble en effet y être présentée tantôt comme un événement quasi miraculeux, où se manifeste clairement la main des dieux,⁹ tantôt comme le fruit de la détermination et du courage des patriotes groupés autour de Charon et de Pélipidas, dont les qualités morales éminentes sont fortement contrastées avec la corruption et l'aveuglement de leurs adversaires.¹⁰

Pourquoi cette dualité de points de vue, dans l'une et l'autre partie du dialogue, et de quel côté penche, éventuellement, la balance aux yeux de l'auteur? Celui-ci est-il plus proche de la foi religieuse d'un Théanor ou du rationalisme d'un Galaxidôros? Ou bien a-t-il délibérément maintenu un certain équilibre entre les positions de ces personnages? Pour tenter de

⁵ Cf. G. Soury, *La démonologie de Plutarque. Essai sur la religion et les mythes d'un Platonicien éclectique* (Paris 1942) 117. Sur l'image de Socrate dans l'oeuvre de Plutarque, voir maintenant la communication de J. P. Hershbelle au Congrès d'Athènes (ci-dessus, n. 1), "Plutarch's Portrait of Socrates," également publiée ici.

⁶ Cf. Hani (ci-dessus, n. 3), *Notice* p. 46.

⁷ Voir à ce sujet mon article sur "La doctrine démonologique dans le *De genio Socratis* de Plutarque: cohérence et fonction," *L'Information Littéraire* 5 (1983) 201-02.

⁸ Sur les liens organiques entre ces deux parties du dialogue et sur l'unité thématique de celui-ci, voir l'article du BAGB cité à la note 1.

⁹ Voir en particulier le retournement de la situation en 587D sq., quand l'initiative catastrophique d'Hippothénidas se révèle finalement salutaire, et la réflexion de Caphisias en 588B 1-3, "... m'adressant à Hippothénidas, je lui pris la main et l'exhortai à avoir confiance, lui disant que les dieux eux-mêmes nous appelaient à l'action" (... ὡς καὶ τῶν θεῶν παρακαλούντων ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, trad. Hani, comme dans la plupart des citations qui suivent).

¹⁰ Voir le récit de l'assaut final, 596D sq., qui oppose de manière systématique la conduite des libérateurs à celle des tyrans et de leurs partisans, cf. A. Aloni, "Osservazioni sul *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco," *Museum Criticum* (Quaderni dell'Istituto di Filologia Classica dell'Università di Bologna) 10-12 (1975-1977) 237-38.

répondre à ces questions, on examinera brièvement d'abord le problème des interventions divines dans le cours des événements rapportés dans le récit historique, puis les théories exposées successivement par Galaxidôros, Simmias et Théanor.

Quelle est la part de la divinité dans la libération de Thèbes, d'après le récit qu'en fait Plutarque dans le *De genio*? On notera tout d'abord qu'il n'y est jamais fait mention d'une intervention directe de puissances divines qui aurait pour effet d'infléchir le cours normal des événements. Ce sont les acteurs humains qui conçoivent et exécutent le plan qui doit conduire au renversement des tyrans et à la récupération de la Cadmée, et ce plan se déroule, dans l'ensemble, conformément à leurs prévisions initiales. Dès le début, Phyllidas indique en effet qu'il va donner une réception, au cours de laquelle il compte enivrer Archias pour le rendre plus vulnérable (577C 2-4). Et comme il n'est pas possible de réunir tous les ennemis des conjurés au même endroit, ceux-ci devront se diviser en deux groupes, qui se chargeront respectivement d'Archias et de Léontiadas. Une fois ces derniers éliminés, "je pense," ajoute Phyllidas, "que les autres disparaîtront en prenant la fuite ou, en tout cas, se tiendront tranquilles, trop heureux si on leur laisse la vie sauve" (577C 6-D 3). De fait, au moment de l'attaque du premier groupe de conjurés, Archias est trop ivre pour se défendre (597A 8-9), tandis que le second groupe vient simultanément à bout de Léontiadas et d'Hypatas (596C 11 sq., 597D 2 sq.). La suite vient confirmer les prévisions de Phyllidas: les partisans des tyrans, croyant que toute la ville est aux mains de leurs adversaires, courent se réfugier à la Cadmée, tandis que la garnison, "frappée de peur devant le danger," ne pense même pas à profiter de sa supériorité numérique pour contre-attaquer (598E 3-F 3).

Il est vrai que le cours de l'action est marqué par plusieurs rebondissements spectaculaires, qui semblent, aux yeux des participants du complot,¹¹ s'expliquer par des raisons surnaturelles. A deux reprises, notamment, alors que le succès de l'entreprise paraissait irrémédiablement compromis, un coup de théâtre, fortement marqué dans le récit,¹² vient rétablir la situation et rendre courage aux patriotes d'une façon apparemment miraculeuse. Il y a d'abord l'épisode d'Hippothénidas, qui a pris l'initiative malheureuse d'envoyer un messenger à cheval au groupe des bannis partis d'Athènes, pour les inciter à faire demi-tour, empêchant ainsi l'exécution du plan prévu, alors que les conditions du succès paraissaient réunies (586B-C). Mais au moment où tout semble perdu, on s'aperçoit que le messenger dépêché par Hippothénidas, que l'on croyait arrivé à destination,¹³ n'est en

¹¹ Voir en particulier la réflexion de Caphisias en 588B 1-3 (note 9, ci-dessus), et comparer 595D 5-6 (Charon).

¹² Cf. 588A 7, "Ἡμῶς δὲ τις ἔσχεν ἄτοπος μεταβολὴ τοῦ πάθους, et 595F 5 sq.

¹³ Ce n'est sans doute pas par hasard que le texte précise, à propos de Chlidon, le messenger d'Hippothénidas, qu'il y a peu de chances de le rattraper avant qu'il délivre son message, car "il a le meilleur cheval qui soit à Thèbes" et "a gagné la course des chevaux montés aux Jeux d'Héraclès, l'année dernière" (585D 4-5 et 9-10).

réalité même pas parti: ce qu'Hippothénidas prend d'abord pour un accident malheureux (597E 2, $\phi\epsilon\upsilon$, μή τι χαλεπώτερον συμβέβηκε;) se révèle ainsi une chance, qui fait brusquement passer les conjurés de l'abattement à l'anxiété suscitée par l'imminence du danger (588A 8–10). A l'épisode d'Hippothénidas répond par ailleurs celui de la convocation de Charon chez Archias (594E sq.),¹⁴ au moment même où les conjurés s'apprêtent à passer à l'action: alors que tous sont "frappés d'épouvante" (595A 5) et prêts à se

387 et souriant," et les exhorte à reprendre confiance; car Archias, informé du retour des bannis, a été assez aveugle pour confier à Charon lui-même le soin d'enquêter sur les rumeurs, et s'est laissé bernier par les fausses assurances de Phyllidas (595C–96A). La prière que les conjurés adressent alors aux dieux (596C 5) a bien l'air d'une réponse à une aide providentielle sans laquelle l'entreprise humaine n'aurait pu être menée à bien.

Mais un examen attentif du texte montre qu'il faut y distinguer entre l'impression que ces coups de théâtre successifs font sur l'esprit des acteurs du drame¹⁵ et la réalité objective des faits: surpris à chaque fois par l'événement, les futurs libérateurs de Thèbes croient tout naturellement que les dieux sont de leur côté, mais il n'y a pas un mot, dans le récit de Caphisias, qui suggère que l'auteur du dialogue endosse personnellement cette explication des événements et veuille la communiquer à son lecteur. Tant s'en faut: dans tous les cas les rebondissements de l'action ont des causes parfaitement naturelles qui nous sont exposées tout au long. Ainsi, le messager d'Hippothénidas est empêché d'accomplir sa mission à cause de son caractère emporté,¹⁶ qui transforme un incident trivial (le prêt d'une bride à un voisin) en une violente scène de ménage (587F–88A). De même, Charon et ses compagnons doivent leur salut non à une intervention miraculeuse de la Divinité, mais simplement aux mœurs dissolues de leurs adversaires,¹⁷ et plus particulièrement à leur propension à l'ivrognerie, qui, après les avoir rendus incapables de prendre au sérieux les rumeurs de

¹⁴ Sur le parallélisme structural des deux passages, voir l'article du BAGB cité à la note 1, pp. 65–67.

¹⁵ Sur l'importance de l'élément dramatique dans la construction du dialogue, voir A. Aloni, "Ricerche sulla forma letteraria del *De genio Socratis*," *Acme* 33 (1980) 45 sq. et, dans une autre perspective, l'article de Desideri cité dans la note 1.

¹⁶ Cf. 587F 8–9, Ἀγανακτοῦντος δ' ἐμοῦ καὶ κακῶς αὐτὴν λέγοντος . . . , 588A 2–3, Τέλος δὲ μέχρι πληγῶν προαχθεὶς ὑπ' ὀργῆς . . . L'insistance de Plutarque sur ce point semble destinée à mettre en relief l'explication *psychologique* de l'incident.

¹⁷ Cf. 596F 4–5, . . . τῇ προσδοκίᾳ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεπτοημένος, F 10, 597A 2–3 (voir la note 2 de Hani, p. 233), et surtout 594D 1–6, dont le rapprochement avec 577C 8 montre que le plan de Phyllidas se réalise jusque dans le détail.

complot,¹⁸ leur interdit même de se défendre efficacement contre leurs assaillants.¹⁹

Ainsi, malgré les apparences, la raison d'être de ces deux épisodes ne saurait être de suggérer que la libération de Thèbes n'a pu être obtenue que grâce à l'aide des dieux. Bien plus: l'extension même que le récit donne à ces incidents (bien qu'ils n'aient, en définitive, aucune influence réelle sur la suite des événements) et le contenu des développements qui y sont consacrés révèlent une intention bien différente de la part de l'auteur. Non seulement, en effet, il ne s'agit pas d'attirer l'attention sur une possible intervention divine, mais l'accent est mis délibérément sur les initiatives des hommes et sur leurs motivations morales.

Cela ressort particulièrement de la scène dont Charon est le centre (594E-96C). Tout y paraît en effet calculé pour faire ressortir le contraste entre l'affolement des autres conjurés, qui soupçonnent injustement une trahison d'Hippothénidas (595A), et la noblesse d'âme sereine de Charon, qu'il communique même à son jeune fils.²⁰ La scène fait par ailleurs manifestement pendant à celle qui ouvre le récit de Caphisias (576C-D). La supériorité dont Charon y fait preuve sur ses compagnons est en effet la réplique de son attitude, à la nouvelle de l'arrivée imminente des bannis venant d'Athènes: "Tandis que nous étions embarrassés et perplexes, Charon, lui, consentit à offrir sa maison" (576D 4-5). L'épisode de la convocation de Charon chez Archias apporte ainsi la confirmation concrète du jugement formulé, dès le début du récit, sur cette figure exemplaire de la conjuration: "Caphisias, cet homme n'est pas un philosophe et il n'a pas reçu une éducation distinguée et exceptionnelle comme ton frère Épaminondas; et pourtant, tu vois qu'il est tout naturellement conduit par les lois à faire le bien et qu'il prend spontanément les plus grands risques pour le salut de la patrie" (576D 10-E 2).²¹ On peut en conclure que les coups de théâtre qui marquent cette scène sont destinés plutôt à mettre en

¹⁸ Cf. 595F 8-96A 3, 'Ο γὰρ Ἀρχίας, ἔφη, καὶ ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς ἤκουσαν ἡκεῖν ἐμὲ κεκλημένον, ἥδη βαρεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης ὄντες καὶ συνεκλελυμένοι τοῖς σώμασι τὰς ψυχάς, μόλις διαναστάντες ἔξω προῆλθον ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας.

¹⁹ "Lorsqu'il reçut [la lettre de son homonyme d'Athènes, l'avertissant du complot], Archias était déjà complètement terrassé par l'ivresse (τῇ μέθῃ κατακεκλασμένος). . . Le porteur de la lettre lui ayant fait observer qu'il y était question d'affaires sérieuses: 'Eh bien! à demain les affaires sérieuses,' s'écria Archias, et il mit la lettre sous son coussin; puis, demandant une coupe, il la fit remplir, et il envoyait sans cesse Phyllidas à la porte pour voir si les femmes arrivaient" (596F 3-9). Cf. aussi 597B 5 sq. (Cabirichos).

²⁰ Cf. surtout 595C (Ταῦτα τοῦ Χάρωνος λέγοντος τὸ μὲν φρόνημα καὶ τὴν καλοκάγαθίαν ἐθαυμάζομεν. . .), D-E, "Les paroles de Charon, Archédamas, firent venir les larmes aux yeux de la plupart d'entre nous; mais lui, c'est sans verser une larme, sans aucune émotion, qu'il remit son fils à Pélopidas et franchit la porte en pressant les mains de chacun de nous et en nous adressant des paroles d'encouragement. Mais tu aurais trouvé plus admirable encore la joie rayonnante du fils et son intrépidité en face du danger; comme un autre Néoptolème, on ne le vit ni pâlir, ni montrer aucune crainte. . ."

²¹ Sur les raisons de cette promotion du personnage de Charon dans le *De genio*, voir mon article du BAGB (ci-dessus, n. 1), pp. 55 et 56, avec note 1.

relief les dispositions morales des participants qu'à suggérer qu'ils n'auraient dû leur succès qu'à une intervention directe de la divinité en leur faveur.

Moins évidentes apparaissent, au premier abord, les motivations de l'épisode d'Hippothénidas. Mais là encore l'intérêt de l'auteur semble aller, au moins pour une part, à la confrontation des attitudes morales des personnages mis en scène. Hippothénidas est d'abord accusé par Phyllidas de lâcheté (586B sq.) et sévèrement jugé par Charon (586D 2-3). Pour sa défense, il demande qu'on ne confonde pas courage et témérité (586B 9-13), et surtout explique que le but n'est pas de faire étalage de bravoure en faisant bon marché de la vie, mais de mettre le maximum de chances de son côté pour parvenir effectivement au résultat recherché, qui est de libérer Thèbes: "Tuer, mourir, cela n'est pas difficile à faire ou à subir; mais arracher Thèbes à tant de forces ennemies qui l'investissent, et chasser la garnison des Spartiates au prix de deux ou trois meurtres, ce n'est pas aussi facile. . ." (586D 10-E 3). Inversement, lorsque Charon sera appelé inopinément chez Archias, un autre conjuré, Céphissodôros, reprochera à ses compagnons leurs tergiversations et les pressera de marcher immédiatement sus à l'ennemi, "plutôt que de rester enfermés dans une salle où [leurs] ennemis [les] extermineraient comme un essaim d'abeilles" (595E 4-F 2). La confrontation entre Hippothénidas et ses compagnons met ainsi sous nos yeux les conflits auxquels donnent lieu, dans toute entreprise qui comporte de grands risques, les efforts de ceux qui s'y sont engagés, pour concilier courage et efficacité.

Est-ce à dire que les dieux seraient entièrement absents du récit de Caphisias sur la libération de Thèbes? Aucun lecteur du dialogue n'oserait sans doute le prétendre. Bien au contraire, ce récit met moins l'accent, au total, sur l'action elle-même que sur les présages et signes divins qui l'accompagnent.²² La divination ne constitue pas seulement, en effet, le thème dominant de la première partie du dialogue (577A-82C), comme on l'a soutenu,²³ elle est pour ainsi dire omniprésente d'un bout à l'autre de l'oeuvre.²⁴ *Mais il n'en est que plus remarquable que ce foisonnement de présages soit pratiquement sans influence sur le déroulement et l'issue de*

²² Cf. BAGB (ci-dessus, n. 1), pp. 63-65.

²³ Cf. M. Riley, "The Purpose and Unity of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*," *GRBS* 18. 3 (1977) 259 sq. Voir notamment 577D ("... signes et présages inquiétants et sinistres pour Sparte"); 578A (présages interprétés par les habitants d'Haliarte comme des signes de la colère suscitée chez les dieux par la violation du tombeau d'Alcmène); 578A-C (mesures prises par les Lacédémoniens pour échapper au châtement annoncé par d'autres signes, et pour se conformer à un oracle); 579 B (oracle relatif à l'autel des Déliens); 579E (songes et signes apparus à l'Étranger arrivé à Thèbes pour s'occuper de la sépulture de Lysis).

²⁴ Cf. 585F (révélation faite à Théanor pendant la nuit passée près du tombeau de Lysis sur la conduite à tenir au sujet de la sépulture de ce dernier); 586F-87A (présages et songe qui ont incité Hippothénidas à décommander le retour des bannis); 594E (heureux présage marquant l'arrivée des bannis à Thèbes); 595F (présage favorable tiré d'un sacrifice par le devin Théocritos).

l'action.²⁵ Ainsi, les précautions multipliées par Lysanoridas pour empêcher la vengeance divine de frapper ceux qui ont violé le tombeau d'Alcmène (578A–B) se révéleront inopérantes, et n'éviteront pas à Lysanoridas lui-même d'être plus tard atteint par le châtiment (cf. 598F 5–6), parce que nul ne lui indiquera l'emplacement exact du tombeau (578C). Surtout, dans la plupart des cas, les présages restent irrémédiablement obscurs pour ceux qui les reçoivent, de sorte que ceux-ci sont incapables d'en tirer profit. Typique, à cet égard, est le cas d'Hippothénidas,²⁶ qui manque de faire capoter toute l'entreprise des patriotes, pour s'être fié à l'interprétation défavorable que les divins ont donnée d'un sacrifice (586F), et pour s'être trompé lui-même sur la signification d'un songe qui lui est apparu (587A–B). Et même si le divin Théocritos a vu plus clair que lui en cette occasion (cf. 587B–C), ce même Théocritos²⁷ ne sera pas plus lucide un peu plus tard, quand il pressera imprudemment ses compagnons de se lancer immédiatement à l'attaque sans attendre le retour de Charon (595F).²⁸ Loin d'indiquer une faveur divine spéciale, qui aurait rendu possible le succès des libérateurs de Thèbes, l'accumulation des présages dans la narration historique du *De genio* semble bien plutôt destinée à faire ressortir le contraste entre ceux qui, engagés dans l'action, doivent recourir aux moyens incertains de la divination ordinaire, et les hommes "exceptionnels" (591C 11, cf. 593B 5–6) qui, tel Socrate, bénéficient d'avertissements directs de la divinité.²⁹

La confirmation nous est d'ailleurs fournie par l'auteur lui-même, d'abord dans un passage qui prend un relief particulier en raison de sa position, puisqu'il se situe dans la conversation préliminaire qui sert d'introduction au récit de Caphisias et en définit par avance l'esprit et l'orientation générale (575A 1–C 9).³⁰ Archédamos y oppose, grâce à une comparaison avec les gens qui regardent les tableaux des peintres, deux catégories d'auditeurs ou de lecteurs de récits historiques: "celui dont la pensée est paresseuse se contente, pour son information, d'apprendre seulement les grandes lignes et l'issue de l'événement; tandis que celui qui, plein d'émulation et d'amour du beau, contemple les réalisations de la vertu comme celles d'un grand art (τὸν δὲ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόκαλον τῶν ὑπ' ἀρετῆς ὥσπερ τέχνης μεγάλης ἀπειργασμένων θεατήν), prend plutôt plaisir au détail des événements, avec l'idée que, si leur issue doit beaucoup

²⁵ Cf. BAGB, *ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁶ D'autant plus remarquable que, comme le montre la comparaison avec la *Vie de Pélopidas* (8. 5), il s'agit d'un motif délibérément introduit par Plutarque dans le récit de Caphisias (cf. BAGB, *ibid.*, p. 64, n. 1).

²⁷ La défaillance du devin est anticipée par l'anecdote symbolique du chapitre 10, voir BAGB, *ibid.*, pp. 61–62.

²⁸ Cf. BAGB, *ibid.*, pp. 67, avec la note 4, et 68.

²⁹ La distinction entre les deux espèces de divination dans le discours de Théanor (cf. 593C sq.) donne manifestement la clé de tout la dialogue, cf. BAGB, *ibid.*, pp. 60–61.

³⁰ Sur la valeur "programmatique" de ce texte, voir en dernier lieu Desideri (ci-dessus, n. 1), p. 570 sq.

au hasard (τοῦ μὲν τέλους πολλὰ κοινὰ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἔχοντος), dans le détail des causes et des actes eux-mêmes, par ailleurs, il découvre le spectacle des combats de la vertu contre les circonstances fortuites (τοὺς δ' ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ἀγῶνας ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὰ συντυγχάνοντα . . . καθορῶντα) et des audaces raisonnées, dans le danger, d'une pensée rationnelle confrontée avec l'occasion et la passion" (575C 3–9).³¹ Il en ressort en effet, sans la moindre équivoque, que Plutarque voit dans la libération de Thèbes une "réalisation" de la "vertu" des patriotes groupés autour de Charon, que l'"issue" de l'événement ressortit selon lui au "hasard," bien plutôt qu'à une quelconque intervention divine,³² et qu'enfin son intérêt va avant tout, comme nous l'avait suggéré l'examen des épisodes d'Hippothénidas et de la convocation de Charon chez Archias, à la confrontation des réactions morales des acteurs de l'histoire avec les vicissitudes du sort.

À cette déclaration liminaire d'Archédamos, qui reflète, selon toute apparence, le point de vue propre de l'auteur, fait écho,³³ d'une manière que l'on croira difficilement fortuite,³⁴ la réflexion insérée par son partenaire Caphisias dans son récit, juste avant la mention de l'ultime événement qui risque de faire échouer le complot pour la libération de Thèbes:³⁵ "Mais, mon cher Archédamos, la mauvaise fortune ('Η . . . χείρων . . . τύχη) qui cherchait à mettre en balance la lâcheté et l'ignorance³⁶ de nos ennemis avec notre audace et nos préparatifs, et à faire de notre entreprise une espèce de drame qu'elle semait depuis le début d'épisodes périlleux, vint croiser son exécution même, et nous jeta dans l'épreuve soudaine et terrible d'une péripétie inattendue" (596D 8–E 3, trad. Hani légèrement modifiée). Pour Caphisias comme pour Archédamos, l'histoire de la libération de Thèbes est celle des tribulations de la vertu des patriotes thébains aux prises avec les aléas de la fortune.

Ainsi s'explique un fait qui a surpris plus d'un commentateur du *De genio*, et que certains se sont évertués à nier ou à minimiser:³⁷ les démons,

³¹ Le texte est ici celui de De Lacy-Einarson (*Plutarch's Moralia*, VII, L.C.L., 1959), adopté par A. Corlu (*Plutarque, Le démon de Socrate*, [Paris 1970]). Je suis responsable de la traduction proposée dans le texte.

³² Sur la place faite par Plutarque au hasard, dans sa conception du monde et de l'histoire, voir les textes cités dans mon livre sur *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, (Paris 1969) 308–10.

³³ Cf. Desideri (ci-dessus, n. 1), 574 sq.

³⁴ L'interpellation d'Archédamos en 596 D 8 a vraisemblablement pour fin, comme en 595B 3 et D 7, d'attirer l'attention sur un point important.

³⁵ Il s'agit de l'envoi à Archias de la lettre dans laquelle son homonyme athénien lui révèle tous les détails du complot, cf. ci-dessus, n. 19.

³⁶ Aloni (ci-dessus, n. 10), p. 235, n. 8, propose de lire ἀνοίας (596D 9) au lieu d'ἀγνοίας. Mais ce dernier mot, leçon des deux manuscrits, est repris par παρασκευαῖς comme μαλακίας l'est par τόλμας.

³⁷ Cf. Riley (ci-dessus, n. 23), 257 sq. (voir *BAGB, ibid.*, 53, avec n. 6). En dernier lieu Desideri (ci-dessus, n. 1), 578 sq., qui en est réduit à inventer l'intervention du "démon d'Alcmène," et à mettre sur le compte des démons tous les présages mentionnés dans le récit de

dont les possibilités d'intervention en faveur des hommes font l'objet des discussions philosophiques qui alternent avec le récit historique, ne jouent *aucun rôle* dans celui-ci et n'y sont même pas mentionnés une seule fois. La constatation est d'autant plus frappante qu'elle contraste avec celle que l'on est amené à faire, dans le débat philosophique, au sujet de Socrate, ou d'autres hommes "exceptionnels" ou "aimés des dieux" (cf. 589C 11, 578E 6, 593A 8-9 et B 5-6), tel Théanor, qui à l'inverse des acteurs de la libération de Thèbes, communiquent directement avec la divinité et en reçoivent une aide personnelle et décisive par l'intermédiaire d'un démon.³⁸

Au reste, cette fois encore, Plutarque s'est chargé lui-même de dissiper toute incertitude, en faisant préciser par Théanor, dans le discours qui apporte au débat philosophique sa conclusion, en même temps qu'il fournit la clé de tout le dialogue, les conditions dans lesquelles les démons peuvent intervenir dans les affaires humaines. Ce sont en effet "les meilleurs d'entre nous," nous est-il expliqué dès le début de ce discours, que "les êtres qui sont au-dessus de nous isolent pour ainsi dire du troupeau, et à qui ils impriment leur marque, jugeant qu'ils ont droit d'être guidés d'une manière particulière et dans des conditions exceptionnelles (*ἰδίας τινὸς καὶ περιττῆς παιδαγωγίας ἀξιοῦσι*),³⁹ sans qu'il soit fait usage de rênes ou d'étrivière pour les diriger, mais seulement de la raison, par le moyen de signes qui restent totalement ignorés de la masse du troupeau" (593B 4-8). Il est curieux qu'on ne se soit pas avisé que le phrase *exclut pratiquement toute possibilité d'une intervention des dieux ou des démons en faveur des libérateurs de Thèbes*: quels que soient, en effet, les mérites de ces derniers, il est clair qu'ils font partie de ce que Théanor appelle ici "le troupeau," et que, loin d'être directement guidés par les puissances divines, comme les privilégiés que sont Socrate et Théanor, ils en sont réduits à interpréter tant bien que mal les signes à l'usage de "la masse," "qui constituent la matière

Caphisias, sans remarquer, du reste, que ces signes divins restent, en tout état de cause, sans aucun effet sur l'issue des événements.

³⁸ Voir notamment, pour Socrate, 580E (anecdote racontée par Théocritos sur la façon dont Socrate a pu éviter, grâce au démon, le rencontre d'un troupeau de porcs qui a mis à mal ses compagnons dans une rue d'Athènes); 581E (intervention du démon en faveur de Socrate lors de la retraite de Délion); pour Théanor et ses amis pythagoriciens, 583B (le démon de Lysis avertit ses amis de sa mort); 585F (message du démon de Lysis à Théanor sur la conduite à tenir au sujet de la dépouille du défunt).

³⁹ Comparer 576D 11 (*μετείληφε παιδείας διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς . . . Ἐπαμεινώνδας*); 578 E 6 (*περιττῶ γάρ . . . τινι καὶ οὐκ ἰδιώτῃ προσέεικεν*, à propos de Théanor); 579F 12 (*ὡς θεοφιλεῖς καὶ περιττοὶ τινες εἶναι δοκοῖεν*. . .); 580F 9 (*τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον ἰδίαν καὶ περιττὴν ἐσχηκέναι δύναμιν*. . .); 589C 10-12 (*ὁ ἄνθρωπος τρεπόμενος δι' εὐπάθειαν ἐσημαίνεται τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ περιττοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸν τοῦ νοήσαντος λόγον*); 589F 1-2 (*ὡς κρείττονα δῆπουθεν ἔχοντας [sc. Σωκράτους] ἐν αὐτῷ μυρίων διδασκάλων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν ἡγεμόνα πρὸς τὸν βίον*).

de l'art appelé divination" (cf. 593D 1-2, . . . τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς σημεῖα δίδωσιν [sc. τὸ θεῖον], ἐξ ὧν ἡ λεγομένη μαντική συνέστηκε).⁴⁰

La suite du discours en apporte du reste la confirmation la plus nette. "Car il est de fait," ajoute en effet Théanor, "que les dieux ne règlent la vie que d'une minorité d'hommes (θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων κοσμοῦσι βίον), à savoir ceux qu'ils veulent combler au plus haut point et rendre véritablement divins" (οὓς ἂν ἄκρως μακαρίου τε καὶ θείου ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι βουληθῶσιν, 593D 3-6).⁴¹ Et pour montrer que "la puissance démonique ne s'associe pas à n'importe qui" (οὐ γὰρ οἷς ἔτυχε συμφέρεται τὸ δαιμόνιον, 593E 8), Théanor compare alors l'assistance des démons à celle que l'on peut apporter à des naufragés qui cherchent à se sauver à la nage: s'ils sont encore loin du rivage, on se contente d'observer en silence (σιωπῇ !) leurs efforts; mais s'ils sont tout près du bord, on les encourage de la voix et du geste, on intervient directement pour les aider à se sauver; "telle est aussi . . . la manière d'agir de la puissance démonique; tant que nous sommes en effet submergés par nos affaires (βαπτιζομένους ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) . . ., elle nous laisse nous démener seuls et faire preuve de persévérance, en nous efforçant, par notre propre vertu, de nous sauver et d'atteindre le port . . ." (αὐτοὺς ἐξαμιλλᾶσθαι καὶ μακροθυμεῖν δι' οἰκείας πειρωμένους ἀρετῆς σφῆζεσθαι καὶ τυγχάνειν λιμένος, 593 F 6-9). Il n'est pas douteux que la phrase s'applique tout particulièrement aux patriotes thébains dont le récit de Caphisias relate l'entreprise, et dont Archédamos évoquait par avance, dans le dialogue introductif, la vertu aux prises avec les vicissitudes de la fortune (τοὺς . . . ἀγῶνας ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὰ συντυγχάνοντα, 575C 6-8).

Ainsi, le récit que nous offre le *De genio* de la libération de Thèbes fait apparaître que pour l'auteur du dialogue cet événement est, pour l'essentiel, l'oeuvre des hommes, tandis que, malgré les apparences, la divinité n'y a joué en définitive qu'un rôle négligeable.⁴² Cette conclusion ne devrait du reste pas surprendre les lecteurs des *Vies*, car si des interventions divines y sont souvent mentionnées,⁴³ Plutarque s'y est toutefois attaché à en marquer les limites, notamment dans une remarquable digression de la *Vie de Coriolan* (32. 4 sq.),⁴⁴ dont la double convergence avec le récit de Caphisias

⁴⁰ Voir ci-dessus, p. 389.

⁴¹ Comparer 586A 5-6, Μυρία μὲν γὰρ ἀτραποὶ βίων, ὀλίγαι δὲ ἄς δαίμονες ἀνθρώπους ἄγουσιν.

⁴² Sans doute les présages indiquent-ils que l'issue de l'entreprise est connue de la divinité avant même son déclenchement (cf. notamment la réflexion apparemment fortuite de Simmias en 578D 7, alors qu'il vient de déplorer la barbarie inhérente à la tyrannie: 'Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως θεῶν μελήσει. Riley [ci-dessus, n. 23], 271, y voit à juste titre un exemple de κληδών, présage tiré d'une parole fortuite, qui prend valeur prémonitoire, cf. 581D 2). Mais il n'en reste pas moins que ces présages ne contribuent aucunement à la réussite finale de l'entreprise.

⁴³ Voir mon étude sur *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 478-82.

⁴⁴ Sur cette page, voir A. Lesky, "Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos," *Sitz. der Heidelb. Ak. der Wiss., philos.-hist. Kl.*, 1961, 4, p. 18 sq.

et avec les explications de Théanor sur "la manière d'agir de la puissance démonique" aurait mérité de retenir l'attention des commentateurs. Il s'agit de l'initiative prise par Valérie d'aller trouver la mère et l'épouse de Coriolan pour les inciter à faire auprès de ce dernier la démarche à laquelle Rome, assiégée par les Volsques, devra son salut. Plutarque voit dans cette initiative extraordinaire et imprévisible l'effet d'une "intuition à laquelle l'inspiration divine n'était pas étrangère" (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν οὐκ ἁθείαστον, 33. 3, trad. Flacelière-Chambry). Il la compare aux interventions divines relatées par Homère, interventions qui suscitent le scepticisme ou les critiques des esprits forts, parce qu'ils y voient des "fictions impossibles" et des "inventions incroyables," qui aboutissent à priver la raison humaine de sa liberté de choix. Prenant la défense d'Homère, Plutarque soutient alors que le poète réserve ces interventions "aux actions extraordinaires et audacieuses, qui exigent une poussée d'enthousiasme et d'exaltation" (ἐν ταῖς ἀτόποις καὶ παραβόλοις πράξεσι καὶ φορᾶς τινος ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ παραστάσεως δεομέναις, 32. 7, trad. Flacelière-Chambry), alors qu'il laisse au pouvoir de chacun "les actes naturels, habituels et qui s'accomplissent logiquement" (τὰ . . . εἰκότα καὶ συνήθη καὶ κατὰ λόγον περαινόμενα, 32. 6).⁴⁵

On ne s'étonnera donc pas que la libération de Thèbes nous soit dépeinte dans le *De genio* comme l'oeuvre d'hommes courageux confrontés avec les aléas de la fortune, car non seulement, comme le dit Théanor, la divinité n'intervient qu'en faveur d'une minorité de privilégiés, mais de plus, elle limite ses interventions directes, comme l'indique la *Vie de Coriolan*, à des cas exceptionnels.

La théorie de Galaxidôros est exposée dans trois chapitres qui se suivent de près (9. 11, et 12) et correspondent respectivement à trois développements liés, mais distincts. Le premier, de portée générale, a pour point de départ une condamnation de la superstition, prolongée par une critique vigoureuse des conceptions religieuses de certains prédécesseurs de Socrate (Pythagore, Empédocle . . .), et par une profession de foi rationaliste. Puis, en réponse à une objection de Théocritos, Galaxidôros applique les principes qu'il vient d'énoncer au problème du démon de Socrate. Enfin, il défend sa conception du démon contre deux espèces d'objections, formulées par Phidolaos et Polymnis. On résumera brièvement ces trois développements.

La condamnation de la superstition (579F 8-9, ὡς ἔργον ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν ἄνδρα καθαρεύοντα τύφον καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας) est motivée par un propos de Polymnis, signalant qu'un étranger, arrivé le jour même dans la ville (Théanor), a passé la nuit près du tombeau de Lysis pour y recueillir, éventuellement, un signe divin relatif à la sépulture de ce dernier. Galaxidôros voit là une manifestation de la fâcheuse propension, si

⁴⁵ Comparer, sur le problème des interventions divines chez Homère, les réflexions parallèles de Plutarque dans *De Pyth. orac.*, 405A sq.

répandue, à "diviniser" ses actes, en s'abritant, soit par faiblesse d'esprit soit par supercherie, derrière des songes, des visions ou d'autres fariboles du même genre (579F). Il peut être utile aux politiques d'user de la superstition "comme d'un frein," pour contenir les débordements d'une foule indisciplinée, mais de tels procédés sont indignes de la philosophie et contraires à sa mission, qui est de justifier rationnellement une conduite conforme à la morale, et non de "chercher refuge auprès des dieux," en recourant à des prophéties et des visions, "domaine dans lequel l'homme le plus médiocre n'obtient souvent pas moins, par le jeu de la chance, que le plus éminent" (580A-B). Le véritable esprit de la philosophie, caractérisé par la simplicité, le refus des faux-semblants, l'amour sincère et exclusif de la vérité, c'est justement Socrate qui l'incarnait, loin de l'"enflure" propre au sophiste, plutôt qu'au philosophe.

Ce n'est pas à dire, pourtant, que Galaxidôros rejoigne la position des accusateurs de Socrate, qui lui reprochaient de mépriser les choses divines. Bien plutôt, selon lui, Socrate a-t-il purifié la philosophie, que Pythagore et son école avaient "remplie de visions, de mythes et de superstition";⁴⁶ et, tandis qu'Empédocle la lui avait transmise "en plein délire" (ἐν μάλα βεβακχευμένην), il "l'habitua à mesurer pour ainsi dire son inspiration à la réalité et à poursuivre la vérité par la sobre raison" (580C 5-6).⁴⁷

Mais comment concilier cette conception de la philosophie socratique avec ce que l'on rapporte au sujet du démon de Socrate, demande alors le devin Théocritos. Car il n'est pas possible de rejeter cette tradition comme une "fable" (ψεῦδος), comparable aux supercheries que vient de dénoncer Galaxidôros. Pour le prouver, Théocritos raconte alors un incident dont il dit avoir été le témoin, en même temps que le devin Euthyphron,⁴⁸ et qui établit la supériorité de la divination socratique, appuyée sur les avertissements du démon, par rapport à la divination ordinaire des devins professionnels, tels Euthyphron et Théocritos lui-même.⁴⁹

Dans sa réponse, Galaxidôros se garde de mettre en doute la réalité du démon, mais en propose une interprétation qui se concilie à la fois avec sa conception rationaliste de la philosophie et avec l'idée qu'il se fait de la personnalité de Socrate. Le démon, explique-t-il, n'est pas une révélation "particulière et exceptionnelle" (ιδίαν καὶ περιττήν) qui serait consentie par faveur personnelle à un individu. C'est, en réalité, un phénomène qui relève de la mantique ordinaire, mais se manifeste "dans les situations obscures et rebelles aux conjectures raisonnables" (ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις καὶ ἀτεκμάρτοις τῷ λογισμῷ). Quand le raisonnement ou la faculté de

⁴⁶ Sur ce passage, voir W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 94, avec n. 48.

⁴⁷ Cf. ci-dessus, p. 383, avec n. 2.

⁴⁸ Il se pourrait que l'anecdote, pour laquelle Plutarque est notre seule source, ait été imaginée par lui pour les besoins de la cause.

⁴⁹ Voir ci-dessus, n. 27.

prévision sont en échec, un facteur en soi insignifiant, comme un éternuement ou une parole fortuite (παρμὸς ἢ κληδών) peut faire pencher la balance d'un côté plutôt que de l'autre. Voilà pourquoi Socrate, dans de telles situations, se laissait guider par ce genre de présages, auxquels on a donné le nom de "démon de Socrate" (580F-81A).

Les objections de Phidolaos et de Polymnis donnent enfin à Galaxidôros l'occasion de préciser sa pensée sur deux points importants. Au premier, qui s'était indigné qu'on pût ainsi "tourner en ridicule une telle manifestation de la puissance prophétique et la réduire à des éternuements et à des voix" (581E 11-12), il répond que des signes en apparence insignifiants peuvent avoir une grande importance pour la connaissance de l'avenir. Socrate était donc fondé à tenir compte de ces signes pour déterminer sa conduite et à prendre au sérieux ce qu'il appelait son démon (581F-82B). Quant à Polymnis, il trouvait surprenant que Socrate eût attribué à l'action du démon ce qu'il décidait d'après un banal éternuement, et voyait là une manifestation de l'"enflure" (τῦφος) et des faux-semblants justement dénoncés par Galaxidôros (581B). Mais ce dernier lui fait observer qu'il est légitime de distinguer entre le signe (l'éternuement) et celui qui l'envoie (le démon) et de mettre l'accent sur le second plutôt que sur le premier (582B-C). Cette réponse, comme la précédente, confirme que la théorie de Galaxidôros ne nie en aucune façon l'existence du démon, mais rejette seulement l'idée que ce démon communiquerait directement avec certains hommes, par des apparitions ou des messages verbaux.

Quelle est la portée de cette théorie de Galaxidôros, quelle fonction faut-il lui reconnaître dans la construction du dialogue? Faut-il croire qu'elle correspond, en tout ou en partie, aux vues personnelles de l'auteur sur le sujet, ou au contraire qu'elle représente une simple étape dans le débat, destinée à être ensuite dépassée par les interventions des autres participants, et définitivement rejetée? Les commentateurs ont généralement opté pour cette dernière interprétation. Ainsi, Hirzel pensait que le point de vue de Galaxidôros était proche de celui des Cyniques, et pouvait refléter les idées qui étaient celles de Plutarque dans sa jeunesse, à l'époque où il écrivait son pamphlet *Sur la Superstition*.⁵⁰ Galaxidôros représenterait alors la "période radicale" de la pensée de Plutarque, dont celui-ci était sans doute déjà assez éloigné quand il rédigeait le *De genio*.⁵¹ De même, H. von Arnim affirme que Plutarque prend nettement parti contre Galaxidôros pour se ranger sans restriction aux côtés des Pythagoriciens Simmias et Théanor,⁵² en leur

⁵⁰ Cf. R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, II (Leipzig 1895) 158, avec n. 1.

⁵¹ Aucun indice sûr ne permet de fixer la date du *De genio*. Mais les affinités qui existent entre ce dialogue et des œuvres comme les *Dialogues pythiques* ou le *De sera numinis vindicta* ne laissent guère penser qu'il puisse s'agir d'une œuvre de jeunesse. Cf. G. Mameli Lattanzi, "Il *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco," (Rome 1933) 109 sq. (cité par Corlu—ci-dessus, n. 31—p. 106); K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, 2^e éd., (Stuttgart 1964) col. 205.

⁵² *Plutarch über Dämonen und Mantik* (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Ak. van Wetensch. Amsterdam, Afdeling Letterkunde, N. R., 22, 1921, 2), p. 4 sq.

faisant reconnaître, dans le cadre du dialogue, une autorité supérieure,⁵³ tandis que, par ailleurs, Galaxidôros lui-même ferait en quelque sorte acte d'allégeance à la personne de Simmias.⁵⁴ Plus récemment, enfin, A. Corlu⁵⁵ et J. Hani⁵⁶ ont vu dans ce personnage un contradicteur de tendance stoïcienne, dont la théorie, erronée et peu cohérente, ne serait exposée que pour mieux mettre en valeur, par contraste, les conceptions du démon développées ensuite par Simmias et Théanor.

Cependant, cette interprétation du rôle dévolu au personnage dans la construction du dialogue paraît difficilement conciliable avec une série d'indications convergentes fournies par le texte à son sujet. On notera tout d'abord que les idées exposées par Galaxidôros ne sont jamais globalement ni expressément réfutées par ses partenaires au cours de la discussion. Seul Simmias semble le critiquer, quand, à la fin de son intervention (589F 3–6), il rejette dédaigneusement, mais sans nommer Galaxidôros, l'opinion de ceux qui parlent de “paroles fortuites, d'éternuements ou de choses du même genre” (κληδόνας ἢ παρμούς ἢ τι τοιοῦτον) pour expliquer le démon de Socrate. Mais cette critique laisse intacte, en tout état de cause, toute la première partie de la thèse de Galaxidôros, qui n'est pourtant pas la moins importante (condamnation de la superstition, de la crédulité excessive des prédécesseurs de Socrate, y compris Pythagore—sans que le Pythagoricien Simmias trouve à y redire . . . —, interprétation strictement rationaliste de la philosophie de Socrate. . .). Qui plus est, il n'est même pas plausible, à la réflexion, que Simmias vise Galaxidôros dans ce passage: non seulement le pluriel dont il use (τῶν κληδόνας . . . εἰρηκότων)⁵⁷ peut désigner d'autres adversaires, mais dans sa réponse à Polymnis Galaxidôros s'est expressément démarqué de ceux qui professent l'opinion rejeté par Simmias: “. . . pour ma part, je m'étonnerais qu'un homme éminent dans la pratique de la discussion et dans la maîtrise de la langue, comme l'était Socrate, ait dit que c'était l'éternuement, et non le démon qui lui faisait signe. C'est comme si l'on disait que l'on a été blessé par le trait, et non par le tireur au moyen du trait, ou encore que le poids est mesuré par la balance, et non par celui qui pèse au moyen de la balance. Car ce n'est pas l'instrument qui fait l'oeuvre, mais celui à qui appartient l'instrument, et qui s'en sert pour produire l'oeuvre. Or, c'est aussi une sorte d'instrument que le signe, dont se

⁵³ Voir notamment, pour Simmias, 576B 7–9, 578A 1–3, 578F 9–10 (figure typique de philosophe), 580B 3–4, 580D 5–6, 581E 7–10, 588C 3 sq. (représentant autorisé de la pensée de Socrate); pour Théanor, 578E 6–7.

⁵⁴ Cf. 581F 5–7, Καὶ ὁ Γαλαξιδωρος· Σιμμίον μὲν, ἔφη, Φειδόλαε, περὶ τούτων, εἴ τι Σωκράτους αὐτὸς λέγοντος ἤκουσεν, ἔτοιμος ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ πείθεσθαι μεθ' ὑμῶν . . . ; 582C 10–11, 'Ἄλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, εἴ τι Σιμμίας ἔχει λέγειν, ἀκουστέον, ὥς εἰδότες ἀκριβέστερον.

⁵⁵ Cf. ci-dessus, n. 31, pp. 19, 48–51.

⁵⁶ Cf. ci-dessus, n. 3, p. 53.

⁵⁷ Conjecture de Bernardakis pour le participe substantivé par τῶν et dont dépendaient nécessairement les trois accusatifs κληδόνας, παρμούς, et τι τοιοῦτον.

sert la puissance qui donne des signes" (582C 3–10). Il est clair que *ce n'est pas la théorie de Galaxidôros* qui est l'objet du "dédain" (cf. 589F 6) de Simmias.⁵⁸

Il est vrai qu'avant que ce dernier expose sa propre théorie, le narrateur signale qu'il avait répondu déjà aux arguments de Galaxidôros sur "la nature et le mode d'action du démon" (588B 12–13). Mais Caphisias précise aussitôt qu'il n'a pas entendu lui-même cette réponse de Simmias (588C 1–3, "Α μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸν Γαλαξιδώρου λόγον ἀντεῖπεν ὁ Σιμμίας οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν). Plutarque aurait pu soit reproduire ou résumer la réfutation de la thèse de Galaxidôros, soit la passer totalement sous silence. En optant pour la solution intermédiaire, il donne l'impression de suggérer que tout n'est pas faux dans cette thèse. En tout cas, au moment où Simmias prend la parole pour donner sa propre explication du démon, tout se passe comme si Galaxidôros, le premier à s'être exprimé sur le sujet, était sorti vainqueur de la première partie du débat, sans que personne ait été en mesure de le réfuter, alors que lui-même n'a eu aucune peine à réfuter les objections de ses contradicteurs (cf. 581F 7–8, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ σοῦ [sc. Φειδολάου] λελεγμένα καὶ Πολύμνιος οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀνελεῖν). On ajoutera que la place qui est réservée à son exposé dans la construction du dialogue⁵⁹ et le fait qu'il reste maître du terrain à l'issue de la première phase de la discussion, jusqu'à ce que la question soit reprise dans le dernier tiers du dialogue, ne se comprendraient guère si Plutarque n'avait accordé aucune valeur à ses arguments. On peut déjà en inférer que le statut de Galaxidôros dans le *De genio* est totalement différent de celui des personnages qui, dans d'autres dialogues,⁶⁰ jouent le rôle de trouble-fête ou de contradicteurs grossiers, dont l'intervention n'a d'autre but que de permettre aux interlocuteurs sérieux, une fois débarrassés du perturbateur, d'entamer le véritable débat.⁶¹

En second lieu, il n'est pas vrai que la thèse de Galaxidôros reflète le point de vue des Cyniques,⁶² ni même celui des Stoïciens,⁶³ même si son

⁵⁸ Contrairement à ce qu'affirme notamment Corlu (ci-dessus, n. 31), p. 52.

⁵⁹ La première discussion sur le démon, dominée par Galaxidôros, occupe 4 chapitres sur 34, soit 6 pages 1/2 de l'édition Hani sur un total de 57.

⁶⁰ Ainsi Didyme-Planétiade dans le *De defectu oraculorum*, "Épicure" dans le *De sera numinis vindicta*, et même Pharnace dans le *De facie in orbe lunae*.

⁶¹ Cf. R. Flacelière, *Plutarque, Oeuvres morales, VI, Dialogues pythiques* (Paris, C.U.F., 1974) pp. 90–91. Significative, à cet égard, est la dernière mention de Galaxidôros en 594B 3–4: en signalant que Théocritos voudrait dire un mot à Épaminondas "en présence de Galaxidôros" et de Caphisias, Plutarque garantit, en quelque sorte, la stature morale du personnage et l'intègre symboliquement au groupe des philosophes, qui fait pendant au groupe des patriotes.

⁶² Cf. Corlu, *ibid.*, pp. 48–49.

⁶³ Comme j'ai eu tort de l'admettre dans *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 252. Les arguments par lesquels von Arnim (ci-dessus, n. 52, p. 5; cf. Corlu, *ibid.*, pp. 49–50; Hani [ci-dessus, n. 3], p. 220, n. 1) cherche à prouver l'origine stoïcienne des vues de Galaxidôros ne sont pas probants. Même si la notion d'ὁμη est stoïcienne, le mot appartient en effet à la langue philosophique commune, et son emploi ne suffit évidemment pas à indiquer une filiation stoïcienne. Par ailleurs, le rejet de la divination naturelle au profit de la divination artificielle est en contradiction avec la position stoïcienne, qui admet aussi bien la première que la seconde, cf. le *De vita et*

langage rappelle occasionnellement celui de Chrysippe.⁶⁴ On en trouvera la preuve dans la concordance frappante qui apparaît entre ce que dit Galaxidôros du rôle de la divinité dans la dispensation des signes de la divination artificielle (582C 3–10, cité ci-dessus), et la manière dont Xénophon prenait déjà la défense du démon de Socrate contre ses détracteurs: Socrate, expliquait-il, ne faisait rien d'autre que ceux qui usent des procédés habituels de la divination. Mais tandis que la plupart des gens disent (à tort) qu'ils ont été guidés par des présages, Socrate s'exprimait plus correctement, en disant que c'était la puissance démonique qui lui faisait signe (cf. *Mémorables*, I, 1, 4 τὸ δαιμόνιον . . . ἔφη σημαίνειν, à rapprocher de *De genio*, 582C 3–4, Σωκράτης . . . τὸ δαιμόνιον αὐτῷ σημαίνειν ἔλεγεν).⁶⁵ La thèse de Galaxidôros apparaît donc d'une parfaite orthodoxie "socratique," et c'est sans doute pourquoi Plutarque a tenu à lui faire décerner, par l'intermédiaire de Polymnis (cf. 581A 8 sq.), le label d'authenticité et la garantie d'un compagnon direct de Socrate, Terpsion de Mégare.⁶⁶ Parallèlement, la vigueur de sa réaction, quand il est soupçonné de faire cause commune avec les ennemis de Socrate (cf. 580B 9 sq.), et la manière dont il se défend, dans ses réponses à Phidolaos et à Polymnis, de vouloir ravalier le "démon" à un phénomène banal et purement matériel montrent qu'il se range résolument dans le camp des Socratiques. De fait, en faisant de Socrate le parfait représentant de l'authentique esprit philosophique, qui n'aspire qu'à "poursuivre la vérité par la sobre raison," il incarne sans doute la réaction rationaliste de certains cercles socratiques contre une interprétation de l'héritage socratique jugée trop entachée de religiosité et trop influencée par le pythagorisme.⁶⁷

poesi Homeri attribué à Plutarque, II, 212, p. 456, 14–18 (Bernardakis), et *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II, 1188 sq., 1196 sq. Enfin, il est douteux que 580F implique une adhésion au dogme stoïcien de la "sympathie" universelle.

⁶⁴ Comparer *De genio*, 580F–81 A et *De Stoic. rep.*, 1045B–V (avec la note de H. Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia*, XIII, 2, LCL, 1976, pp. 508–09, a) et cf. *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 251, avec n. 3.

⁶⁵ Voir aussi 582B7–9, . . . καὶ ταῦτα φάσκων αὐτὸς οὐ παρμὸν οὐδὲ φωνὴν ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιον αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων ὑφηγεῖσθαι. Encore plus étroit est le parallèle entre le propos de Galaxidôros et ce que Xénophon fait dire à Socrate dans son *Apologie*, 13: "... tandis que [les autres] nomment ce qui les avertit 'oiseaux,' 'paroles,' 'rencontres fortuites,' 'devins,' moi je l'appelle un 'signe divin' (δαιμόνιον), et j'estime qu'en usant de ce nom je m'exprime avec plus de vérité et de piété que ceux qui attribuent aux oiseaux le pouvoir qui appartient aux dieux" (trad. F. Ollier).

⁶⁶ Terpsion est mentionné par Platon, avec son compatriote Euclide, au nombre des disciples étrangers qui étaient aux côtés Socrate le jour de sa mort (*Phédon*, 59 c 3). On le retrouve d'autre part, toujours avec Euclide, dans le prologue du *Théétète* (142 a–43a), et c'est à lui qu'est faite la lecture de l'entretien rédigé par Euclide qui forme le contenu du dialogue.

⁶⁷ Voir la référence de la n. 46, ci-dessus.

Quant au fait que Galaxidôros accepte de s'en remettre à l'autorité de Simmias au sujet de démon,⁶⁸ il n'implique en aucune façon un reniement de sa propre théorie. Tant s'en faut: en déclarant qu'il est prêt à écouter ce que Simmias a à dire à ce sujet et à y souscrire, Galaxidôros fait plutôt comprendre que sa propre explication du démon pourrait recevoir de la bouche de Simmias, grâce à la longue intimité de ce dernier avec Socrate, son complément naturel, en même temps que d'utiles éclaircissements.⁶⁹ Son appel à Simmias fait donc prévoir un prolongement et un approfondissement du débat, bien plutôt qu'un retour en arrière et un départ sur nouveaux frais. Ainsi, à la fin de la première phase de la discussion au sujet du démon, rien ne laisse prévoir une réfutation de la thèse qu'y a développée Galaxidôros, et de fait, comme nous l'avons vu, Plutarque a ostensiblement exclu une telle réfutation dès la reprise du débat (588C 1-3, cf. ci-dessus).

Enfin, l'importance *positive* de la contribution de Galaxidôros à la discussion philosophique du *De genio* ressort avant tout des convergences qu'on y découvre avec des idées que l'auteur reprend ailleurs à son compte.⁷⁰ C'est vrai, tout d'abord, de la véhémente condamnation de la superstition qui marque le débat de son intervention (579F sq.), et que l'on retrouve d'un bout à l'autre de la carrière de Plutarque,⁷¹ depuis l'oeuvre de jeunesse qu'est sans doute le *De superstitione* jusqu'à de nombreux passages des *Moralia* et des *Vies* que l'on peut assigner à la maturité ou à la vieillesse de l'auteur.⁷² Même l'idée que les hommes politiques peuvent légitimement user de la

⁶⁸ Voir ci-dessus, n. 54.

⁶⁹ Rien ne justifie l'affirmation de Hani (ci-dessus, n. 3), p. 222, n. 2 de la p. 89, selon laquelle la position de Galaxidôros se serait modifiée "à la fin de son intervention" (582C) "par rapport à ce qu'elle était au début (580)." Cf. "La doctrine démonologique dans le *De genio* . . ." (ci-dessus, n. 7), pp. 204-05.

⁷⁰ Cf. Aloni, "Ricerche . . ." (ci-dessus, n. 15), p. 62.

⁷¹ Voir *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (ci-dessus, n. 43), pp. 523-25. Cf. également H. Adam, *Plutarch's Schrift "Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum,"* (Amsterdam 1974) 49-50; A. Barigazzi, *Plutarco contro Epicuro*, (Firenze 1978) pp. XL-XLI; F. E. Brenk, In *Mist Appareled. Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives*, (Leyde 1977) 13-14; G. Lozza, *Plutarco, De superstitione*, (Milano 1980) 18-20. J'avoue ne pas comprendre comment Brenk, *ibid.*, p. 5, n. 10, peut prétendre que j'ai tenté de justifier l'idée d'un développement croissant de la superstition dans la pensée de Plutarque, alors que j'ai expressément rejeté cette idée, notamment dans le passage dont la référence est indiquée ci-dessus (voir également, dans le même livre, la note 2 de la page 502, avec la référence à Geffcken, et la note 3 de la p. 463. . .). Brenk croit également (*ibid.*, p. 7, n. 13) que j'ai vu "an uninterrupted move towards Neoplatonism in Plutarch's writings," en contradiction flagrante avec mon dernier chapitre, qui aboutit à la conclusion qu'on ne peut déceler d'évolution sensible dans la pensée religieuse de Plutarque!

⁷² Cf. *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 505 sq., et comparer en particulier la formule de Galaxidôros en 579F 8-9, ὡς ἔργον ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν ἄνδρα καθαρεύοντα . . . δαισιδαμονίας, avec *De Iside et Osiride*, 352B 3-4, à propos des Hiéraphores et Hiérostoles du culte d'Isis, οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον περὶ θεῶν πάσης καθαρεύοντα δαισιδαμονίας καὶ περιεργίας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φέροντες κ.τ.λ.

superstition "comme d'un frein" pour imposer à une foule indocile ce qui est conforme à son intérêt (580A 1-5) apparaît à plusieurs reprises dans les *Vies*,⁷³ notamment dans la *Vie de Numa*,⁷⁴ où elle est expressément rapprochée de la philosophie de Pythagore.⁷⁵

De même, l'auteur des *Vies* fait plus d'une fois écho à la protestation de Galaxidôros contre ceux qui recourent abusivement à la divination au lieu de raisonner (580A 9-11), qu'il s'agisse de Nicias, qu'il représente paralysé "par l'ignorance et la superstition" lors d'une éclipse de lune,⁷⁶ ou, inversement, de Démosthène, qu'il approuve implicitement d'avoir refusé de "prêter attention aux oracles et d'écouter les prophéties," dans lesquelles il ne voyait, à l'exemple de Périclès, que prétextes pour se conduire en lâche, se dispenser de raisonner.⁷⁷ Et la raison morale invoquée ici par Galaxidôros—les présages sont à la portée de l'homme le plus médiocre, aussi bien que du meilleur (cf. 580B 1-3)—est aussi celle qui inspire par exemple, dans la *Vie de Paul-Émile*, la réflexion de Plutarque au sujet de Persée, qui s'imaginait que sacrifices et prières pouvaient compenser sa lâcheté: ". . . il n'est pas licite que celui qui n'a pas visé atteigne le but, ni que celui qui lâche pied soit vainqueur, ni, d'une façon générale que celui qui ne fait rien connaisse le succès et que le méchant prospère."⁷⁸

Plus généralement, la profession de foi rationaliste de Galaxidôros, son refus de "diviniser" les actions humaines, comme de "chercher refuge auprès

⁷³ Voir *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, pp. 505 (avec la note 5) – 506.

⁷⁴ 8. 4 et 6-7 (cf. *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 506, notes 6 et 7).

⁷⁵ Il faut noter qu'on trouve chez plusieurs auteurs antérieurs ou postérieurs à Plutarque (Polybe, Diodore, Strabon, Denys d'Halicarnasse, Saint Augustin . . .) un thème parallèle sur la "pieuse tromperie" (*pia fraus*) dont usent les politiques avisés pour imposer aux foules les mesures qui leur sont profitables. Voir les références réunies par E. N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, I (Stockholm 1965) p. 497, n. 910; II (Stockholm 1974) pp. 135, 414, n. 282, 416-17, n. 300, 422, n. 342. Voir d'autre part K. Döring, "Antike Theorien über die staatspolitische Notwendigkeit der Götterfurcht," *Antike und Abendland* 24 (1978) 43-56. L'origine ultime du thème est sans doute à chercher dans la théorie platonicienne du "mensonge utile," cf. *Rép.* III, 389b, V, 459c-d.

⁷⁶ Cf. *Vie de Nicias*, 23. 1 sq.

⁷⁷ Cf. *Vie de Démosthène*, 20. 1, et voir *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 520. On notera qu'ici encore Galaxidôros (et par son truchement Plutarque) se situe dans la droite ligne de la tradition socratique, comme le montre le rapprochement de *De genio*, 580F 11-12, ([τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον] ἐν τοῖς ἀδῆλοις καὶ ἀτεκμαρτοῖς τῷ λογισμῷ ῥοπήν ἐπάγειν, cf. 580D 1-4, ἐν πράγμασιν ἀδῆλοις καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσυλλογίστοις φρόνησιν . . .) avec Xénophon, *Mém.* I, 1. 9, ἔφη δὲ [sc. ὁ Σωκράτης] δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι . . . Plutarque, du reste, n'est ni le premier ni le seul à reprendre le thème: comparer, entre autres, Démocrite, B 234D-K; Xénophon, *Cyrop.* I, 6. 6; Platon, *Lachès*, 198e; Dion Chrysostome, 10. 28; Épicure, *Sent. Vat.*, 65; Epictète, *Manuel*, 32. 3 (cf. A. Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* [Stuttgart 1894] 44-46).

⁷⁸ 19. 5. Le même thème est déjà dans la *De superst.*, 169B sq. (cf. notamment 169C 6, ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἐλπίς ὁ θεός ἐστιν, οὐ δειλίας πρόφασις), ce qui prouve qu'il s'agit derechef d'un trait fondamental et d'une constante de la philosophie religieuse de Plutarque. Cf. *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 494 sq.

des dieux," correspond à une tendance profonde de la pensée de Plutarque,⁷⁹ dont un passage fameux de la *Vie de Périclès* (6. 1) offre peut-être la meilleure illustration. Plutarque y explique le bénéfice principal que, selon lui, Périclès a tiré de la fréquentation d'Anaxagore: "... il s'éleva grâce à lui au-dessus de la superstition. Celle-ci naît de l'effroi inspiré par les phénomènes célestes aux hommes qui n'en connaissent pas les causes, et qui, par suite de leur ignorance, sont pris de trouble et d'affolement en matière de religion (περὶ τὰ θεῖα δαίμονῶσι καὶ ταραττομένοις). La science de la nature, en bannissant cette ignorance, substitue à la superstition timide et fébrile la piété ferme que de bonnes espérances accompagnent" (trad. Flacelière-Chambry). Entre la religion rationnelle que Plutarque admire ici chez Périclès et la philosophie de Socrate, telle que la présente Galaxidōros, la ressemblance est évidente, de sorte que la sympathie de l'auteur va nécessairement à la seconde aussi bien qu'à la première. De même, on ne peut guère douter que Lamprias soit son porte-parole dans le passage du dialogue *Sur la disparition des oracles* où il explique que les "théologiens et poètes de l'ancien temps" n'avaient en vue que les causes divines des événements, en négligeant leurs causes naturelles, tandis qu'inversement les modernes ont eu tendance à privilégier les secondes au détriment des premières. "Aussi la doctrine des uns et des autres est-elle déficiente, puisque ceux-ci ignorent l'agent et l'auteur, ceux-là les origines et les instruments" (436D-E). La voie moyenne que s'efforce de tracer ici Lamprias est bien celle qu'entend suivre de son côté Galaxidōros, en récusant à la fois ceux qui veulent "diviniser" nos actions et ceux qui "méprisent les choses divines" (582B 10-C 2) en confondant le signe et celui qui l'envoie (582C 5-10). Elle correspond par ailleurs aussi bien à la théorie exposée dans la *Vie de Coriolan* sur les limites des interventions divines dans les affaires humaines qu'à son application pratique dans la narration historique du *De genio*.

Ces remarques nous amènent nécessairement à conclure que, pour l'auteur du *De genio*, la théorie de Galaxidōros sur le démon n'est pas fausse, mais appelle des compléments et des rectifications, qui seront apportés dans la deuxième phase de la discussion philosophique, en particulier par Simmias, auquel Galaxidōros passe en quelque sorte ostensiblement le relais en 582C 11-12. La fonction de son intervention apparaît dès lors de préparer le terrain à ceux qui prendront la parole après lui, en posant des principes et en affirmant des positions qui ne seront pas remises en question, et en écartant, corrélativement, les explications erronées et opposées, tant de ceux qui multiplient indûment les interventions du démon et y voient abusivement des messages directs de la divinité, que de ceux qui en nient la réalité et dessaisissent le démon au profit de signes purement matériels.

⁷⁹ Voir *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, pp. 510-14.

Tandis que pour Galaxidôros le démon est un phénomène qui ressortit à la divination ordinaire, et auquel il ne convient pas de prêter "un pouvoir particulier et *exceptionnel*" (ιδίαν καὶ περιττὴν δύναμιν, 580F 9), pour Simmias, au contraire, il s'agit d'un avertissement spécial dont bénéficient certains hommes "*exceptionnels*" (ἐνσημαίνεται τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ περιτοῖς ἀνδράσι . . . , 589C 10–11). Cependant, malgré l'importance de cette divergence, et bien que Simmias, dans la conclusion de son exposé, semble faire cause commune avec Phidolaos plutôt qu'avec Galaxidôros (cf. 589F 3, Ἡμῖν μὲν, ὦ Φειδόλαε, répondant à 581E 10, Τί οὖν, ὁ Φειδόλαος εἶπεν, ὦ Σιμμία;), on découvre de nombreuses convergences entre ses propos et ceux de son prédécesseur.

Les premiers mots que Caphisias rapporte de l'intervention de Simmias—tout de suite après avoir signalé qu'il n'avait pas entendu sa réponse à Galaxidôros⁸⁰—sont pour signaler que Simmias n'avait pas reçu de réponse directe de Socrate, quand il l'avait interrogé sur son démon. En revanche, ajoute-t-il aussitôt, "il avait souvent entendu Socrate exprimer l'avis que les gens qui prétendent avoir des visions grâce auxquelles ils avaient communiqué avec un être divin étaient des imposteurs" (πολλάκις δ' αὐτῷ παραγενέσθαι τοὺς μὲν δι' ὄψεως ἐντυχεῖν θεῷ τινὶ λέγοντας ἀλαζόνας ἡγουμένῳ, 588C 5–6). Cette entrée en matière, dont tous les détails sont significatifs, est destinée à indiquer au lecteur, nous l'avons vu, que l'exposé de Simmias n'annule pas celui de Galaxidôros, mais le corrige et le complète. En second lieu, en précisant d'entrée de jeu qu'il n'a pu obtenir de réponse de Socrate sur la nature du démon, Simmias donne à entendre que sa propre explication ne prétend pas à la vérité absolue, mais, comme celles de ses partenaires, n'est rien d'autre qu'une hypothèse raisonnable appuyée sur les faits connus de tous.⁸¹ Corrélativement et enfin, en écartant d'emblée la possibilité d'une communication directe de la divinité au moyen de visions, Simmias fait écho à la protestation initiale de Galaxidôros contre ceux qui "divinisent leurs actions en dissimulant les fantaisies qui leur viennent à l'esprit derrière l'écran de songes, d'apparitions (φάσματα) et d'autres inventions prétentieuses du même genre" (579F 12–14).⁸²

Cet accord de départ entre Galaxidôros et Simmias prend un relief accru si l'on s'avise que la même position est encore affirmée à deux reprises dans

⁸⁰ 588C 1–3, voir ci-dessus, p. 397.

⁸¹ Comparer la conclusion du discours, en 589F 3–5, Ἡμῖν μὲν . . . καὶ ζῶντος Σωκράτους καὶ τεθνηκότος οὕτως ἐννοεῖν περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου παρίσταται . . . , et cf. 588C 9, (παρίστατο). Cf. toutefois 588C 6–8 (suite de la phrase citée dans le texte ci-dessus), τοῖς δ' ἀκοῦσαι τινος φωνῆς φάσκουσι προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διαπυνθανομένῳ μετὰ σπουδῆς. La phrase, tout en marquant l'accord de Simmias avec Théanor (cf. 585F 8, et voir le texte ci-dessus), montre que sa théorie, sans être plus qu'une hypothèse, bénéficie tout de même, jusqu'à un certain point, de l'appui de Socrate lui-même.

⁸² Cf. également 580B 1, . . . πρὸς μαντεύματα τρέπεται καὶ ὄνειράτων ὄψεις . . .

le dialogue, en dehors même du contexte du débat philosophique sur la nature du démon. En 585F, Théanor rapporte en effet que la nuit où il est resté près du tombeau de Lysis pour recevoir éventuellement les instructions du défunt (cf. 579F 6), il n'eut "pas de vision," mais crut "entendre une voix" (εἶδον μὲν οὐδέν, ἀκοῦσαι δὲ φωνῆς ἔδοξα). Parallèlement, dans le mythe de Timarque, le narrateur raconte qu'au début de son séjour dans l'Au-delà, "quelqu'un *qu'il ne voyait pas* s'adressa à lui" (εἰπεῖν τινα πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὁρώμενον, 591A 3-4). Plus tard, quand la voix de son guide cesse de se faire entendre, Timarque tente de se retourner pour voir celui qui lui parlait. En vain: à ce moment précis, il reçoit de nouveau un violent choc sur la tête et perd connaissance (592E). Il est clair que dans le *De genio* personne, pas plus le personnage mythique de Timarque que les Pythagoriciens Simmias et Théanor ou le rationaliste Galaxidōros, ne croit à la possibilité de l'apparition d'êtres divins, et il n'est pas moins clair que l'auteur du dialogue partage entièrement ce scepticisme,⁸³ montrant ainsi que sa piété s'apparentait plutôt à celle de l'hellénisme classique⁸⁴ qu'à la religiosité plus crédule de sa propre époque.⁸⁵

La même tendance domine en réalité tout l'exposé de Simmias, qui apparaît ainsi comme une tentative systématique de rationalisation d'un phénomène religieux présenté comme exceptionnel, et où l'on perçoit, à tout moment, un effort presque pathétique pour concilier croyance religieuse et explication rationnelle. On le constate dès que Simmias, après avoir écarté toute idée d'apparition du démon, en vient à formuler sa propre explication: "C'est pourquoi il nous vint à l'esprit, en réfléchissant dans nos réunions entre nous, de nous demander si peut-être le signe démonique de Socrate n'était pas, plutôt qu'une vision, la perception de quelque voix ou l'appréhension d'une parole entrant en contact avec lui de quelque extraordinaire façon (οὐκ ὅψις ἀλλὰ φωνῆς τινος αἰσθησις ἢ λόγου νόησις . . . συνάπτοντος ἀτόπῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ πρὸς αὐτόν), tout comme, dans le sommeil (ὥσπερ καὶ καθ' ὕπνον), il n'y a pas de voix, mais des

⁸³ On en trouvera la confirmation, notamment, dans le prologue de la *Vie de Dion* (2. 3 sq.), où Plutarque a bien de la peine à admettre qu'un démon malfaisant ait pu apparaître à Brutus, et se montre sensible à l'argument de ceux qui soutiennent que "jamais un homme sensé n'a eu la vision d'un démon ou d'un spectre" (μηδενὶ ἂν νοῦν ἔχοντι προσεσεῖν φάντασμα δαίμονος μηδ' εἰδῶλον). Finalement, c'est la qualité exceptionnelle des témoins, ἄνδρες ἐμβριθεῖς καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀκροσφαλεῖς οὐδ' εὐάλωτοι πάθος, qui le fait pencher, non sans hésitation, à prendre en considération une aussi étrange tradition: οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν πάντων παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον . . . par rapport aux tristes cités du *De genio*, ce passage du prologue de *Dion* relève pour ainsi dire l'exception qui confirme la règle.

⁸⁴ Comparer par exemple Euripide, *Hipp.*, 86 (Hippolyte à Artémis), κλύων μὲν αὐδὴν, ὄμμα δ' οὐχ ὁρῶν τὸ σόν; Sophocle, *Ajax*, 15-16 (Ulysse à Athéna), κἄν ἄποπτος ᾗς ὅμως, / φώνημ' ἀκούω καὶ συναρπάζω φρενί, et déjà *Hymne hom. à Déméter*, 111, χαλεποὶ δὲ θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι.

⁸⁵ Ainsi pour Apulée, *De deo Socratis*, 20, le signe divin de Socrate n'est pas seulement une voix, mais une apparition, *ipsius daemonis species*.

impressions et des appréhensions de paroles que l'on reçoit, et qui font croire que l'on entend des gens parler" (588C 9-D 4).

Ce qui importe, dans un tel texte, n'est évidemment pas la pertinence, ni même la rationalité objective de l'explication proposée, mais l'état d'esprit qu'elle révèle chez celui qui l'avance. Or, il est clair que Simmias cherche essentiellement à rendre acceptable rationnellement, autant que faire se peut, le phénomène qu'il s'agit d'accréditer. A cette fin, il écarte non seulement l'idée d'une apparition du démon, mais même, dans un second temps, l'idée qu'il y avait d'abord substituée, à savoir celle de l'audition d'une voix: φωνῆς τινος αἰσθήσις est ainsi immédiatement corrigé en λόγου νόησις συνάπτοντος ἀτόπῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ. Après quoi, pour tenter d'atténuer l'étrangeté du phénomène invoqué, il recourt à une analogie empruntée à l'expérience, en évoquant les voix que l'on croit entendre en rêve, bien qu'il n'y ait ni son ni perception véritable.

Ce passage du discours de Simmias a un parallèle remarquable (qui n'a pas échappé à la sagacité de Robert Flacelière)⁸⁶ dans la fameuse digression de la *Vie de Coriolan* au sujet des paroles qu'aurait prononcées la statue de la Fortune Féminine lors de sa consécration à Rome, après le retrait des Volsques (37. 5). Plutarque y expose d'abord longuement les raisons d'accueillir avec scepticisme ce que l'on rapporte au sujet de prodiges de cette espèce (38. 1-3). Mais il poursuit alors sa réflexion en ces termes: "Pourtant, lorsque l'histoire veut forcer notre assentiment en citant de nombreux témoins dignes de foi,⁸⁷ c'est qu'un phénomène différent de la perception s'est produit dans la partie imaginative de notre âme (ἀνόμοιον αἰσθήσει πάθος ἐγγιγνόμενον τῷ φανταστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς), et nous entraîne à croire vraie une apparence, de même que dans le sommeil (ὥσπερ ἐν ὕπνῳ) nous croyons entendre, alors que nous n'entendons pas, et voir alors que nous ne voyons pas" (38. 4).⁸⁸

L'intérêt particulier de ce chapitre de la *Vie de Coriolan*, pour le problème qui nous occupe, c'est que le rapport existant entre ses deux parties (38. 1-3 et 38. 4) est semblable à celui que nous avons cru déceler, dans le *De genio*, entre l'intervention de Galaxidōros et celle de Simmias: le scepticisme que Plutarque commence par exprimer au sujet du prodige de la statue parlante correspond à celui de Galaxidōros au sujet des apparitions ou des messages directs du démon, tandis que l'argument par lequel il tente ensuite de justifier rationnellement le prodige est la réplique de celui dont use Simmias pour rendre plausibles les manifestations du démon. Le

⁸⁶ Plutarque, *Vies*, III, C.U.F. (Paris 1964) p. 253 (note de la p. 216, à 38. 4).

⁸⁷ "Ὅπου δ' ἡμᾶς ἡ ἱστορία πολλοῖς ἀποβιάζεται καὶ πιθανοῖς μάρτυσιν . . . La phrase fait exactement pendant, dans ce contexte, à Εἰ δὲ Δίων καὶ Βρούτος, ἄνδρες ἐμβριθεῖς καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀκροσφαλεῖς οὐδ' εὐάλωτοι πάθος, οὕτως ὑπὸ φάσματος διετέθησαν . . . οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν πάντων παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον . . .", dans le contexte du prologue de la *Vie de Dion* (2. 5, cf. ci-dessus, n. 83). Voir Plutarque et le stoïcisme, p. 512, n. 6.

⁸⁸ Traduction Flacelière-Chambry légèrement modifiée.

rapprochement nous apporte donc la preuve que, dans le débat philosophique de notre dialogue, la position personnelle de l'auteur ne s'exprime pas uniquement dans l'exposé de Simmias, mais aussi et conjointement dans la contribution de Galaxidôros.

La suite du discours de Simmias confirme que sa préoccupation essentielle est bien de fournir un support rationnel à sa conception du démon, considéré comme un avertissement divin parvenant à quelques hommes supérieurs. D'où la référence à l'état du corps, qui est un obstacle, chez les hommes ordinaires, à l'appréhension de ces messages démoniques (588D). Ainsi s'explique également qu'il recoure de nouveau à l'analogie de l'expérience pour tenter d'accréditer l'idée que la "pensée sans voix" d'êtres divins puisse atteindre, par un contact insensible, et conduire une âme d'élite "simplement en l'effleurant," comme un petit gouvernail suffit à faire virer un gros bateau, ou comme la main du potier, "par simple attouchement," imprime une rotation régulière au tour (588E-F). Plus loin, la faculté qu'a l'âme de mouvoir le corps est invoquée pour faire comprendre qu' "un esprit puisse être guidé par un esprit supérieur, et une âme par une âme plus divine . . ." (589A-B). Après quoi, Simmias revient à son idée d'un langage purement spirituel, qui serait transmis sans le truchement de la parole, et l'appuie sur l'analogie de la transmission dans l'air du langage ordinaire (589C), puis sur une expérience physique (certains sons ne sont captés que par certains objets récepteurs: de même, les messages démoniques ne sont perçus que par une minorité privilégiée, 589D).

Deux phrases du discours confirment péremptoirement que tout l'effort de Simmias vise bien à désarmer les sceptiques: en 589C 6, il estime que "le phénomène du langage permet d'une certaine façon de convaincre les incrédules" (τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας); tandis qu'en 589D 9, il s'étonne que le vulgaire admette les inspirations divines pendant le sommeil, tout en jugeant "étonnant et incroyable" (θαυμάστον καὶ ἄπιστον) que le même phénomène puisse se manifester à l'état de veille. Par là, Simmias se révèle, en définitive, plus proche de Galaxidôros, pour qui la "raison" et la "démonstration" sont la marque distinctive de la philosophie (580A 9-10), que des Pythagoriciens critiqués par ce dernier, et parmi lesquels ou le range lui-même habituellement en même temps que Théanor. Ce qui permet de comprendre, pour finir, la ressemblance que l'on perçoit entre les modes de raisonnement dont usent les deux personnages pour étayer leurs thèses: tout comme Galaxidôros se référerait aux symptômes médicaux et aux phénomènes naturels pour montrer que des faits insignifiants peuvent annoncer de grands événements (581F-82A), Simmias recourt aux exemples du gouvernail et de la roue du potier pour faire admettre qu'une force immatérielle puisse agir sur l'esprit par un contact insensible.

L'exposé de Théanor s'ouvre par une phrase qui fait délibérément écho aux propos de Simmias en 589C 6 et D 9: ". . . je serais bien surpris qu'on refusât de croire ce que Simmias nous dit (θαυμάζω δ' εἰ τοῖς ὑπὸ Σιμμία)

λεγομένοις . . . δυσπιστήσουσί τινες). . . ; pourquoi *refuserait-on de croire* (ἀπιστοῦντες) qu'il existe des hommes divins et aimés des dieux . . ." (593A 6 sq.). De fait, toute la première partie de son discours vise essentiellement à convaincre les sceptiques, comme avait voulu le faire Simmias, qu'il n'y a rien d'absurde ni de déraisonnable dans la notion d'un démon intervenant directement en faveur d'un homme. Corrélativement, son but n'est pas de rejeter entièrement les idées défendues par Galaxidōros, mais—toujours en accord avec l'intervention de Simmias—de leur apporter un complément et un correctif importants. Théanor montre en effet que si *dans la plupart des cas* les choses se passent effectivement comme l'avait dit Galaxidōros, il existe cependant une minorité d'hommes privilégiés qui bénéficient d'avertissements directs de la part de la Divinité.⁸⁹

On peut même penser⁹⁰ que le passage du discours dans lequel Théanor développe sa distinction des deux espèces de divination (593C sq.) est destiné, dans l'esprit de l'auteur, à intégrer en quelque sorte la théorie de Galaxidōros à celle de ses partenaires:⁹¹ si cette théorie est en effet applicable à la grande majorité des cas, il apparaît maintenant qu'elle ne suffit pas à rendre compte de quelques exemples, qui ressortissent à la divination naturelle inspirée, d'interventions directes de la Divinité, dont la deuxième partie du discours s'efforce de prouver la réalité.

La continuité qui apparaît ainsi entre l'intervention de Théanor et celles de ses partenaires du débat démonologique est d'autre part confirmée par l'utilisation du même type d'argumentation. Comme Simmias et Galaxidōros, en effet, Théanor recourt avec prédilection à l'analogie et à l'expérience pour atténuer ce qui pourrait paraître choquant dans sa thèse du point de vue rationnel. Ainsi faut-il comprendre, notamment, la longue comparaison, au début de son discours, entre l'attitude des dieux à l'égard de leurs favoris et celle des hommes envers les animaux qu'ils sélectionnent pour un dressage spécial (593A–B, καθάπερ οὖν ἀνὴρ . . . οὕτω καὶ οἱ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς). Théanor s'efforce ainsi de justifier, en invoquant l'expérience humaine, une idée que Plutarque prend ailleurs à son compte en la qualifiant de "hautement philosophique."⁹² De même, dans la deuxième partie du discours, la multiplication des comparaisons qui s'accumulent les unes sur les autres ne relève pas principalement d'un motif littéraire: en recourant successivement aux exemples du traitement spécial que les rois et les chefs

⁸⁹ 593B 4–6, οἱ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς βελτίστους . . . ιδίᾱς τινὸς καὶ περιττῆς παιδαγωγίας ἀξιοῦσιν, répond expressément à ιδίαν καὶ περιττήν δύναμιν en 580F 9. Comparer d'autre part 589D 5–6, où Simmias anticipe, en opposant ἱερῶς καὶ δαιμονίους ἀνθρώπους à οἱ δὲ πολλοί, la thèse que développera plus loin Théanor.

⁹⁰ Ainsi Riley (ci-dessus, n. 23), p. 266.

⁹¹ Théanor reprend en 593B l'argument de Galaxidōros en 582C, mais en l'appliquant exclusivement à l'élite des θεῖοι ou θεοφιλεῖς ἄνθρωποι.

⁹² Cf. *Vie d'Alexandre*, 27. 11: ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς [sc. Ἀλέξανδρος] περὶ τούτων φιλοσοφώτερον δοξάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὥς πάντων μὲν ὄντα κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων πατέρα τὸν θεόν, ιδίους δὲ ποιούμενον ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἀρίστους.

militaires réservent à leurs intimes, de l'aide apportée par les anciens athlètes à ceux qui ont pris leur relève, et du secours que l'on accorde seulement aux naufragés près de toucher terre (593C–F), Théanor a surtout cherché à faire admettre que ni l'idée d'une communication privilégiée de la Divinité avec certains hommes, ni la vieille croyance en un démon personnel intervenant en faveur de ses protégés ne sont intrinsèquement absurdes.

Finalement, on constatera à quel point Théanor, à l'instar de Simmias, est attentif à faire sa place au rationalisme de Galaxidôros, en restreignant autant que possible le champ d'application de cette divination inspirée, dont il entend pourtant prouver la possibilité. De là son insistance à souligner que seule une minorité d'élus est en mesure d'en bénéficier.⁹³ Corrélativement, il prend bien soin de rappeler dans sa conclusion (593F 9 sq.) qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un privilège consenti par la Divinité à quelques favoris, mais de la sanction morale d'une vie qui a atteint son plus haut degré d'élévation, et s'est approchée d'elle-même du monde divin par la pratique de la vertu. Ses derniers mots apportent ainsi une ultime réponse à l'exigence de Galaxidôros, qui voulait que les messages du démon ne fussent pas dispensés indifféremment aux plus médiocres et aux meilleurs.⁹⁴

On peut donc conclure qu'aux yeux de Plutarque il n'y a pas contradiction entre les deux images de Socrate présentées successivement dans les deux parties de la discussion philosophique du *De genio* sur le démon. L'interprétation rationaliste de Galaxidôros n'est pas reniée par ses partenaires, mais prolongée et amendée pour tenir compte du cas exceptionnel de Socrate et de quelques autres hommes "divins" ou "aimés des dieux." Corrélativement, la partie narrative du dialogue confirme pleinement les résultats de la discussion philosophique, en montrant que la libération de Thèbes a été pour l'essentiel l'oeuvre des hommes engagés dans l'action, puisque, comme l'explique Théanor, les dieux n'interviennent qu'exceptionnellement pour favoriser les entreprises de certains hommes. Ainsi, dans tout le dialogue, comme dans le reste de son oeuvre,⁹⁵ Plutarque s'est efforcé de faire sa part à l'explication rationnelle des choses sans sacrifier pour autant les "causes divines,"⁹⁶ c'est-à-dire, en définitive, de

⁹³ Voir ci-dessus, pp. 391–92.

⁹⁴ Cf. 580B2–3, et voir ci-dessus, pp. 394 et 401.

⁹⁵ Voir *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, p. 516 sq., et cf. Brenk (ci-dessus, n. 71), p. 235.

⁹⁶ Cf. *De defectu orac.*, 436D–E (ci-dessus, pp. 401–02).

concilier sa foi de prêtre d'Apollon avec ses exigences de philosophe.⁹⁷

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⁹⁷ Cf. R. Flacelière, "Plutarque dans ses *Oeuvres Morales*," dans *Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales*, I, 1, C.U.F., *Introduction générale* (Paris 1987) pp. CLI-CLII: "... Plutarque n'a jamais varié sur le fond. Les deux constantes de sa pensée, depuis sa jeunesse jusqu'à sa mort, à savoir un double attachement, une double fidélité à la πατριος πίστις, d'une part, et de l'autre à la philosophie, ... ont toujours été les mêmes. Jamais sa conception de la vie et du monde ne s'écarta sensiblement de ces deux pôles." Sur la religion de Plutarque, voir en dernier lieu F. E. Brenk, "An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II, 36. 1, (Berlin-New York 1987) 248-349 (avec une abondante bibliographie). Voir également, dans le même volume, Chr. Froidefond, "Plutarque et le platonisme," pp. 184-233 (notamment pp. 228-29).

Una nuova interpretazione del *De genio Socratis*

ADELMO BARIGAZZI

Sul *De genio Socratis* è stato scritto molto, per lo più sui temi religiosi e teologici che contiene, ma sul problema primario, lo scopo e l'unità dell'opera, la critica è rimasta disorientata, non avendo ancora saputo indicare una linea d'interpretazione soddisfacente. In realtà suscita subito una grande meraviglia il fatto che il titolo fa pensare a una discussione filosofica e poi ci si trova di fronte alla narrazione, molto drammatica, di una gloriosa impresa della storia tebana, capace di suscitare forti emozioni e sentimenti patriottici. Ci sono personaggi storici di grande rilievo e altri minori, ardenti di amore per la libertà; c'è gioia per la vittoria conquistata sui tiranni e i nemici, uccisi o in ritirata. La discussione filosofica ha un'estensione abbastanza ampia, inferiore però alla narrazione, ed occupa la parte centrale. Il problema dominante sta appunto nel trovare un rapporto fra le due parti, quella demonologica, un argomento che a Plutarco stava molto a cuore, e quella storica, un'impresa che nobilitava la terra dell'autore e lo riempiva di orgoglio.

Si sono analizzati e confrontati i dati relativi al medesimo fatto, la liberazione di Tebe dal giogo spartano nell'inverno del 379 a.C., forniti da Plutarco nella *Vita di Pelopida* (cc. 6-13) e da altre fonti: Senofonte (*Hell.* V 4. 1-13), Callistene di Olinto, Diodoro Siculo (15. 25-27), Cornelio Nepote (*Vita Pelopidae* 1-4; *Vita Epaminondae* 10). Si sono notate uguaglianze e differenze nei particolari,¹ cercate le fonti di Plutarco, si è tentato di separare ciò che è realmente accaduto da ciò che è un prodotto della fantasia. Sull'altro versante si è illustrata la dottrina demonologica, il *daimon* socratico e i segni della divinazione e il *daimon* personale e gli aspetti miracolosi e mistici collegati con quella materia, su cui discutono, in casa di Simmia, lo scolaro di Socrate, i congiurati rimasti a Tebe, e naturalmente anche qui si sono indagate le fonti. Ma tutti questo elude il problema di fondo: il titolo, si afferma, non conviene e non se ne sa indicare un altro più appropriato, perchè si riconoscono nel dialogo tre o

¹ Si veda specialmente E. von Stern, *Gesch. der spart. und theban. Hegemonie vom Königsfrieden bis zum Schlacht bei Manintinea*, (Diss. Dorpat 1884) e *Xenophons Hellenika und die bööthische Geschichtsüberlieferung* (Dorpat 1887).

quattro argomenti, che procederebbero in ordine sparso. Non trovando una spiegazione, i critici hanno attenuato o annullato il valore di una delle due parti: qualcuno ha privilegiato la parte storica e ha definito il resto "une assez longue digression," che non mantiene le sue promesse, come del resto le due dissertazioni 8 e 9 Hobein (14 e 15 Dübner) di Massimo Tirio ugualmente sul tema demonologico.² Altri hanno privilegiato la parte filosofica dopo l'asserzione di R. Hirzel³ che Plutarco vorrebbe confutare l'antica ingiuria di μισολογία contro i Tebani, un'accusa ricordata nel c. 1 del dialogo. In particolare per W. Christ⁴ la parte storica farebbe solo da cornice e il resto rivelerebbe, attraverso il discorso demonologico, la potenza della divinità nel determinare il destino degli uomini, configurato da una parte nel successo dei congiurati, dall'altra nella sconfitta e punizione degli Spartani. Ma lo stesso Christ giudica non felice la combinazione delle due parti, la storica e la filosofica, e, per dar rilievo al difetto, ricorda come nel *Fedone* platonico, un dialogo che Plutarco avrebbe tenuto presente nel comporre il suo, la discussione sull'immortalità dell'anima è strettamente connessa con le ultime ore di Socrate.

In realtà, perché è stato scelto il tema demonologico, quando a illustrare l'eroica impresa del 379 sarebbe stato più adatto nella discussione un argomento come l'amor di patria? L'obiezione è valida anche contro la tesi, sostenuta specialmente da C. Kahle,⁵ di una difesa dei Tebani dall'accusa di μισολογία, ed è chiaro che non basta osservare che il *daimonion* socratico era un tema di attualità al tempo di Plutarco, come mostrano gli scritti di Apuleio e di Massimo Tirio. Non è più di una semplice dichiarazione quel che dice A. Corlu,⁶ che il titolo indicherebbe l'argomento di maggiore importanza, che il proemio giustificerebbe il quadro storico e la narrazione sarebbe solo un mezzo per ottenere un effetto estetico e alleviare lo spirito dei lettori con l'alternarsi dei discorsi filosofici e delle fasi del racconto.

Ma perché la parte narrativa è così ampia, molto più dell'altra? Proprio il proemio, che preannuncia discorsi e fatti intrecciati, costringe a riflettere e a cercare una connessione fra le due parti; altrimenti si rinuncia a intendere e non c'è da meravigliarsi che si sia giunti ad una conclusione come quella di Th. Eisele,⁷ il quale, discutendo dell'opinione del Christ, dichiarò senza mezzi termini che la dissonanza fra azione e discussione, fra realtà e misticismo è stata voluta dall'autore stesso per ottenere, con originalità, uno scopo estetico.

Bastano i brevi cenni che abbiamo dato per mostrare quanto grande sia il disorientamento della critica; la quale in ogni tempo sullo scritto di Plutarco

² B. Latzarus, *Les idées religieuses de Plutarque* (Paris 1920) 112.

³ *Der Dialog* (Leipzig 1895) vol. II, 167.

⁴ "Plutarchs Dialog von Daimonion des Sokrates," *Sitz.-ber. der philos.-philol. und der hist. Classe der Akad. der Wiss. zu München* (1901) 69-110.

⁵ *De Plutarchi ratione dialogorum componendorm*, (Diss. Göttingen 1912) 91-93.

⁶ Plutarque, *Le démon de Socrate* (Paris 1970) 89.

⁷ "Zur Dämonologie Plutarchs von Chäroneia," *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* 17 (1904) 30.

ha espresso giudizi negativi. L'ammirazione di Montaigne per il *De genio Socratis*⁸ riguarda la profondità e varietà dei pensieri, non la struttura; ma i Croiset⁹ hanno sentenziato: "une composition franchement mauvaise." E perché la cosa risaltasse di più si è fatto il confronto con *L'Eroticòs*, che è ugualmente un dialogo drammatico, in cui le fasi di un racconto e i discorsi filosofici sull'amore s'intrecciano con una convenienza e una misura tali che perfino R. Flacelière¹⁰ si è sentito costretto a riconoscere che l'uso del racconto nel *De genio Socratis* è "excessif et disproportionné." Anche K. Ziegler, che ha tradotto coi quattro dialoghi pitici il *De genio Socratis*¹¹ ed è l'autore del repertorio *Plutarchos* nella Real-Encyclopädie XVI 1 (1951), non ha trovato di meglio che riprendere, a danno di Plutarco, il confronto con il *Fedone* e giudicare esteriore il legame fra l'azione e la discussione demonologica, realizzato artificiosamente con l'introduzione del pitagorico Teanore, che sarebbe "un personaggio certamente inventato," e del mito di Timarco, e riaffermare la vecchia tesi che l'autore voleva sfatare il pregiudizio sui Beoti come μισόλογοι e fors'anche "mettere in luce il suo diretto legame con Atene e l'Accademia."¹²

Qualche tentativo di risolvere il problema dell'unità è stato fatto recentemente. D. A. Stoike¹³ vede una corrispondenza fra la libertà che i congiurati cercano di ottenere per Tebe e la libertà che è cercata dalle anime nel regno dei démoni: la lotta per la libertà vista come interazione fra eventi umani ed eventi cosmologici sarebbe l'idea centrale dell'opera. In questo modo l'impresa tebana sarebbe in funzione del pensiero filosofico. Ma in tutto lo scritto non s'incontra mai un accenno a quella connessione di idee e, a parte la lunghezza della narrazione in cui non poche cose sovrabbonderebbero, la figura preminente di Epaminonda, col suo deciso rifiuto di partecipare alla strage, non rientrerebbe bene nell'atmosfera di viva aspirazione alla libertà; infatti, se fosse stata seguita la sua condotta, la liberazione di Tebe non sarebbe avvenuta così rapidamente e brillantemente.¹⁴

⁸ *Essais* III 9, éd. par. A. Thibaudet (Paris 1950) 1115.

⁹ *Hist de la Littér. grecque*, t. V (Paris 1920) 495.

¹⁰ *Dialogue sur l'amour* (Paris 1952) 31.

¹¹ *Plutarch über Gott und Vorsehung, Dämonen und Weissagung. Religionsphilosophische Schriften* (Zürich 1952).

¹² *Plutarco*, trad. ital. (Brescia 1965) 245.

¹³ *De genio Socratis, Moralia* 575A–598F, in H. D. Betz, *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1975) 236–85.

¹⁴ L'interpretazione dello Stoike è stata giudicata favorevolmente da P. Desideri, "Il *De genio Socratis* di Plutarco. Un esempio di storiografia tragica," *Athenaeum* (1984) 569–85: sullo sfondo cosmologico la storia acquisterebbe un aspetto tragico come lotta tra virtù e *tyche* e sarebbe "un romanzo scritto dalla fortuna." Certamente per Plutarco negli eventi la fortuna ha molta importanza, ma egli non vuole narrare il trionfo della *tyche* sulla virtù, la quale è frutto della *phronesis*, e questa non dipende mai dalla *tyche* (cf. *De fortuna, An virtus doceri possit* ecc.).

Anche le tesi di M. Riley e di D. Babut¹⁵ non convincono, sebbene i due articoli, come quello dello Stoike, siano ricchi di osservazioni particolari degne di attenzione. Il primo, rifacendosi all'osservazione di G. Méautis¹⁶ che il "trattato unisce il πρακτικὸς βίος, nel racconto della liberazione di Tebe, col θεωρητικὸς βίος, nelle considerazioni sul genio di Socrate," ha tentato di mostrare che l'intento di Plutarco era di illustrare l'ideale dell'unione tra il pensiero e l'azione, tra la filosofia e l'impegno politico, spiegando come il *logos* operi quando gli individui in una data situazione fanno delle scelte e come queste possano essere guidate da potenze superiori come i démoni. Epaminonda sarebbe la figura che getta un ponte tra il filosofo e il cittadino, il simbolo della felice unione tra filosofia e politica. Ma nel dialogo non c'è il minimo accenno alla nota attività futura, politica e militare, di Epaminonda; quel che è detto alla fine sull'intervento del personaggio (34. 598 CD) non è sufficiente a farlo considerare un uomo di azione, perchè, nel confronto con Carone, con Pelopida e gli altri congiurati, egli appare "inerte e senza coraggio" (ἀμβλὺς καὶ ἀπρόθυμος), come lo giudica l'indovino Teocrito (3. 576E), e in nessuna parte c'è un richiamo all'ideale dell'unione di pensiero e azione o a qualche personaggio che la possa rappresentare.

Alla conclusione opposta è arrivato il Babut: notando che nel dialogo ci sono due categorie di persone dal comportamento contrastante, quelli passionali come Carone e quelli capaci di dominare le passioni come Epaminonda, che assomiglia a Socrate, il quale fu allontanato dalla politica dal suo *daimon*, il critico conclude che l'intento di Plutarco è di mostrare l'inconciliabilità della condotta dell'uomo d'azione e di quella dell'uomo di pensiero. A comprova viene addotta la *Vita di Pericle* (c. 16), dove, a proposito di Anassagora che per amore della filosofia lasciò andare in rovina il suo patrimonio, si nota che c'è una grande "differenza tra la vita del filosofo contemplativo e quella dell'uomo politico," perchè l'uno si applica alle cose nobili e belle senza sentire il bisogno di ciò che è materiale, l'altro si trova a contatto con i bisogni degli uomini e sperimenta che a volte la ricchezza è un bene necessario. Ma in quel passo, si può osservare, si fa una constatazione: non si afferma nessuna inconciliabilità, che del resto non è conforme al pensiero di Plutarco. La differenza fra le due condotte di vita è basata sulla differenza fra virtù noetica e virtù etica, ma ciò non esclude il filosofo dalla vita politica come partecipazione e incremento al bene comune. Quel che il Babut osserva (p. 73 s.), a sostegno della sua tesi, sulla distinzione appunto fra virtù noetica e virtù etica nel *De virtute morali*

¹⁵ M. Riley, "The Purpose and Unity of Plutarch's *De genio Socratis*," *Gr. Rom. Byz. St.* 18 (1977) 257-83; D. Babut, "Le dialogue de Plutarque Sur le démon de Socrate. Essai d'interprétation," *Bull. Assoc. G. Budé* (1984) 51-76. L'articolo di K. Döring, "Plutarch und das Daimonion des Sokrates," *Mnem.* 37 (1984) 376-92, riguarda il tema sui démoni e specialmente i cc. 20-24.

¹⁶ "Le mythe de Timarque," *Rev. d. Et. Anc.* 52 (1950) 201.

appartiene alla teoria, non si traduce in una inconciliabilità pratica: la *phronesis*, o saggezza pratica, attinge alla *sophia*, o sapienza teoretica; questa è del tutto immateriale e senza mescolanze (440D), l'altra invece si manifesta nell'azione, tra le passioni degli uomini e le vicende della fortuna, da cui può uscire vittoriosa perché non è soggetta alla fortuna e in luogo dell'instabilità e della confusione può instaurare l'ordine e la tranquillità. L'irrazionale può essere superato dal razionale, e questo anche nel campo politico, come si ricava chiaramente dagli scritti politici di Plutarco. Egli non si stanca mai di esaltare la potenza del *logos*, che non è scritto su tavole come le leggi positive, ma convive e coabita sempre in noi e non ci abbandona mai lasciandoci senza guida; per questo egli ama soffermarsi su coppie di personaggi come Platone e Dione, Panezio e Scipione l'Emiliano, a riprova dell'importanza e necessità dell'unione dell'azione e del pensiero.¹⁷ Il governante ben educato e assennato sente sempre dentro di sé la voce della ragione, come il re dei Persiani era avvertito ogni mattina, quando si alzava, da uno dei ciambellani: "Alzati, o re, e rifletti sulle cose sulle quali il grande Oromasde vuole che tu rifletta."¹⁸ Di qui nasce la necessità dell'educazione filosofica perché l'uomo politico senta vivo il dovere di servire la comunità per il bene pubblico anche nella vecchiaia, un argomento a cui è dedicato lo scritto *An seni res publica sit gerenda*: l'attività politica non consiste, come credono i più, nell'avere incarichi ufficiali, parlare alla tribuna e gridare nelle assemblee, come fare il filosofo non significa insegnare da una cattedra e scrivere libri, ma trasferire nelle azioni quotidiane i principi morali, come faceva Socrate; e il politico vecchio può ancora istruire, incoraggiare quelli che nutrono retti pensieri, dissuadere quelli che fanno del male.¹⁹

La figura di Socrate che viene fuori da questo trattato e da altri scritti non è quella di un uomo contemplativo che non trova una conciliazione fra l'azione e il pensiero: il *daimon* che egli ascolta concerne anche le vicende politiche. Se veramente nel *De genio Socratis* si illustrasse la separazione tra filosofia e politica e si volesse dimostrare che il filosofo, per la sua diretta comunicazione con la divinità, esce vincitore dal confronto, resterebbe offuscata la bella impresa compiuta dai Tebani, e questo non è ammissibile. Se poi si volesse esaltare solo l'impresa, resterebbe danneggiato il riflessivo Epaminonda: cosa anche questa inaccettabile per la grandissima ammirazione che Plutarco ha per quel grandissimo conterraneo. In breve, l'uno e l'altro aspetto sono degni di approvazione e ambedue cooperano all'esaltazione di Tebe, della sua storia e dei suoi personaggi, il che equivale a dire che azione e pensiero sono conciliabili.

Se si bada alla proporzione delle parti, viene spontanea l'idea di non considerare la narrazione storica, molto ampia, in funzione della parte

¹⁷ *Max. cum. princ. philos. esse diss.* 1. 776A-77A.

¹⁸ *Ad princ. ind.* 3. 780CD.

¹⁹ *An seni res p. sit ger.* 26. 796 ss.

filosofica, ma viceversa questa in funzione di quella, cosicché l'impresa, tanto celebrata perché portò alla liberazione di Tebe dalla tirannide e poi alla sua egemonia sulle città greche, riceve un chiarimento dalla dottrina demonologica. Si potrebbe subito pensare ad un'opposizione fra Tebani e Spartani, i primi come guidati dalla divinità perché amanti della giustizia, gli altri come oppressori, passionali e violenti, e vedere nello scritto una giustificazione dell'egemonia tebana, meritata e accordata dal volere divino. Molti particolari potrebbero trovare un significato sotto questa luce e soprattutto si otterrebbe una connessione fra il tema storico e quello filosofico. Ma questa è una semplificazione eccessiva e troppo schematica. Per la tirannide parteggiano anche dei Tebani, del partito oligarchico, Archia, Filippo, Leontiada, e anche fra i congiurati non mancano le persone passionali e violente. Non ci si può quindi accontentare di una schematica opposizione fra buoni, protetti dalla divinità, i Tebani, e cattivi, condannati dalla divinità, gli Spartani.

A mio parere, bisogna porre maggiore attenzione alla figura di Epaminonda: questa, se è ben intesa, può far capire quale è l'intento del dialogo, la sua struttura, la sua unità, il suo valore artistico. Epaminonda ha un grande rilievo sia in principio sia nella parte centrale sia nella chiusa. All'inizio (3. 576D-577A) è presentato un grave problema di coscienza del personaggio: egli rifiuta di partecipare all'uccisione dei concittadini, perché non vuole far morire nessun cittadino senza processo. Ciò è messo in rilievo da un personaggio rispettabile, l'indovino Teocrito, in opposizione alla condotta di Carone, il quale non ha esitato ad offrire la sua casa per ospitare gli esuli che stavano tornando da Atene per compiere l'impresa. Osserva Teocrito a Cafisia, fratello di Epaminonda: "Carone non è un filosofo né ha avuto un'educazione distinta ed eccezionale come Epaminonda, ma per natura, come vedi, è guidato dalle leggi verso ciò che è bello, addossandosi volontariamente il più grave rischio per il bene della patria. Epaminonda invece, che si considera superiore a tutti i Tebani per la sua educazione, è senza mordente e slancio (ἀμβλὺς καὶ ἀπρόθυμος: 3. 576DE)."

Queste parole suonano come un rimprovero o una severa condanna, tanto che Cafisia si sente costretto a difendere il fratello tacciando l'indovino di precipitazione nel giudicare, con una certa ironia per la ripresa di un vocabolo al superlativo in senso contrario: per Teocrito Epaminonda è ἀπρόθυμος, per Cafisia Teocrito è προθυμότερος, cioè eccede nell'ardore: "O impetuoso Teocrito, noi compiamo quello che è stato deciso; Epaminonda, senza riuscire a persuaderci del contrario, è naturale che resista alle nostre sollecitazioni e si rifiuti di fare ciò che è contro la sua natura e le sue convinzioni. Anche un medico che promette di guarire la malattia senza ricorrere al ferro e al fuoco, non saresti ragionevole a costringerlo a tagliare e bruciare. Egli non vuole, senza una grave necessità (ἄνευ μεγάλης ἀνάγκης), uccidere nessun concittadino senza processo (ἄκριτος), ma è

pronto a lottare con coraggio insieme a quelli che cercano di liberare la città senza spargimento di sangue e massacri di cittadini. E poiché non riesce a persuadere la maggioranza e noi ci siamo mossi per questa via, chiede solo di lasciarlo libero di cogliere, puro del sangue e senza responsabilità, il momento favorevole per contribuire anche al bene comune senza offendere la giustizia (μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι προσισόμενος). Pensa infatti che l'impresa non avrà un limite: forse Ferenico e Pelopida volgeranno le armi contro i più colpevoli e malvagi, ma Eumolpida e Samida, uomini di temperamento irascibile e focoso, profittando della notte, non deporranno le spade prima di aver riempito la città intera di stragi e d'aver ucciso molti nemici personali" (3. 576F-577A).

A nessuno deve sfuggire l'importanza di questa difesa di Epaminonda, ed è significativo che essa è ripetuta nell'ultima sezione dell'opera (25. 594B), dopo la discussione demonologica, quando sta per cominciare l'azione conclusiva. Teocrito, insieme a Cafisia e a Galassidoro, compie un ultimo tentativo per convincere Epaminonda, ma non sortisce un effetto migliore. La motivazione del rifiuto non cambia, ma è più chiara: accanto alla volontà di non uccidere senza processo nessun cittadino, si nota che è nell'interesse del partito democratico che qualcuno dei congiurati resti estraneo alle uccisioni e non sia accusato o sospettato di aver agito per qualche vantaggio personale e si possa così credere alla sincerità dei suoi consigli. Qui con la frase τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Θηβαίων si allude al partito democratico, a cui appartenevano i congiurati, e in generale c'è riferimento ai difficili rapporti futuri con il partito oligarchico che aveva appoggiato l'occupazione spartana nel 382.²⁰ La giustificazione appare ragionevole e tutti sanno che Epaminonda non era contrario all'impresa antitirannica: conosce esattamente il giorno in cui i fuorusciti tornano a Tebe e mantiene il segreto; ha già preso accordi con Gorgida e altri per intervenire nel momento opportuno (25. 594B). Ed è Epaminonda che, finita la dotta conversazione sui démoni, invita il fratello Cafisia a scendere con gli amici al ginnasio per raggiungere i compagni e dare inizio all'esecuzione finale del piano (25. 594A).

Nella *Vita di Pelopida* (c. 7) Plutarco informa che, come Pelopida ad Atene incitava e sosteneva moralmente i compagni esuli, così Epaminonda in patria istillava nei giovani nobili pensieri spingendoli a misurarsi nei ginnasi con gli Spartani e umiliandoli, quando riuscissero vincitori, col rinfacciare loro la vergogna di tollerare la schiavitù che opprimeva Tebe. E fu Epaminonda, si dice ancora in quella vita (c. 12), che, dopo l'uccisione dei polemarchi, presentò Pelopida e i suoi compagni nell'assemblea del popolo, salutati da tutti con grida ed applausi come benefattori e salvatori della patria. Non siamo dunque di fronte ad un filosofo contemplativo: Epaminonda è rimasto inerte solo *quoad cum civibus dimicatum est*, come

²⁰ Plut. V. *Pelop.* 5; Xen. *Hell.* V 2. 25 ss.

si legge in Cornelio Nepote (v. *Pel.* 4), non avendo voluto partecipare a nessuno dei due gruppi che si assunsero il compito di sopprimere i concittadini filospartani, l'uno guidato da Carone e Melone contro Archia e Filippo, l'altro da Pelopida e Damoclidia contro Leontiada e Ipata (30. 596D).

Anche in un altro punto si accenna al tentativo di persuadere Epaminonda: dopo l'episodio di Ippostenida che mette in grande agitazione i congiurati, Fillida si allontana a preparare l'inganno del banchetto, Carone se ne va a casa sua a ricevere gli esuli e Teocrito con Cafisia ritorna da Simmia per avere l'occasione di conferire ancora con Epaminonda (19. 588B). Il particolare prepara il colloquio riferito poi nel c. 25. Si tratta di un semplice cenno, nient'affatto necessario; ma è molto significativa tutta questa insistenza sul rifiuto di Epaminonda ed esige una spiegazione, perché intorno ad esso sembra che si aggiri tutto il resto, sia la discussione demonologica sia la distribuzione dei compiti nell'esecuzione finale dell'impresa (25. 594CD; 30. 596CD; 34. 598CD).

Daremo una risposta in seguito: per ora notiamo che l'avversione di Epaminonda alle lotte fratricide e in generale alla violenza si accorda con il senso dell'iscrizione sulla tavoletta trovata nella tomba di Alcmena ad Aliarto e interpretata da un dotto sacerdote egiziano (7. 578E-579D). Essa ordinava ai Greci di istituire degli agoni in onore delle Muse e di rinunciare alle guerre deponendo le armi e vivendo nella concordia e nella giustizia con l'aiuto della ragione e della *paideia*. L'ordine divino non fa parte della trattazione demonologica, che sarà discussa in seguito in casa di Simmia, ma è connesso ugualmente con presagi celesti, perché alla violazione della tomba di Alcmena da parte di Agesilao sono seguiti indizi sfavorevoli agli Spartani, che il capo della guarnigione nella Cadmea, Lisanorida, cerca di stormare, dopo che la carestia e l'inondazione del lago Copaide hanno colpito gli abitanti di Aliarto, consenzienti all'apertura del sepolcro. Di questo fatto non si hanno notizie da altre fonti: può far parte della speciale politica lacedemone che trasportava a Sparta le spoglie di eroi mitici per cercare di giustificare le pretese sui territori occupati e consolidare l'egemonia sulla Grecia;²¹ ma per noi è significativo il fatto che la fine delle guerre e delle discordie fra le città greche è presentata come una ingiunzione della divinità e che sulla cosa s'insiste con l'episodio della duplicazione dell'altare di Delo, che si risolveva in un invito a mitigare i costumi e attendere solo alla cultura e all'educazione (7. 579B-D).

Il motivo, che compare prima della trattazione demonologica e poco dopo il rifiuto di Epaminonda, col quale sicuramente è da mettere in relazione, è come una premessa che pare suggerire un'interpretazione dell'intera impresa tebana come una tendenza verso la pace, suprema aspirazione dell'attività umana, con la soppressione delle ingiustizie e della

²¹ Cf. G. L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London-Cambridge 1962) 67 ss.

violenza. Ciò sembra consonare con una spiegazione della storia politica della Grecia che circolava ancora ai tempi di Plutarco, quando, sotto la guida dei Romani, i Greci avevano trovato finalmente la pace. Secondo la tradizione storiografica del *Tricaranos*, attribuito a Teopompo, l'esperienza negativa delle tre egemonie, ateniese, spartana e tebana, aveva dimostrato che era impossibile instaurare una pace duratura in Grecia con la supremazia di una grande città e che bisognava trovare un'organizzazione politica e un'educazione morale che escludesse il particolarismo e mirasse ad una concezione più universale. In ciò consentiva Plutarco,²² il quale nel *De genio Socratis* raffigura Epaminonda contrario alla violenza, come colui che è fornito di una profonda educazione filosofica ed è guidato, come Socrate, da un'intima voce divina.

Epaminonda è di gran lunga il più virtuoso e questa sua superiorità morale è messa in luce nella parte centrale del dialogo, dopo che egli è comparso sulla scena, nei cc. 13-24. Ma, per dare rilievo alla cosa, il suo arrivo è stato preannunciato dal padre Polinnide, che è stato l'artefice di quella educazione: egli verrà insieme al filosofo pitagorico Teanore, suo ospite, che è giunto dall'Italia per riportare in patria la salma di Liside, il maestro pitagorico di Epaminonda, morto e sepolto a Tebe. L'operazione vien fatta in ottemperanza a certi segni divini ed è questo che dà origine alla discussione sulla demonologia, che naturalmente porta il discorso su Socrate. La lunga trattazione sulla ricchezza e il suo uso (cc. 13-15), che ha la forma di un *ἀγών* secondo le norme della retorica,²³ non è una digressione inopportuna, come è stata giudicata,²⁴ che voglia dar corpo e sostanza alla figura di Teanore e alla sua presenza, ma al contrario è la presenza del filosofo pitagorico che tende a esaltare la grandezza morale di Epaminonda, e nasce il sospetto che a questo scopo sia stato inventato tutto quello che concerne Teanore, e forse il personaggio stesso, e che sia stato abilmente inserito nella discussione demonologica, un argomento in cui il filosofo mostra di essere un'autorità,²⁵ per dare il tocco definitivo, col commento al mito di Timarco, alla personalità morale di Epaminonda (24. 593A-594A). Infatti questo è molto caro alla divinità ed è in comunione con essa non per mezzo di segni esterni, che sono propri dell'arte divinatoria e richiedono un'interpretazione, ma direttamente per mezzo di un *daimon* personale, privilegio concesso a pochissimi, come a Socrate.

Quando Epaminonda ha esposto le sue profonde ragioni per rifiutare la grossa somma di denaro offertagli da Teanore per le cure prestate a Liside, Simmia, preso da ammirazione, esclama: μέγας, μέγας ἀνὴρ ἐστίν

²² Si veda il mio studio "Plutarco e il corso futuro della storia," *Prometheus* 10 (1984) 264-86, in particolare 263 sul *Tricaranos*, 281 ss. sulla pace universale.

²³ Cf. C. Kahle, *De Plut. ratione dialog. compon.* (Diss. Göttingen 1912) 79; A. Corlu, *op. cit.* 44.

²⁴ Vedi per es. F. Bock, *Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Schrift Περὶ τοῦ Σ. δαίμ.* (Diss. München 1900) 18.

²⁵ Cf. A. Corlu, *op. cit.* 80 s.

Ἐπαμεινώνδας (16. 585D), e l'elogio si estende al padre Polinnide che ha educato così i suoi figlioli. La povertà di Epaminonda e della sua famiglia richiama alla mente quella di Socrate, già ricordata e lodata da Polinnide (11. 581 C) e certamente Simmia ha pensato al suo maestro associando a lui Epaminonda, e questo è nelle intenzioni di Plutarco. Infatti la somiglianza con Socrate culmina quando Epaminonda viene annoverato fra i pochissimi uomini che sono assistiti da un *daimon* personale: ciò riconosce lo stesso Teanore—e non ha dubbi perché il pilota si riconosce dal modo di navigare—, quando, dopo aver rinunciato, obbedendo ad una voce udita nella notte, a disseppellire il corpo di Liside perché la sua anima è già stata giudicata e rinviata ad un'altra esistenza, fissa gli occhi su Epaminonda come se volesse scoprire la costituzione fisica e l'aspetto di Liside.²⁶

Qui c'è la consacrazione, fatta da un pitagorico, di Epaminonda, educato da un pitagorico, fra gli uomini più perfetti, e il confronto con Socrate diventa stringente per il famoso *daimonion* del filosofo ateniese, su cui, dopo un intermezzo non breve relativo ai congiurati (cc. 17–19), viene portato il discorso degli interlocutori (cc. 20–24). Attraverso l'esame della natura e del modo di manifestarsi del *daimonion* socratico e del mito di Timarco si conclude che gli uomini sono guidati più o meno da démoni, a seconda di come sono mescolati con la materia: alcuni, del tutto immersi nel corpo, sono completamente in balia delle passioni (22. 591D); altri sono

²⁶ 16. 586A. Vorrei conservare ἀναθέμενος dei codici, corretto da Leonicus in ἀναθεώμενος che tutti gli editori hanno accolto, e leggere poi τὴν φύσιν (ἐκείνῳ καὶ) εἶδος (il καὶ è stato aggiunto da Victorius). Con ἐκείνῳ si riprende ἐκείνου τάνδρος di qualche riga prima, con riferimento a Liside, un'espressione tipica del pitagorismo per indicare un maestro defunto; ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς “di nuovo” è in rapporto con l'affermazione precedente che Epaminonda aveva il medesimo démone di Liside (χρῆτο ταύτῳ δαίμονι). Insomma si vuol dire che Teanore, visti gli effetti del demone di Liside, spontaneamente è portato a ravvisare in Epaminonda la fisionomia di quello (ἀνατίθ. τί τι “attribuire, trasferire qualcosa a qualcuno”). Dal passo si ricava, pare, che l'anima di Liside, staccata dal corpo con la morte, dopo il giudizio (κεκριμένη), è stata sottoposta ad un'altra incarnazione ed è stata unita ad un altro démone, mentre quello che aveva in precedenza era passato a dirigere Epaminonda. Dunque ad ogni incarnazione tocca in sorte un demone nuovo (ἄλλῳ δαίμονι συλλαχοῦσαν: cf. Max. Tyr. 8. 8f Hob. εἰληχεν). Ciò sembra naturale, perché le esistenze sono diverse e non è opportuno pensare ad un'assistenza contemporanea a due esistenze da parte di un medesimo démone. Anche il singolare τὸ δαιμόνιον in 24. 593F non porta a concludere che il démone segue la medesima anima sino alla fine del ciclo delle incarnazioni: esso è usato in senso generico, con allusione ai vari démoni. Alla fine di quel capitolo s'illustra la fase prossima alla conclusione del ciclo delle innumerevoli nascite (593F τῆς περιόδου συμπεραينوμένης), quando un'anima, dopo aver lottato bene, si avvicina al porto: allora il démone (quello a cui era toccato l'assistenza in quel periodo) si fa più zelante ed esorta con energia l'anima a salvarsi. Ma questi sono punti particolari della demonologia, nella quale non tutto è chiaro. Al nostro fine conta questo: la condotta di vita di Epaminonda è paragonata a quella d'un sant'uomo come era il filosofo Liside, suo maestro, e quindi degno della massima credibilità, poiché la divinità gli ha assegnato il medesimo démone. Per il fondo pitagorico della parte demonologica, oltre G. Soury, *op. cit.* 131 ss., si può vedere A. Corlu, *op. cit.* 52 s., 59 ss.; J. Ilani, introd. nell'edizione del *De genio Socratis* (Belles Lettres 1980) 52 ss.; tenta di fare delle precisazioni K. Döring, *art. cit.* in n. 15. 390 s.

mescolati parzialmente alla carne e il loro *démone* può esercitare una qualche guida, non continua ma oscillante (22. 591E–592A); infine altri, muovendosi in linea retta, obbediscono sempre docilmente al loro *démone* fin dalla nascita. Questi sono gli uomini indovini e ispirati (22. 592C); ma gli dei, mentre di solito manifestano la loro volontà attraverso sogni e prodigi, che sono l'oggetto della divinazione e hanno bisogno di essere interpretati, talvolta comunicano direttamente con alcuni, molto pochi, che dagli esseri superiori sono scelti fra noi come in un gregge il pastore segna e cura i capi migliori, e li fanno degni di un'educazione particolare ed eccezionale (24. 593B). Quei pochissimi uomini prescelti sono detti "divini e beati al massimo."²⁷ In questo modo Epaminonda, la cui educazione è definita "superiore e straordinaria," è raffigurato come un altro Socrate,²⁸ il "Socrate tebano" accanto al "Socrate ateniese." Per questo, mentre gli altri congiurati mostrano incertezze nell'interpretare i segni celesti che loro capitano (si veda in particolare l'episodio di Ippostenida: cc. 17–19) e ondeggiano fra speranze e paure, Epaminonda vede chiaramente le cose e si comporta senza dubbi e tentennamenti.²⁹ Dunque anche la lunga discussione demonologica è strettamente collegata con Epaminonda e si può comprendere il titolo del dialogo *De genio Socratis*: è un accostamento onorifico del tebano al grande filosofo ateniese e suona come se fosse più chiaramente *De genio Socratis atque Epaminondae* oppure *De Genio alterius Socratis*.

Ma la definizione di "Socrate tebano" che rapporto ha con il tema della congiura? A chiarimento, si potrebbe fare un'altra domanda: come si sarebbe comportato Socrate nella circostanza di Epaminonda? È molto importante al nostro fine un passo dell'*Apologia di Socrate* (31C–32C) in cui Platone ci fa vedere come Socrate prestava ascolto al suo *démone*. Plutarco certamente l'aveva presente per giustificare la condotta di Epaminonda nell'impresa del 379. Può sembrare strano, dice Socrate in quel luogo, che io mi preoccupi tanto di dare consigli in privato e non vada alla tribuna a parlare al popolo. Non è perché mi manchi il coraggio; come vi ho detto più volte, e ne ha parlato anche Meleto nell'accusa, c'è dentro di me una voce divina, che si fa sentire fin dalla mia fanciullezza e mi dissuade dal fare azioni che sto per compiere: è questa voce che mi vieta di occuparmi di cose politiche. E mi pare che faccia bene a vietarmelo, perché, se non avessi obbedito, sarei già morto da tempo e non avrei fatto le cose utili che ho fatto, perché avrei cercato d'impedire che si commettessero nella città

²⁷ 24. 593D θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων κοσμοῦσι βίον, οὓς ἂν ἄκρως μακαρίους τε καὶ θείους ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι βουλευθῶσιν. Sulla corrispondenza di espressioni che sottolineano il carattere straordinario si veda Babut, *art. cit.* 57.

²⁸ La cosa è stata notata da tempo: cf. C. Kahle, *op. cit.* 85 e 93; anche D. Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, 344 ss.

²⁹ Su questo comportamento contrastante insiste il Babut, *art. cit.* 64 ss.; ma non si deve dimenticare che tali contrasti appartengono al carattere drammatico e Plutarco v'indulge anche per motivi artistici.

cose ingiuste. Una volta che era membro del Consiglio dei Cinquecento—ed è l'unica carica di cui abbia fatto parte nella nostra città—, mi opposi con voto contrario, unico dei pritani, alla condanna dei generali accusati di non aver raccolto i naufraghi e i morti dopo la battaglia delle Arginuse, una condanna illegale come in seguito riconosceste anche tutti voi. E un'altra volta sotto i Trenta oligarchi mi rifiutai di andare a Salamina per condurre Leonte ad Atene e metterlo a morte, e lasciai andare gli altri quattro che avevano ricevuto l'incarico con me. Come vedete, non c'è mancanza di coraggio nella mia condotta né paura della morte, ma ferma decisione di difendere sempre e dovunque la giustizia.

Molto simili sono i sentimenti di Epaminonda quando rifiuta di partecipare all'uccisione degli oligarchi filospartani: non rifiuta per paura di morire, ma per timore che siano uccisi anche cittadini innocenti; era il suo *daimon* che lo dissuadeva. Come il divieto demonico a Socrate di svolgere attività politica si limitava all'aspetto ufficiale implicante cariche pubbliche, non nel senso di non occuparsi in assoluto di politica, perché la sua predicazione morale era in sostanza un'azione politica, di critica a quella ufficiale, così il divieto del *daimon* di Epaminonda era circoscritto; tant'è vero che, riconquistata la libertà, egli fu al servizio della sua patria politicamente e militarmente e morì sul campo di battaglia, sempre intento a non offendere i suoi principi filosofici. Senza ricordare le imprese posteriori, Plutarco ha voluto giustificare la condotta del personaggio in quella particolare circostanza e l'ha attribuita ad un consiglio del *daimon* che lo guidava, cioè ad una voce celeste, e poteva spiegare in quel modo anche il ritardo, notato in *De lat. viv.* 4. 1129C, della sua partecipazione alla vita politica dopo i 40 anni. Evidente dunque ed efficace è il confronto con il *daimonion* socratico, che dà il titolo all'opera.

Dall'esame che abbiamo fatto risulta che Epaminonda è la figura centrale del *De genio Socratis*. In rapporto a lui il dialogo può essere diviso in tre parti: 1. 575B–12. 582C; 13. 582D–24. 594A; 25. 594A–34. 598F. Nella prima parte è presentato il problema di coscienza che trattiene Epaminonda dal partecipare alla strage, anche se egli condivide l'ideale di libertà; nella seconda parte è data la giustificazione di quel comportamento, fondata non sul piano pratico, ma religioso e morale con il richiamo a Socrate; nella terza parte è illustrata la partecipazione di Epaminonda all'insurrezione dopo che sono stati uccisi i polemarchi; e con la visione del popolo che, eccitato da lui, insorge e tumultua brandendo le armi, mentre gli Spartani corrono a chiudersi nella cittadella, da dove poco dopo si ritireranno lasciando libera la città, l'opera si conclude.

Questa raffigurazione di Epaminonda, non lo possiamo negare, ci sorprende, perché in quell'impresa egli non occupa, nella tradizione storiografica, una posizione di rilievo. In Senofonte³⁰ egli non è neppure

³⁰ *Hell.* V 4. 1–12.

menzionato; fra i pochi personaggi ricordati spicca Fillida come orditore della trama. Nella *Vita di Pelopida* dello stesso Plutarco il primo posto è tenuto da Pelopida, che solitamente viene menzionato per indicare la schiera dei congiurati e fra gli esuli è il principale sostenitore degli animi (c. 7). Di Epaminonda si dice che, quando Pelopida, Ferenico e non pochi altri furono cacciati in esilio, "fu lasciato in pace perché non lo si credeva importante, giudicandolo un innocuo studioso di filosofia e senza potere per la sua povertà." È un modo per dire che egli non fu tra i protagonisti della congiura. Sul problema di coscienza e l'astensione dalle uccisioni, il motivo fondamentale del *De genio Socratis*, non c'è parola; invece è ricordata la sua attività dopo l'uccisione dei polemarchi, nel sollevare il popolo e chiamarlo a raccolta in quella notte e nel presentare, sul far del giorno, all'assemblea Pelopida e i compagni fra grida ed applausi.³¹ La giustificazione del rifiuto di Epaminonda si trova nella *Vita di Epaminonda* di Cornelio Nepote e costituisce un elemento significativo nel problema delle fonti; ma anche là è Pelopida che figura come capo degli esuli tornati in patria e quindi dell'impresa;³² Epaminonda, *quamdiu facta est caedes civium, domo se tenuit*, perché *omnem civilem victoriam funestam putabat*; poi, *postquam apud Cadmeam cum Lacedaemoniis pugnari coeptum est, in primis stetit*. Le medesime cose sono ripetute da Cornelio nella *Vita di Pelopida*, nella quale quell'impresa occupa quasi tutta la breve biografia e l'astensione di Epaminonda è notata per far risaltare il merito maggiore di Pelopida: *itaque haec liberatarum Thebarum propria laus est Pelopidae, ceterae fere communes cum Epaminonda* (c. 4).

Non è qui opportuno affrontare il problema delle fonti storiche,³³ ma nasce il sospetto, e si rafforza esaminando i particolari, che nella tradizione ci siano stati degli ampliamenti a favore di Epaminonda, il cui comportamento in quell'occasione non poteva non suscitare qualche sorpresa, perché la sua gloria restasse intatta e anche il primato nella famosa coppia tradizionale Epaminonda-Pelopida, nella quale Pelopida *fuit altera persona Thebis, sed tamen secunda ita ut proxima esset Epaminondae*.³⁴ Così sembra voler colmare un vuoto la notizia che Epaminonda a Tebe, come Pelopida ad Atene, spronava i giovani a liberarsi dalla vergogna della

³¹ Gli storici nel ruolo di Pelopida avvertono delle esagerazioni: gli è attribuita falsamente la prima beotarchia dopo la liberazione (Plut. v. *Pelop.* 13): cf. S. Fuscagni, "La beotarchia di Pelopida e il numero dei beotarchi dopo la presa della Cadmea," *Rend. Ist. Lomb.* 106 (1972) 415 ss., e "Callistene di Olinto e La Vita di Pelopida di Plutarco," in *Storiografia e propaganda*. Contributi dell'Ist. di Storia antica dell'Univ. Cattolica di Milano 1975, vol. III, 44 ss. Resta però il fatto che il merito principale di quell'impresa è attribuito da Plutarco a Pelopida, non ad Epaminonda, e la condotta di quest'ultimo in quella circostanza suscita una sorpresa, che richiede appunto una spiegazione.

³² V. *Epam.* 10 *duce Pelopida*.

³³ Si veda in proposito la lucida esposizione del Corlu, *op. cit.* 22-39.

³⁴ Nep. V. *Pelop.* 4. 3.

schiavitù.³⁵ La giustificazione di voler evitare l'uccisione di cittadini innocenti trovava un saldo fondamento, e perciò facile credito, nella profonda educazione filosofica del personaggio. Contribuisce a darle rilievo l'episodio di Cabirico (31. 597BC). Nella sala del banchetto in cui sono uccisi Archia e Filippo, c'è anche un magistrato con funzioni religiose, Cabirico, un personaggio che non è ricordato in nessuna altra fonte. Si cerca di risparmiarlo, "essendo sacro e consacrato per il bene della patria": abbandoni i tiranni e cooperi alla liberazione della città. Poiché, pieno di vino, non era in grado di ragionare e si mise ad agitare la lancia che gli arconti usavano portare sempre con sé, Cafisia, afferrata quell'arma, gridava all'uomo di lasciarla e di salvarsi, altrimenti sarebbe stato ucciso. Ma Teopompo, un congiurato meno riflessivo, colpisce Cabirico con la spada gridando: "Giaci qui morto con quelli che adulavi; in Tebe libera non porterai più la corona e non sacrificherai più agli dei, nel cui nome lanciasti molte imprecazioni contro la patria pregando spesso per i suoi nemici." Caduto Cabirico, Teocrito, che era lì vicino, ha l'avvertenza di sottrarre la sacra lancia dalla contaminazione del sangue. Furono uccisi anche alcuni pochi servi che avevano osato opporre resistenza, ma gli altri che stavano fermi furono rinchiusi nella sala del banchetto, per timore che si spargessero per la città ad annunziare prima del tempo quel che era accaduto.

Questo episodio, raccontato con molti particolari, vuol togliere ogni aspetto odioso d'inutile violenza e sembra inventato³⁶ o almeno ampliato da Plutarco. L'uccisione di Cabirico e dei pochi servi è un esempio di quella μεγάλη ἀνάγκη di cui parla Epaminonda giustificando il suo rifiuto col timore che certe persone violente profittassero dell'occasione e uccidessero per interessi personali. In realtà gli eccessi non mancarono. A parte le donne che calpestarono e coprirono di sputi il cadavere del carceriere, ucciso da Fillida quando furono liberati i prigionieri politici (33. 598B), un comportamento femminile verso il nemico ucciso che è deplorato già in Platone,³⁷ Senofonte³⁸ ricorda che, quando gli Spartani uscirono dalla cittadella dietro la garanzia di aver salva la vita, quelli che furono riconosciuti come nemici personali, malgrado le libagioni e i giuramenti, furono presi e uccisi; alcuni furono sottratti e salvati dagli Ateniesi, che erano venuti dai confini in aiuto ai Tebani, ma si arrivò anche al punto di prendere e sgozzare i figli degli uccisi. La tradizione storiografica tebana e filotebana, come suole accadere, passò sotto silenzio le azioni vergognose e cercò di tramandare le cose onorevoli, come il profondo senso di giustizia del grande Epaminonda.

³⁵ Plut. *V. Pelop.* 7.

³⁶ Vedi anche Babut, *art. cit.* 56.

³⁷ *Resp.* 469D.

³⁸ *Hell.* V 4. 12.

Anche a questo, com'è noto, non mancarono gli avversari politici, come Meneclide menzionato da Cornelio Nepote,³⁹ e sono noti i processi che il generale dovette subire per abuso di potere.⁴⁰ Plutarco, che non si stanca mai di esaltare il grande compatriota, nel *De genio Socratis* ha concentrato la sua attenzione su una circostanza della vita in cui gli avversari potevano trovare motivi di biasimo e ha voluto liberarlo da ogni accusa o macchia di viltà o di tepidezza, in una gloriosa impresa che brillava solo di luce, e cercò di dare un fondamento religioso e filosofico alla sua condotta, presentandolo come guidato dalla divinità. E si noti come sia rilevata anche una saggezza politica non comune: dopo la cacciata degli Spartani, era necessario per il bene di tutti trovare una conciliazione con il partito oligarchico, che si era compromesso con la tirannide. Questa lungimiranza contemperava la difesa sia della giustizia sia degli interessi generali della città⁴¹ e fa pensare all'attività posteriore del grande Epaminonda che costruì sulla sconfitta di Sparta l'egemonia di Tebe.

In una lettera di Platone,⁴² a proposito dell'opposizione di Dione a Dionisio di Siracusa, si trova il consiglio che il saggio non usi la violenza per rovesciare il governo costituito, se bisogna ricorrere a uccisioni, proscrizioni ed esili; Plutarco all'autorità del grande filosofo ha sostituito una voce divina, comunicata ad uno degli uomini migliori e più vicini agli dei e degni di essere paragonati a Socrate. È questa una difesa su un piano superiore all'umano, che intende troncare ogni velleità di replica e levare definitivamente ogni ombra.

Tutta l'impresa della liberazione della Cadmea, che fu compiuta da pochi uomini e nella quale, come dice Plutarco,⁴³ "Pelopida senza abbattere rocche o mura, entrando in una casa qualsiasi con soli undici suoi amici, sciolse e spezzò, per usare una metafora che esprime bene la verità, le catene del predominio spartano, credute indissolubili e infrangibili", fu per tempo considerata come favorita dagli dei. Proprio sotto questa luce la espone Senofonte, il quale premette questa osservazione che richiama il pensiero di Erodoto:⁴⁴ "Si potrebbero in generale addurre altri esempi fra i Greci e i barbari a prova che gli dei non si dimenticano di coloro che violano le leggi divine ed umane, ma dirò solo quel che segue. Gli Spartani, che, dopo aver giurato di lasciare l'autonomia alle città, s'impadronirono dell'acropoli di Tebe, ricevettero la punizione ad opera di quelli stessi di cui avevano violato

³⁹ V. *Epam.* 5. Un aneddoto dentro il quadro di questa inimicizia è ricordato anche da Plutarco in *De laude ipsius* 9. 542B; vedi anche *Praec. ger. rei* p. 10. 805C e specialmente V. *Pelop* 25. 5 ss.

⁴⁰ *Nep. V. Epam.* 7-8; *Diod.* XV 72. 1-2; *Paus.* IX 14. 5-7 e i recenti articoli di J. Buckler, "Plutarch on the Trials of Pelopidas and Epaminondas (369 a.C)," *Class. Philol.* 73. (1978) 36-42, e *The Theban Hegemony* (Cambridge Mass. 1980) 138-45.

⁴¹ Cf. 3. 577A μετά τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενος.

⁴² *Ep.* VII 331D.

⁴³ V. *Pelop.* 13.

⁴⁴ *Hell.* V 4. 1.

i diritti, essi che non erano mai stati vinti da nessuno; e per abbattere il governo di coloro che avevano appoggiato l'operazione allo scopo di dominare personalmente, bastarono sette dei cittadini mandati in esilio." In questa atmosfera religiosa, del tutto consona allo spirito di Plutarco, è stata immersa anche la figura di Epaminonda, illuminato da una saggezza superiore, che pochissimi uomini hanno avuto in dono dalla divinità.

Ora siamo in grado di rispondere alla domanda, posta in precedenza (p. 416), perché Epaminonda sia il personaggio centrale del *De genio Socratis*: verso di lui, per somiglianze o per contrasti, converge ogni cosa. L'accusa di ἀμβλύτης e di mancanza di προθυμία che l'indovino Teocrito gli rivolge all'inizio (3. 576E), in contrasto con la generosità e prontezza di Carone, nonostante la differenza di educazione, apparteneva verisimilmente alla tradizione e non è escluso che vi si accennasse nella lacuna non breve segnata nei codici in quel luogo (60 lettere in E, 56 in B), per esempio in questo modo: Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ Βοιωτῶν ἀπάντων τῷ πεπαιδευθῆναι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξίων διαφέρειν ἀμβλύς ἐστι καὶ ἀπρόθυμος, (τοῦτο δὲ λέξουσιν, οὐδὲ βοηθεῖ τοῖς νῦν κινδυνεύουσιν, ὥς ὕστερον, μετὰ) τοῦτον ἢ τινα (λαβὼν ἢ οὐδένα) βελτίονα καιρόν, αὐτῷ πεφυκότι καὶ παρασκευασμένῳ καλῶς οὕτω χρῆσόμενος. "Epaminonda, che si considera superiore a tutti i Tebani per l'educazione alla virtù, è inerte e senza volontà—questo diranno un giorno—e non reca aiuto a quelli che ora corrono pericolo, come se volesse in seguito, senza poter cogliere dopo questa quasi nessuna altra occasione migliore, mettere a profitto le sue belle qualità naturali e acquisite con l'educazione."⁴⁵

La difesa e l'esaltazione sono fatte su un piano superiore, diverso da quello solito davanti ai tribunali degli uomini: Epaminonda è un uomo eccezionale, fa parte dei pochissimi ἄκρως μακάριοι τε καὶ θεῖοι ἄνδρες (24. 593D), come sono detti dal filosofo pitagorico che nel nome *Theanor* rivela la sapienza divina, e biasimare la sua condotta è da persone superficiali e irreligiose. A ragione si lamenta la perdita della *Vita di Epaminonda* per vari motivi; fra l'altro ci avrebbe aiutato non poco a comprendere, credo, il *De genio Socratis*. Anche le *Vite* offrono non poco materiale per riflessioni sui rapporti fra i personaggi e i démoni, tanto che possono essere considerate una demonologia in atto o un'interpretazione filosofica e religiosa della storia.⁴⁶

Le ragioni del rifiuto addotte da Epaminonda hanno convinto non solo Cafisia e l'indovino Teocrito (3. 576F), ma anche gli altri congiurati o almeno la maggior parte (25. 594C). Naturalmente non pochi lettori non

⁴⁵ Le parole τοῦτο e τοῦτον potevano trovarsi all'inizio o alla fine di due righe consecutive e l'occhio potè trascorrere per errore da una riga all'altra; così l'aplografia fra τινα e οὐδένα potrebbe essere stata causata dall'identità della sillaba finale. Per ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς, frase idiomatica per dire "quasi nessuno", "per non dire nessuno", cf. Xen. Cyr. VII 5. 45 ecc.

⁴⁶ Per la demonologia nelle *Vite* vedi specialmente F. H. Brenk, *In Mist Appelled. Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (Leiden 1977) 106–12.

sono stati né saranno soddisfatti, perché non credono che l'idealismo morale possa conciliarsi con l'attività politica. Ma il nostro compito è di comprendere Plutarco, senza lasciarci deviare da problemi non pertinenti. Costoro hanno un predecessore in Filippo il Macedone, che da ragazzo visse come ostaggio a Tebe e "se potè sembrare che volesse imitare Epaminonda, forse capì le ragioni delle sue capacità militari, ma non ebbe niente di comune con lui per le doti morali, quelle che fecero l'altro veramente grande e che Filippo non ebbe né per natura né per educazione."⁴⁷ Ma Plutarco non giudicò Filippo degno di una sua biografia.

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⁴⁷ V. *Pelop.* 26.

Plutarco, Socrate e l'Esopo di Delfi

MARIA JAGODA LUZZATTO

Plutarco parla spesso di Esopo¹ inquadrandolo in un ben preciso contesto storico-culturale e descrivendo con grande sensibilità filologica il tipo di *sophia* rappresentato dall'antico favolista. Questo approccio plutarco merita a mio parere uno studio approfondito non solo perché lo studioso di Cheronea, come è riconosciuto ormai universalmente è, in ogni caso, una ricchissima miniera di dati, ma anche e soprattutto perché, come è successo in questi ultimi decenni, gli studi sulla favolistica esopica hanno paradossalmente sepolto Esopo come personaggio storico. Il redattore dell'esteso articolo sul favolista nella *Realencyclopädie* dice senza mezzi termini che "der legendäre Aisopos" deve essere inteso solo come "Verkörperung einer praktischen Lebensweisheit" e che, per quel che ne riguarda la personalità, bisogna ritenere assodato che, nonostante le numerose attestazioni antiche, Esopo appartiene in realtà al mondo del mito.² Anche chi, come B. E. Perry³ o M. Nøjgaard,⁴ crede senz'altro all'esistenza di un Esopo storico nel VI secolo a.C., si limita a fare una constatazione che rimane però improduttiva in una ricerca che ha per oggetto solo le tarde raccolte esopiche dal primo secolo d.C. in poi (Fedro, Babrio, la *Collectio Augustana*, ecc.) oppure altrettanto tardi prodotti come il cosiddetto *Romanzo di Esopo*.⁵ Ma la consistenza storica dell'antico favolista è stata, mi sembra, messa in ombra soprattutto da coloro che, dall'eterogeneo materiale esopico di età imperiale, impregno di motivi del

¹ Cfr. W. C. Helmbold - E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (Oxford 1959), Philol. Monogr. XIX, p. 2.

² S. Josifović s.v. *Aisopos* in *RE Suppl.* XIV (1974), col. 21, 19 sgg. Risente di questa tendenza M. L. West, "The Ascription of Fables to Aesop in Archaic and Classical Greece," *Entretiens Hardt* 30 (1984), pp. 116 sgg., in particolare p. 128.

³ *Babrius and Phaedrus* (London-Cambridge Mass. 1965), Introd. p. XXXV.

⁴ *La fable antique*, I (København 1964) 456 sgg.

⁵ Editto da B. E. Perry nelle sue due principali recensioni, *G e W*, in *Aesopica* I (Urbana Ill. 1952) 35-77 e 81-107.

tardo cinismo,⁶ hanno estrapolato, con evidenti forzature filologiche, gli elementi portanti di quella che sarebbe una 'ideologia' esopica: si negano o si ignorano le più antiche e fedeli testimonianze e si cerca di cogliere il significato della *sophia* esopica tra le amare meditazioni autobiografiche dei prologhi di Fedro,⁷ o tra le pagine del tardo romanzo più ricche di motivi cinici.⁸ Così uno dei più importanti studiosi di favolistica greca, Otto Crusius, scriveva che "die Geschichte der Fabel in Europa beginnt mit dem Aufsteigen der niederen Volksschichten, der Bauern und Halbbürtigen . . ."⁹ ed in recenti studi si afferma che Esopo fu per gli antichi "il tipo dello schiavo, del proletario, del plebeo"¹⁰ e che la favola esopica costituisce un passo decisivo "nell'elaborazione di una cultura laica popolare."¹¹ Il leggendario Esopo ha per scopo di impersonare la condizione degli strati sociali più umili e l'antica favola esopica è addirittura vista come "geeignete Lektüre für die breitesten Volksmassen."¹² A questo punto una domanda: nella selva di questi apriorismi ideologici, può aiutarci l'Esopo di Plutarco? Gli studiosi di favolistica esopica lo hanno praticamente ignorato ed i brevi accenni di coloro che si sono occupati del problema servono poco dal nostro punto di vista perché appaiono chiaramente condizionati in partenza dagli stessi luoghi comuni su Esopo cui ho fatto appena riferimento. Così per il Wilamowitz l'Esopo che nel *Convivium septem sapientium* discute con Solone, Biante e gli altri *sophoi* è un personaggio leggendario, "der Schalk dessen Mutterwitz über die Schulweisheit triumphiert."¹³ e questo nonostante che Plutarco dia chiaramente alla personalità di Esopo lo stesso spessore storico che dà agli altri personaggi politici protagonisti del dialogo e nonostante che Esopo nel *Convivium* manifesti di possedere, come vedremo, non meno cultura greca degli altri invitati. L'opinione del Wilamowitz è stata ripresa tale e quale da August Hausrath nell'importante articolo *Fabel* sulla *RE*.¹⁴ J. Defradas, nell'introduzione alla sua edizione del

⁶ Cfr. G. Thiele, "Phaedrus-Studien" *Hermes* 41 (1906) 562 sgg. Vedi in particolare le pp. 586-88 per l'accostamento Esopo/Diogene in due scrittori della prima età imperiale, Fedro e Dione di Prusa (quest'ultimo contemporaneo di Plutarco).

⁷ Cfr. in particolare Phaedr. *Prol.* III 33-37 (ed. Guaglian.), un passo nel quale il tardo favolista latino vede personificata in Esopo la *servitus obnoxia* che diceva attraverso le favole ciò che non osava dire apertamente. Cfr. in proposito il mio *Fedro, un poeta tra favola e realtà* (Torino 1976) 7-8 e 20 sgg.

⁸ Sugli elementi cinici del *Romanzo di Esopo*, cfr. l'importante articolo di A. La Penna, "Il romanzo di Esopo," *Athenaeum* n. s. 40 (1962) 305 sgg.

⁹ Cfr. l'Introd. a C. H. Kleukens, *Das Buch der Fabeln* (Leipzig 1913), p. IX.

¹⁰ Così A. La Penna in "La morale della favola esopica come morale delle classi subalterne nell'antichità," *Società* 17 (1961) 528.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 465.

¹² Così S. Josifović nell'art. in *RE*, cit., col. 22, 1 sgg.

¹³ In "Zu Plutarchs Gastmahl der Sieben Weisen," *Hermes* 25 (1890) 198 (= *Kl. Schrift.* III [Berlin 1969], p. 119).

¹⁴ Cfr. *RE* 6. 1 (1909), col. 1709, 60 sgg.

Convivium plutarcheo¹⁵ trova una grande somiglianza tra l'operetta di Plutarco che chiama (seguendo il Wilamowitz) 'il Romanzo dei sette sapienti' ed il tardo *Romanzo di Esopo*. In particolare, trova che l'Esopo del *Convivium* presenti le stesse caratteristiche dell'Esopo del *Romanzo*: di fronte a personaggi come Solone o Biante, "en face de ces aristocrates il fait figure du rustre, de révolutionnaire, il est du côté des masses populaires . . ."¹⁶ e ancora "à l'aristocratie des Sept Sages qui consacrent au dieu de Delphes leurs maximes de sagesse, s'oppose son esprit populaire et frondeur . . ."¹⁷ Ma Plutarco, come vedremo, non ha detto niente di simile ed il suo interesse per Esopo non aveva nessuna motivazione romanzesca o novellistica.

In effetti, e questo è, a mio parere, il nodo del problema, gli studiosi non sembrano essersi accorti del fatto che Plutarco parla di Esopo con grande serietà e lo ricorda in particolare (il fatto non mi sembra sia stato notato) in testi connessi con Delfi, con la religiosità del santuario e con la antica morale di ispirazione delfica. E' ben noto quanto lo scrittore di Cheronea fosse legato all'entourage delfico: egli fu anche a più riprese sacerdote del dio¹⁸ ed indagatore appassionato, soprattutto nella tarda maturità e nella vecchiaia, dei dati storici, religiosi e culturali riguardanti il prestigioso santuario. Il suo interesse per la personalità dell'Esopo storico era dettato non solo dal desiderio di ricostruire attraverso le fonti più sicure i contorni precisi della *sophia* di un famoso personaggio del sesto secolo a. C., ma anche e soprattutto dal fatto che, secondo una ben documentata e compatta tradizione storica, Esopo proprio a Delfi era stato protagonista di una tragica vicenda.

Come attestano concordemente autorevoli fonti antiche, Erodoto, Aristofane, Aristotele,¹⁹ Esopo fu messo ingiustamente a morte dai cittadini di Delfi sotto la falsa accusa di ἱεροσυλία. Ne seguì una lunga vicenda giuridico-finanziaria, conclusasi appena pochi decenni prima della nascita di Erodoto.²⁰ La cronaca di Eusebio ed il cosiddetto *Chronicon Romanum* (che pure, per altre date del VI° secolo, discorda dalla cronografia apollodorea ed eusebiana) danno concordemente, per la morte di Esopo, la data del 563

¹⁵ Cfr. *Le Banquet des Sept Sages* (Paris 1954) 23-26 (ristampato con lievi modifiche in *Plutarque, Oeuvres morales* II [Paris 1985] 184-86).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁸ Sui rapporti di Plutarco con Delfi vedi l'esauriente trattazione di K. Ziegler s. v. *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* in *RE* 21. 1 (1951), coll. 659-62.

¹⁹ Hdt. II 134; Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1446 e *schol. vet. ad loc.*; Arist. *fr.* 487 Rose (dalla Δελφῶν πολιτεία); cfr. i *Testimonia vet. de Aesopo* a cura di B. E. Perry, *Aesopica* I., cit., *test.* 13, 20, 21 (*test.* 27 è da Zenob. *vulg.* che ha soppresso la citazione da Arist. presente nel passo originale di Zenobio pubblicato da M. E. Miller in *Mél. de Littér. Grecque* [Paris 1868], 369 = II 106).

²⁰ Cfr. J. Sarkady, "Aisopos der Samier. Ein Beitrag zur archaischen Geschichte Samos," *Acta Class. Univ. Scient. Debrecen.* 4 (1968), p. 8.

a. C.²¹ Con questa datazione si concilia benissimo la notizia che Diogene Laerzio deriva dal biografo peripatetico Ermippo, secondo la quale Αἰσωπος ὁ λογοποιὸς ἤκμαζε intorno alla 52^a Olimpiade, quindi tra il 572 ed il 569 a. C.²² La notorietà del compositore di *logoi*,²³ il grande prestigio religioso e politico di cui godeva Delfi nella prima metà del VI° secolo ed il lungo strascico giudiziario che ebbe la vicenda sono tre elementi che spiegano bene perché la data della morte di Esopo fosse registrata nelle cronografie e perché Aristotele, in uno scritto dal taglio storico-politico come la *Δελφῶν πολιτεία*, inserisse il tragico scontro tra Esopo ed i cittadini di Delfi fra le vicende significative riguardanti quella *polis*. Stando a quanto ci dice un breve *bios* esopico restituitoci da un papiro del II° secolo d. C.²⁴, a ricordo ed ammenda di quella clamorosa morte i Delfi costruirono, ai piedi della rupe dalla quale Esopo era stato gettato, un piccolo memoriale con un βωμός presso il quale Esopo, considerato ἥρωας, ricevette, non sappiamo fino a quando, l'omaggio ufficiale del più prestigioso santuario greco: un dato sul quale non abbiamo motivo di dubitare se si considerano ben documentate usanze proprio di quell'epoca.²⁵

Che la vicenda delfica di Esopo fosse da Plutarco considerata un fatto storico sul quale non c'era da dubitare è dimostrato da due fra i più significativi passi che egli dedica all'antico favolista. Nel *De Pythiae oraculis*, un dialogo che R. Flacelière, su basi molto convincenti, data agli ultimi anni di vita di Plutarco,²⁶ la guida mostra ai visitatori di Delfi il

²¹ Precisamente Euseb.—Hier. *ol.* 54. 1, p. 102b Helm (anno 564–63); *Chron. Rom.* in FGrHist II n. 252, 30 (anno 563–62), cfr. F. Jacoby, *comm. ad loc.* (II 2, p. 829, 23 sgg.). Cfr. B. E. Perry, *Aesopica*, cit., *test.* 9–10. Anche Suid. s. v. *Aisopos* riporta la stessa data: ἐν γὰρ Δελφοῖς ἀδίκως ἀπολέσθαι . . . κατὰ τὴν νδ' Ὀλυμπιάδα.

²² Cfr. A. La Penna, "Il romanzo di Esopo," art. cit., pp. 281–82 (dove nota giustamente che "della cronologia di Esopo si è avuta sempre una coscienza abbastanza chiara").

²³ Cfr. il fr. 611, 33 Rose (= Heracl. Lemb. 33 Dilts) derivato dal compendio che Eraclide Lembo fece del *De re publica Samiorum* di Aristotele: Αἰσωπος δὲ ὁ λογοποιὸς εὐδοκίμει τότε, con riferimento sincronico alla morte a Samo del mitografo Ferecide di Siro (cfr. il fr. 611, 32 Rose = 32 Dilts) che, sempre secondo fonte aristotelica (cfr. Arist. *fr.* 75 Rose) fu contemporaneo di Talete e degli altri *sophoi*, cfr. Kurt v. Fritz, s. v. *Pherekydes* n. 4 in *RE* 19. 2 (1938), col. 2026, 21–41. Si veda anche D. S. IX 28 (*excerpt.*): ὅτι Αἰσωπος κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους συνήκμαζε τοῖς ἐπτά σοφοῖς.

²⁴ Si tratta del *POxy.* XV 1800: il fr. 1 contiene le vite di Saffo e Simonide, i *fr.* 2–3 (consecutivi) contengono le vite di Esopo, Tucidide, Demostene, Eschine. E' significativo che il *bios* di Esopo sia posto fra *bioi* di prosatori ed ancor più significativo dal nostro punto di vista che la vita del *logopoios* sia collocata fra *bioi* di personaggi storici. Il *POxy.* dà grande spazio all'episodio delfico (30 righe della col. II del fr. 2) confermando la fama e del favolista e della sua morte. Cfr. A. Lamedica, "Il *POxy.* 1800 e le forme della biografia greca," *SIFC* ser. III 3 (1985) 57–58.

²⁵ Cfr. ad es. il *temenos* dedicato dai cittadini di Priene ad un famoso contemporaneo di Esopo, Biante: D. L. I 88 (il monumento è spesso menzionato in iscrizioni prienesi: cfr. *Inscriptiones aus Priene*, hrsg. von F. F. Hiller v. Gaertringen (Berlin 1906), nn. 111, 245; 113, 88; 117, 34; cfr. n. 424, 37 e nota *ad loc.*). Anche un altro dei *sophoi* coevi di Esopo, Chilone, fu onorato con un *heroon* a Sparta, dopo la sua morte (Paus. III 16, 4).

²⁶ Cfr. "Plutarque et la Pythie," *REG* 56 (1943) 73.

luogo nel quale erano collocati in tempi antichi gli obelischi di ferro dedicati dalla ricchissima e famosa cortigiana Rodopi. Ad uno dei visitatori, il giovane Diogeniano, Plutarco, sacerdote del dio di Delfi, fa pronunciare un severo rimprovero per gli antichi abitanti di quel luogo sacro (cfr. 400E): la *polis* (il termine è significativo) che concesse ad una cortigiana il terreno dove sistemare le cospicue decime dei suoi illeciti guadagni, è davvero la stessa *polis* che ha messo ingiustamente a morte Esopo.²⁷ Parole dure che sono allo stesso tempo condanna dei bassi interessi della *polis* di Delfi e difesa di Esopo e della sacralità del luogo.

Nel *De sera numinis vindicta*, dialogo ambientato a Delfi e scritto, come il *De Pythiae oraculis*, negli anni della vecchiaia,²⁸ Plutarco sviluppa la sua meditazione moralistico-religiosa sulla tragica sorte di Esopo e ritiene che la grave punizione che il dio inflisse ai Delfi, e la pesante ammenda che essi dovettero pagare dopo ben tre generazioni, siano da annoverare fra i fatti storici che dimostrano che esiste ed è giusta una *sera numinis vindicta* nei riguardi di una collettività di cittadini che abbiano gravemente peccato. Questa è in sostanza la risposta che Plutarco stesso dà nel dialogo al fratello Timone che poco prima aveva narrato dettagliatamente l'episodio delfico (cfr. 556F sgg.) proprio al fine di dimostrare il contrario, cioè l'ingiustizia di una punizione che colpisca i figli ed i figli dei figli per le colpe dei padri. Fra i vari episodi citati da Timone, Plutarco sceglie proprio la vicenda di Esopo per sostenere la sua tesi: la trasmissione della pena attraverso il tempo da una generazione all'altra può essere paragonata alla trasmissione di un grave contagio attraverso lo spazio, anzi "desta più ammirazione il fatto che di un male nato in Etiopia sia morto ad Atene Pericle, che non il fatto che, essendo stati malvagi i cittadini di Delfi . . . , la giustizia si sia compiuta sui loro figli" (558F). Con la medesima consapevole severità Plutarco fornisce al suo interlocutore una seconda ragione: la responsabilità collettiva di una *polis* si perpetua attraverso i secoli ed ogni generazione, così come ha diritto di vantarsi delle glorie dei padri, allo stesso modo deve subire il contraccolpo dei loro errori collettivi (559A-C). E' lecito supporre che le opinioni personalmente sostenute da Plutarco in questo dialogo riflettano tradizionali tratti della morale e della religiosità delfica ufficiale. Non va dimenticato inoltre che Plutarco, come sacerdote e membro del consiglio anfizionico, avrà potuto consultare direttamente antiche fonti delfiche: certo è che, per

²⁷ Per la connessione Rodopi-Esopo fonte storica era Hdt. II 34 (si noti, per inciso, che Erodoto usava la connessione con Esopo proprio per fornire un elemento preciso al fine di datare Rodopi, cfr. la giusta osservazione di Ém. Chambry nella "Notice sur Ésope" premessa ad *Ésope, Fables*, Paris 1927, p. IX): un'altra utile testimonianza per dimostrare come già per Erodoto la datazione di Esopo era un dato storico preciso sul quale basare sincronismi.

²⁸ Cfr. R. Flacelière, art. cit., p. 109 n. 1 e Y. Vernière in *Plutarque, Oeuvres morales*, VII, (Paris 1974) 94-96 (secondo la quale il *De sera* va collocato "très tard dans la carrière de Plutarque, juste avant le *De Pythiae* or quelques années avant sa mort." Plutarco partecipa al dialogo come decano del gruppo, sacerdote del dio, membro del consiglio anfizionico, epimelete e personalità di grande prestigio (cfr. Y. Vernière, *ibid.*, p. 99).

vicende lontane nel tempo, riguardanti la storia politico-religiosa di Delfi nella prima metà del sesto secolo a. C., Plutarco, almeno in un caso, ha fatto esplicito ricorso proprio agli *hypomnemata* ufficiali del santuario.²⁹ Per questi motivi assume per noi particolare importanza la già menzionata narrazione dello scontro tra Esopo e gli abitanti di Delfi in 556F sgg. Da una attenta lettura del passo si ricavano le seguenti informazioni:

I) Esopo venne a Delfi inviato ufficiale di Creso di Lidia. La stessa notizia è data da Plutarco in *Sept. sap.* 150A, un passo da cui risulta che Esopo, sempre su mandato di Creso, prima di recarsi a Delfi si fermò a Corinto, alla corte del tiranno Periandro. Il *Convivium* di Plutarco ha appunto come cornice storica la presenza di Esopo e di altri *sophoi* a Corinto in una data che non può che essere vicinissima a quella storicamente ben attestata della morte di Esopo a Delfi, il 563 a. C. (v. sopra). La riunione dei *sophoi* presso Periandro è anche ricordata in *Sol* 4, 1. Secondo un'altra informazione fornita da Plutarco in *Sept. sap.* 155B, Esopo e Solone prima di incontrarsi a Corinto si erano già visti alla corte di Creso: quanto prima non è specificato. L'incontro di Solone ed Esopo alla corte di Creso è menzionato da Plutarco anche in *Sol* 28, 1 subito dopo la famosa descrizione dell'incontro fra Solone e Creso (derivata da Hdt. I 30-33): una notizia, quest'ultima, ritenuta generalmente leggendaria per il fatto che, secondo lo schema cronologico vulgato, i viaggi di Solone sarebbero avvenuti subito dopo il 594-92 circa e Creso invece sarebbe diventato re appena nel 561-60.³⁰ Inoltre, se Esopo è stato ucciso a Delfi nel 563 e Creso è divenuto re al più presto nel 561 anche la storicità dell'ambasceria di Esopo per conto del sovrano orientale viene fortemente incrinata. D'altra parte il severo contesto del *De sera numinis vindicta* nel quale è inserita la notizia sull'ambasceria del *sophos* dimostra, come abbiamo visto, che Plutarco considerava l'episodio tutt'altro che leggendario. Inoltre le considerazioni metodologiche che lo stesso Plutarco premette alla narrazione dell'incontro fra Solone e Creso in *Sol* 27, 1 dimostrano che anche quell'episodio era da lui considerato storico: egli infatti rileva che gli ἔνιοι che rifiutano la storicità dell'incontro si basano per il loro rifiuto su tavole cronologiche (χρονικὰὶ κανόνες) che per quell'epoca così antica non hanno raggiunto alcun assestamento sicuro ed univoco. Si fa un torto allo spirito critico di Plutarco dicendo che "il sait et il dit que la chronologie s'oppose à la possibilité de cette rencontre:"³¹ egli anzi dice proprio che nel caso delle date riguardanti Solone e Creso non c'è una cronologia ma ci sono cronologie in contrasto fra di loro; sono solo ἔνιοι che rifiutano la storicità

²⁹ Cfr. *Sol.* 11, 2 e R. Flacelière in *Plutarque, Vies II*, (Paris 1961) 4.

³⁰ Cfr. ad es. W. W. How-J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1928) I 67. Tipiche le parole di K. Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon* (Cardiff 1926), 18: "Chronology ... must be obeyed: the interview between Solon and Croesus never actually occurred."

³¹ Così R. Flacelière in *Plutarque, Vies*, cit., 4.

dell'episodio e solo alcuni χρονικοί κανόνες che danno loro ragione. Stando così le cose, Plutarco ritiene di non avere ragioni sufficienti per considerare leggendario un episodio testimoniato da molte fonti autorevoli (τοσοῦτους μάρτυρας ἔχοντα) e perfettamente rispondente a criteri interni di analisi della personalità soloniana. Quanto criticamente fondata fosse l'obiezione di Plutarco alla validità assoluta delle tavole cronologiche per il sesto secolo lo dimostrano alcuni recenti studi storici che tendono a rivalutare la testimonianza erodotea rispetto alla cronologia vulgata di origine ellenistica. Così ad es. A. R. Burn notava a proposito di Erodoto che, per quel che riguarda le date del sesto secolo, la datazione erodotea è senz'altro preferibile a quella degli storici posteriori e sosteneva che "the majority of the dates earlier than the period of the Persian wars, which pass current in our Greek history text-books, are wrong."³² In particolare una meticolosa operazione di scavo nella cronologia erodotea per il sesto secolo ha dato alcuni risultati di grande interesse: risulta così che, stando ad Erodoto, Creso fu re non dal 561 al 547 circa (cronologia vulgata) bensì dal 571 al 557 circa³³ e che i viaggi di Solone in Egitto, a Cipro ed a Sardi si svolsero non poco dopo il 594-92 ma in una data che sta fra il 569 ed il 560.³⁴ La storiografia recente quindi giudica che nessuna ragione cronologica scientificamente valida si opponga all'incontro Solone-Creso³⁵ e, possiamo aggiungere noi, questa cornice cronologica erodotea rende perfettamente plausibile storicamente anche il fatto che Esopo fosse inviato dal re Creso a Corinto ed a Delfi nel 563 circa. Non è improbabile che per questi episodi riguardanti Esopo, Solone e Creso Plutarco avesse a disposizione precise registrazioni degli *hypomnemata* delfici (v. sopra): non si può far a meno di notare, infatti, che sia l'incontro di Solone e Creso,³⁶ sia l'ambasceria di Esopo sono eventi strettamente legati alla storia politica ed alla morale

³² A. R. Burn, "Dates in Early Greek History," *JHS* 55 (1935) 140.

³³ Cfr. F. Mitchel, *An Investigation of the Chronological Systems used by Herodotus*, diss. (Yale 1954), 280, e Sophocles S. Markianos, "The Chronology of the Herodotean Solon," *Historia* 23 (1974) 13. Non sarà inutile ricordare a questo punto che nel *Chronicon Romanum* che, come abbiamo detto più sopra, dà per la morte di Esopo a Delfi la data del 563, l'inizio del regno di Creso è posto in una data notevolmente precedente il 563, di quanto non sappiamo perchè l'iscrizione proprio in quel punto è mutila. Comunque questo *Chronicon*, redatto nel 16 d.C., dimostra che la polemica di Plutarco contro la cronografia apollodorea (in *Sol.* 27, 1, su menzionato: cfr. anche F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* II 2, n. 252, p. 829) aveva un ben preciso appoggio oltre che in autorevolissimi μάρτυρες (v. sopra) anche in χρονικοί κανόνες alternativi (cfr. S. S. Markianos, art. cit., 15).

³⁴ Così S. S. Markianos, art. cit., 17.

³⁵ Cfr. S. S. Markianos, *ibid.*, pp. 9-10. Vedi anche A. R. Burn, art. cit., 142. Possibilista, ma su basi diverse, T.F.R.G. Braun in *CAH*² III 3 (1982) 54, con cui cfr. C. Talamo, *La Lidia arcaica* (Bologna 1979) 143 sgg.: va ricordato inoltre che, secondo Erodoto (I 25), Aliatte padre di Creso regnò per 57 anni, il che implica sicuramente tutta una lunga fase di transizione durante la quale Creso, il figlio maggiore, aveva già funzioni regali (e soprattutto, è facile supporre, in politica estera, dati i suoi stretti legami culturali con il mondo greco).

³⁶ Cfr. O. Regenbogen, "Die Geschichte von Solon und Krösus," in *Herodot.*, ed. W. Marg, (Darmstadt 1965) 384-85.

delfica e che gli stretti e frequenti rapporti di Creso con Delfi, attestati dal punto di vista sia storico che archeologico,³⁷ avevano certo una posizione di rilievo nella storia del santuario nel VI° secolo e quindi anche negli *hypomnemata* riguardanti quell'epoca.

Rimane da vedere se con questa collocazione cronologica dell'ambasceria di Esopo per conto di Creso nel 563 circa possa conciliarsi l'altra notizia, quella riguardante la missione di Esopo presso Periandro di Corinto (v. sopra). Anche in questo caso ci troviamo davanti a due cronologie totalmente inconciliabili fra di loro: da una parte la cronologia vulgata di Periandro che fa perno sulla data del 585, anno in cui, secondo lo storico ellenistico Sosicrate, sarebbe avvenuta la morte del tiranno (D. L. I 95); dall'altra parte la datazione ricavabile dai vari passi di Erodoto in cui è menzionato Periandro (soprattutto Hdt. V 94–95 e III 48), secondo la quale il tiranno, pur molto vecchio, era ancora politicamente attivo nel 561 o poco dopo, quando Pisistrato già governava Atene. Ritengo che É. Will abbia ben dimostrato quanto “le témoignage d'Hérodote, le plus ancien, le plus cohérent, le plus développé aussi dans sa brièveté” sia preferibile a quello della storiografia ellenistica.³⁸ Inoltre una lettura non preconcepita di Hdt. III 48 e del corrispondente passo del *De Herodoti malignitate* di Plutarco,³⁹ ha

³⁷ Cfr. J. Defradas, *Les thèmes de la propagande delphique* (Paris 1972²) 215 sgg. e H. W. Parke, “Croesus and Delphi,” *GRBS* 25. 3 (1984) 209 sgg.

³⁸ Cfr. É. Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris 1955) 382-91 e 438-40. Cfr. in particolare p. 389. Difensore della cronologia bassa erodotea fu K. J. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* I 2 (Strassburg 1913) 276-82. Difende Erodoto anche A. R. Burn, art. cit., p. 141. J. B. Salmon nella sua pregevole monografia *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford 1984) si fonda sulla cronologia alta semplicemente perchè “generally accepted” (p. 186 n. 1): cfr. le giuste obiezioni di L. Moretti nella recensione su *Athenaeum* n. s. 64 (1986) 251.

³⁹ L'articolo di J. Servais, “Herodote et la chronologie des Cypselides,” *AC* 38 (1969) 28–81 dimostra paradossalmente proprio con la sua lunghezza quanto sia costoso accettare Sosicrate contro Erodoto, soprattutto quando per sostenere la cronologia alta si deve operare un pesantissimo intervento testuale (cfr. pp. 77–78; ad es. assurdo appare il confronto con Hdt. V 56 nella n. 92 a p. 69) su un passo di Erodoto (III 48, 1) tramandato compattamente da tutta la tradizione manoscritta (cfr. l'ottima ediz. di H. Rosén, *Herodotus, Historiae*, I [Lipsiae 1987] 284). Il testo trádito di Hdt. III 48 in effetti non contraddice Plu. *De Herodoti malignit.* 22 perchè Plu. usa γεγεά non nell'accezione convenzionale della storiografia ionica antica (= un terzo di secolo, cfr. Hdt. II 142, 2 ed il comm. di W. W. How–J. Wells, *op cit.* I p. 440), bensì nell'accezione generica per indicare il fatto che non i nonni, non i loro figli, ma i figli dei loro figli agirono contro i Sami e definire quindi un lasso di tempo che può essere non superiore ad una cinquantina di anni circa: che questa sia l'interpretazione da dare al passo plutarcheo è dimostrato dal confronto (sfuggito, mi sembra, agli studiosi) fra Hdt. II 134 e Plu. *De sera namin. vind.* 557A (τρίτη . . . γεγεά). Il fatto che Hdt. I 70 collochi la vicenda del cratere sotto Creso ed in III 48 collochi questa stessa vicenda approssimativamente (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον) nello stesso periodo in cui Periandro inviò i fanciulli ad Aliatte, indica che queste due vicende si sono svolte, secondo Erodoto, negli anni di transizione tra Aliatte e Creso: ad es. nel 573/2 era ancora re Aliatte, nel 571 era già re Creso (v. sopra). Questa delimitazione del χρόνος in Hdt. I 70 e III 48 è confermata da III 47 in cui è detto che un anno prima di rapire il cratere i Sami avevano rapito la corazzata che Amasi di Egitto aveva inviato agli spartani: e Amasi era re, secondo Erodoto, dal 574–70 circa (cfr. i dati in S. S. Markianos, art. cit., p. 6 n. 23). Plutarco quindi dice che i nipoti nel 525 circa (data sicura, cfr. Servais p. 62) vendicarono

il vantaggio di rispettare la compattezza della tradizione manoscritta erodotea in quel luogo, di far concordare Erodoto con sè stesso e con Plutarco e anche di far concordare Plutarco con sè stesso dato che nel *Convivium septem sapientium* egli considera appunto Periandro ancora attivo nel 563 (data che si ricava, come abbiamo visto, dalla presenza di Esopo che poco dopo morirà a Delfi). Del resto si può senz'altro pensare che anche per la cronologia dei Cipselidi Plutarco avesse a disposizione una fondamentale documentazione delfica dato che Cipselo, il fondatore della dinastia, ebbe strettissimi rapporti politico-religiosi col santuario: l'oracolo sostenne ai suoi albori la sua tirannide illuminata chiamandolo βασιλεύς⁴⁰ e Plutarco, proprio alla fine del *Convivium* e nel *De Pythiae oraculis* (399F) si sofferma sul significato della famosa palma di bronzo dedicata da Cipselo a Delfi⁴¹ a memoria del suo legame col dio.

In conclusione si può affermare che il contesto in cui Plutarco colloca la figura di Esopo nel *De sera numinis vindicta* e nel *Convivium* ha tutti i caratteri della storicità, risale a fonti fra le più antiche a lui disponibili (Erodoto e gli *hypomnemata* delfici) e comunque preellenistiche e dimostra quanto arbitrario sia fare un qualsiasi paragone fra lo spirito di queste testimonianze storico-biografiche plutarchee e lo spirito del *bios* esopico quale risulta dal tardo *Romanzo* (v. sopra, ad es. Defradas): basti pensare che nel romanzo non c'è nessuna menzione di figure quali Solone o gli altri famosi uomini politici e *sophoi* contemporanei di Esopo (Biante, Pittaco, ecc.), il re Cresò non è contemporaneo di Ahmose II (Amasi) ma di Nectanebo, contemporaneo di Alessandro Magno ed ha un ruolo essenziale un re Lykòros di Babilonia mai esistito. In Plutarco invece abbiamo scarsissime notizie storiche, solo quelle che l'erudito di Cheronea poteva su buone ed antiche basi considerare sicure e sono, non a caso, come si è visto, notizie connesse con la presenza di Esopo nella Grecia continentale, tra Corinto e Delfi e con le gravi conseguenze della sua ingiusta morte.

l'offesa subita dai nonni alla fine del regno di Aliatte. Erodoto invece con γενεῇ πρότερον segnala solo genericamente che l'offesa era stata fatta (γεγόμενον) alla generazione che era adulta e matura più di un terzo di secolo prima della spedizione e la data più precisa la dà con il sincronismo che segue (κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον . . .) col quale rimanda, come si è detto, alla fine del regno di Aliatte (egli non accetta, evidentemente, la versione dei fatti data dagli accusati stessi, i Sami, che, come è detto in I 70, datavano la vicenda ai tempi della caduta di Sardi, per Hdt. il 557 circa, vedi sopra). Cfr. invece la lunga discussione di Servais, pp. 62-79 (le ragioni grammaticali e sintattiche non convincono: γενεῇ è infatti ben altro che un dativo di tempo, cfr. Rosén, nota *ad loc.* e τοῦ κρ. τῇ ἀπρ. non può essere espunto perchè perfettamente erodoteo, cfr. Hdt. III 47, 1 p. 284, 3 Rosén).

⁴⁰ Cfr. Hdt. V 92 e 2 e N.G.L. Hammond in *CAH*² III 3 (1982) 345; S. I. Oost, "Cypselus the Bacchiad," *CPh* 67(1972) 21 sgg.; J. B. Salmon, *op. cit.*, 219.

⁴¹ Cfr. W. Déonna, "L'ex-voto de Kypsélos à Delphes: le symbolisme du palmier et des grenouilles," *Rev. Hist. Rel.* 140 (1951) 52-53 che nota quanto la simbologia politica dell'ex-voto del tiranno illuminato sia vicina allo spirito di una delle favole di più sicura origine esopica.

Proprio la scarsità di questi dati, peraltro storicamente precisi e dettagliati, dimostra che anche davanti ad Esopo e agli altri *sophoi* Plutarco si pone con quella stessa tipica attitudine di biografo ed erudito che, in casi più fortunati, nei quali le fonti erano molto più generose, come per il *bios* di Solone, costituisce a tutt'oggi il più valido aiuto per ricostruire le tipologie della *sophia* morale e politica della Grecia preclassica.⁴²

II) Nel passo del *De sera numinis vindicta* citato sopra, Plutarco afferma esplicitamente che Esopo giunse a Delfi come inviato di Creso e con un duplice incarico, uno religioso,⁴³ nei riguardi del santuario e del dio, l'altro politico-diplomatico nei riguardi dei cittadini di Delfi. Plutarco sottolinea che Esopo realizzò la parte religiosa della sua missione, rendendo al dio l'omaggio dovuto, non realizzò invece la transazione politico-diplomatica: infatti a seguito di un violento dissidio con i cittadini, l'inviato di Creso rimandò indietro tutti i cospicui donativi a Sardi con la motivazione che coloro ai quali erano destinati si erano rivelati del tutto indegni di riceverli.⁴⁴ Dalla somma di questi scarni dati si può dedurre che Plutarco riteneva notizie storicamente fondate: a) che Esopo nell'ultima fase della sua vita fu politicamente legato al *basileus* lidio⁴⁵ ed intrattene per suo conto rapporti ad alto livello con realtà politico-religiose della Grecia centrale (Corinto e Delfi); b) che il *sophos* orientale fu condannato a morte in seguito ad uno scontro con una collettività di cittadini (*polis*, come dice Plutarco stesso nella sua risposta a Timone, v. sopra) e che nessun ruolo specifico ebbero i sacerdoti o il santuario. Conviene osservare inoltre che il dissidio fra Esopo e la *polis* di Delfi suppone, come del resto è confermato

⁴² Cfr. ad es. Plu. *Sol.* 3, 6-8 e M. L. Paladini, "La tradizione dei Sette Savi e la Vita di Solone," *REG* 69 (1956) 397-98; A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London 1974) 198 sgg.

⁴³ Questo preciso scopo è confermato anche da *Sept. Sap.* 150A.

⁴⁴ Plutarco purtroppo non ci dice niente sulle cause del dissidio perchè la narrazione di Timone ha tutt'altro scopo. Tuttavia, stando alle notizie fornite dall'importante *POxy.* 1800 (v. sopra), Esopo avrebbe accusato apertamente i cittadini di essere nient'altro che parassiti che vivevano alle spalle dei devoti che si recavano al santuario. Questa stessa versione dei fatti è sottintesa anche dall'arcaizzante ed erudito Giambo I di Callimaco (*Call. Ia.* I 26-27) come spiega lo scolio *ad loc.* restituitoci da un papiro del II° sec. d.C., *PSI IX* 1094 (cfr. *schol. ad fr.* 191, 26 Pf., p. 165). Un altro aspetto del dissidio tra Esopo ed i cittadini di Delfi si coglie nel Giambo II di Callimaco (*fr.* 192, 14 Pf.) dove si dice che Αἴσωπος ὁ Σαρδιηνός (cioè proveniente da Sardi) raccontò ai Delfi una favola (che essi non ascoltarono con piacere) secondo la quale gli uomini πολύμυθοι καὶ λάλοι hanno ereditato la loquacità dagli asini, dai cani e dagli altri animali.

⁴⁵ Cfr. anche Plu. *Sol.* 28, 1 dove si dice che Creso fece chiamare Esopo a Sardi evidentemente perchè era venuto a conoscenza della sua fama di *sophos*. La differenza di attitudine fra l'orientale Esopo e l'attico Solone nei riguardi della monarchia lidia è ben rivelata dall'aneddoto, probabilmente storico, narrato in *Sol.* 28, 1. Una tarda eco della fonte antica cui attingeva Plutarco si ha nell'*excerptum* da Diodoro Siculo (D. S. IX 28): cfr. B. Snell, *Leben und Meinungen der Sieben Weisen* (München 1952) 91 che stranamente dà la precedenza a D.S. (che la fonte fosse in questo caso Eforo non è dimostrabile).

dalla testimonianza di Callimaco (v. sopra), che Esopo avesse parlato davanti ai cittadini svolgendo una *demegoria*.

E' facile vedere quanto poco questi scarni ma precisi dati si concilino con "l'esprit populaire et frondeur" che J. Defradas intravedeva nell'Esopo di Plutarco o con la "cultura laica e popolare" di cui parlano molti studiosi di favolistica esopica o ancora con il supposto Esopo "antiapollineo" che intravedono coloro che hanno preso in considerazione solo il tardo *Romanzo* ed anzi una sola fra le due redazioni, quella di G, che è più ricca di interpolazioni tardoantiche.⁴⁶

III) Plutarco è ben a conoscenza della tradizione storica tramandata da Hdt. II 134 secondo la quale Esopo fu schiavo a Samo: lo dicono sia Diogeniano sia Timone nei due passi su citati del *De Pythiae oraculis* (400E) e del *De sera numinis vindicta* (557A); in quest'ultimo è ricordato Idmon (o Iadmon) "nipote di coloro che avevano comprato Esopo a Samo." Due frammenti della *Costituzione dei Sami* di Aristotele, uno tramandatoci dal compendio di Eraclide Lembo,⁴⁷ l'altro da uno scolio ad Aristofane,⁴⁸ confermano la storicità della schiavitù di Esopo a Samo e aggiungono due importanti notizie: che egli fu liberato da Idmon e che divenne famoso raccontando pubblicamente ai Sami un *logos*. Come ha ben notato il Sarkady,⁴⁹ il fatto che Aristotele parlasse di Esopo in un trattato storico-politico indica già di per sè stesso che il favolista dopo che fu liberato ebbe un qualche ruolo pubblico e politico nella vita di Samo. Ed in effetti in un famoso passo della retorica di Aristotele, in cui si parla dell'impiego politico del *logos* di animali (*Rhet.* II 20, 1393^b, 22 sgg.), Esopo δημηγορῶν ἐν Σάμῳ narra una favola squisitamente politica, quella della volpe e della zecche, e paragona un demagogo⁵⁰ ricco ad una zecca grossa e ben pasciuta:

⁴⁶ Significativa soprattutto la trattazione dell'argomento data da B. E. Perry nell'Introd. a *Babrius and Phaedrus*, cit., pp. XL sgg. (cfr. in particolare la n. 1 a p. XLI). Lo studioso accetta l'assurda tesi di A. Wiechers, *Aesop in Delphi* (Meisenheim am Glan 1961) il quale a sua volta basa le sue deduzioni solo sulla recensione G del *Romanzo di Esopo*. A. La Penna nell'articolo su *Athenaeum* del 1962, su cit., rifiuta giustamente (p. 277, n. 33) la tesi del Wiechers ma parla poi (p. 278) di "anticlericalismo esopico" e di "satira contro i preti parassiti in cui già allora si esprimeva la protesta di ceti umili . . ." Il passo del *De sera numinis vind.* di Plutarco non è commentato, a quanto mi risulta, da nessuno studioso. La prima attestazione della ostilità tra Esopo e gli ιερείς di Delfi si ha nel IV° secolo, in una declamazione di Libanio (vol. V pp. 118, 15-119, 1 Foerster) che dimostra comunque come siano di epoca ancora più tarda le interpolazioni della recensione G riguardanti l'ostilità di Apollo per Esopo.

⁴⁷ Fr. 611, 33 Rose (= Heracl. Lemb. fr. 33 Dilts).

⁴⁸ Cfr. *schol. vet.* in Av 471 (= Arist. fr. 473 Rose).

⁴⁹ Art. cit. (sopra, n. 20) 9-10.

⁵⁰ L'uso del termine "demagogo" fatto da Aristotele per realtà politiche del VII/VI secolo è probabilmente anacronistico e non può avere tutte le valenze che gli erano proprie nella realtà ateniese tra quinto e quarto secolo: *demagogos* per l'epoca preclassica può indicare infatti solo un membro dell'aristocrazia o dell'oligarchia che cerca di prevalere sugli altri concorrenti al potere appoggiandosi a larghi settori del *demos*. A conferma di ciò si noti che in Arist. *Pol.* 1310b,

è meglio per il popolo essere comandato da una zecca sola e per di più ben pasciuta che, uccisa questa, essere assalito da molte zecche magre ed avidi di sangue; un *logos* che ben esprime il modo amaro e pragmatico con cui il *sophos* orientale guardava alla realtà politica delle città ioniche caratterizzata da continui sommovimenti e *staseis*. Plutarco conosceva bene anche questa attività demegorica di Esopo a Samo, come dimostra l'uso che fa di questa favola nell'*An seni res publ. ger. sit* 790C.

I dati storici della schiavitù e della attività pubblica e politica a Samo che Plutarco poteva acquisire da testimonianze autorevoli come Erodoto e Aristotele (e certo anche da altre fonti ancora) ci inducono a ribadire che né in Plutarco né in alcuna fonte storica antica c'è il minimo accenno al fatto che la schiavitù di Esopo implicasse una sua provenienza da ceti popolari o un suo particolare coinvolgimento in problemi riguardanti i ceti più umili. In Plutarco e nelle sue fonti la schiavitù di Esopo rimane un puro fatto biografico che rivestì un ruolo giuridico-finanziario nell'annosa e complessa vicenda giudiziaria che seguì alla morte del favolista. I punti di contatto dell'Esopo del tardo *Romanzo* con la tipologia dello schiavo della commedia attica ed il contrasto, tipico nel *Romanzo*, della "rudimentale filosofia dello schiavo con la filosofia del padrone, cioè con la filosofia aulica tradizionale,"⁵¹ sono caratteristiche del tutto assenti dall'Esopo di Plutarco o di Erodoto o di Aristotele e sono da ritenersi invenzione novellistica di età imperiale priva di qualsiasi base storica. Non va infatti dimenticato che Erodoto chiama Esopo λογοποιός, un termine che implicava di per sé una persona colta, attiva culturalmente con scritti in prosa: così ad es. nel medesimo passo (II 134–35) Erodoto parla di Σαπφούς τῆς μουσοποιού e di Αἰσώπου τοῦ λογοποιού ed in vari luoghi nei quali è menzionato il prosatore Ecateo di Mileto egli è definito λογοποιός come Esopo.⁵² Aristofane nell'importante passo di Av. 471 racconta un antico *logos* esopico a sfondo cosmogonico (assente, si noti, da tutte le tarde raccolte esopiche a noi giunte) e definisce "incolto" (ἀμαθής) chi non lo conosce.⁵³ Lo scoliasta (*schol. vet., ad loc.*) qualche secolo dopo non poteva fare a meno di richiamare l'attenzione dei suoi lettori, abituati ormai ad un Esopo ben diverso, sul fatto che, ai tempi di Aristofane, τὸν λογοποιὸν Αἰσώπων διὰ σπουδῆς εἶχον.⁵⁴ A questa antica tradizione torna Plutarco quando in

29–31 e 1315b, 27 è chiamato *demagogos* Cipselo di Corinto. Cfr. le importanti precisazioni al riguardo di S. I. Oost, "Cypselus the Bacchiad," cit., pp. 19–20.

⁵¹ A. La Penna, "Il romanzo di Esopo," cit., 300–03.

⁵² Cfr. Hdt. II 143; V 36 e 125. Vedi anche M. Nøjgaard, *La fable antique*, I (København 1964) 454 e G. F. Nieddu, "Testo, scrittura, libro nella Grecia arcaica e classica," *S & C* 8 (1984) 216–17 e 255. Il termine erodoteo *logopoios* era applicato ad Esopo anche dal biografo peripatetico Ermippo, *ap. D. L.* I 3, 72.

⁵³ Cfr. M. Nøjgaard, *op. cit.*, 474.

⁵⁴ L'antica prosa gnomica e politica di Esopo impregnata sull'impiego didattico del *logos* di animali doveva in effetti avere finalità e scopi molto seri ed impegnati, il che non esclude

Sol. 28, 1 rende ad Esopo il titolo erodoteo di *logopoios* e considera l'eschivo un personaggio culturalmente tanto rappresentativo da poter essere diventato consigliere e collaboratore di un sovrano orientale.

E' ben noto che nell'antichità, in seguito a guerre, rappresaglie ed azioni di pirateria⁵⁵ potevano cadere in schiavitù persone di ogni ceto sociale, da umili artigiani a personaggi dei più alti ranghi.⁵⁶ In un'epoca come il VII^o-VI^o secolo a. C. la mancanza di omogeneità del fenomeno schiavitù dal punto di vista sociale con il conseguente diverso esito delle storie di singoli prigionieri, cui un mercato cinico quanto altamente selettivo poteva aprire insospettite possibilità di realizzare in terra straniera le proprie doti personali, rendono estremamente verosimili storicamente e socialmente vicende come quella del *logopoios* Esopo, personaggio colto e perciò di ceto elevato, proveniente da zone fortemente ellenizzate come la Tracia costiera o la Frigia⁵⁷ e trapiantato a Samo, uno dei centri più vivaci della cultura ionica. Per le ragioni appena dette e per la accertabile assenza di concentrazioni massicce di schiavi nel quadro politicamente vario e frammentato delle *poleis* dell'Asia Minore tra il VII^o ed il VI^o secolo a. C. è sicuramente anacronistica l'ipotesi che al tempo di Esopo esistesse qualcosa come una "visione della vita elaborata dagli schiavi e dai reietti" (v. sopra) della quale il favolista sarebbe stato interprete privilegiato. Sia l'Esopo delle più antiche fonti storiche, sia l'Esopo fortemente arcaizzante di Plutarco, sembrano contraddire un simile punto di vista.

naturalmente che la finalità seria potesse talora essere raggiunta con una satira ed un'ironia che potevano arrivare fino al γελοῖον. Del resto, come ha ben chiarito R. S. Falkowitz, la storia della favola di animali nel Vicino Oriente era sempre stata legata alla cultura scritta, alla scuola, alla didattica, alla retorica (e quindi, per forza di cose, a ceti socialmente elevati) e niente aveva a che fare con le strutture della cultura orale e del folklore (cfr. *The Sumerian Rhetoric Collections* (Winona Lake, Indiana, 1984) 4-5 e *id.* in *Entretiens Hardt* 30 (1984) 1-2). Da questo punto di vista è eliminato l'ostacolo ad una "prosa esopica" nel VI secolo che intravedeva B. E. Perry nel su cit. *Babrius and Phaedrus*, Introd. p. XXXVI. Per una collocazione del genere dei *logoi* esopici all'interno di una "tradition savante, scolaire" fin dai tempi della Grecia arcaica, cfr. gli interessanti ed originali interventi di M. Nøjgaard e di M. Lasserre in *Entretiens Hardt* XXX (1984) 29-32. Giusta, anche se imprecisa in qualche dettaglio, la prospettiva di C. Wendel, *Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung verglichen mit der des Vorderen Orients* (Halle-Saale 1949) 79-80.

⁵⁵ I Sami erano famosi per la pirateria, cfr. J. M. Cook, *The Greeks in Ionia and the East* (London 1962) 90. In particolare nel VI^o secolo gli *Iawan* (Ioni) sono menzionati da fonti orientali come noti mercanti di schiavi, cfr. T.F.R.G. Braun, "The Greeks in the Near East," in *CAH*² III 3 (1982) 14.

⁵⁶ Cfr. ad es. proprio per i tempi di Esopo, l'importante censimento di prigionieri di guerra su tavolette babilonensi degli anni 595-70: vedi T.F.R.G. Braun, *op.cit.*, 22.

⁵⁷ Sulla provenienza di Esopo cfr. la documentazione completa in B. E. Perry, *Aesopica*, cit., test. 4-6. Secondo una antica tradizione (Hdt. VII 73) i Frigi provenivano dalla Tracia. Cfr. comunque Chr. Danoff s.v. *Thrake* in *Kl. Pauly* V (1979), col. 779, 34 sgg.; G. Neumann s.v. *Phryger*, *ibid.* IV (1979), col. 823, 2 sgg. e T. J. Dunbabin, *The Greeks and their Eastern Neighbours* (London 1957) 64 sgg.

Il contesto nel quale la *sophia* esopica viene collocata nel *Convivium septem sapientium* è una utile riprova di quanto ho fin qui esposto. L'operetta, sicuramente plutarchea,⁵⁸ è ben lontana dall'essere una divagazione novellistica,⁵⁹ ma rappresenta anzi un *tour de force* filologico e storico col quale Plutarco cerca di recuperare tra le antiche tradizioni della Grecia preclassica i contorni precisi della *sophia* arcaica greco-orientale: in essa i προβλήματα βασιλικά (cfr. 146E; 152F), le ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις (153B-D), le σοφίας ἄμιλλαι (151B), le ἀπορίαι degli antichi agoni poetici (153F), gli αἰνίγματα (148D; 154B), il *logos* esopico (164B), le antiche massime delfiche (164B-C), gli animali e le piante simboliche del memoriale di Cipselo (164A), assumevano valenze politiche e morali il cui ricordo si era poi in gran parte perduto nella Grecia classica ed ellenistica. L'opera non ha, e non potrebbe avere, la compattezza strutturale della narrazione inventata,⁶⁰ proprio perchè è costituita in tutti i suoi particolari da frammenti che Plutarco ha pazientemente raccolto dalle più varie, antiche ed attendibili fonti che aveva a disposizione. Fin dall'inizio il lettore viene messo di fronte alla problematicità della ricostruzione storico-filologica (cfr. 146B) e l'operetta, rivolta sicuramente ad un pubblico dotto,⁶¹ è scandita da una sottile e continua sensibilità per l'autentico, il genuino, il documentato.⁶² I personaggi più peregrini sono corredati da scarse notizie storico-biografiche, le poche che Plutarco poteva reperire e considerare attendibili: da Nilosseno di Naucrati (146E) ad Ardalo di Troezen (150A) a Chersia, poeta di corte dei Cipselidi (156F), a Mnesifilo amico di Solone (154C), niente di novellistico ma solo l'occasione per porre un problema, chiarire una questione, autenticare una tradizione e completare un mosaico di antica cultura ellenica. E tutto converge verso il finale scandito da vicende (Arione, Enalo, Cipselo) legate al dio di Delfi ed alla glorificazione di quel

⁵⁸ Vedi J. Defradas in *Plutarque, Oeuvres morales*, II (Paris 1985) 169-73 e K. Ziegler, s.v. *Plutarchos von Chair*. in *RE* 21. 1 (1951), coll. 881-85.

⁵⁹ Così il Wilamowitz in "Zu Plutarchs Gastmahl . . .", cit. 196-98 (= *Kl. Schrift.* III, cit., 117 sgg.). J. Defradas in *Plutarque, Oeuvres mor.*, II, cit., p. 188 nega che Plutarco abbia avuto in quest'opera intenzioni di storico: ma, come abbiamo visto, il contesto storico e cronologico del *Convivium* non è affatto impreciso e tantomeno impossibile e novellistico (v. le obiezioni di Defradas, *ibid.* 170 sg.). Anche K. Ziegler, s.v. *Plutarchos, op. cit.*, col. 883, 40 sgg., afferma che lo scopo di quest'opera è puramente "künstlerisch" e "rhetorisch-sophistisch." Recentemente però S.J.D. Aalders in "Political Thought in Plutarch's *Convivium Septem Sapientium*," *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977) 30 pur ribadendo che Solone, Amasi, Creso, Periandro non potevano essere contemporanei, ritiene che Plutarco abbia "seriously tried to put this dialogue in its historical setting."

⁶⁰ Cfr. K. Ziegler, *art. cit.*, col. 883, 27 sgg. e J. Defradas, *op. cit.*, 173.

⁶¹ Ad es. Amasi è nominato appena in 151B mentre nell'introduzione 146E-F, dove si parla di Nilosseno di Naucrati e della sua missione, Plutarco sottintende che i suoi lettori sappiano che il re di cui si parla è Amasi, mai menzionato esplicitamente.

⁶² Cfr. ad es. 147B (detto attribuito a Pittaco invece che a Talete), 151F (rifiuto della tradizione del dissidio tra Solone e Chilone), oppure le considerazioni sulla differenza fra l'impossibile e l'insolito e fra il παράλογον ed il παράδοξον che concludono la discussione sulle vicende di Arione e di Enalo (163D).

santuario che tanto ruolo aveva avuto nel custodire e diffondere le più tipiche espressioni delle *sophia* del sesto secolo, le famose massime dei *sophoi*. Sicchè ha ragione lo Ziegler ad accostare il *Convivium* ad un'opera come il *De Pythiae oraculis* che peraltro, come abbiamo visto, è da collocare negli ultimi anni della vecchiaia di Plutarco.⁶³ In un'opera di questo genere, concepita dall'autore come un condensato di antichi messaggi culturali, è significativo che il *sophos* martire di Delfi abbia un ruolo consistente e certo non di secondo piano: la dotta disquisizione sulle tre principali massime delfiche che conclude l'opera (164C) non è affidata a Solone o a Biante o a Chilone, ma ad Esopo, ed è nel *Convivium* (158B) che leggiamo la più densa lode della *sophia* esopica definita καλή, ποικίλη, πολύγλωσσος ed affine alla *sophia* dell'antichissimo Esiodo, che con il *logos* di animali ammoniva i *basileis*. Attraverso il contrasto fra Esopo e lo scita Anacarsi, Plutarco sottolinea l'appartenenza di Esopo alla sofisticata cultura greco-anatolica e la sua estraneità ad alcuni aspetti tipici delle culture barbariche: ad Anacarsi che rifiuta la raffinata ed antica arte del flauto Esopo risponde con un dotto ed allusivo verso di Cleobulina sul flauto frigio (150F) ed in 155A il favolista scherza sul fatto che il sapiente scita consideri virtù l'essere senza casa e l'abitare in un carro. Sono passi significativi che fanno capire quanto questo antico *logopoios* che vive alla corte di un re orientale ed è ben integrato nella cultura greca contemporanea (alla fine del *Convivium* cita ad es. tre versi di Omero) sia lontano dall'Esopo schiavo cinicheggiante delle raccolte favolistiche di età imperiale o del tardo *Romanzo*. Possiamo supporre che il dotto di Cheronea avesse fonti antiche e precise che gli permettevano di dare ad Esopo quello che era di Esopo e ad Anacarsi quello che era di Anacarsi. E' così che Plutarco, con la sua ricerca erudita sull'arcaico genere sapienziale dei προβλήματα e delle ἀπορίαι (146E; 152F; 153F) ci permette di recuperare, dietro a due prolissi e grotteschi episodi della parte samia del *Romanzo di Esopo*, la antica fonte storico-biografica poi deformata dal tardo romanziere: Biante di Priene aveva risposto alle domande del faraone Amasi (cfr. 146F e 151B-D) come poi l'immaginario e farsesco Esopo del tardo *bios* (cfr. V. Aes. 51-55 e 68-73 GW) rispondeva al padrone Xanto ed agli *scholastikoi* di Samo.⁶⁴ Così, sempre nel *Convivium*, un episodio che nell'eterogenea raccolta esopica fedriana vede protagonista Esopo (Phaedr. III 3) risulta in realtà derivato da antiche notizie storico-biografiche su Talete e Periandro, come dimostra Plutarco in 149C-E. Tutte queste costanti e sottili rettifiche erudite inserite con magistrale *nonchalance* nell'animata cornice del *Convivium* rivelano con quanto rigore, in ogni capitolo di questa breve opera, Plutarco cerchi di seguire le tracce più autentiche della *sophia* del sesto secolo. Nell'ottica

⁶³ Cfr. K. Ziegler, art. cit., col. 884, 62 sgg.

⁶⁴ Cfr. H. Zeitz, "Der Aesoproman und seine Geschichte," *Aegyptus* 16 (1936) 242 e A. La Penna, "Il romanzo di Esopo," cit., 294.

plutarchea Esopo non ha un ruolo né minore né subordinato a quello degli altri *sophoi*:⁶⁵ come loro è particolarmente interessato alla meditazione di problemi morali e politici apparendoci così in perfetta continuità con la figura del *logopoios* politicamente attivo di cui parlava Aristotele nelle *Costituzioni* di Samo e di Delfi. La valenza politico-morale della simbologia tratta dal mondo animale è un leit-motif di questa opera nella quale sono ricordate o narrate per esteso favole esopiche⁶⁶ e rievocate discussioni politiche περὶ τῶν θηρίων durante antiche riunioni conviviali:⁶⁷ alla fine dell'opera, poi, i convitati chiedono al dotto poeta Chersia di spiegare cosa simboleggino le numerose rane del monumento di Cipselo e Plutarco poco dopo (164A-B) ci fa sapere che Chersia aveva lodato i *logoi* di Esopo per il loro stretto rapporto con le massime di Delfi. Attraverso questa attenta panoramica sul simbolo animale nella Grecia pre-classica, dal *logos* esopico alla discussione politica al monumento pubblico alla poesia impegnata, Plutarco ricostruisce, in maniera frammentaria ma suggestiva, i contorni di un antico genere sapienziale e fa risorgere un Esopo del quale, dopo Aristotele, si erano perse le tracce. Nessuna meraviglia quindi che nella parte centrale del *Convivium*, dedicata alla trattazione politica sul buon governo, Esopo intervenga ed esprima il suo parere discutendo da pari a pari con Solone e gli altri. Semmai è significativo che, essendo il colloquio articolato in due tempi, prima περὶ βασιλείας, poi περὶ δημοκρατίας, Esopo intervenga solo nella prima parte. In 152B, dopo che Solone, Biante e gli altri *sophoi* hanno espresso il loro parere sul miglior βασιλεὺς καὶ τύραννος⁶⁸ inducendo il loro ospite Periandro nel più profondo sconforto,

⁶⁵ Mi riferisco soprattutto al punto di vista di Wilamowitz e Defradas riportato all'inizio di questo lavoro. In 150A il modo di sedersi a tavola di Esopo rispetto a quello di Solone sta ad indicare usanze diverse (Esopo vive in Lidia) e non differenzia, come vorrebbe Defradas (cfr. *Plutarque, Oeuvres*, cit., 329) lo schiavo Esopo dall'uomo libero Solone: Esopo infatti era ormai già da tempo libero e famoso e, come Plutarco sottolinea proprio in questo passo, si trovava presso Periandro investito di una importante missione politico-diplomatica. Anche nella battuta con la quale Chilone conclude la favola narrata da Esopo, non c'è nessuna allusione ad una bassa condizione sociale del favolista (cfr. Defradas, *ibid.*, 329) bensì un modo arguto di esprimere la differenza fra due generi sapienziali affini: Chilone dice scherzosamente ad Esopo che con il suo *logos* colorito ha espresso "lentamente" quello che si poteva dire in due sole parole, γνῶθι σαυτὸν (cfr. D.S. IX 10, 1). Anche il breve *logos* esopico è per Chilone βραδὺς rispetto alla βραχυλογία Λακωνική (cfr. Pl. *Prot.* 343a e Plu. *De Pythiae orac.* 29, 400E). Cfr. invece la interpretazione di Wilamowitz in *Kl. Schrift.* III, cit., p. 134.

⁶⁶ Cfr. 150A-B (l'indicazione geografica Λυδὸς è un tratto arcaico, cfr. ad es. Semon. fr. 9 West), 150F, 155B, 156A, 157B; per le favole in 150F e 157B Plutarco è il nostro unico testimone (sulla favola esopica arcaica tornerò in un prossimo lavoro).

⁶⁷ Cfr. 147B. Si ricordi l'antico famoso *skolion* attico in *PMG* fr. 892 Page. L'uso continuò a lungo, cfr. la scherzosa rievocazione di Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1258.

⁶⁸ Si noti l'accostamento arcaizzante dei due termini che corrisponde bene al fatto che la discussione avviene davanti a Periandro, figlio di Cipselo, tiranno-re (cfr. quanto notato in proposito più sopra e N.G.L. Hammond in *CAH*² III 3 [1982] 348): non mi sembra che "the difference between βασιλεὺς and τύραννος... plays a considerable role in the *Convivium*," come vorrebbe Aalders, art. cit., p. 33.

Esopo interviene in difesa di Periandro rimproverandoli perché invece di essere σύμβουλοι sono κατήγοροι τῶν ἀρχόντων: emerge quindi ancora una volta dietro al *logopoios* il consigliere e collaboratore di un sovrano, lo stesso che in *Sol.* 28, 1 spiega all'uomo politico ateniese che con i re bisogna ὡς ἥκιστα ἢ ὡς ἥδιστα ὀμιλεῖν. Poco dopo, sempre in 152B, Esopo rimprovera Solone per non aver preso su di sé il governo di Atene quando l'oracolo di Delfi glielo aveva suggerito e per questa via Plutarco ci dà anche l'opinione che Esopo aveva sulla migliore forma di governo per una *polis*.⁶⁹ La totale estraneità del sapiente greco-orientale Esopo al problema della δημοκρατία è dimostrato con un argomento *e silentio*: Esopo è completamente assente nella seconda parte della discussione (cfr. 154D-E).

Se consideriamo questa testimonianza plutarchea unitamente agli indizi che ci dà la favola che, secondo *Artist. Rhet* II 20 (v.sopra), Esopo narrò δημηγορῶν ἐν Σάμῳ, possiamo ricostruire una visione politica certo frammentaria per la scarsità dei dati, ma coerente con la personalità di un *sophos* che aveva lasciato il movimentato mondo ionico per rimanere alla corte di un sovrano e diventare suo attivo collaboratore. Il *logos* di Samo vede un *demos* destinato ad essere sempre in balia di avide zecche, i demagoghi: se ne ammazza una sarà assalito subito dalle altre. L'Esopo del *Convivium* auspica per la *polis* il governo di uno solo e considera compito dei *sophoi* essere σύμβουλοι e non κατήγοροι di chi chiede il loro aiuto per meglio governare. Questo stesso Esopo, collaboratore di Cresò e difensore di Periandro, fu ingiustamente ucciso a Delfi in seguito ad un grave dissidio con la *polis*: e quanto severamente Plutarco nel *De sera numinis vindicta* condanni questo atto l'abbiamo visto. A questo Esopo, non a Chilone o a Biante, Plutarco fa concludere il *Convivium* con una disquisizione sulla presenza dei temi delle massime delfiche in Omero: un omaggio alla saggezza morale e politica del *logopoios* ed alla sua cultura greca.

Il rigore filologico e storico e cronologico col quale questi dati sono presentati da Plutarco ci impedisce di pensare che in tutto ciò ci sia qualcosa che Plutarco non potesse convalidare con le sue fonti. Non solo: l'antichità di questo Esopo è dimostrabile, mi sembra, anche per altra via, con un passo che non è plutarcheo, che è di molti secoli prima e che si illumina di luce nuova se Esopo era così come Plutarco, fedele alle sue fonti, ce lo ha presentato. Si tratta del famoso inizio del Fedone platonico in cui si dice che Socrate in prigione, nei giorni che precedettero la sua morte, compose un inno ad Apollo e mise in versi τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους (*Phaed.* 60d-61b): a questa attività si dedicò Socrate mentre gli

⁶⁹ Cfr. 152D πόλιν . . . οἷε κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἄριστα πράττειν τὴν ἐνὸς ἀκούουσιν. Plutarco, sacerdote di Delfi e sostenitore della politica imperiale, sembra stare dalla parte di Esopo, come dimostra il modo con cui il diniego di Solone è commentato in *Plu. Sol.* 14. 4 (cfr. Aalders, art.cit., p. 38 ed in generale C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* [Oxford 1971] 112-13).

Ateniesi erano a Delo a rendere omaggio ad Apollo; al ritorno della nave da Delo la condanna a morte doveva essere eseguita (cfr. *ibid.* 59d; 61a). A Cebete che per conto del poeta Eveno di Paro chiede al condannato perchè abbia scelto di scrivere ποιήματα su Apollo e su argomenti esopici Socrate risponde che lo ha fatto obbedendo ad una sollecitazione del dio stesso:⁷⁰ e prima ha composto l'inno (61b), poi le favole, sicchè l'inno ad Apollo appare proemio (60d) alle favole, a loro strettamente legato.⁷¹ La critica si è sempre trovata in imbarazzo davanti a questo passo. Perché Socrate prima di morire per mano degli ateniesi si è occupato di *logoi* esopici?⁷² E perché questo strano abbinamento dei *logoi* con un inno ad Apollo? Se pensiamo all'Esopo ricostruibile attraverso la testimonianza plutarchea il passo del Fedone assume una intensa e precisa allusività in ogni suo particolare. Socrate, che dal dio di Delfi era stato riconosciuto sapiente (cfr. Pl. *Apol.* 21a), manda alla *polis* che lo ha condannato a morte un messaggio attraverso i *logoi* di quel *sophos* che anch'egli da una *polis* fu condannato a morte. Mentre gli ateniesi sono a Delo a rendere omaggio al dio, Socrate con l'inno e con i *logoi* di Esopo assimila la sua situazione a quella dell'antico *logopoios* che rese omaggio al dio di Delfi e con amari *logoi* (v. sopra) denunciò la corruzione della *polis*. Apollo punì gravemente i Delfi per la morte del *sophos* Esopo: cosa farà per la morte di Socrate?⁷³ Se, come penso, il passo del Fedone è carico di tante allusività, sarebbe interessante sapere quali favole esopiche Socrate trattò. Una tradizione biografica certamente antica conservataci da Diogene Laerzio (II 5, 42) ci dà i primi due versi di una favola di Socrate: Esopo appare in qualità di *demegoros* (v. sopra), parla ad una *polis*, quella di Corinto, ed invita a μὴ κρίνειν ἀρετὴν λαοδίκῳ σοφίῃ, un passo che, a chi tenga presente l'Esopo di Plutarco, suona assai familiare; è l'invito a non giudicare la vera *areté* sulla base della λαοδ. σοφίῃ, la sapienza accreditata dal giudizio popolare, dai tribunali del λαός.⁷⁴ L'Esopo, collaboratore di Creso e difensore di Periandro, che alla fine del *Convivium* di Plutarco spiega le aristocratiche massime delfiche⁷⁵ e

⁷⁰ Gli ἐνύπνια di cui parla insistentemente in *Phaed.* 60c-61 sono manifestazioni della volontà del dio, cfr. Pl. *Apol.* 33c.

⁷¹ Cfr. M. L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, II (Oxford 1972) 118, *Socr. fr.* 1-2, *adn. ad loc.*

⁷² Tipico è l'intervento di M. Schanz, "Sokrates als vermeintlicher Dichter," *Hermes* 29 (1894) 601.

⁷³ Cfr. anche ad es. Pl. *Apol.* 30c. Di un tale rapporto Socrate/Esopo/Apollo ci dà testimonianza un testo tardo ma notoriamente ricco di motivi antichi, Liban. *Apol. Socr.* 181 (vol. V, p. 118 Foerster): naturalmente in questo passo, stando ai dati più antichi ricostruibili da Plutarco e da altre fonti (v. sopra), l'ostilità Esopo/sacerdoti di Delfi e l'influenza già attiva dell'Esopo del tardo Romanzo (τίς ἄν μὴ φιλονεικῶν . . .) sono elementi che dimostrano che siamo nel IV secolo d.C.

⁷⁴ Veramente strana l'interpretazione di B. Gentili e C. Prato in *Poetae Elegiaci* II, (Lipsiae 1985) 80 (*appar.* a *Socr. fr.* 1) secondo cui qui κρίνειν varrebbe προκρίνειν, facendo così di λαοδ. σοφίῃ una opzione positiva rispetto ad una *areté* aristocratica.

⁷⁵ Sulle suggestioni aristocratiche ed antidemocratiche delle massime delfiche, cfr. le utili annotazioni di J. Defradas, *La propagande delphique*, cit., pp. 282-83.

trova la morte in un tragico contrasto con una *polis*, poteva effettivamente aver espresso un concetto del genere nella sua sosta a Corinto: l'autenticità del frammento socratico mi sembra difficilmente negabile.⁷⁶ E non è davvero strano che Socrate, che era stato accusato fra l'altro di leggere i poeti (in particolare Omero) in chiave antidemocratica,⁷⁷ abbia deciso di ribadire alcuni concetti fondamentali della sua visione politica e morale con componimenti in versi e non in prosa.

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⁷⁶ Esso è invece generalmente considerato spurio, cfr. ad es. E. Diehl, *Anthol. Lyr. Gr.* I (:954), p. 134 e M. L. West, cit., p. 118. Lo considerano autentico B. Gentili-C. Prato, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁷⁷ Cfr. le interessanti considerazioni di F. Lasserre, "Platon, Homère et la cité," in *Stemmata, Mélanges . . . offerts à J. Labarbe, Suppl. à L'Antiquité Classique*, (Liège 1987) 5 sgg. Sulle opinioni politiche di Socrate cfr. W.K.C. Guthrie, *Socrates* (Cambridge 1971) cap. XIII, e sul rapporto dell'uomo politico *sophos* con il *πλῆθος* cfr. il significativo passo di Pl. *Apol.* 31e.

Plutarco ed Euripide: alcune considerazioni
sulle citazioni euripidee in Plutarco
(*De aud. poet.*)

PAOLO CARRARA

Le numerose e non sempre ovvie citazioni poetiche che costellano da un capo all'altro il "corpus" degli scritti plutarchei hanno posto, e continuano a porre, il difficile problema se Plutarco abbia veramente letto di prima mano le opere letterarie dalle quali cita, o se invece un tale tesoro di sentenze non sia altro che parte del patrimonio erudito attinto dallo scrittore di Cheronea alle sue letture filosofico-antiquarie, cioè a "fonti intermedie."

Il problema è ulteriormente complicato dalla constatazione che Plutarco fu realmente uno dei maggiori e migliori conoscitori di letteratura del suo tempo; il che, unito alla sua prodigiosa memoria e all'amore senza riserve per tutto ciò che costituiva il passato glorioso della nazione ellenica, ci obbliga certamente ad ammettere nel suo caso una messe di letture di prima mano cospicua. A ciò si aggiunga che il secondo secolo fu, per la letteratura greca, un secolo di prodigioso risorgimento,¹ del quale lo scrittore di Cheronea, con la sua appassionata e poliedrica attività di ellenista, fu artefice principalissimo. Saremmo pertanto tentati di concludere che Plutarco abbia letto di prima mano la maggior parte di quei versi e di quelle sentenze con i quali esemplifica e abbellisce di continuo le sue composizioni.

In realtà una conclusione del genere è sicuramente azzardata, anzi illegittima. Le numerose citazioni plutarchee presentano in genere un aspetto assolutamente "convenzionale": sono in gran parte "loci communes" che si trovano anche presso altri scrittori e antologisti.² L'impressione che si ricava alla fine dalla lettura degli scritti plutarchei

¹ Cfr. G. Cavallo, *Conservazione e perdita dei testi Greci*, in *Società Romana e Impero Tardoantico*, vol. 4: *Tradizione dei Classici* (Bari 1986), 84 sgg.

² Certo tutt'altro che rari sono anche i casi nei quali Plutarco è, o sembra essere, per noi l'unico testimone di un passo altrimenti ignoto; ma nel giudicare di ciò conviene essere molto prudenti. I frammenti di antologie restituiti dai papiri ci testimoniano continuamente l'esistenza di una tradizione antologica molto più ricca di quella conservataci dal Medioevo. Si veda recentemente l'antologia di poeti comici di P. Harris 171 pubblicata da E. Livrea, *ZPE* 58 (1985) 11 sgg.: la maggioranza dei testi in essa contenuti sono nuovi per noi.

sembra piuttosto essere—erroneamente, come si vedrà—quella di una vastissima conoscenza e di una grandiosa compilazione, ma essenzialmente di seconda mano. Si potrebbe ipotizzare—paradossalmente e non senza forzatura—che Plutarco non abbia letto alcunché al di fuori di Omero, di antologie e di scritti filosofico-morali. È chiaro che una tesi del genere, a riguardo di colui che fu senz'ombra di dubbio un dottissimo ellenista di età flavio-antonina, dagli sconfinati interessi culturali e dai cospicui mezzi finanziari, è patentemente assurda. Assurda sì, ma non ingiustificata, e soprattutto non molto più assurda dell'altra che pretenderebbe di postulare per il dotto di Cheronea una diretta conoscenza di prima mano per tutti gli originali—epica, lirica, tragedia, commedia, letteratura in generale—dai quali egli attinga un verso o una sentenza.³

Bisogna premettere, a mio avviso, che un'impostazione "manichea" del problema delle letture di Plutarco, come degli altri autori antichi, non consente di raggiungere nessun apprezzabile risultato, anzi sarà senz'altro fuorviante. Dedurre infatti dalla massa delle citazioni letterarie una univoca correlazione con la massa delle letture sarebbe un'ingenuità, perché prescinderebbe in pieno dal metodo di studio, di formazione e di lavoro proprio della persona colta di età ellenistica e romana.⁴ Né d'altra parte, un radicale scetticismo sulla reale consistenza del patrimonio di letture plutarchee sembra, come si è detto, più giustificato e ragionevole.

Un valido spunto per definire meglio i termini della questione credo che possa trovarsi nell'attenta considerazione della testimonianza che Plutarco stesso ci ha lasciato a questo proposito con lo scritto *De audiendis poetis*. Mi servirò come campione d'indagine delle citazioni euripidee che in esso si trovano per tentare di illustrare alcuni fenomeni piuttosto interessanti e significativi a riguardo della nostra ricerca.

Innanzitutto lo scritto di Plutarco intitolato πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκούειν⁵ non è né un trattato di estetica né un trattato teorico di poetica. La preoccupazione dell'autore in esso non è, almeno fondamentalmente, né come i poeti debbano scrivere né che cosa sia la poesia. Lo scritto di Plutarco è un trattato pedagogico-morale. In esso si

³ Si veda la raccolta delle citazioni W. C. Helmbold-E. G. O'Neil, "Plutarch's Quotations," *Amer. Philolog. Association: Monogr.* 19 (Philadelphia 1959).

⁴ L'eterno meccanismo di appesantimento dei programmi scolastici, di slittamento di discipline, un tempo ritenute specialistiche, verso i livelli più bassi del "cursus studiorum" e l'inevitabile formarsi di letteratura manualistica ed antologica è ben delineato in H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris, Ed. du Seuil 1965⁶), tr. it. (Roma, Edizioni Studium 1978) 222-23. Il cambiamento che avviene nei "piani di studio" durante l'età classica (cambiamento che prepara la scuola ellenistico-romana) è messo in relazione da J. Bams, "A New Gnomologium," *CQ* (1950-51) I 125 sgg., II 1 sgg., con il diffondersi della tecnica sofistica di insegnamento (cfr. II 8 sgg.).

⁵ Il titolo greco, in tutte le sue varianti attestate dai mss.—unica eccezione il cosiddetto *Catalogo di Lampria* che omette τὸν νέον—fa esplicito riferimento ai giovani: πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν, cfr. E. Valgiglio, *Plutarco, De audiendis poetis* (Torino, Loescher 1973) 59.

prende in esame il problema, tutto pratico e concreto, se e in qual misura la poesia (oggi diremmo piuttosto "la letteratura") debba aver spazio nella formazione dei giovani. Lo spunto alle considerazioni plutarchee, sebbene mai direttamente dichiarato, è costituito dalla celebre tesi platonica⁶ secondo la quale la poesia è sostanzialmente fuori luogo nell'educazione. È naturale che Plutarco, sincero estimatore di Platone e desideroso continuamente di calcare le sue orme,⁷ sentisse tutto il disagio che in lui, estimatore della poesia e della cultura greca, la posizione del filosofo ateniese creava. D'altra parte, dopo Platone, la tradizione peripatetica e stoica avevano ampiamente riabilitato la poesia e si può dire che la severa condanna platonica fu condivisa, quando lo fu, più su un piano teoretico che nei fatti. Plutarco infatti non esita a riconoscere all'esperienza poetica un ruolo importante nel "curriculum" della formazione della persona colta che per lui è, naturalmente, da identificare nel filosofo.⁸ Tutto il primo capitolo del *De audiendis poetis* è basato su questo concetto.

Alcuni secoli dopo, Basilio, metropolita di Cesarea di Cappadocia, fonderà proprio su Plutarco un'idea analoga per poter far spazio nel suo programma educativo alla "letteratura" classico-pagana.⁹ Il parallelismo fra le due posizioni è evidente, ma deve essere sottolineato richiamando alcune analogie che possono a prima vista venire sottovalutate. In entrambi i casi coloro ai quali si concede la lettura della poesia classica sono giovani: i *vέοι* della cerchia familiare di Basilio,¹⁰ Soclaro e Cleandro—figli

⁶ Cfr. *Resp.* 377 D, 605 A–607 C, ecc.

⁷ Cfr. K. Ziegler, "Plutarchos von Chaironeia," *R. E.* 21. 1 (1951) 639–962; tr. it. *Plutarco* (Brescia, Paideia 1965) 362 sgg.

⁸ L'istruzione superiore era identificata, per gli antichi, con la retorica o con la filosofia, mentre la lettura della poesia era appannaggio della scuola secondaria (cfr. Marrou 225—tr. it.). Naturalmente c'era contrasto fra i sostenitori della prevalenza della retorica e quelli della filosofia e Plutarco era dichiaratamente schierato con i secondi (cfr. Ziegler 349–52—tr. it.); significativo mi sembra a questo proposito che in *De audiendo* 8. 41 E–F Plutarco ricorra, nei riguardi della retorica, al tradizionale esempio dell'ape che si applicava proprio alle letture di poeti: bisogna agire come l'ape che sa scegliere non i fiori più belli e attraenti, ma quelli ricchi di sostanza. Il prologo del *De aud. poet.* non lascia dubbi sul fatto che compito dell'uomo adulto fosse quello di coronare gli studi con il dedicarsi alla filosofia nella sua veste più scientifica e meno inquinata da lenocini formali, mentre una filosofia mescolata ad attrattive poetiche poteva essere concessa ai giovani, per cominciare ad istradarli alla vera sapienza (vd. *De aud. poet.*, I. 14 D–F). Dello stesso parere l'anonimo compositore dello scritto *De liberis educandis* (pervenuto fra le opere di Plutarco), che riferisce, condividendolo completamente, il detto del filosofo Bione che paragonava coloro che si dedicano alle discipline "letterarie" ai Proci omerici i quali non potendo avere Penelope (=la filosofia), si accontentavano delle ancelle (le belle lettere), cfr. *De lib. ed.* 10. 7 C–D.

⁹ Su Plutarco fonte di Basilio cfr. M. Naldini, *Basilio di Cesarea, Il discorso ai giovani*, testo, trad. e comm. di M. N. (Firenze, Nardini 1984) 28 sg.; Il cap. 8 di Basilio segna un importante nodo del ragionamento: dalla istruzione secondaria si passa alla filosofia —ovviamente nel senso cristiano del termine, si veda lo studio di A. M. Malingrey, "Philosophia," *Et. et Comm.* (Paris 1961); questo passaggio chiarisce il valore e i limiti dello stadio precedente, cfr. Naldini, *Basilio di C., Disc. ad giov.*, cit., p. 11 n° 3.

¹⁰ Cfr. Basilio, *Ad adul.*, I. 3 e Naldini, *Basilio di C., Discorso ai giov.*, cit. 10 sg.

rispettivamente di Plutarco e di Marco Sedatio, dedicatario del trattatello— nello scritto plutarco.

Sia in Plutarco che in Basilio traspare di continuo un sincero e, direi, incoercibile amore per la grande letteratura classica. La posizione teoretica è tuttavia in entrambi i casi improntata a grande cautela e, direi, a diffidenza. Essa denuncia il pesante condizionamento platonico¹¹: se Platone aveva proibito la poesia, Plutarco può al massimo ammetterla come momento propedeutico alla vera e propria formazione dell'adulto, cioè alla formazione filosofica: la posizione di Plutarco nei confronti della poesia è assimilabile a quella nei confronti della retorica,¹² tutta l'introduzione al trattatello, con le sue cautele e le sue analogie paraboliche è sintomatica a questo riguardo.

Ci si può a questo punto domandare: se Plutarco assegna alla lettura dei poeti e della letteratura classica in generale un posto, importante sì, ma rigorosamente confinato al "vestibolo" della παιδεία, non avrà egli forse fatto ciò basandosi sulla prassi educativa ordinaria del suo tempo? Plutarco non è mai un astratto teorizzatore e, d'altra parte, il tono dell'introduzione del *De aud. poet.* sembra rispecchiare dei dati di fatto concreti.¹³ Il *De audiendis poetis* è, da questo punto di vista, una miniera preziosa di informazioni circa le letture scolastiche che si facevano allora ad un dato stadio della formazione culturale del giovane.¹⁴ Una tale considerazione mi sembra che autorizzi a ritenere del tutto fuorviante la pretesa di trovare senz'altro nello scritto una testimonianza della vitalità di questo o quell'autore in quel tempo.

Esaminando le citazioni del *De Aud. poet.*, possiamo dividere il materiale citato in due grandi sezioni. Da un lato le citazioni omeriche, numerosissime: esse costituiscono, per così dire, la struttura portante dell'esemplificazione dello scritto, la testimonianza principe per dimostrare un'asserzione che viene fatta. È questa una caratteristica comune a tutte le opere antiche del genere, ed è pertanto ragionevole pensare che molto materiale omerico citato da Plutarco appartenga alle fonti da esso impiegate. Ma data l'importanza che alla lettura integrale del testo omerico si attribuiva nella scuola, è naturale inferire che molte citazioni omeriche derivino da Plutarco già dalla stessa sua educazione letteraria elementare. Omero infatti, in edizione integrale, continuava ad essere il libro di lettura dell'Ellade.¹⁵ Naturalmente ciò equivale a dire, dato i metodi di apprendimento degli

¹¹ In Basilio, poi, le riserve nei confronti della tradizione letteraria classica risultano aggravate anche dalla diffidenza con la quale il cristianesimo vedeva tradizionalmente la παιδεία greca. Si vd. comunque M. Naldini, "La posizione culturale di Basilio Magno" in *Atti del Congresso intern. su Basilio di Cesarea* (Univ. di Messina 1979 [Messina 1983]) 189–216; Idem, "Paideia origeniana nella orat. ad iuv. di Basilio Magno," *Vet. Chr.* 13 (1976) 297.

¹² Cfr. sopra, n. 8.

¹³ Cfr. l'accento a Cleandro in 1. 15 B, e i numerosi riferimenti all'effetto che questo o quell'accorgimento possono avere sui giovani studenti (6. 22 D, 23 A, ecc.).

¹⁴ L'importanza dello scritto plutarco come testimonianza di primaria importanza per le letture della scuola del tempo di Plutarco è sottolineato dal Bams, II 3.

¹⁵ Marrou 224 (tr. it.).

antichi, basati sulla lettura a voce alta e sul mandare a memoria,¹⁶ che Omero era conosciuto a memoria dalla totalità delle persone colte.

Una riprova di ciò, se mai ce ne fosse bisogno, è costituita dai ritrovamenti papiracei omerici, superiori di gran lunga a quelli di qualsiasi altro autore. È interessante notare che fra i papiri omerici un posto importante è occupato da testi che in qualche modo si devono connettere con la scuola elementare e con l'apprendimento della scrittura e della lettura.¹⁷

Il trattato plutarcheo, dunque, presupponendo che tale lettura fosse prevista per i giovani destinatari, ci fa concludere con certezza in favore della lettura omerica integrale da parte del suo autore.

Dall'altra parte dobbiamo collocare il blocco di tutte le altre citazioni. Fra queste quelle di letteratura drammatica—in particolare dalle tragedie di Euripide—sono senz'altro una massa notevole. Da dove provengono queste citazioni? Da dove provengono i numerosi passi euripidei che costellano il trattato?

La risposta non è difficile a trovarsi, ma necessita di una considerazione preliminare. In nessun punto del trattato si dà un giudizio, non dico estetico, ma neppure etico su una qualunque tragedia euripidea nel suo insieme, non si accenna mai all'effetto che potrebbe produrre sull'animo del giovane la lettura delle azioni e dei discorsi di questo o quel personaggio, delle parole di questo o quel coro, o la valutazione di questa o quella grande situazione. L'esame della poesia euripidea è *unicamente* confinato alle sentenze del poeta. Cosa dobbiamo dedurre da ciò? Mancanza di sensibilità di Plutarco? Incapacità di valutare per quello che valgono *Medea*, *Troiane*, *Baccanti*? Una conclusione del genere sarebbe davvero frutto di grande ingenuità. Dalla constatazione fatta possiamo, a mio avviso, dedurre una e una sola cosa: lo scritto di Plutarco è una guida alla lettura "morale" della poesia: abbiamo visto che esso illumina il giovane sul come accostarsi al primo grande libro dell'Ellade, ad Omero; ora è il momento di passare al secondo grande libro di testo della scuola secondaria greca: gli gnomologi.¹⁸ Sulla genesi, la struttura ed il valore di questi prodotti si è scritto molto; basti qui citare i nomi di Elter, Horna, Barns¹⁹; i ritrovamenti papiracei di quest'ultimo secolo, poi, ci hanno restituito numerosi esempi di questo tipo

¹⁶ Si veda l'elogio della memoria e della sua assoluta preminenza nell'educazione che fa l'anonimo *De lib. ed.* 13. 9 D-E.

¹⁷ Basti, fra i molti, l'esempio del celebre "Livres d'écolier du III^e siècle av. J.-Ch." (ed. O. Guérard et P. Jouguet, Publ. de la Soc. Roy. Egypt. de Papyr., Textes et Doc., II) 131-39; si vd. anche Marrou 224 (tr. it.).

¹⁸ Non diversamente da Plutarco si comporterà Basilio: Le citazioni di Solone e Teognide sulla ricchezza in *Ad adul.*, 5. 11 e 9. 20 sembrano tratte da un'antologia a tema; anzi Basilio farebbe ad essa un esplicito riferimento e rimanderebbe apertamente alla compilazione, Cfr. G. Morelli, "Il Solone di Basilio di Cesarea," *RFIC* 41 (1963) 193 sgg.; Naldini, *Basilio di C.*, *Disc. ai giov.*, cit. 26.

¹⁹ A. Elter, *De gnomologiorum Graecorum historia atque origine* (Bonn 1893-97); K. Horna, "Gnome, Gnomendichtung, Gnomologien," *R. E. Suppl.* 6 (1935) 74-87; J. Barns, *A New Gnomologium*, cit.

di libri, in modo da documentarne con sufficiente chiarezza l'ampia e capillare diffusione nell'Egitto ellenistico e romano. Tenendo presente ciò, possiamo ancora una volta constatare come Plutarco, conformemente alla propria indole, non proponga qui astratte considerazioni sulla poesia, sia pure in relazione alla gioventù, ma si attenga strettamente ai dati di fatto, alla prassi scolastica del suo tempo e indichi il modo migliore di metterla a frutto, sviluppandone le potenzialità e reprimendone gli abusi.²⁰ Se ciò è vero si potrebbe, paradossalmente, affermare che Plutarco, nella veste di commentatore di libri scolastici, non tragga e non voglia trarre nulla *in questo scritto* dalla lettura diretta del teatro euripideo. Non è Euripide—che egli certo conosceva benissimo direttamente e che certamente avrà citato a memoria in più passi della sua immensa opera, magari attingendo anche ad opere meno divulgate—non sono i drammi del terzo tragico ateniese che ora gli stanno a cuore; sono i libri scolastici che corrono per le mani di Soclaro e di Cleandro e la prassi educativa su di essi imperniata la fonte delle sue preoccupazioni di intellettuale impegnato e l'argomento dei suoi consigli di pedagogo illuminato e prudente.

Vediamone subito un esempio lampante.

De aud. poet. 12. 33 C. Plutarco sta esemplificando il metodo usato dagli Stoici per rendere moralmente utili sentenze di poeti, che altrimenti potrebbero essere dannose. Si tratta della παραδιόρθωσις ossia ἐπανόρθωσις, procedimento che, considerato di per sé, non può non lasciarci perplessi, ma che gli Stoici praticarono ampiamente. Cleante (*SVF* I 562, p. 128)—dice Plutarco—riscrisse (cfr. μεταγράφων) "il passo sulla ricchezza" (τὸ περὶ τοῦ πλούτου, senza alcun accenno all'autore o al dramma: curioso modo di citare da una tragedia! meno strano se si sta citando da un'antologia tematica): si tratta, noi sappiamo, di Eur. *Electr.* 428 sg., che Plutarco cita così:

φίλοις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' εἰς νόσους πεσόν
δαπάναισι σῶσαι.

Sembra—e la cosa non meraviglia—che la tragedia fosse nota a Plutarco anche nella sua interezza²¹; egli tuttavia cita il passo con una lezione che non solo non può essere genuina,²² ma che ben difficilmente si sarà mai letta in

²⁰ Questa è, a mio avviso, anche la posizione di Basilio nel suo *Ad adolescentes*: come far sì che una prassi scolastica ormai consacrata dall'uso plurisecolare, ed alla quale i giovani di "buona famiglia" non possono sottrarsi, possa essere usata al meglio dai rampolli di una grande famiglia cristiana ai vertici della società del suo tempo, senza che ciò si traduca in guasti per la vita dello spirito.

²¹ Cfr. L. Di Gregorio, "Lettura diretta e utilizzazione di fonti intermedie nelle citazioni plutarchee dei tre grandi Tragici, II (Euripide)," *Aevum* (1980) 56. Contraria invece ad una conoscenza diretta C.S.J. Mitchell, *An analysis of Plutarch's Quotations from Euripides*, (Diss. Univ. South. California 1968) 197.

²² I mss. di Euripide (che in questo caso sono i soli L e P) leggono ξένοις non φίλοις. La stessa lezione dei mss. sembra nota anche a Dione Crisostomo (7. 28).

manoscritti completi della tragedia, per quanto cattivi. La variante inferiore φίλοις è infatti determinante per il senso che qui si vuol dare al passo euripideo e presuppone l'inserimento in un contesto περὶ φιλίας, ad esempio uno gnomologio tematico; questo contesto doveva essere presente a chi diede origine al rifacimento attribuito a Cleante. Una controprova di ciò si trova nel fatto che il passo, in una versione più ampia (vv. 426–28) e quindi indipendente da Plutarco, si legge in Stob. 4. 31. 7, e puntualmente troviamo anche qui la variante φίλοις. L' "excerptum" dunque, previo necessario adattamento, doveva essere topico in sezioni sull'amicizia che attingevano alle "riscritture" di Cleante o di chi per lui.

Del resto, tutte le numerose citazioni euripidee che si trovano nel cap. 6 denunciano il loro legame con la letteratura di origine stoica intorno al problema della παραδιόρθωσις: sia quelle fatte esplicitamente risalire a Zenone e Cleante, sia gli altri esempi aggiunti da Plutarco.²³ Analogamente il contesto di *De aud. poet.* 4. 20 D con la sua struttura "antilogica" rimanda, come giustamente fa osservare Di Gregorio,²⁴ a quel tipo di letteratura gnomologica. Così pure da una discussione, di probabile origine stoica, sul termine εὐδαιμονία deriveranno le citazioni di tragedie peraltro molto note—e che Plutarco avrà certamente conosciuto—come la *Medea* e le *Fenicie* in *De aud. poet.* 6. 25 A.²⁵ Esaminando il resto dei versi euripidei impiegati da Plutarco nello scritto notiamo in continuazione la solita indifferenza per il contesto originario, spesso l'omissione del nome della tragedia e perfino dell'autore, mentre non di rado ritroviamo che si tratta di versi largamente utilizzati nella letteratura antica. Perfino nel caso del *Cresfonte*, tragedia che dovette essere nota al Nostro il quale ebbe forse occasione di esserne spettatore in un qualche adattamento teatrale,²⁶ Plutarco cita il comunissimo fr. 449. 2–4 N² (tradotto anche da Cicerone, *Tusc.* 1. 48. 115).

Plutarco, tuttavia, conosceva Euripide e ciò deve metterci in guardia contro procedimenti troppo rigidi (è questa forse la maggior difficoltà che si incontra in ricerche del genere). Egli poteva infatti anche aggiungere ad una citazione qualche tratto attinto alla sua diretta lettura degli originali. Non ci meraviglieremo di trovarne un esempio in un testo di carattere ben diverso da quello del *De aud. poetis.* In *Vit. Lys.* 15 Plutarco cita, sempre dall'Elettra euripidea, l'inizio della parodo (vv. 167–68):

Ἀγαμέμνωνος ὦ κόρα,
ἤλυθον, Ἡλέκτρα, ποτὶ σὰν ἀγρότειραν αὐλάν,

²³ L'esempio di Antistene (33 C) è attribuito (cfr. Sereno ap. Stob. 3. 5. 36) anche a Platone ed il verso è citatissimo nell'antichità.

²⁴ Cfr. Di Gregorio 50.

²⁵ Cfr. Valgiglio 166.

²⁶ Cfr. Di Gregorio 63, A. Harder, "Euripides' Kresphontes and Archelaus," *Mnemos. Suppl.* 87 (Leiden, Brill 1985) 4.

i versi, cioè, intonati da un Focese nel corso della riunione conviviale degli Spartani all'indomani della presa di Atene ad opera di Lisandro. La citazione è chiaramente di seconda mano non potendo non derivare dalla fonte storica (Duride?) dalla quale Plutarco attinge tutto l'episodio. Il modo con il quale lo scrittore introduce la citazione . . . ἐκ τῆς Εὐριπίδου Ἠλέκτρας τὴν παράδοον, ἧς ἡ ἀρχή . . ., con la sua tipica annotazione da grammatico (ἧς ἡ ἀρχή) difficilmente sarà appartenuta all'originale; essa ha tutta l'aria di un'aggiunta, di una puntualizzazione di Plutarco. E non è necessario pensare, col Di Gregorio,²⁷ che nella fonte i versi non fossero riportati, ma venissero semplicemente indicati con ἐκ τῆς Εὐριπίδου Ἠλέκτρας τὴν παράδοον e che sarebbero stati aggiunti²⁸ da Plutarco. Il supplemento plutarcoo potrebbe unicamente limitarsi a quell'annotazione squisitamente "scolastica" ἧς ἡ ἀρχή,²⁹ ma tale da farci capire che il luogo era presente alla mente dello scrittore.

Casi analoghi, dove citazioni ovvie e tradizionali possono essere accompagnate da qualche annotazione che riveli come chi scrive avesse diretta conoscenza del contesto originale dal quale l'"excerptum" proviene sono sparse ovviamente in molti luoghi dell'opera plutarcoea³⁰ e accanto ad esse si trovano anche citazioni assolutamente originali.

Da quanto abbiamo fin qui osservato, mi sembra che emerga con chiarezza che, accanto al giudizio sulla citazione e sull'immediato contesto, sia importante valutare nell'insieme l'opera entro la quale la citazione compare. Senza voler dare delle regole fisse ed infallibili, il carattere dello scritto si è visto quanto possa influire. In un'opera di elevatissimo impegno stilistico come la *Vita di Lisandro* lo scrittore non tralascia di abbellire la propria fonte con un ricordo personale. Nel caso invece del *De audiendis poetis*, opera tutt'altro che trascurata nello stile, ma di differente destinazione, Plutarco non vuole affatto nascondere di lavorare su fonti intermedie; anzi, egli sente tutto il peso della tradizione gnomologica ed interpretativa che si era sedimentata nella prassi scolastica e da essa egli vuole prendere le mosse. Se volessimo allora rendere più esplicito il titolo del trattato plutarcoo, potremmo spingerci a scrivere: "Come si debbano comporre ed usare i libri di testo nella scuola secondaria." In quest'ottica anche la prassi, per noi ripugnante, della παραδιόρθωσις può assumere connotati più precisi. Essa infatti, avendo un intento eminentemente pedagogico, non si esercita per sua natura sui testi della letteratura classica

²⁷ Cfr. art. cit. 57.

²⁸ In ogni caso a memoria e non per collazione del testo euripideo.

²⁹ Si vedano le stereotipate didascalie nelle raccolte di *Hypotheses* drammatiche: titolo, οὐδ' (ἧς, ὧν) ἀρχή (verso iniziale del dramma), ἡ δὲ ὑπόθεσις (segue il riassunto).

³⁰ Cfr. Di Gregorio 76 sgg. Si veda il caso dell'*Ifigenia in Aulide*. In *De aud. poet.* 12. 33 E si citano i vv. 29-33, versi generici e noti anche allo Stobeo. Ma in un altro luogo della sua produzione e, singolarmente, ancora in una biografia (*Nic.* 5. 7), Plutarco cita i vv. 445-50, dimostrando di conoscere il riferimento al contesto di provenienza, cfr. Mitchell 188-89, Di Gregorio 62.

come un metodo di critica letteraria (nel senso odierno); essa è piuttosto un modo di utilizzare a pieno, nella formazione del giovane, l'unico patrimonio a disposizione, la tradizione letteraria. Si tratta dunque ancora una volta di operare su testi a loro volta organizzati in "corpora" e finalizzati all'educazione. Non a caso la παραδιόρθωσις fu praticata ampiamente dagli stoici, in particolare da quel Crisippo il cui posto nella tradizione gnomologica fu certamente relevantissimo.³¹

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³¹ Cfr. Bams II 9 sgg.

Plutarch's *Erotikos*: The Drag Down Pulled Up

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Plutarch's dialogue on love, or Love, the *Erotikos*—better known to most readers as the *Amatorius*—in spite of its obvious Platonic inspiration advocates heterosexual married love as the ideal.¹ But focus on this aspect seems to have obscured the real novelty of the essay. At least, this study will try to demonstrate that Plutarch's originality consists not so much in the aspect of reciprocal egalitarian love, as the incorporation of this type of love into the Platonic goal of the vision of the Beautiful, and a new concept of what the Form of the Beautiful is.

In the course of the *Erotikos* Plutarch cites Euripides' *Hippolytos* (193–95) as a starting point for an understanding of the true nature of love:

δυσέρωτες δὴ φαίνόμεθ' ὄντες
τοῦδ' ὅτι τοῦτο στίλβει κατὰ γῆν,
δι' ἀπειροσύνην ἄλλου βίотου . . .

Ill-starred lovers we seem to be
Of this, whatever gleams upon the earth,
Through inexperience of another life . . .²

Plutarch's context is *lethe* (forgetfulness), which cancels the vision of the Beautiful once seen in another world.³ The words are of Phaidra's nurse in a powerful Greek drama centered on resistance to Eros. In Euripides' play, apparently a classic revision of an earlier *Hippolytos*, Phaidra dies nobly to

¹ Text of R. Flacelière, in R. Flacelière and M. Cuvigny, *Plutarque. Oeuvres Morales X* (Paris 1980). A. Barigazzi is preparing an edition with translation and commentary—cf. I. Gallo, "Una nuova iniziativa scientifica ed editoriale: il *Corpus Plutarchi Moraliū*," in F. E. Brenk and I. Gallo, eds., *Miscellanea Plutarchea* (Ferrara 1986) 143–45; "Note critiche ed esegetiche all'*Eroticos* di Plutarco," *Prometheus* 12 (1986) 97–122; idem 245–66. J. Irigoin's study of the manuscript tradition has now appeared in R. Flacelière, J. Irigoin, J. Sirinelli, A. Philippon, *Plutarque. Oeuvres Morales I.I* (Paris 1987) ccxxvii–cccxxiv; and that of M. Manfredini, "Sulla tradizione manoscritta dei 'Moralia' 70–77," in A. Garzya, G. Giangrande, M. Manfredini (I. Gallo, ed.), *Sulla tradizione manoscritta dei "Moralia" di Plutarco* (Salem 1988) 123–38.

² 764E. Flacelière, 149; Y. Vernière, *Symboles et mythes dans la pensée de Plutarque* (Paris 1977) 208–13. Euripides' text (anapests of nurse): J. Diggle, *Euripidis Fabulae I* (Oxford 1984) 215, with Plutarch's better reading (195 ἀπειροσύνην VΔ et Plut. 764: -vav).

³ Treated by H. Martin, "Plutarch, Plato, and Eros," *CB* 60 (1984) 82–88; 86.

save her *aidos* (shame, respect, chastity—linked with fidelity to her marriage vows) rather than surrender to an Eros steeped in the perverted bestiality of her maternal inheritance and dragging her soul downward. She commits suicide rather than attempt to seduce Hippolytos. The quotation, then, is not haphazard. Rather it points to the contrast between the drag down, symbolized by Phaidra's sexual drive, and the pull up—in Platonic philosophy the positive evaluation of Eros which leads to the Beautiful in Itself.⁴ The dramatist who offered to the world Phaidra, also created Medeia, Helena, Kanake, Stheneboia, Laodameia, and many other women whose relationship to life centered around a destructive Eros.

There can be no doubt that Euripides enormously influenced subsequent Hellenistic literature. The negative treatment of Eros is exemplified in Hellenistic literature by Apollonios of Rhodes' *Argonautika*, dealing with the destructive love of Medeia for Iason. Undoubtedly he drew on Euripides' brilliant exposition of the power of love. But in the *Hippolytos* the two major characters, though doomed to die, wrench a moral victory from Aphrodite.⁵ Medeia submits. Apollonios' shadow fell upon the Dido of Vergil's *Aeneid*. Her passion for Aeneas causes her suicide, and eternal enmity between Carthaginians and Romans. Ovid's generally positive attitude toward *amor* is also influenced by Euripides and Hellenistic writing. However, his is a poetic development paralleling Plutarch's literary-philosophical exposition. Still, the *Erotikos* is remarkable for its clarity in extolling heterosexual married love, and for its striking frame—the love of Ismenodora for Bacchon. The essay seems, then, at first sight an intellectual milestone.

Literature on the *Erotikos* concentrates on the positive evaluation of *eros*, heterosexual reciprocity, and the equal status of the partners. Three distinct approaches to the *Erotikos* can be noted: the anti-Epicurean, the Platonic and the "unitary"—the integration of the sexual and non-sexual aspects of love. The first characterizes to a large extent Robert Flacelière, whose interest in the Greek concept of *eros* can be detected in an article on the anti-Epicurean thrust of the *Erotikos*, his book *L'Amour en Grèce*, and his separate edition of the *Erotikos*—later incorporated into the Budé *Plutarque*.⁶ The outstanding love for his own wife seems reflected in his

⁴ See the excellent treatments of C. P. Segal, "The Tragedy of the *Hippolytos*: The Waters of Ocean and the Untouched Meadow," *HSCP* 70 (1965) 117–69 and J. M. Bremer, "The Meadow of Love and Two Passages in Euripides' *Hippolytus*," *Mnemosyne* 28 (1975) 268–80; also F. E. Brenk, "Phaidra's Risky Horsemanship: Euripides' *Hippolytos* 232–38," *Mnemosyne* 39 (1986) 385–87.

⁵ The theme is elaborated in G. Paduano, *Studi su Apollonio Rodio* (Rome 1972), esp. 120–23.

⁶ *L'Amour en Grèce* (Paris 1971) 163–88—noting Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean influence on Plutarch; "Les épicuriens et l'amour," *REG* 67 (1954) 69–81; *Plutarque. Dialogue sur L'Amour (Erotikos)* (Paris 1953), reworked for *Plutarque. Oeuvres Morales X* (Paris 1980), esp. 20–31. R. Laurenti, *I frammenti dei dialoghi* (Naples 1987), has recently edited the

ardor for certain ideas found in Plutarch.⁷ Recently Adelmo Barigazzi has deepened the anti-Epicurean dimension of Flacelière's work.⁸

Next, there is the Platonic approach, followed to some extent by Flacelière and elaborated recently by Hubert Martin.⁹ Finally, Michel Foucault's chapter on Plutarch in his *L'histoire de la sexualité* focuses on the "unitary aspect" of Plutarch's Eros.¹⁰

Flacelière and Barigazzi note Epikouros' negative attitude toward *eros* in the following texts:

ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς.

The Epicureans hold that the *sophos* should not fall in love.

οὐδὲ θεόπεμπτον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, . . .

Nor does *eros* have a divine origin, . . .

καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν, ὥς

Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς Περὶ φύσεως.

In his *Problems* and *On Nature* Epikouros says that the sage (*sophos*) should <not> marry or beget children.

(DL 10. 118; 119 = I 118. 8–10; 119. 12).¹¹

Barigazzi admirably illuminates the long philosophical tradition before and after Epikouros in opposition to the fundamentals of the Epicurean position—revealing Plutarch as much less an innovator than usually

fragments of Aristotle's *Erotikos*. A. Lesky, *Vom Eros der Hellenen* (Göttingen 1976) 146–50, suggests strong Stoic influence on Plutarch. C. W. Chilton, "Did Epicurus Approve of Marriage? A Study of Diogenes Laertius X, 119," *Phronesis* 5 (1960) 71–74, argues convincingly that Epikouros recommended against marriage. Recent bibliography on Greek *eros* can be found in A. Carson, *Eros the Bittersweet* (Princeton 1986).

⁷ See P. Demargne, "Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Robert Flacelière," *CRAI* (1984, 3) 3–12.

⁸ *Plutarco contro Epicuro* (Florence 1978); "Il tema dell'amore: Plutarco contro Epicuro," I. Gallo, ed., *Temi e aspetti dello stoicismo e dell'epicureismo in Plutarco*. (*Quaderni del Giornale Filologico Ferrarese* 9 [Ferrara 1988]) 89–108.

⁹ Martin above, note 3. For recent discussion and bibliography on Plato, see K. J. Dover, *Plato. Symposium* (Cambridge 1980), esp. 1–5, 13–14; D. Wender, "Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist," in J. Peradotto and J. P. Sullivan, eds., *Women in the Ancient World* (Albany 1984) 213–29; C. J. Rowe, *Plato* (Brighton 1984) 171–73; D. M. Halperin, "Plato and Erotic Reciprocity," *CIAnt* 5 (1986) 60–80. The fundamental study is F. W. Comford, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*," in W. K. C. Guthrie, ed., F. M. Comford, *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays* (Cambridge 1950) 119–31—reprint in G. Vlastos, ed., *Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays* II (South Bend, Indiana 1971) 119–31.

¹⁰ *Histoire de la sexualité* III. *Le souci de soi* (Paris 1984) 224–42, esp. 241–42; reviewed critically by A. Cameron, "Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory after Foucault," *JRS* 76 (1986) 265–71; and very severely by M. R. Lefkowitz, "Sex and Civilization," *Partisan Review* 52 (1985) 460–66, who questions his methodology and use of evidence.

¹¹ Second numbering that of G. Arrighetti, *Epicuro, Opere* (Torino 1960) 27. Arrighetti in the last passage prints the mss.' μὴν, where a negative is required; see Chilton (73) who would read in place of καὶ μὴν καὶ either οὐδὲ or οὐδὲ μὴν.

imagined.¹² Martin detects two distinct Platonic strands: the first (758D–59B) treating love as a madness (*mania*—not psychic disorder but divine inspiration), the second (764E–66B) extolling Eros as the divine guide to recollection of the Form of the Beautiful (*to kalon*).

Foucault's treatment of the unitary aspect of Plutarch's *Erotikos* is more theoretical and speculative. Greeks before Plutarch conceived Eros in terms of antitheses: noble-vulgar, *eros-phia*, active-passive. Altruistic and elevating love or friendship is contrasted with lustful satisfaction. Active or passive defines the relationship to the other partner. However, in the excellent unitary view of Plutarch—according to Foucault—the partners, considered as spouses, are joined as active subjects rather than as objects of love: "Better to love than be loved." Moreover, their sexuality contributes to, rather than distracts from, the higher aspects of love. The principle of reciprocity thus becomes the principle of fidelity: love frustrates the cloying and deforming effects of cohabitation and sexual routine. The opposition between *phia* and *aphrodisia* collapses, since, united with grace (*charis*), both elements contribute to the desired goal. Pederasty, in contrast, which is frustrated in its attempt at perfect integration, is exposed as a horrible failure. Plutarch's stand, then, is both traditional and revolutionary—traditional in its eulogy of Eros, so fundamental to Greek religion and culture, revolutionary in shattering the barrier between "vulgar" love oriented toward sexual pleasure and "spiritual" love meant for the tendance of souls. Plutarch's Eros is monistic, based on reciprocity and *charis*.¹³

Before beginning his discourse, Plutarch prayed to the god of love. With a devout prayer let us, too, return to the shrine of Eros, confident that, though the threshold is worn, its mysteries have not been totally divulged. Fundamental to a proper evaluation of the essay is a thorough study of the massive and complex influences of women and sexuality in the early Empire.¹⁴ Such a vast subject, even if containable in a few pages, requires

¹² See F. Lasserre, "Ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι," *MH* 1 (1944) 169–78, esp. 177. D. Babut, "Les Stoïciens et l'amour," *REG* 76 (1963) 55–63, esp. 62, and C. E. Manning, "Seneca and the Stoics on the Equality of the Sexes," *Mnemosyne* 26 (1973) 170–77, show that the Stoics by no means believed in equality. Flacelière, "Caton d'Utique et les femmes," in A. Balland et al., eds., *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine* (Paris 1976) 293–302, notes how the Stoic Cato "lent out" his wife Marcia to a childless friend (296).

Prof. Whittaker, whose Budé *Didaskalikos* should appear soon, suggests a Middle Platonic comparison with Alkinoos, *Didaskalikos* XXXII. 7–XXXIII. 4 (187–88); cf. G. Invernizzi, *Il Didaskalikos di Albino e il medioplatonismo* II (Rome 1976) 205–07; Apuleius, *De Platone et eius Dogmate* II. 13–14 (238–40); J. Beaujeu, *Apulée. Opuscules philosophiques* (Paris 1972) 91–92, and M. Giusta, *I dossografi di etica* (Torino 1974–1975) II, 194–99. Whittaker sees a general absence of emphasis, or no mention at all, of heterosexual or conjugal love in other Middle Platonists or in the Neoplatonists.

¹³ Foucault, 224–42, esp. 241–42.

¹⁴ R. Macmullen, "Women's Power in the Principate," *Klio* 68 (1986) 434–43, esp. 437, notes high local offices held by Greek women. For treatment of the subject and bibliography,

great specialized competence, and risks betrayal in male hands.¹⁵ But two elements can be explored here. The first is the importance of the literary "frame" of Ismenodora's "rape" of Bacchon. The second is a clue dropped by Plutarch toward the end of the dialogue that "Egyptian mythology" is the key to the correct Platonic interpretation of Eros.

A brief resumé of the dialogue is in order. The *Erotikos* begins with an event which startles the *dialogi personae* and is intended to shock the reader. The beginning is typical of the more baroque style of Plutarch with its contrasts, movement, and theatricality differentiating it from the mostly static settings of Plato's dialogues on love, the *Phaidros* and *Symposion*.¹⁶ In Ovid's story of Procris and Cephalus, the aged Cephalus recounts to two youths how he loved his beautiful young wife but tragically slew her while hunting, mistakenly thinking her some beast. The time-frame emphasizes the contrast between youth and age, erotic passion and mature wisdom—a mood suggesting reflection and universalizing on a momentary experience of mutual happiness in the bloom of life.¹⁷

In the dialogue recounted by Plutarch's son, the author himself, now in advanced age, is, unusually, the principal character. He has brought his young bride to the festival of Eros, the *Erotideia*, at Thespiæ, a town not far from his home, to offer prayers and sacrifice to the god—an event occasioned by her parents' bitter rift. The *mise en scène*, however, is the

much of it mentioning Plutarch's *Erotikos* in passing, see, for example, E. Cantarella (trans., M. Fant), *Pandora's Daughters. The Role and Status of Women in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Baltimore 1987); and reviews of recent literature: M. B. Skinner, "Des bonnes dames et méchantes," *CJ* 83 (1987) 69–74 and G. Casadio, "La donna nel mondo antico . . ." *StudPat* 34 (1987) 73–90.

¹⁵ For Plutarch's feminism see P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods. An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), esp. 1–12; R. Flacelière, "Caton d'Utique et les femmes;" H. Martin, "Amatorius (Moralia 748E–71E)," in H. D. Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1978) 442–537; K. O'Brien Wicker, "Mulierum Virtutes (Moralia 242E–63C)," in Betz, 106–34; idem, "First Century Marriage Ethics: A Comparative Study of the Household Codes and Plutarch's Conjugal Precepts," in J. W. Flanagan and A. W. Robinson, *No Famine in the Land* (Missoula, Montana 1975) 141–53; L. Goessler, *Plutarch's Gedanken über die Ehe* (Zurich 1962), esp. 15–43; M. Pinnoy, "Plutarchus' Consolatio ad Uxorem," *Klio* 9 (1979) 65–86; W. L. Odom, *A Study of Plutarch. The Position of Greek Women in the First Century after Christ* (unpubl. diss. Virginia 1961); V. Longoni (introd., D. Del Como), *Plutarco. Sull'amore* (Milano 1986); A. Borghini, "Per una semiologia del comportamento: strutture di scambio amoroso (Plut. *Erot.* 766C–D)," in *Scritti in Ricordo di G. Buratti* (Pisa 1981) 11–39; F. Le Corsu, *Plutarque et les femmes dans les "Vies Parallèles"* (Paris 1981).

¹⁶ The *Erotikos*, like Petronius' Banquet in the *Satyricon*, seems influenced by Xenophon's *Symposion*. On Xenophon, see Foucault, II, 116, 167, 248, 256; Goessler, 22. Xenophon, 8. 3, praises conjugal love. Kallimachos' *Epigram* 1 advises a youth not to marry above his status.

¹⁷ Beautifully interpreted by C. Segal, "Ovid's Cephalus and Procris: Myth and Tragedy," *GB* 7 (1978) 175–205, esp. 177, 183. For a less idealistic interpretation see F. E. Brenk, "Tumulo Solacia or Foedera Lacti: The Myth of Cephalus and Procris in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*," *AugAge* 2 (1982/1983) 9–22.

nearby shrine of the Muses on Mount Helicon, where Plutarch and his friends have retired for more tranquillity.¹⁸ For a clamorous event had broken the traditional somnolence of Thespiiai. Bacchon, the town's celebrated love (*eromenos*), had been contemplating marriage with a young and wealthy widow, Ismenodora. But being a minor he had asked for more experienced advice. The two referees, though, deadlocked, have entrusted the decision to Plutarch and his friends. A debate now ensues over the superiority of homosexual or heterosexual love—for boys or women—with each side denigrating the other, and over the relative merits of marrying above one's status. At that moment a friend gallops up to relate that not only has Ismenodora kidnapped the apparently willing Bacchon from the *palaistra* but her female friends have already dressed him in a wedding gown (*himation*) (754E–55A).¹⁹

The second important consideration is the assertion—in regard to the Platonic doctrine of love—that “dim, faint effluvia of the truth” are scattered about in Egyptian mythology (762A). This is not an isolated cadence, for at 764A Soklaros asks Plutarch to return to the Egyptian material:

But as for your hint that Egyptian myth is in accord with the Platonic doctrine of Eros, you can no longer keep from revealing and explaining your meaning. We would love to hear even only a small bit of matters so great.

Plutarch at this point, as in his essay *On Isis and Osiris*, alludes to one Egyptian myth identifying Eros with the sun and another identifying Aphrodite with the moon. He continues with his own explanation of the philosophical distinction between the sun, which belongs to the visible (*horaton*) and Eros, part of the intelligible sphere (*noeton*).

The matter is dropped there, but it suggests Plutarch's reinterpretation of the Eros of Plato's “middle” period (*Symposion*, *Phaidros*, *Politeia* [*Republic*], and *Phaidon*).²⁰ Moreover, Plutarch seems to “sign” his work. He apparently is referring here to the final speech of *On the E at Delphi*—which explains the distinction between the visible sun and the true Apollon—

¹⁸ The feminism of Plutarch's dialogues is limited: women—even his wife and Ismenodora—should be heard (about) but not seen (or talk).

¹⁹ Goessler (27) discusses the dramatic techniques here.

²⁰ See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 184–230, esp. 201; “The Academy in the Middle Platonic Period,” *Dionysius* 3 (1979) 63–78, esp. 65–68; “Plutarch and Second Century Platonism,” in A. H. Armstrong, ed., *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality* (London 1986) 214–29, esp. 223–25; J. Gucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978) 96–97, 207–71; P. L. Donini, *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino* (Torino 1982) 117–21, and “Plutarco, Ammonio e l'Academia,” in *Miscellanea plutarcea*, 97–110; J. Barthelmess, “Recent Work on the *Moralia*,” *idem* 61–81, esp. 72–74; C. Froidefond, “Plutarque et le platonisme,” *ANRW* II. 36. 1 (1987) 185–233; J. Whittaker, “Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire,” *idem* 81–123, esp. 117–21; F. E. Brenk, “An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia,” *idem* 248–349, esp. 262–75 (“Indices,” *ANRW* II. 36. 2 [1987] 1300–22).

Helios, the one and unchangeable God, whose image is the sun. He also seems to publicize a future *Isis and Osiris*, his treatise on Egyptian Isis religion. The vocabulary of the *Erotikos* and the tentative manner of broaching the subject appear to exclude an already issued *Peri Isidos kai Osiridos*.

The reference reinforces the chronological relationship between the *Erotikos* and the *Peri Isidos*—dialogues most likely belonging to Plutarch's latest period of literary activity.²¹ We are only beginning to understand the status of women in the Early Empire. But Plutarch, with some ambivalence, certainly succumbed to the epoch's fascination for Isis. In his essay on the Isiac religion he transformed the central myth, the goddess Isis' search for the dead Osiris and resuscitation of her husband's body, into a Platonic allegory of the soul's ascent toward the Form of the Beautiful. But in his desire to metamorphosize the myth into a Middle Platonic allegory with Osiris symbolizing the Form of the Beautiful and Isis as his lover, he redirected the main thrust of Isis religion, which is centered on the power and omnipotence of Isis.

In the light of *On Isis and Osiris* some of the more radical developments of the *Erotikos* receive sharper contours. Plutarch's most spectacular achievement—contrasting with Plato's *Symposion* and *Phaidros*—might appear to be the eulogy of heterosexual married love and, in particular, the element of reciprocity between male and female. But such a view was actually current in philosophical circles long before Plutarch. Such love was a popular theme in Roman literature—though often patronizing, humorous, or pathetic—for example, in Ovid. Plutarch's greatest achievement, then, was not the glorification of heterosexual—and especially married—love over homosexual or pederastic love but rather the introduction of heterosexual love into the Platonist's study—namely the ascent of the soul to the Beautiful in Itself, and a new anthropomorphic conception of the Beautiful as the final goal (*telos*) of the soul. Thus the calling card of the Middle Platonists, "assimilation to God" (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) acquires a very literal meaning.²²

²¹ See Flacelière, 7–11; C. P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works," *JRS* 56 (1966) 61–74 (66), and *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 34. Froidefond, 211–12, accepts Flacelière's arguments. On *Peri Isidos* see G. W. Bowersock, "Some Persons in Plutarch's *Moralia*," *CQ* 15 (1965) 267–70; discussion in F. E. Brenk, *In Mist Appareled. Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (Leiden 1977) 5–6.

The *Markos Antonios*, one of the last, or the last, *Lives* of Plutarch, also uses the Isis motif. See Brenk, "Imperial Heritage," 319—citing F. Le Corsu, "Cléopâtre-Isis," *Bull. Soc. Franç. d'Égyptolog.* 82 (1978) 22–23, and *Isis. Son mythe et ses mystères* (Paris 1977) 86–91, *Plutarque et les femmes dans les "Vies Parallèles"* (Paris 1981) 220–23. The matter is treated in C. B. R. Pelling's commentary, *Plutarch, Life of Antony* (Cambridge 1988) 251–52, 319.

²² Froidefond treats Plutarch's *daimon* (with the rejection of Plato's *Eros-daimon*), the twist on ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, and the close relationship between the *Erotikos* and *Peri Isidos* (206–12). See also, D. Babut, "Sur quelques énigmes du 'Phèdre,'" *BAGB* (1987, 3) 260–84; 277.

Plutarch's allegorization of the Isis myth combines—or confuses—the fundamentals of Platonism. Such confusion has enormous consequences for the conception of three fundamentals of Middle Platonism: matter, God (*Demiourgos* or *Nous*), and the model (*paradeigma* or Form).²³ In Plutarch's allegorical interpretation of the Isis myth, reflected in the *Erotikos*, these elements become terribly confused. Platonic matter (receptacle, potency, etc.) refuses to sit quietly at home while the Form of the Beautiful delights in its (his, His) new-found mind (*logos*, or *nous*). A corollary—not fully developed by Plutarch but with a great future—is the divine love for the soul, a love going far beyond the mere paternal or providential love of gods or God in Greek religion or philosophy. The Form of the Beautiful, once only an object, rejoices not only in its new-found mind but also in its power to return or initiate love. But Osiris, who is identified with the Form, also has *nous* and is responsible for the creation of the world. Thus, Osiris is assimilated somewhat to the *Demiourgos*. Isis, who is matter, also has *nous* and as the object of Osiris' love assumes something of the function of the Form.

The Platonic ascent toward the Form of the Beautiful as a passive intellectual object has been transformed by Plutarch into the reciprocal love of the soul and its *telos*, conceived of as both the Form of the Beautiful and a divine person. First, speaking of Eros as the soul's guide to the Beautiful he compares the god to the sun—in Plato and in Plutarch an image of the Form of the Beautiful. In the ever fluid and slippery allegorical interpretations of *Peri Isidos*, Osiris, too, like Eros, is the guide to the *telos*, or vision, and is compared to the sun. This Platonic aspect of the allegorical interpretation of the myth is also traditional.

Once the inner dynamic of the Isis religion enters, the goddess becomes a very active element, analogous to the supreme divinity of the aretalogies. Even in Plutarch's minimalizing account, she is the driving force which discovers and reanimates Osiris' dismembered body, in love overcoming all obstacles, even the death of the beloved. The terminology for the divine union is that of Plato's homosexual or pederastic lovers. But we should not forget that even Plato treated Alkestis, who died for her husband, Admetos, as a supreme example of dedicated love, nor that her love, like that of Isis, overcame death (nor, perhaps, that it was Euripides who immortalized her). Isis, like the pederast, must be the active element; for the quest for the beloved precedes that for the Beautiful. Osiris corresponds first to the beloved boy, then to the Form of the Beautiful in the Platonic works. For the strikingly erotic union of the soul with the Form, Plato again was Plutarch's inspiration, but, as so often, the pupil outstripped the master.

²³ Elaborated by S. M. Chiodi, "Tematica ierogamica nel *De Iside*," *Miscellanea plutarcea*, 121–26, and "Demiurgia e ierogamia nel *De Iside* plutarceo. Un'esegesi platonica del mito egiziano," *SMSR* 52 (1986) 33–51. See also Brenk, "Imperial Heritage," 301–03; Froidefond, 224–25, 231.

Subtle, perhaps unconscious, transformations occur in the elaboration of the philosophical myth as Plutarch replaces Plato's primarily homosexual model with a heterosexual one. Osiris (Form of the Beautiful) must according to the myth also be an active element, the eternal lover of Isis (receptacle, *chora*, matter, potency, etc.). Isis' ardent lover Osiris thus replaces the inanimate object—the passive, though divine and intelligible but not rational, Platonic Form. Reciprocity is extolled. Plutarch has not only betrayed Plato by creating a different function for the Form but has planted a time-bomb in Platonism, the acceptance by future Platonists of an equivalence between God and the Form.

We can begin to discern the creeping metamorphosis of Platonic terminology. "Lovely" (*erasmion*, *Erotikos* 765D, F) reflects *erasmiotaton* used in *Phaidros* (250E) for the Form of the Beautiful, but "beloved" (*agapetos*, 765D) is an intruder. Also somewhat unusual is "dear" (*philion*, 765D). Combined, we find this remarkable description of the soul's reaction to the Beautiful: "... courting . . . the truly lovable and blessed and beloved of all and dear" (τὸ ἐράσμιον ἀληθῶς καὶ μακάριον καὶ φίλιον ἅπασιν καὶ ἀγαπητόν, 765D), echoed at 765F: "produces a refraction of memory from that appearing beautiful here, toward the divine and lovable and in all truth blessed and marvelous Beauty" (. . . τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ μακάριον ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐκεῖνο καὶ θαυμάσιον καλόν).²⁴ In the *Phaidros* we find "the desire and mystery of true lovers" (προθυμία μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, 253C) but this is applied to human love.²⁵ We do find, though, in relationship to "the divine Beautiful in itself, unique in form" (αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν μονοειδές) the ambiguous word "consorting with" (συνεῖναι, συνόντος αὐτῷ, *Symposion* 211D, 212A), and following upon a pederastic context "yearn for Being" (ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος, *Phaidon* 65C), "love the truth [the true] (ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, *Philebos* 58D).²⁶ *Makarion*, which has divine, eschatological, and erotic connotations in Plutarch, in Plato is applied to the vision rather than to the Form itself: "the blessed vision ("beatific vision") and sight" (μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, *Phaidros* 250B), "of mysteries most blessed, . . . happy, straightforward appearances" (τελετῶν . . . μακαριωτάτην . . . ἀπλᾶ . . .

²⁴ See Martin, "Amatorius," 521. 765D is paralleled in *Symposion* 204C, where τὸ ἐραστόν = τὸ τῷ ὄντι καλὸν καὶ ἀβρὸν καὶ τέλειον καὶ μακαριστόν; cf. Alkinoos, *Didaskalikos* XXVII. 2 (180. 6–8) (perhaps influenced by Plato, *Timaios* 87C). See Whittaker, "Platonic Philosophy," 92, and "Proclus and the Middle Platonists," in J. Pépin, ed., *Proclus. Lecteur et interprète des Anciens* (Paris 1987) 287–89. This was a key text in Middle Platonism, with a notable parallel in Alkinoos X (165. 27) and Plutarch, *Peri Isidos* 374D: τοῦ πρώτως ἐραστοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ καὶ τελείου καὶ αὐτάρκους (8 πρώτως V: πρώτου O [hiatus] ἐραστοῦ Markl. at cf. Platonis loc. cit. / ἐφετοῦ] ἀφετοῦ m).

²⁵ 253C 3 τελετή corr. Par. 1808: τελευτή BT. OCT texts and apparatus used for the Platonic quotations. On τελετή over τελευτή, see C. J. Rowe, *Plato: Phaedrus* (Warminster 1986) 187; Brenk, *JHS* 107 (1987) 206.

²⁶ So A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris 1950) 352–53—with some exaggeration.

καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα, *Phaidros* 250B–C), and at 256A–B the better life in this world is called “most blessed and harmonious” (μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὁμοιοητικόν).²⁷

Since Plato was more concerned with presenting an intellectual vision of the Form, he continually stresses direct vision, sight, an intellectual knowledge or grasp when he comes to speak directly of the Form. The erotic association of Isis with the Form of the Beautiful (Osiris) in the *Peri Isidos* comes from Plato's description of the passion of homosexual love, the prelude to real love—which in the *Phaidros* is reciprocal. At times this vocabulary, when used for the Form, is startling—even though it is more traditional than one might expect. For example we find “associating in beautiful things” (τοῖς καλοῖς ὁμιλήσας, *Erotikos* 766B) and “this goddess also who participates always with the first god and is associated with Him in the love of the fair and lovely things about him . . . in love . . . consorts with him . . . yearns for him . . . and being importunate over him . . . (συνούσαν ἔρωτι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνον ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν . . . ἐρᾶν . . . συνούσαν . . . ποθεῖν . . . γλιχομένην ἐκεῖνον, *Peri Isidos* 374F–75A), “loving always and pursuing and consorting in love with” (ἐρῶσαν ἀεὶ καὶ διώκουσαν καὶ συνούσαν, 383A) for Isis' love of the Beautiful (*kallos*) as a model for the soul's intellectual vision.²⁸

As elsewhere in Plutarch we find him somewhat reluctant to directly identify God with the Form of the Beautiful. Here, for Isis' love of Osiris he employs the phrase “the beautiful and fair things about him” (συνούσαν ἔρωτι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνον ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν, 374F–75A), where in the Greek of his period, for example, “those about Epikouros” can simply mean “Epikouros.” Similarly the conduct of Osiris, who is equivalent to the supreme God and the Form of the Beautiful, is described in ambiguous language: “. . . of which end (*telos*) is the knowledge of the first and lord—whom the goddess encourages us to seek—beside her and with her living and consorting” (. . . παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα, 352A).

Makarion also takes on an erotic context. The soul's desire for the Platonic Form at *Erotikos* 765F is for “the divine and lovable and dear and

²⁷ See C. Riedweg, *Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von Alexandrien* (Berlin 1987), with reference to gold plates, epigraphy etc., esp. 334.

²⁸ Text of *Peri Isidos*, J. G. Griffiths, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (Cambridge 1970); see in particular, 71–74, 563–65; and J. Hani, *La religion égyptienne dans la pensée de Plutarque* (Paris 1976) 20–21.

Professor Donini believes the *Erotikos* presupposes, and was chronologically close to, Plutarch's *De Facie in Orbe Lunae*—especially evident at *Erotikos* 764D. In his view, Plutarch in *De Facie* 939E, 944E, and 945C already toys with sexual distinctions and erotic language for the female moon and male sun (as the image of the Good [*Politeia*] and supreme God and Father-Begetter of the Kosmos [*Timaios*]); but he discovered in the Egyptian myth more fertile possibilities for sexual and reciprocal symbolism.

Plutarch's allegorical interpretation was aided by virtually limiting himself to pre- or early Hellenistic sources (Griffiths, 75–100, esp. 84–85), where Osiris has more importance than Isis.

beloved . . . Beauty" (*theion, erasmion, makarion . . . kalon*)²⁹ The phrase is not unlike that in Plutarch's treatise *On the Face in the Moon*, the final part of which contains an eschatological myth. Here intellect sees an image of the Form reflected in the sun. Intellect (*nous*) is separated from soul (*psyche*) through love of "the desirable and beautiful and divine and blessed" (*epheton, kalon, theion, makarion*, 944E) "for which all nature in one way or another yearns" (ὁρέγεται—another ambiguous term).³⁰ Plato's impersonal descriptions of the Form—"the really real" (*to ontos on*), "of single form" (*monoeides*)—tend to disappear. Plutarch's *hagnos* (pure, holy, inviolable) joins the Platonic *hieros* (holy) and *katharos* (pure) in the context of the Beautiful: "the holy and sacred (*hieros* and *hosios*) Osiris," "the invisible and the unseen, the dispassionate and pure (*hagnon*) kingdom of Osiris" (*Peri Isidos* 375E, 382–83A). In Plutarch's romantic context the intellectual vision is not only, as in Plato, a mystery (*telete*) but also a marriage made in heaven, a *hieros gamos*.³¹

The language in some respects echoes Philo, the Alexandrian philosopher of the Julio-Claudian period, who also equates God with the Form of the Beautiful. *On the Cherubim* speaks of God being the summit and the goal (*telos*) of happiness (*eudaimonia*)—"blessed, incorruptible, bestowing on all from the fountain of the beautiful (Beautiful? [*kalon*]); for the things of this world would not be beautiful, if they were not impressions from the archetype, in truth, the uncreated beautiful, blessed (*makarion*), imperishable" (86). Or, "God himself becomes our *hierophantes* causing us to see the hidden beauties (*kalle*), invisible to non-initiates . . . You souls, who have tasted the divine love(s) (*theioi erotes*), hasten toward the vision, which draws all eyes to itself . . ." (*On Dreams* I. 164, 165); ". . . he entered into the darkness where God was, that is, into the unseen, invisible, incorporeal, and model essence (*paradeigmatike ousia*) of all existent things . . . revealing Himself a work like a painting, all beautiful and divine in form." (*Moses* I. 158). Some contemplate the "Uncreated, Divine, the First Good, and Beautiful and Happy (*eudaimon*) and Blessed (*makarion*), . . . that better than the Good and more beautiful than the Beautiful, and more blessed than blessedness, more happy, moreover, than happiness itself (. . . τὸ κρεῖττον μὲν ἀγαθοῦ, κάλλιον δὲ καλοῦ, καὶ μακαριότητος μὲν μακαριώτερον, εὐδαιμονίας δὲ αὐτῆς

²⁹ Martin, "Amatorius," 492–94, 522. Whittaker, "Platonic Philosophy," 92, notes that—influenced by *Timaios* 87C—the couplet *theion* and *erasmion* appears as well in Alkinoos, *Didaskalikos* XXVII. 2 (180. 6–8) and may have been popular in Middle Platonism.

³⁰ The term *epheton* is defined as Aristotelian in H. Cherniss and W. C. Helmbold, *Plutarch's Moralia* XII (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 213, note g. But Whittaker, seeing its roots rather in *Philebos* 20D, observes that though Plutarch and Alkinoos—independently and alone among Middle Platonists—used it, it did not resurface until the Neoplatonists ("Proclus," 287–88).

³¹ Y. Vernière, "Initiation et eschatologie chez Plutarque," in J. Ries, ed., *Les rites d'initiation* (Louvain-La Neuve 1986) 335–52, esp. 338, 346, 349, treats the mystery aspect.

εὐδαιμονέστερον. . .) and of anything else besides the above—should it exist—more perfect.” (*Embassy to Gaius* 5)³²

Plato's *Timaios*—on the nature of the universe—for which we have a long Plutarchan commentary, is responsible for some of the changes. Both extol *logos* and *noeton*. But though the Form of the Beautiful exists in the *noeton*, neither Plato nor Plutarch in his commentary attribute *logos* to the Form. *Logos* belongs *par excellence* to the Craftsman-Creator, the *Demiourgos*. Plato's own thought on creation was obviously obscure. The elusiveness of God in Plato elsewhere and the tendency of Platonic philosophy after him suggest that his *Demiourgos* belongs to an Einsteinian understanding of the intelligibility granted matter. The *kosmos* itself contains a kind of intelligence or power of evolution and self-organization—albeit, a rationality (*logos*), unlike that of the Stoics, physically separate from matter. But outstanding commentators on the *Timaios*, both ancient and modern, have interpreted the *Demiourgos* not merely as an allegorical representation of the intelligibility shaping matter but as a non-anthropomorphic mind (*nous*) responsible for the evolution of the cosmos.³³ In any case the line between the complex of Ideas, the intelligible universe (*kosmos noetos*), and *nous* had begun to wear thin by Plutarch's day. His simplifying approach to Plato, combining elements from disparate passages, though cautious in its terminology, radically transforms the impersonal *telos* of Plato into an anthropomorphic, even erotic God. The Isis myth may have led him whither he willed not, but the pretext of an allegorical interpretation allowed him more freedom in expressing his new concept of God than would a strictly philosophical exposition. At least, in the allegorical interpretation he appears more radical than elsewhere.

Heterosexual love, as in the old cosmogonic myths, begins the universe. The love of Isis and Osiris—who apparently had studied Plutarch's commentary on the *Timaios*—generates their child Horos, an allegory for the *kosmos*. Divine love becomes the paradigm for human love. Thus, human *aphrodisia* receive a new philosophical and religious dimension. Human love becomes a reflection of the quasi-eternal divine

³² Philo texts those of R. Arnaldez et al., eds., *Les oeuvres de Philon* (Paris 1963–1972); see XXXII, A. Pelletier, *Legatio ad Caium* (1972) 64, note 2, for parallels here. J. Dillon, “The Transcendence of God in Philo: Some Possible Sources,” *Center for Hermeneutical Studies* 16 (1975) 1–8, with responses by G. E. Caspary, 9–18, and D. Winston, 19–22, is an excellent discussion of this knotty problem. Similar to Philo and Plutarch is Alkinoos (Albinos), *Didaskalikos* X. 3 (164); see Invernizzi, 26, and Whittaker, “Platonic Philosophy,” 102–10.

³³ Discussion in Brenk, “Imperial Heritage,” 262–75, esp. 263, 268–69; add J. B. Skemp, “The Spirituality of Socrates and Plato,” *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality*, 103–20 (116–19); and R. D. Mohr, *The Platonic Cosmology* (Leiden 1985) 39–41. See also J. P. Hershbell, “Plutarch's ‘De animae procreatione in Timaeo’: An Analysis of Structure and Content,” *ANRW* II. 36. 1 (1987) 234–47, esp. 235–38. In Middle Platonism the *Demiourgos* moved from supreme principle active in the world to a second God (*Nous*)—sometimes confused with the world-soul; see Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 7.

love which begot and continues to beget the world and all within. The *aphrodisia* are not simply the Epicurean sensual motions constituting sexual pleasure—so well described in the verses of Lucretius' *De rerum natura*—motions deprived of mystery and religious significance. Rather, they hint at the soul's eternal destiny. An image of the love which generated Plato's most perfect *kosmos*, they aid in the philosophical ascent. In marriage, though, as in Plato's myth of lovers, human love must deepen. With the passage of time the more sexual or sensual aspects of love should cede to a purer and more intellectual appreciation of the other's true beauty. Marriage, then, initiates Platonic love—conceived, however, not as a movement toward an impassive Form but for a responsive Lover.

Ring composition, appropriate to this Greek setting, will hopefully swing us back where we began, to the tale of Ismenodora and Bacchon. In her love for Bacchon, Ismenodora, like Isis, is the driving force. Her name, though indicating force (*is, menos*), also suggests Isis. As beautiful and lovable, the boy Bacchon represents the Form of the Beautiful, the destiny of the true lover. His name—a form of Bacchos—suggests Dionysos, the Greek name for Osiris. Passive in receiving her love, once she has taken the initiative, he also actively returns it—becoming even more assimilated to Osiris, the god of reciprocal love.³⁴

A simultaneous plot, leaving the resolution in doubt until the last minute, parallels the denouement of the philosophical inquiry. The literary medium is that of *On the Daimonion of Sokrates*. The theme of this dialogue is the nature of Sokrates' *daimonion* ("the divine," or "supernatural"—not really "*genius*"), but through the dialogue the exciting events of the Theban insurrection under Epaminondas against Spartan rule are woven. The Ismenodora-Bacchon tale, commencing and finishing the dialogue, is not extraneous. The *Erotikos* is played out against a backdrop of the visible love of Ismenodora and Bacchon—the *horaton*, so to speak—while the *noeton*, the invisible *hierogamia* with the now personal Beautiful, embraces the *logos* of the participants. Such a *hierogamia* is the *telos* of each true lover. The female's aggressivity in the quest for the Form of the Beautiful (Bacchon, Osiris), then, is the underlying thread of the "phenomenal" romances which close the work.

As in the entire Plutarchan corpus, divided between philosophy (*Ethika*) and lives (*Bioi*), real events balance against theoretical speculation. Plutarch's examples of heroic women are notable too in not being limited, like those of Plato, to Athens or mythical Greece. Rather, geographically

³⁴ Professor Barigazzi notes the real etymology of the heroine's name—"gift of Ismenos," (the river of Thebes). Dionysiac associations may be intended; cf. Euripides, *Bacchai* 5: "I have arrived at Dirke's streams and Ismenos' water." Naturally such connotations add to the mystical-eschatological orientation of the *Erotikos*, besides linking "Ismenodora" to "Bacchon." Plutarch omits at this point the role of Bacchon as Eros-mystagogue, leading Ismenodora to the Idea (Form) of the Beautiful.

they reflect the universal breadth of the Graeco-Roman world. In tone, too, they breathe a realism not so evident in the world of Plato's dialogues. Camma, who avenges her husband by drinking a poisonous toast with his murderer, is from Gaul. So is Empona, who ostensibly mourning her dead husband, mates with him in his underground hiding place and bears him sons.³⁵ The quasifictional character, Semiramis—whose assassination of Ninos is related earlier in the dialogue—is Assyrian.

With the exception of the Semiramis story, the tales of female virtue or courage—of Camma and Empona and their husbands—are in fact traditional depictions of womanly virtue. Still they underscore the courage and tenacity of women dedicated to a beloved husband. Above all Ismenodora and Semiramis, who assume male roles, symbolize the new erotic dialectic.³⁶ One, in abducting Bacchon, assumes the role of Herakles—the epitome of masculinity and philandering. Semiramis, only the maid and concubine of a palace slave of Ninos, becomes through her intelligence a Klytaimnestra, not only contriving the execution of the king and ruling in his place but winning Plutarch's approbation. The other accounts, though, besides being illustrations of courage and nobility—demolishing the denigrations of pederasts—contain primary Isiac themes: a wife's search and mourning for her dead or assumed to be dead husband, the bearing of children to the "defunct" (Empona); revenge for murder (Camma), and undying, married love triumphing over death and the grave.

Essential to the dialogue is the counterpoint in themes of harmony and disharmony—not surprising where the Muses and Eros invisibly preside. The dialogue begins with the dissonance between the parents of Plutarch's wife, the event bringing the young couple to Thespiiai. There follows the strange resonance between Ismenodora and Bacchon, the disharmonious arguments deadlocking the referees, the *choros* of the friendly circle of Plutarch, the discord of their arguments, the harmony of Ismenodora and Bacchon, which turns abduction into marriage, the return to the disharmony of the arguments of homo- and heteroadvocates, the accord of Ptolemaios Philadelphos ("lover of his sister") and his concubine Belestiche, the sour note in the love story of Ninos, assassinated by Semiramis, the wedding preparations of Ismenodora and Bacchon soon to be celebrated in song, followed by the Roman Galba's resignation to his wife's strident infidelity, the sun's and moon's tuneful progression, and the harmonious finale, the undying loves of Camma and Sinatus, of Empona and Sabinus.³⁷

³⁵ Recounted in Plutarch's *Mulierum Virtutes* 257E–58C (Flacelière, 152); see also Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods*, 103–06; on Empona, Flacelière, 154–55.

³⁶ Flacelière, 138; A. M. G. Capomacchia, *Semiramis. Una femminilità ribaltata* (Rome 1986), esp. 24–26, 29–31. The story appeared in a romance found in many versions. Other of Plutarch's heroines here are Abrotonon (Habrotonon?) of Thrace, Bacchis of Miletos, and Belestiche of Alexandria.

³⁷ And the reconciliation of all the participants (Longoni, 159–60).

In conclusion, the philosophical originality of the *Erotikos* consists not particularly in its egalitarian treatment of love and marriage. Rather the evaluation of marriage, including sexuality, in the ascent toward the Form, and the identification of the Form with a loving God are its revolutionary aspects. The powerful expression of the dialogue, however, emphasizing striking contrast with Plato's *Symposion* and *Phaidros* conceals the more radical philosophical message.³⁸

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³⁸ Thanks are due to Professors Christopher J. Rowe of Bristol and John Whittaker of Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland, for carefully going over the manuscript and making many helpful corrections and suggestions—the first especially in the Platonic matter and the second in the Middle Platonic parallels. The author is grateful also to Professors John Dillon of Trinity College, Dublin, Adelmo Barigazzi of the University of Florence, and Pier-Luigi Donini of Torino, who also kindly looked over the text and suggested improvements.

Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα—Sources and Credibility of
De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 8

JOHN GLUCKER

How does one ascertain that a saying ascribed to Zeno of Citium represents a genuine philosophical view of the founder of Stoicism? This is no idle question. By the time of Diogenes Laertius at the latest, most people seem no longer to have read the works of the early Stoics. Having completed the biographical section in his *Life of Zeno* (VII. 1–38), Diogenes proceeds to offer us, not a summary of Zeno's own philosophy, but a Stoic κοινή. His excuse for this (VII. 38)—διὰ τὸ τοῦτον κτίστην γενέσθαι τῆς αἱρέσεως—is feeble. The Stoics were no Epicureans or Pythagoreans, claiming to carry on and disseminate the “true doctrines” discovered once for all by a divine founder: even Diogenes' own doxography enters, from time to time, into details about disagreements and disputes among the various Stoics. Plato was also the founder of a “school of thought.” This does not prevent Diogenes from presenting us with a long summary of Plato's own ἀρέσκοντα (III. 67–109). When Diogenes' source supplies an account of various ἀγωγαί within the same school, he has no hesitation in reproducing his source's doxography with all the shades of difference (III. 86–97). It is merely that by his time, very few people were likely to have read the hundreds of scrolls written by Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and their disciples and followers—or rather, those of them still readily available. Even by the time of Cicero, the ordinary educated man—even a writer on philosophical themes like Cicero himself—did not attempt to read the original works of the early Stoics, but used summaries and doxographies. What about Plutarch?

It is not my intention here to deal, yet again, with the whole issue of Plutarch's familiarity with early Stoic sources. Much has been written on it, from many different angles, often in terms of such generalities and probabilities as “Plutarch, who read so much . . .” or “Plutarch must have read his Zeno—he quotes him so often” (the examples are my invention, but they are not pure fiction). I have chosen to concentrate on one piece of Plutarchean evidence which, I believe, can be treated as a test case. Here, then, is the text of *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 8:

Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα

‘μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης, πρὶν ἄμφω μῦθον ἀκούσης’

ἀντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος ‘εἴτ’ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπών, οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος (πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον), εἴτ’ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν (ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μηδ’ ὑπήκουσε κληθεὶς ἢ ὑπακούσας ἐτερέτισεν). ἦτοι δ’ ἀπέδειξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν· οὐκ ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος.’ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας αὐτὸς ἀντέγραφε μὲν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν, ἔλκε δὲ σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. καίτοι ἢ ἀπέδειξε Πλάτων ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξε τὰ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, κατ’ οὐδέτερον δ’ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον ἀντιγράφειν ἀλλὰ πάντως περιττὸν καὶ μάταιον. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.¹

A genuine piece of evidence for an “eccentric” Zenonian doctrine? This is the way in which our passage has been regarded by numerous distinguished scholars in the last hundred years or so. A. C. Pearson includes two parts of this chapter, as Fragments 29 (the anecdote) and 6 (ἔλκε—τοὺς μαθητάς) of Zeno, in his *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*.² On the anecdote, he comments: “The argument is couched in the syllogistic form which Zeno especially affected: see *Introd.* p. 33”³—where the specimens of syllogism he adduces are very different from the disjunctive argument in our passage. What matters, however, is that Pearson takes this chapter of Plutarch seriously as a piece of Zenonian doctrine. So does von Arnim, who has the anecdote as *SVF* I. 78 (Zeno, *Rhetorica*), the sentence concerning Plato as I. 259 (Zeno, *Ethica*), and the sentence on sophisms as I. 50 (Zeno, *Logica*). Nicola Festa regards the anecdote as the only surviving fragment of Zeno’s lost work “Ἐλεγχοὶ δύο.”⁴ Alfons Weische takes it to be an argument against Arcesilaus’ practice *in utramque partem disputandi*.⁵ Both are quoted by the late Harold Cherniss in a note to his edition of the text—true, without comments, but with an obvious acceptance of our passage as genuine evidence for a Zenonian doctrine.⁶ To crown it all, we have the clear statement of Professor Daniel Babut in his great work on Plutarch and the Stoics:

¹ Text: Pohlenz-Westman. I have omitted the apparatus, since there are no readings relevant to the argument.

² *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, with introduction and explanatory notes . . . by A. C. Pearson . . . (London 1891) 80–81; 60–61.

³ *Ibid.* p. 60.

⁴ Nicola Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, vol. I (Bari 1932) 115–16.

⁵ Alfons Weische, *Cicero und die neue Akademie* (Münster 1961) 77–78.

⁶ Plutarch’s *Moralia*, vol. XIII, part II, ed. by Harold Cherniss (Loeb Classical Library 1976) 429, note a. See his Introduction, 373–74.

En revanche, *De Stoic. rep.* p. 1034 E (7) [misprint for 8—J. G.], de portée beaucoup moins générale, et où Plutarque semble reproduire presque littéralement le raisonnement par lequel Zénon démontrait qu'il est inutile dans un procès—ou en débat philosophique—de prêter l'oreille aux deux parties ou d'écouter le point de vue de l'adversaire, doit être considéré comme une véritable citation, bien que Plutarque n'ait pas pris la peine ou n'ait pas pu indiquer de quel livre elle provenait, et bien qu'il ne prétende pas la reproduire mot à mot.⁷

Doit être considéré comme une véritable citation. After all this, one finds it surprising that this piece of "Zenonian doctrine" has not yet found its way into the standard histories of Greek Philosophy or of the Stoa.⁸

But hold. If the argument in our anecdote were to be regarded as representing a genuine philosophical position of Zeno, it would land him, not merely in the contradictions indicated by Plutarch. It would also imply a wholesale rejection of the task of dialectic as described by Zeno himself in *SVF* I. 48–49—both independent of Plutarch. It would also imply that such Chrysippean fragments as *SVF* II. 127–29 (all taken from Ch. 10 of *Stoic. Rep.*) constitute a complete departure from a doctrine of the founder of the school and a total rejection of that doctrine.

Let us now consider the form of the anecdote in our chapter. It is a story about Zeno answering with a counter-argument (ἀντέλεγεν), a literary quotation. Whether the hexametric line μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης κτλ. is Pseudo-Phocylides⁹ or Hesiod,¹⁰ it is not very likely that the ancient poet would have been introduced by Zeno as ὁ εἰπών, and that Zeno would quote him simply to contradict him. Zeno is not Socrates of the "aporetic dialogues." When Zeno wishes to quote poetry—even to alter its order or its sense—other expressions are used: συνεχῆς τε προεφέρετο . . . τοὺς . . . Εὐριπίδου στίχους (DL VII. 22); τοὺς θ' Ἑσιόδου στίχους μεταγράψαι οὕτω (ib. 25); φησὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης (ib. 28). No. It is far more likely that what we have here is not a quotation from one of Zeno's own works, in which the ancient hexameter is brought in only to be confuted, but an anecdote about Zeno. Someone, on some occasion, quoted this line of poetry against Zeno. Zeno countered him with his disjunctive argument—showing, by the way, in the very act of refuting him that he *had* listened to the other side: but on this later.

What we have here looks far more like the sort of literary anecdote called by ancient rhetoricians *χρεία*. A number of rhetorical manuals from

⁷ Daniel Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 222–23.

⁸ I find no mention of it, for example, in any edition of Zeller, Ueberweg-Praechter, or Pohlenz.

⁹ Diehl, *Anth. Lyr.*³ 2, p. 98, v. 87—cited in double square brackets. See his apparatus of testimonia to this line.

¹⁰ Fr. 338 Merkelbach-West.

late antiquity deal at some length with *χρεία* as a rhetorical device.¹¹ Their treatment of this sub-literary form is almost entirely the same, with many sentences and passages repeated virtually word for word (except for the more lengthy discussion of Theon, which is probably his own extension of what he had found in his source). The question of their common source (Hermogenes?) should be investigated elsewhere.¹² For our purpose, it would be enough to quote at random a definition of *χρεία* offered by one of these late rhetoricians:

χρεία ἐστὶ λόγος ἡ πρᾶξις εὐστοχος καὶ σύντομος, εἰς τι πρόσωπον ὀρισμένον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παραλαμβανομένη.¹³

It may also be of some use for our passage of Plutarch to note that one of these rhetoricians realized that not each and every *χρεία* has to be serious and to contain a moral: ἔστι δὲ χαριεντίζεσθαι τὴν χρείαν ἐνίστε μηδὲν ἔχουσαν βιωφελές.¹⁴ For the rest—as one could expect from handbooks of rhetoric for the instruction of beginners—*προγυμνάσματα*—much of their discussion is devoted to such exercises as turning a *χρεία* from one grammatical case to another; and their standard division of *χρεῖαι* is into *λογικαί*, *πρακτικαί*, *μικταί*—a “literary,” rather than a “philological” classification. Fortunately, we have an earlier and very

¹¹ Hermogenes, *Progymn.* ch. 3; Aphthonius, *Progymn.* ch. 3, pp. 23–25 Rabe; Theon, *Progymn.* chs. 5–6, Spengel, *Rhet. Graeci* 2, pp. 96–106; Nic. Soph., *Progymn.* ch. 3, Spengel 3, pp. 458–63. Modern literature: G. von Wartensleben, *Begriff der griechischen Chreia und Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer Form* (Heidelberg 1901) (with a collection of philosophers’ *χρεῖαι* on pp. 31–124—which does not include our anecdote in the Zeno section, pp. 128–30); Gustav Adolf Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon, Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig und Berlin 1909) 247–53; 269 ff.; Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetoric* (München 1960) vol. I, 536–40. Gerhard supplies numerous references to modern literature. Lausberg cites a wide range of ancient sources, both Greek and Latin. For more recent literature, see also Klaus Berger, “Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament,” *ANRW* II. 25. 2, 1031–1432, with an extensive bibliography, pp. 1379–1432. (The section relevant to our discussion: pp. 1092–1110, and bibl. 1092); Robert C. Tannenhill, “Types and Functions of Apophthegms in the Synoptic Gospels,” *ANRW* II, 25. 2, pp. 1792–1829 (bibl. pp. 1826–29). Berger has a “taxonomy” of *χρεῖαι* in Greek pagan and Jewish sources and the NT, according to “Frage und Anlass der Chrien” and “Struktur der Antwort” (pp. 1096–1103), which comes close to that of Quintilian, and many of his examples are helpful. On p. 1095, he also refers to literature on *χρεῖαι* in Rabbinic sources. Tannenhill’s division of *χρεῖαι* according to their purpose (“correction stories,” “quest stories,” “objection stories,” and the like) has more to do with modern literary theory than with ancient technique and practice. I owe the last two references to Professor Frederick E. Brenk.

¹² This common source is most likely to be later than Quintilian (see below), whose whole treatment is hardly aware of it. The great reputation of Hermogenes in late antiquity suggests that he may be the source.

¹³ Nic. Soph. (n. 11 above) 459.

¹⁴ Theon (n. 11 above) 96. See also his discussion of the “jocular” type of *χρεία*, pp. 99–101.

different discussion of *χρεία*, clearly independent of these later manuals, which divides *χρεῖαι* into more "philological" groups: Quintilian I. 9. 4:

Chriarum plura genera traduntur: unum simile sententiae, quod est positum in uoce simplici: "dixit ille" aut "dicere solebat"; alterum quod est in respondendo: "interrogatus ille," uel "cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit"; tertium huic non dissimile: "cum quis dixisset aliquid" uel "fecisset."

Quintilian goes on to mention also what the later rhetoricians called *πρακτικὴ χρεία*: *etiam in ipsorum factis esse chrian putant . . .* This should not detain us. For our purpose, the important type of *χρεία* is Quintilian's second category, in which someone was asked (*ἐρωτηθεὶς*) or was told something by someone else (*πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα*), and he responded (*εἶπεν*, *ἔφη*, *φησὶν* and the like). We shall soon return to this type of *chria* in *respondendo* and cast an eye on the numerous examples of it in Diogenes Laertius and some pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegmata. Let us first consider the nature and development of *χρεία* as a literary form.

The derivation of *χρεία* from the Homeric and Hesiodic *αἶνος* and the Aesopian fables, maintained by some modern scholars,¹⁵ seems to me unlikely. A fable employing animals as symbols of human character and behaviour and a story about a clever repartee by some great man—albeit that the purpose of both is "to point a moral and adorn a tale"—are two different things. *Χρεία* starts not immediately after the age of epic poetry but a few hundred years later, and in a philosophical *milieu*. The books of *χρεῖαι* ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope by Diogenes Laertius, quoting Sotion (DL VI. 80) are given in a "dissenting list": it is not in the main list of his works, probably derived from the Alexandrian catalogues, which precedes it. Von Wartensleben may be right in regarding Metrocles the Cynic (DL VI. 33) as the first compiler of a book of *χρεῖαι* known to us by title.¹⁶ With Zeno of Citium we seem to be on surer ground. Diogenes Laertius quotes one anecdote about Crates the Cynic, Zeno's own teacher, on the authority of Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν ταῖς χρεῖαις (VI. 91). Aristo of Chius is reported by Diogenes (VII. 163) to be the author of *χρειῶν ιά*; and Persaeus (VII. 36) as the author of *χρειῶν δ'*. It is far from certain that the *χρεία πρὸς Διόνυσον* ascribed by Diogenes (II. 84) to Aristippus of Cyrene is a collection of apophthegms: why the singular? The other work, *Χρειῶν τρία*, is ascribed to him in Sotion's alternative list (II. 85). It thus appears that the practice of gathering such anecdotes and publishing them arose first in the circles of the Cynics and the early Stoics. By the time we reach the first century BCE, we have five anecdotes ascribed expressly to the *Χρεῖαι* of Hecato, the pupil of Panaetius (DL VI. 4; 32; 95; VII. 26; 172), and two

¹⁵ Von Wartensleben (n. 11 above) 8–27; Gerhard (ib.) 247–53.

¹⁶ Von Wartensleben 29.

anecdotes likely to have been lifted from the same collection (VII. 2; 181).¹⁷ One can assume that in the three or four centuries which separate Diogenes Laertius from Hecato, such collections of χρεῖαι must have increased and multiplied as philosophy was leaving its private enclaves and becoming part of a gentleman's education. The pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegms belong to this literary form and most probably to this period. So does much of the material which went into the making of *Gnomologium Vaticanum* and other gnomologia.¹⁸

When we come to Diogenes Laertius, we note, not merely that he recounts innumerable χρεῖαι of various types—virtually hundreds of them. We would rather have been surprised if he did not. What is more significant is that most of his χρεῖαι tend to come in series, or in clusters, in one or two places in each life. Since I have not seen this phenomenon noted before,¹⁹ I supply here a provisional list of these clusters of χρεῖαι in Diogenes Laertius:

Book I Thales: 35–36; Solon: 58–59; 60; 63; Chilon: 68–69; 77; Bias: 86–87; Cleobulus: 91–92; Periander: 97–98; Anacharsis: 103–05; Myson: 107–08; Pherecydes: 117.

Book II Anaxagoras: 7; 10; Socrates: 30–36; Aristippus: 66–82; Stilbo: 114–18; 119; 127–28.

Book III Plato: 1–5.

Book IV Xenocrates: 10; Arcesilaus: 43; Bion: 47 (with the significant introduction: πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα χρεῖωδη πραγματεῖαν περιέχοντα.)²⁰; 48–51.

¹⁷ See Heinz Gomoll, *Der stoische Philosoph Hekaton* (Leipzig 1933) 90–91; 112–13.

¹⁸ As suggested already by Gerhard (n. 11 above) 252–53.

¹⁹ Richard Hope, *The Book of Diogenes Laertius* (New York 1930), deals mainly with Diogenes' probable sources for anecdotes in the various *Lives* (pp. 71, 82–83), and with a literary "taxonomy" of anecdotes according to their purpose and function (pp. 169–74). Eduard Schwartz, article *Diogenes Laertius* (*Diogenes* 40), *RE* V (= *Realencyclopädie*, vol. v) (1905) 738–63, finds it sufficient to say: "Dass Diogenes Apophthegmensammlungen vorlagen, sah schon Bahnsch; diese Untersuchungen lassen sich nur auf Grund handschriftlichen Materials weiterführen" (758). But why? Bahnsch has not been available to me. I find no reference to χρεῖαι in our latest book on this theme of the sources, Jørgen Mejer, *Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background*, Hermes Einzelschriften 40 (Wiesbaden 1978)—where one might have expected something in the section "Biographies of Philosophers," 90–93.

²⁰ Confirming, in similar words, the etymology offered by Theon (n. 11 above) 97: ὅτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων χρεῖωδης ἐστὶ τῷ βίῳ. Von Wartensleben (n. 11 above) 28–29, argues for this etymology, against the fantastic derivation from χρησμός suggested by Wilhelm Goettling, but he does not refer to this passage of Diogenes. The derivation of χρεῖα from χρεῖωδης—although not much else about its nature and history—was already taken for granted by Isaac Casaubon, *Animadversiones in Athenaeum* (Lugduni 1645) ("the last edition revised by the author!") 4, line 22 ff.

Book V	Aristoteles: 17–19; Demetrius: 81.
Book VI	Antisthenes: 3–9; Diogenes: 22–28; 30; 33–69; 80; 91.
Book VII	Zeno Citieus: 16; 19–26; Aristo Chius: 163; Cleanthes: 171–74; Chrysippus: 182–84.
Book VIII	Pythagoras: 9; Theano: 43.
Book IX	Zeno Eleaticus: 27; Pyrrho: 64; 66; 113.

Whether Diogenes compiled these large clusters of anecdotes from various collections available to him, or copied them from one or two *gnomologia* which already existed in his time, is a moot question. We simply do not know about the structure of these early collections of *χρεῖαι*. Some of the later *gnomologia* which have reached us are arranged in a “doxographical” manner, by themes; some are arranged by philosophers.²¹ The existence of clusters of *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes, and his general manner of work, would suggest that such a collection of *χρεῖαι* arranged under the names of individual philosophers (Hecato’s?) was employed. What is of far greater interest to us is the very large number of *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes and other sources which employ the formulae ἐρωτηθεῖς or πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα in their “protasis,” and ἔφη, εἶπεν (or the like) in their “apodosis”: Quintilian’s *chria in respondendo*. Again, I have not seen this issue of the formulaic structure of *χρεῖαι* treated anywhere in this particular fashion. I therefore supply here another provisional list of three types of *χρεῖαι*: the plain *dixit* or *dicere solebat*, Quintilian’s first category; *interrogatus ille*, his category II. 1; and *cum hoc ei dictum esset*, his II. 2. I have taken my examples, for what is, after all, a provisional list, from Diogenes Laertius, and from the pseudo-Plutarchean Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν (BΣ) and Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά (ΑΛ).

I. *dixit; dicere solebat* (ἔφη, ἔλεγε, ἔφασκε and the like).

DL I. 35; 58; 63; 69; 77; 86; 87; 91; 103; 104; 105; 108;
II. 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 36; 67; IV. 48; 49; 50; 51; V.
18; 19; VI. 3; 5; 6; 8; 27; 28; 30; 33; 35; 38; 46; 49;
51; VII. 21; 22; 23; IX. 64.

II. *interrogatus ille . . . respondit* (ἐρωτηθεῖς and the like . . . ἔφη and the like).

²¹ Some, like the famous *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, are arranged by “doxographical” headings. Since doxography started with Theophrastus, it is not impossible that even some of the earliest books of *χρεῖαι* may have been arranged in this manner. But it appears that this literary form began in Cynic and Stoic circles. Disciples of the early Cynics and Stoics were at least very likely to arrange their collections by names of philosophers, to glorify their own masters. For a recent discussion of *gnomologia*, with copious references to manuscript material and modern research, see Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia*, American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn. 1975) 9–35.

DL I. 35; 36; 58; 59; 68; 77; 86; 87; 103; 104; 105; II. 10; 33; 68; 69; 70; 72; 73; 76; 80; III. 38; IV. 48; V. 17; 18; 19; VI. 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 27; 47; 49; 50; 51; 52; 54; 55; 56; 60; 62; 63; 67; 68; 69; VII. 23; 24; 26; 172; VIII. 43; IX. 113.

BE 176D; 184C; 185A; 190D; 194A.

AA 210E; F; 212C; 213C; 215D; 216C; 217D; 218F; 220A; F; 222E; 224D; 225D; 227B; C-D; 231F; 232B.

III. *cum hoc ei dictum esset . . . respondit* (πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα . . . ἔφη and the like).

DL I. 35; 36; 63; II. 7; 10; 35; 36; 71; 74; 75; 76; 79; 80; 81; 119; 128; IV. 49; 50; V. 19; VI. 4; 8; 9; 33; 34; 36; 39; 42; 45; 49; 52; 54; 55; 59; 60; 61; 64; 68; VII. 19; 20; 21; 23; 171; 172; 174; VIII. 182; IX. 113.

BE 175C; D; E; 176D; 182C; 186E-F; 189E; F; 190D.

AA 208B; 217D; E; 218C; F; 221D-E; 224D; 228A; D; 229E.

A note of warning. I have not included here Quintilian's third category, *cum quis dixisset aliquid uel fecisset*. The number of χρεῖαι of this type is roughly the same as their number in the other categories—with a slight preponderance of it in the Cynic Lives of Diogenes, as one could only expect. Nor—since this is merely a provisional list—have I given the numbers of χρεῖαι of each type in each paragraph of Diogenes or Stephanus page of Plutarch. Many χρεῖαι of the same category tend to come in twos or threes in the same region of the text, just as groups of χρεῖαι of the same category tend to cluster together within a wider area. It may well be that Quintilian's classification represents divisions and chapter-headings already existent in collections available to him—and to Diogenes later. This should be further investigated. For my present purpose, suffice it if I have shown that χρεῖαι beginning with the formulae ἐρωτηθεὶς and πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα are as frequent in some of our major sources as are plain maxims or sayings.

I shall not weary the reader with specimens of χρεῖαι beginning with πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα. Almost any of the dozens in my list will do. But our particular χρεῖα in Plutarch has two unusual characteristics: a) instead of the usual beginning of the "apodosis" with ἔφη, εἶπεν or the like, Plutarch has here ἀντέλεγεν; b) the "protasis" is no mere saying or question by someone, but a literary quotation.

It is true that ἀντέλεγεν is unusual. I have found no other example of it in χρεῖαι I have checked.²² This may be due to Plutarch's literary art,

²² The same anecdote is reported with the same words in some MSS of the scholia on Lucian *Cal.* 8 in Jacobitz' *editio maior*, vol. IV (Leipzig 1841) 232-33, beginning with the words Πλούταρχος ἐν τῷ περὶ Στωϊκῶν ἐναντιωμάτων. It is therefore of no independent value. I cannot see why v. Arnim should cite this scholion at the end of *SVF* I. 78, as if it were a different source.

wishing to emphasize that, despite the matter of his argument, Zeno did listen to the other side and refuted it. Or he may have wished to emphasize that Zeno's refutation was couched in the "antilogistic," disjunctive form. We shall return to this.

As to *χρεῖαι* with literary quotations, they are not all that rare. Here is a partial list of some such *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes Laertius: II. 78; 82; 117; IV. 9; 46; 47; VI. 36; 44; 50; 52; 53; 55; 57; 63; 66; 67; 104; VII. 172; IX. 59.

Of all these, perhaps the nearest in form to Plutarch's story of Zeno is Diogenes Laertius' anecdote concerning Diogenes of Sinope and his master Xeniades (VI. 36):

Τῷ πριαμένῳ αὐτὸν Ξενιάδῃ φησί, "ἄγε ὅπως τὸ προσ-
ταττόμενον ποιήσεις." τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος

ἄνω ποταμῶν χωροῦσι παγαί,

"εἰ δὲ ἱατρὸν ἐπρίω νοσῶν, οὐκ ἄν," (ἔφη)²³ "αὐτῷ ἐπεῖθου,
ἀλλ' εἶπες ἂν ὥς ἄνω ποταμῶν χωροῦσι παγαί;"

Plutarch himself was not unaware of the nature of *χρεῖα*. At least in one passage of his writings, his view of its value is far from complimentary. In Chapter 7 of *Progr. Virt.*, Plutarch speaks of those who begin to apply themselves to the study of arguments (*λόγοι*)—and begin, usually, by choosing one of the wrong types of arguments. Those who begin by collecting anecdotes are the last on this list (78F):

... ἔνιοι δὲ χρεῖας καὶ ἱστορίας ἀναλεγόμενοι περιίσσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀνάχαρσις ἔλεγε τῷ νομίσματι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἢ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν χρωμένους ὁρᾶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οὕτως τοῖς λόγοις παραριθμοῦμενοι καὶ παραριθμοῦντες, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν εἰς ὄνησιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τιθέμενοι.

Not that Plutarch himself is above using some *χρεῖαι* when it suits him. At least in one place in his *Lives* (*Demosth.* 11. 2–7), he recounts some *χρεῖαι* of Demosthenes, ending with the words (7), ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἐτέρων γελοίων καίπερ ἔτι πλείω λέγειν ἔχοντες, ἐνταῦθα παυσόμεθα. This sounds almost as though Plutarch had a collection of *χρεῖαι* before him. He could not resist the temptation to tell some of them; but being a serious writer of "morality biographies," he soon checked himself and remembered his real task. He continues: τὸν δ' ἄλλον αὐτοῦ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας θεωρεῖσθαι δίκαιόν ἐστιν.

It is clear that Plutarch knows what a *χρεῖα* is, and that he attaches no great value to it as a source of serious information and edification either to

²³ Supplied by Stephanus and obviously right, as the formula of the "apodosis."

the historian or to the philosopher. Did he, then, simply slip and forget all he knew about this sub-literary form and its value when he came to our story about Zeno? Or did he, in his zeal to amass as many Stoic contradictions as possible, overlook the fragile nature of this kind of source? Since we can only guess where he may have found this particular *χρεία* (Hecato, or one of the early compilations by a pupil of Zeno?), and since it is not unlikely that when he wrote the work before us, he was already relying on his own notes and excerpts rather than on his sources,²⁴ we can only guess.

This is not the end of our enquiry. Having told his anecdote, Plutarch continues: τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας κτλ. Cherniss translates: "after having propounded his argument (1034E)." But is ἐρωτᾶν simply "to propound an argument?" Nor is it simply "to pose a question," as translated by Amyot ("& ce pendant luy mesme qui faisoit cest demande" . . .) and translators who follow him. Zeno poses no question in Plutarch's story. It has a more technical sense, some traces of the history of which are indicated in LSJ, s. v. ἐρωτάω II. 2:

In Dialectic, opp. demonstration, *question* an opponent *in order to refute him from his answers*, Arist. *APr.* 24^a 24; τὶ ib. 42^a 39; hence later, *submit, set forth, propound* an argument, λόγον Gal. 5. 257 :—Pass., ὁ λόγος . . . ἐρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται Arr. *Epict.* 2. 19. 1; ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ σοφίσματος S.E. P. 2. 237.

Even this is to simplify matters. It is true that Sextus frequently uses the combination λόγον ἐρωτᾶν (ἐρωτᾶν and variants). But he always uses this expression for a *refutation*, usually in the form of a syllogism, of a "dogmatic" position. The refuting λόγος offered by Sextus is more often than not a plain syllogism, but sometimes it is a disjunctive argument in the form of "either . . . or", concluding with "neither . . . nor" at the point of final refutation. Here is a provisional list:

Plain syllogistic refutation: PH I. 20; 33–34; II. 134; 239; 248; 250; 254 (where it is distinguished from σοφισμα); III. 66; 116; 280; M VIII. 215; 216; 227; 234; 444–45; IX. 92; 133; 182; 205; X. 171.

Disjunctive refutation: PH II. 185 (+ M VIII. 465); 186; III. 76; 127; 163; 239 (referring back to 172); M X. 94; 110.

What is, perhaps of greater interest is that in most of these places, Sextus applies this expression, ἐρωτᾶν λόγον and variants, to the Pyrrhonian's own refutation of his "dogmatic" opponent. Diodorus Cronus is mentioned more than twenty times by name in Sextus' works. Only at

²⁴ See Cherniss (n. 6 above) 369–401, who argues for the use of "note-books" containing excerpts made by Plutarch himself, as his main immediate source for passages quoted in his Stoic books.

X. 87, 94 and 110 does Sextus apply this expression to a disjunctive argument by Diodorus—in all three cases, to the same argument against the existence of motion. Yet it is precisely to Diodorus Cronus and his Megaric friends that we must turn if we are to trace the origin of this peculiar expression—which, by the time of Sextus, has been watered down to imply any “structured” argument used in refuting an opponent.

Of Euclides of Megara, we are told by Diogenes Laertius (II. 106):

... καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἴτ' ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεκτικοί, οὓς οὕτως ὠνόμασε πρῶτος Διονύσιος ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν τοὺς λόγους διατίθεσθαι.²⁵

Of Eubulides of Miletos, Diogenes writes:

... ὃς καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν διαλεκτικῇ λόγους ἠρώτησε, τὸν τε ψευδόμενον κτλ. (II. 108; Giannantoni IIB. 13, p. 53; Muller 64, p. 31).

Muller translates properly: “arguments de forme interrogative.” This is confirmed by an anonymous comic fragment—most probably by a contemporary of Eubulides—cited by Diogenes in the same passage:

οὐριστικός δ' Εὐβουλίδης κερατίνας ἐρωτῶν
καὶ ψευδαλαζόσιν λόγοις τοὺς ῥήτορας κυλίων κτλ.

This is not the place to discuss in any detail the seven paradoxes of Eubulides counted in this passage of Diogenes.²⁶ But it should be fairly clear by now that some, at least, of these arguments were couched in the form of disjunctive questions, the answer to any of which is “yes” or “no.” A good example—probably the nearest we have to the original form—of this Megaric practice, is supplied by Diogenes Laertius (II. 116), in the form of a *χρεία* about Stilbo of Megara:

τοῦτόν φασιν περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς τοῦ Φειδίου τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἐρωτῆσαι· “ἄρά γε ἡ τοῦ Διὸς Ἀθηνᾶ θεὸς ἐστι;” φήσαντος δέ, “ναί,” “αὕτη δέ γε,” εἶπεν, “οὐκ ἔστι Διός, ἀλλὰ Φειδίου.” συγχωρουμένου δέ, “οὐκ ἄρα,” εἶπε, “θεὸς ἐστιν.”

One notes the expression λόγον ἐρωτήσας. A similar expression, *συνερωτᾷ λόγον*, is employed by Sextus in reporting the disjunctive

²⁵ I cannot see why Gabriele Giannantoni, *Socraticorum Reliquiae* vol. I (Naples 1983) 129, quotes the last part of this sentence only in IIP 3 (Dionysius Chalcedonius). Robert Muller, *Les Mégariques, Fragments et témoignages* (Paris 1985) 25, quotes the whole passage as 31, the first fragment in Section IC, “Développement et situation dans l'histoire de la philosophie de l'école issue d'Euclide.”

²⁶ For the latest detailed discussion, with the relevant sources (alas, in translation only!), see Muller (last n.), *Annexe I*, 75–90, and his notes to Frs. 64–65, pp. 113–19; 193 (n. 128)–196 (n. 168).

argument of Diodorus Cronus against movement (*M X.* 87; repeated with ἡρωτήσθαι φασιν τὸν λόγον at 94, and ἡρώτηκε δὲ ὁ Διόδωρος τὸν . . . λόγον at 110).

If Diodorus was the inventor of so many *Fangschlüsse*, he was, according to Diogenes Laertius, still no match for Stilbo of Megara. The story of how Diodorus died of shame because he could not solve dialectical problems put to him by Stilbo is well-known today: it has been spread around by logicians who, even if they would not go as far themselves, look with envy on the serious manner in which those ancient Megarians took their logic. Fact or fiction—this should not detain us here.²⁷ What is of greater importance is the language (*DL II.* 111):

οὗτος παρὰ Πτολεμαίῳ²⁸ τῷ Σωτῆρι διατρίβων λόγους τινὰς διαλεκτικούς ἡρωτήθη πρὸς Στίλπωνος· καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος παραχρῆμα διαλύσασθαι κτλ.²⁹

We have already seen one ἐρώτησις of Stilbo. Diogenes Laertius II. 119 supplies us with two more of this sort. These ἐρωτήσεις are so similar in nature to the long string of *Fangschlüsse* reported by Diogenes at VII. 186–87, that I am inclined to think they may well be also Stilbonian in origin. Diogenes reports them with the opening sentence ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος καὶ τοιούτους τινὰς ἡρώτα λόγους, and ends with the words οἱ δ' Εὐβουλίδου τοῦτο φασιν. Since, in the first part of 186, we have been given the names of some ὁμώνυμοι—two doctors and one writer on agriculture also named Chrysippus—it looks, at first glance, as if what we have here is something like “but to return to Chrysippus the philosopher . . .” It is therefore taken to be a Chrysippean testimonium by modern scholars.³⁰ But these could hardly be Chrysippus' own arguments. After all, Chrysippus objected to the Μεγαρικά ἐρωτήματα (*SVF II.* 270–71); and the only argument in this passage which has a *Sitz im Leben* of a sort is “the Man in Megara” paradox. Add to this the fact that the last of these arguments is ascribed to another Megarian, Eubulides. Quite clearly, ὁ φιλόσοφος at the beginning of this passage is a “bad stitch,” probably by

²⁷ See Muller 128, on Frs. 99–100—who also rightly remarks: “On note, d'autre part, à propos de la dialectique en général, que ces fr. offrent l'avantage de contenir explicitement plusieurs des traits caractéristiques évoqués ailleurs: les arguments en forme de question, l'obligation de répondre sur le champ, et aussi le caractère de jeu de société que révérait volontiers un entretien dialectique.” (My emphasis).

²⁸ Misprinted Πτολεμαίῳ in Long's *OCT*.

²⁹ Pliny the Elder, *NH VII.* 180, translates the report he must have found in a similar Greek source: . . . pudore [obiit] Diodorus sapientiae dialecticae professor, lusoria quaestione non protinus ab interrogatione Stilponis dissoluta. A reader of this Latin testimonium alone would have to guess hard in order to arrive at the terminology of its Greek *Unterlage*. Both Greek and Latin passages: Giannantoni II F 1–2, vol. I, pp. 73–75.

³⁰ Von Arnim, *SVF II.* 279, p. 92, with the “man in Megara” argument—of all things—in spaced letters signifying genuine Chrysippus. Giannantoni III B 13, p. 53, referring to this *SVF* fragment in evidence of Chrysippean origin. Muller 65, p. 31.

Diogenes himself, who may have found this passage among his notes for his Chrysippus book, without indication of the source. Why not? *Il est capable de tout*. If there is any truth in Heraclides' report (DL II. 120; Giannantoni II 0 4; Muller 167) that Stilbo was also a pupil of Zeno of Citium, one possible explanation is that a string of ἐρωτήσεις formulated by Stilbo, and perhaps "solved" by Chrysippus, found its way into some late doxographic source concerned with Chrysippus. It may have been truncated in that source—or it may be Diogenes who copied only the "juicy" paradoxes. But enough of this.

That the Megarians were not only, or chiefly, logicians, but first and foremost dialecticians—this has been noted (although not as often as it should have been) by some historians of logic, and by the latest editor of the Megaric testimonia. They also note that these Megaric ἐρωτήσεις were originally couched in the form of alternative questions to be answered with "yes" or "no."³¹ But almost all the Megaric ἐρωτήσεις which have reached us are already formulated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism—in fact, in the form of a Stoic disjunctive argument, using ἢ or ἤτοι as the disjunctive particles.³² Why, then, call them ἐρωτήσεις?

A clue to this problem may be found in two versions of the same syllogism, ascribed by Diogenes Laertius to Diogenes of Sinope. In both versions, the argument is almost word for word the same—but the opening formula is distinctly different. Let us have the two:

VI. 37

συνελογίζετο δὲ καὶ οὕτως·

τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ πάντα·
φίλοι δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς·
κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων·

πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν

VI. 72

πάντα τῶν σοφῶν εἶναι λέγων καὶ
τοιούτους λόγους ἐρωτῶν οἷους
ἄνω προειρήκαμεν·

πάντα τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ·
φίλοι δὲ τοῖς σοφοῖς οἱ θεοί·
κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων·

πάντα ἄρα τῶν σοφῶν

The variations in wording are insignificantly small. But when, at 37, Diogenes Laertius presents this argument as a plain syllogism (συνελογίζετο), he says plainly οὕτως. When, at 72, he presents it as an ἐρώτησις, he uses a more careful language: τοιούτους λόγους ἐρωτῶν οἷους—indicating that this is not the exact form of Diogenes' original

³¹ Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Bd. I (Leipzig 1855) 42 ("ἐρωτᾶν ist der stehende Ausdruck"), taking such passages as Isocrates 15. 45, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν, οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν, Arist. *Soph. El.* 17. 175b ff.; 176a14 ff; *Top.* VII. 7. 160a32; Alex. ad *Soph. El.* 50 ff, to refer to the Megarics. One could add to this Polemo's warning against some dialecticians of his age, including the words κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐρώτησιν θαυμάζεσθαι, DL IV. 18. Michael Frede, *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen 1974) 19–23, esp. 20–21. Muller, loc. cit. n. 27 above, and 113.

³² Frede (last n.) 93–96.

ἐρώτησις. I do not accuse Diogenes Laertius of such fine distinctions. He must have found them in his sources. Such language is not restricted to this particular passage. Stilbo's ἐρώτησις at II. 116—although it opens with a proper question (but carries on with two plain συμπεράσματα) is also prefaced with τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἐρωτῆσαι. So is the string of ἐρωτήσεις at VII. 186–87, just discussed. It opens with τοιοῦτους τινὰς ἡρώτα λόγους—and indeed, these are already couched in plain disjunctive form.

These are only a few traces of such a distinction. By the time of Sextus Empiricus, ἐρωτᾶν had already lost its original sense and was merely used for any refutation—disjunctive or plainly syllogistic. A formula like ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὕτως (e.g. *M* VII. 340) or οὕτως συνερώτα (X. 87) is quite regular. At X. 110, Sextus can even say of Diodorus Cronus ἡρώτηκε δὲ ὁ Διόδωρος τὸν ἐκκείμενον λόγον—referring back to the argument of 87 (τὸν περιφορητικὸν συνερώτα λόγον . . . λέγων—followed by a plain disjunctive argument) and 94 (ὅταν λεγῇ ὁ Διόδωρος—followed by the same disjunction). But could one assume that the more careful formulation, using τοιοῦτος and variants in the passages cited in our last paragraphs (and one can add, e.g., *DL* VI. 69), is an indication of an earlier practice, at a stage when reports of Megaric ἐρωτήσεις were already being “translated” into the forms of Stoic syllogisms, but when the “translators”—to indicate that this was a reformulated version of the original dialectic argument, used a cautionary τοιοῦτος rather than a plain οὗτος? It is, in any case, not without interest that in our passage of *Stoic. Rep.*, Plutarch opens his story with the cautious τοιοῦτω τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος, although he follows it at the end with τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας. Is it possible that what he found in his source was τοιοῦτος in both cases—and that Zeno had couched his refutation, in the original setting, in the form of Megaric ἐρώτησις?³³

How exactly did Zeno do that? In our passage of Plutarch, he asks no questions: he already uses the “translation” into a disjunctive argument. Almost all the ἐρωτήσεις ascribed to the Megarics and Diogenes of Sinope have also reached us in such “translations.” The only exception I know is the opening question of Stilbo's argument at *DL* II. 116, beginning as it does with ἀρά γε.

Yet we have a number of such ἐρωτήσεις, beginning with ἀρα or ἀρά γε, ascribed by Aristotle (*Soph. El.* 20. 177b10–26) to Euthydemus. The immediate context (177a33 ff.) is that of λόγοι παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν. But the wider context (175a1–4 ff.) is that of ἀποκρίσεις to

³³ That Plutarch is not invariably careless may, perhaps, emerge from a comparison of *Stoic. Rep.* 16. 1041C–D, τοιοῦτους ἡρώτηκε λόγους (where the original arguments may have been disjunctive and put in the form of questions—but where, in any case, Plutarch may simply have changed and shortened the various stages of the original syllogisms), with 10. 1036A, where the quotation from Chrysippus is followed by ταυτὶ γὰρ αὐταῖς λέξεσιν εἴρηκεν.

Sophistic ἐρωτήματα.³⁴ Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described in Plato's *Euthydemus* (e.g. 272b) as experts in the ἐριστική τέχνη. Their mode of investigation and refutation is clearly that of posing a question of "either . . . or" (e.g. 275d: πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;) to which the other side can only answer with one of two alternatives. The refutation (in this example, 276a–b) is conducted in terms of questions, some of which naturally begin with ἄρα. These questions are so often called ἐρωτήσεις or ἐρωτήματα in that dialogue, that one need not bring any reference. That Socrates himself also poses ἐρωτήματα (e.g. 278e), and some of his own questions begin with ἄρα γε (ibid.), is only part of the whole purport of this dialogue, pointing out the difference between Socrates' questions and refutations, which lead to some positive advancement, and those of the eristics, aimed merely at an easy refutation. The main point is that, at the hands of such Sophists as Euthydemus and his brother, this technique of refutation by a series of questions with alternative answers is clearly described as eristic—the very name given to the Megarians in DL II. 106. We can draw some support for these antecedents of the Megaric eristic in that famous passage of *Meno* (80d–e), where Meno poses to Socrates two questions, each of which can be described as potentially disjunctive. Socrates, identifying Meno's argument as ἐριστικὸς λόγος (80e2), proceeds to "translate" them into a proper disjunctive argument. Euthydemus' arguments, all beginning with ἄρα questions, as reported by Aristotle in *Soph. EI*. 20, are very similar in type to the Megarian ἐρωτήσεις we have discussed. Whatever the part played by the Eleatics, and especially by Zeno of Elea, in the formation of the dialectic, both of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and their like and of the School of Megara—and this is not the place to enter into this old problem—it is clear that one can draw a fairly straight line from the question-and-answer technique of refutation of the two brothers to the technique of Megaric ἐρωτήσεις.³⁵

The technique of "translating" Megaric ἐρωτήσεις into Stoic syllogisms—first, with a cautious τοιοῦτος and variants—may well have been instituted by the Stoics themselves, in order to facilitate logical refutation. What is clear is that the Stoics studied such *Fangschlüsse* and

³⁴ In *Rhet.* II. 24. 1400a28 ff., Aristotle reproduces the "trireme in Piraeus" ἐρώτησις, as well as some other ἐρωτήσεις of Euthydemus, in shorthand syllogistic form. But then, in his *Rhetoric*, he is not concerned with the questioning technique of the dialectician, but rather with depicting the same fallacy, τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαίρουντα (1401a25–26) as employed by the orator in "straight" speeches.

³⁵ Muller, 113, on 64–65, notes that no argument ascribed to Eubulides in our sources appears in Plato's *Euthydemus*, while two of his paradoxes are presented in Aristotle's *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. This would strengthen the assumption that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—some of whose arguments, as we have just noted, are reported by Aristotle independently of Plato—were indeed "eristics" in their own right. One can, therefore, also assume that their techniques may well have influenced the Megarians.

employed the whole armoury of their own dialectic to refute them. The zeal of Chrysippus and his disciples in refuting such Μεγαρικά ἐρωτήματα or σοφίσματα is richly attested in *SVF* II. 270–87, assembled by von Arnim from such diverse sources as Cicero, Plutarch, Galen, Lucian, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus, Epictetus and some of the commentators on Aristotle. But we remember that even in our chapter of Plutarch (= *SVF* I. 50), we are told of Zeno: ἔλνε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε κτλ. From *SVF* II. 271 (Plutarch), and especially from 272 (Galen), it seems clear that such σοφίσματα are mainly those Megaric paradoxes. It is not unlikely that such Megaric paradoxes were the main preoccupation of Chrysippus' περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Πόλλιν (DL VII. 198 = *SVF* II. 16). Yet we have seen that in our chapter of Plutarch, Zeno is made to employ precisely this type of Megaric σοφισμα to refute his unfortunate opponent. Plutarch had noted as much as that, and accused Zeno of contradiction. Should we?

Of course not. The anecdote as we have it is no piece of philosophical doctrine, taken out of one of Zeno's serious books, but an amusing χρεία, in which Zeno is reported by someone else as refuting an adversary who thinks he is "too clever by half," and he does this by using precisely that sort of Megaric dialectic which he spent much of his time refuting. Moreover, by listening to the other man's argument and spending some time in answering it with a counter-argument (Plutarch's emphatic ἀντέλεγεν),³⁶ Zeno shows in practice that he has, in this case, listened to the other side.

If our χρεία is a genuine anecdote, recounting something which really happened to Zeno—and we must remember that Plutarch is our only source—³⁷one can now use one's imagination and reconstruct roughly what may have happened.

Zeno was most probably expounding in public some of his own ideas and referring with contempt to those of someone else, which he described as "not worth listening to." Someone in the audience challenged him by quoting the hexametre line, to the effect that one should listen to the other side. Zeno—far from not listening to the other side—even bothered to refute him. In his refutation, he used—quite consciously, I would guess—the Megaric mode of refutation which, as a teacher of dialectic, he did his best to confute. Those of his proper pupils standing around must have realized—and most probably enjoyed—both the fallacious nature of Zeno's argument, and the "refutation in practice" offered by his very action. But

³⁶ If Prantl (n. 31 above) is right in regarding Isocrates 15. 45 as a reference to the Megaric technique—and the similarity in terminology to passages we have examined, where the Megarians are explicitly mentioned, is compelling—then the term ἀντέλεγεν in our passage of Plutarch echoes ἀντιλογικοί of Isocrates, thus confirming our suggestion that in the original form of this anecdote, Zeno was depicted as using a Megaric ἐρώτησις technique.

³⁷ See note 22 above.

here was a clever piece of repartee. It would be a pity not to record it. Someone did. It found its way into some collection of *χρεῖαι*, where—when he was collecting materials for his books against the Stoics—Plutarch found it. By the time he came to write *Stoic. Rep.*, Plutarch most probably had forgotten his source. He either paid no attention to the obvious form of this *χρεῖα*, or forgot (what Theon, at least, knew) that a *χρεῖα* can sometimes be a mere joke. In his zeal to refute Zeno, he treated this clever little joke as a serious piece of Zenonian doctrine. Unfortunately, he has been followed in this by modern scholarship.

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Plutarch, Hesiod, and the Mouseia of Thespiai

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This study grows out of a number of years of work on Hesiod, rather than on Plutarch. It finds its place in a series of papers on Plutarch because it argues for re-evaluation of the Plutarchan commentary on the *Works and Days*. My primary point rests on the fact that, with reference to the shrine of the Heliconian Muses, Plutarch was a local, and an extraordinarily educated and articulate local. His commentary on the *Works and Days* was an act of piety for his native Boeotia much as his essay on the maliciousness of Herodotus served the same function. His primary concern here was to demonstrate the ethical value of the great Boeotian poet, and in the process he identified as "interpolations" several passages too "trivial" to stand with the rest. But if one looks carefully at the most important interpolation he claims to have identified in the *Works and Days*, its implications are very far-reaching indeed. In fact, when the condemned passage is examined in the context of the other "confessional" passages in Hesiod, it becomes clear that its exclusion calls in question the very idea of a personal and historical Hesiod—a notion that has been examined and subjected to scrutiny only by the two generations of scholarship on archaic Greek poetry since Milman Parry.

Rather than recapitulate here the history of the problem of the Hesiodic corpus, we may simply recall a few facts to serve as a basis for the discussion that follows. First, there is almost no evidence for the state of the text of Hesiod before the Hellenistic period.¹ Secondly, the text of Homer—the best available comparandum—was stabilized in the third and second centuries—in the Hellenistic period—to produce what is known as the vulgate, which is both the principal source of the medieval manuscript tradition and the point of departure for modern scholarship.² The fourth and

¹ Cf. M. L. West, Hesiod, *Theogony* (1966) [hereafter, West (1966)], 48–72, and esp. 65–66 on the papyri; M. L. West, Hesiod, *Works and Days* (1978) [hereafter, West (1978)], 75–82.

² That the Hellenistic vulgate was a normalization and reduction of the two poems, against the background of the "long" or "wild" texts of the fourth and third centuries is generally accepted (T. W. Allen, *Homer, the Origins and the Transmission* [1924] 271–82, 302–27). Whether that vulgate corresponded to a conservative text predating the "long" texts, and if so, to what degree, are questions more difficult to answer. For a concise survey of the problem, see G.

third centuries knew longer versions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, now largely lost.³ Thirdly, the Hellenistic reading public was very fond of the poetry of Hesiod. One might even argue that the *Theogony*, *Works and Days*, and *Catalogue of Women* (along with such lost works as the *Astronomy*) came into their own when Hellenistic poets imitated Hesiod (or advertised themselves and their contemporaries as his imitators) and Hellenistic scholars worked to refine the text.⁴ My contention is that both the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, though doubtless comprising very old material, much of it far older than any imaginable historical Hesiod, may well have been influenced and shaped even more significantly than the poems of Homer by their normalization (and canonization) in the Hellenistic period.

The historicity of Hesiod is problematic.⁵ Along with Homer's, his is one of the two major surviving voices from a larger group of hexameter poets standing at the very beginnings of Greek literary tradition. Of these semi-mythic poets, "Orpheus" would seem to have been little more than a conventional persona, adopted by many poets over many generations. "Musaeus" is more elusive still, and the Homeric corpus, whose speaker maintains a scrupulous anonymity, defies reduction to a single poet's *oeuvre* today as it did in antiquity. Only Hesiod advertises his own identity, organizing his traditional lore around a personality and a series of autobiographical anecdotes so idiosyncratic that it is difficult to read them as purely conventional. The tendency of scholarship in the past 50 years has been to question all the information that such poetry and its parallel biographic traditions offer about its creators,⁶ and to view the earliest speakers of Greek poetry—from Homer and Hesiod to Archilochus and Theognis—as personae generated by poetic traditions rather than as creative individuals with recoverable biographies and personalities. The often cited

M. Bolling, *The Athetized Lines of the Iliad* (1944) 5–6. Bolling believed in a recoverable prototype, which he described as "an Athenian text not earlier than the sixth century" (p. 5). Given that the fourth and third centuries (and in Egypt, even the second century) knew substantially longer texts, one is on safer ground assuming that the vulgate was the product of the growing Hellenistic book trade (Allen, 321–27) and so came to dominate the late papyri and to form the principal foundation of the medieval manuscript tradition. It was thus the earliest widely disseminated, normalized written text of the poems, and though it may be possible to refine it and draw certain conclusions about its antecedents, the likelihood that any earlier text of Homer could be confidently reconstructed in its entirety is slight.

³ Cf. T. W. Allen, *Homer, the Origins and the Transmission* (1924) 268–69, 301–03.

⁴ For citations and echoes in Hellenistic (and other) poetry, see the apparatus of the indispensable *editio maior* of Rzach (1902). On Hellenistic scholarship on the poems, West (1966) 48–52; West (1978) 63–75.

⁵ See G. Nagy, "Hesiod": 43–73 in T. J. Luce, ed., *Ancient Writers* (1982), and cf. Mark Griffith, "Personality in Hesiod," *Classical Antiquity* 2 (1983) 37–65.

⁶ The trend begins with Milman Parry, but for recent developments, see Nagy (above, n. 5) and M. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (1981).

polemical passage of Josephus (*Against Apion* 1. 12) that presents Homer as a prehistoric, illiterate bard, whose songs were assembled in later days, is unique evidence for a perception among the ancients of the peculiar status of authorship in archaic Greek poetry.

My purpose here is to add Plutarch to the list of ancient witnesses for the conventional character of the personae of archaic Greek poetry. He will not, however, be such a friendly witness as Josephus. Indeed, Plutarch himself had a large stake in the historicity of these illustrious figures from the dim past, and the author of the *Lives* (and, moreover, of a lost *Life of Hesiod*, if the Lamprias Catalogue is to be believed)⁷ cannot be made into a "Parryist" or "Nagyist"—he believed in a historical Hesiod, beyond any substantial doubt. But without any desire on his part to shatter the Hesiodic persona into a figment of convention, Plutarch provides evidence that is important and underappreciated, pointing to a perception among men of letters of the early centuries of the Christian era that *some* elements of the "confessional" Hesiod did not correspond to any historical reality. Rather, they were elaborations that served the interests of the institution that had taken possession of Hesiod and his poetry—the Festival of the Muses sponsored by the people of Thespiiai in central Boeotia. When this evidence is juxtaposed with the documented doubts about the authenticity of the Hesiodic *prooimía* voiced by Hellenistic scholars, Plutarch's testimony takes on crucial importance. If scepticism is justified where Crates, Aristarchus, and Plutarch were sceptical, the confessional Hesiod of Ascra, the shepherd of Helicon with his special devotion to the Muses, crumbles into dust. What is left is a body of Hesiodic wisdom poetry whose persona is hardly more individualized or confessional than that of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. The conclusion that this poetry and its conventions (including the persona of its singer) are the products of a tradition of song rather than an individual singer is modern, but the doubts about the integrity of the information provided by the Hesiodic corpus about its singer were present by the Hellenistic period.

Before turning to the text and to Plutarch's comments on it, it is first necessary to survey the evidence we have for the "Mouseia" of Thespiiai, a pentaeteric festival of performance arts, known to Plutarch and to Pausanias. This institution would seem to be the force that perpetuated (if, indeed, it did not create) the highly confessional "Ascrean" bard of the central poems of the transmitted Hesiodic corpus. There is no way of knowing whether there was a Hesiod before there was a festival of the Heliconian Muses, but the Hellenistic scholars and Plutarch provide evidence strongly suggesting that it was after the festival had taken hold of the poems that this highly individualized persona took on its definitive form.

⁷ Lamprias Catalogue #35: 'Ἡσιόδου βίος. Sandbach, in the Loeb *Moralia* 15, p. 81, indicates four passages from the *Moralia* containing material that "may have been used in the *Life*."

Hesiod and the Mouseia of Thespiiai

The Hesiodic topography of western Boeotia is generally well known.⁸ It is customary to contrast the nameless, faceless, placeless narrator of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* with that of the Hesiodic corpus, who mentions his own name, that of his brother, and provides about a dozen toponyms to give a locus to his song. The exercise in literary-critical fantasy called the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* starts off by saying (suggestively, and perhaps paradoxically) that *both* Homer and Hesiod were the objects of competition among various cities which claimed them as native sons⁹—scarcely credible, in the light of the text with its apparent geographical precision—but in all probability the author's point is simply that all the cities would *like* to claim both poets. He quickly goes on to point out that Hesiod, in fact, settled the question of his home-town in the *Works and Days* (639–40), when he informed us that his father came from Kyme in Asia Minor to live in Boeotia,¹⁰

And settled next to Helikon in a godawful village
Called "Barren Oak," bad in the winter, awful in the summer,
and *never* any good.

There were few doubts expressed in antiquity about the correct location of Hesiod's "Barren Oak" or Askra.¹¹ Hesiod, though, hardly impresses the reader as a well socialized member of the community in question. One might suspect that the poet would have alienated his neighbors by giving their village's name a snooty Ionian pronunciation—"Ἀσκη rather than Boeotian Ἀσκρα—but then, if we are to imagine him a real citizen of a real village of that name, his deprecating portrait of the town would surely be sufficient to guarantee his unpopularity, and his foreign accent and contempt for the jargon of the locals need not be worrisome.¹² No one

⁸ Each toponym and the history of its interpretation is discussed in P. W. Wallace, "Hesiod and the Valley of the Muses," *GRBS* 15 (1974) 5–24. This is now supplemented by the Cambridge-Bradford Boeotia Expedition (see below, n. 14). For the archaeology of the valley, see the synthesis by Georges Roux, "Le Val des Muses et les Musées chez les auteurs anciens," *BCH* 78 (1954) 22–48. The initial publications, by Paul Jamot and others (n. 19, below) were fragmentary and Roux's overview came only a half-century later, when much information (and indeed, some of the inscriptions) had been lost. On the inscriptions, see also Werner Peek, "Die Musen von Thespiiai": 609–34 in *GERAS Antoniou Keramopoulou* (Athens: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1953).

⁹ The problem is in the verbal phrase in the opening sentence, εὐχονται λέγεσθαι. Though it might seem to be saying that all men "boast" that Homer and Hesiod "are called" their own fellow citizens, the sense is more likely to be something along the lines of "rejoice in claiming" or simply "would like to claim."

¹⁰ νάσσατο δ' ἄγχ' Ἑλικῶνος οἰζυρῇ ἐνὶ κόμῃ.

Ἀσκη, χεῖμα κακῇ, θέρει ἀργαλή, οὐδέ ποτ' ἐσθλή.

¹¹ The "translation" is based on a gloss in Hesychius. Cf. Nagy, "Hesiod" 64.

¹² If there is a single Boeotian word in the corpus, it is Φίκ[α] (= Σφίγγα), *Theog.* 326.

explicitly doubts Ascra's location, but there is no testimony from *anyone* in antiquity (after Hesiod) who claimed to have visited the village of Ascra. There is, of course, the testimony of Pausanias, who visited a valley northwest of Thespiiai to see the shrine of the Muses there, and was shown by the Thespiots who were then in control of the place a hill—no doubt the one now called *Pyrgaki*—with a ruined tower, which they said was the site of Barren Oak, now uninhabited.¹³

The story was not without substance. Though Pausanias could not have verified it, there had been a large village—if not on top of *Pyrgaki*, then on its slopes, with its center roughly at the confluence of the two streams that form the valley of the Muses. This was determined in the 1982 survey work of the Cambridge-Bradford Bocotia Expedition, which located the site and established a tentative chronology for the settlement based on surface finds.¹⁴

It is possible that Strabo saw Ascra. He visited Greece as a soldier and probably saw some of the Greek sites he describes. He locates Ascra 40 stadia northwest of Thespiiai,¹⁵ and no doubt he (or his source) had in mind the hill later shown to Pausanias, and much later yet identified as Ascra by 19th-century travelers.¹⁶ Strabo does not say whether the village was inhabited in his time (which was also that of Augustus), and he may have reported the location from an earlier geographer without himself laying eyes on it. The probability is, however, that Ascra was then already a deserted ruin, as it was in Plutarch's time, about a century later. Plutarch's commentary on Hesiod, transmitted through the scholia on the *Works and Days*, relates that the people of Thespiiai destroyed Ascra and that the survivors fled to Orchomenos, some 25 kilometers to the northwest.¹⁷ A generation later, Pausanias saw only a tower—Plutarch surely, and Strabo probably (if he saw anything), saw the same. And so the evidence points to an Ascra obliterated by the Roman period, but still *located* with remarkable precision.

The reason this deserted site of what was apparently never more than an undistinguished village was so easily identifiable is not difficult to find. The valley below may have had few permanent inhabitants, but it was the scene of one of the most important competitive festivals of the arts in Greece.

The excavations in the area initially involved tearing down churches to recover inscriptions on the stones from which they were built. During the 1880's, the French were energetic in their pursuit of this sort of

¹³ Pausanias 9. 29. 1–31. 9.

¹⁴ A. D. Snodgrass, "The Site of Ascra," in P. Roesch and G. Amoud, eds., *Actes du Colloque International du CNRS: La Béotie antique* (Lyon, 16–20 mai, 1983), 1985.

¹⁵ Strabo 9. 2. 25.

¹⁶ Wallace (above, n. 8) 6–7, with n. 2.

¹⁷ A. Pertusi, *Scholia vetera in Hesiodi Op. et D.* (1955), ad W & D 633–40 (= Plutarch, *Εἰς τὰ Ἡσιόδου ἔργα*, fr. 82 [Sandbach]).

archaeological research. They destroyed at least a half-dozen little chapels in the valley of the Muses—one map shows nine,¹⁸ but it is unlikely that the continuity from the daughters of Memory to the various saints and manifestations of the Panaghia honored in this valley is as clear cut as that number might suggest. The result of this demolition was a large corpus of inscriptions that provide an exceptionally rich fund of information about the festival and related institutions.

Perhaps the most interesting of these is a contract of the third century B.C. which represents a reorganization of the contest.¹⁹ The inscription documents the competition's transition from ἀγῶνες θεματικοί—games for prizes—to the more prestigious status of ἀγῶνες στεφανίται—games for wreaths, or crowns. There was money at stake, and our inscription is among other things a precious indication of the dynamics of the relationship of the unionized performers to the organizers of the festival. Provision is also made for changing the year of the festival—the inscription clearly represents the embodiment in a formal agreement of the reform of an existing festival. Paul Jamot, who published the inscription in 1895, insisted on this and though he dated the inscription to the third century, wrote, "Mais en même temps nous ne pouvons douter que ces jeux n'existassent déjà avant cette époque, puisque le texte est relatif précisément à la réorganisation du concours."²⁰ Sketchy as they are, the publications of the French excavators of the valley of the Muses are filled with parenthetical remarks of this sort. The material remains recovered belong to the third century or later, but of course, the excavators reiterate, the festival and the cult must have been much older. Their frustration is understandable. The site is linked to Hesiod and yet it has virtually no archaeological record before the third century B.C. G. M. Sifakis has down-dated the decree cited above from a vague "third century" to the period 220–208.²¹ This incidentally puts it close to the largest recorded gift to the Muses of Helicon—25,000 drachmas from Ptolemy IV Philopator.²² This gift at the very end of the third century may account for some of the architectural remains excavated. The valley has yielded some archaic pottery, including that from the surface finds associated with the large village mapped by the Cambridge-Bradford Boeotia Expedition. A spring high up the slope produced a fragment of a bronze cauldron rim with 10 letters of an archaic inscription to some nameless Heliconian deity, but there is little more.²³

¹⁸ Roux (n. 8, above) 23.

¹⁹ Paul Jamot, "Fouilles de Thespies, les jeux en l'honneur des Muses," *BCH* 19 (1895) 314–16.

²⁰ Jamot (n. 19, above) 312.

²¹ G. M. Sifakis, "Organization of Festivals and the Dionysiac Guilds," *Classical Quarterly* n. s. 15 (1965) 206–14.

²² P. Roesch, *Thespies et la confédération béotienne* (1965) 221.

²³ A. Plassart, "Fouilles de Thespies et de l'hiéron des Muses de l'Hélicon: Inscriptions (6ème article): Dédicaces de caractère religieux ou honorifique; bornes de domaines sacrés (2),"

The festival, in other words, is attested in the archaeological record only for the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Many of the inscriptions are Roman, and though there may have been interruptions,²⁴ the Mouseia of Thespias were apparently celebrated until Constantine looted the site to decorate his new capital. Certainly the valley of the stream now called the Arkhontitsa was inhabited before 300 B.C., and the large village there may have been called Askra. But there is nothing to connect the ruined village with the festival, and there is nothing to prevent believing that it was the Thespiots, after they destroyed the village, who developed a festival there, in the period after Alexander. That festival advertised its archaic roots and claimed a special relationship to the traditions of archaic wisdom poetry that went under the name of Hesiod. This connection becomes explicit in inscriptions such as IG VII 1785 (no longer extant), apparently a boundary marker for a revenue-producing property in the valley, belonging to the "Synthytaí of the Hesiodic Muses."²⁵ There is nothing, however, to show that this landscape or its festival had any real connection with the poems that seemed to stand at the origin of Greek tradition (though there is ample evidence that it advertised such a connection).

Nothing in the archaeological record, then, stands in the way of suggesting that the festival called the Mouseia celebrated Hesiod's Muses and traced its origins to the crusty old Heliconian sage without the slightest historical connection to the tradition of Hesiodic poetry. If the Heliconian cult of the Muses existed before the Hellenistic period, its shrine in the valley of the Arkhontitsa was so insignificant that no trace of it remains. But from the third century on, this institution was demonstrably affluent and conspicuous. That is, when Hesiodic poetry was held in highest esteem, when it was being praised and "imitated" by the poets of Alexandria and was reaching its first substantial reading audience, an important festival of the arts was advertising its connections with that poetry and its singer and claiming both as its own.

BCH 50 (1926) 385. The bronze cauldron rim was found before 1890 at Kriopegadi, traditionally identified as Hesiod's Hippokrene: Wallace (n. 8, above) 16–18.

²⁴ Cf. Jamot (n. 19, above) 364, on the gap in inscriptional evidence from the mid-first century B.C. to the late second century after Christ.

²⁵ P. Roesch, *Thespias et la confédération béotienne*, 221. Cf. IG VII 4240, discussed by Werner Peek, "Hesiod und der Helikon," *Philologus* 121 (1977) 173–75.

The Festival and the Text of Hesiod — Plutarch's Evidence

What might the Mouseia of Thespiiai, celebrated in a valley of Mount Helicon from perhaps 300 B.C. to the decline of the pagan festivals in the fourth century after Christ, have done to the surviving text of Hesiod?

Let me repeat that almost nothing is known of the text of Hesiod before the Hellenistic period. There are echoes in other poets, a great abundance of them, which modern editors of Hesiod have gone to great trouble to assemble. Sadly, however, few of these echoes help in dating even specific portions of the poems. There are also a few quotations in later authors, starting with Plato, but these are surprisingly few and not evenly distributed throughout the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*.

There is also the same sort of conflicting testimony about the corpus as that for Homer. While the Bocotians (according to Pausanias) declared only the *Works and Days* to be the work of Hesiod, and not even all of that, others listed as many as a dozen titles. The *Suda* represents a typical opinion regarding Hesiod's *oeuvre*. It lists (s. v. Hesiodos) "the *Theogony*, the *Shield of Heracles*, the *Catalogue of Women of the Heroic Period*, a dirge (for someone named Batrakhos, with whom he was in love), *On the Idaean Dactyls*, and many others."

Widespread doubt about the authenticity of specific bits of information in Hesiod is reflected by Aelian, who remarks parenthetically in a discussion of the Niobids, "The ancients seem not to agree with one another regarding the number of the children of Niobe . . . Hesiod says there were 19, unless the verses are not Hesiod's at all, but like many others have been mistakenly attributed to him."²⁶

The disagreement about what was and what was not Hesiodic in the works of Hesiod seems in fact to have been far more pervasive in antiquity than the similar debate on Homer. As Aelian's remarks indicate, it involved not only the authenticity of entire works, but that of sections or even specific verses within works. The debate continues today, with hardly less energy,²⁷ a half century after the work of Milman Parry forced a reassessment of the concept of authorship in archaic Greek poetry. In fact, however, for all their contradictions, the Hesiodic poems have a demonstrable unity guaranteed by a rich and coherent manuscript tradition. It is not certain, however, whether this unity predates the Hellenistic period. These are (as with the poems of Homer) a group of archaic poems *as conceived by the*

²⁶ Aelian, *Varia historia* 12. 36.

²⁷ The most credible recent analysis is that of Friedrich Solmsen, "The Earliest Stages in the History of Hesiod's Text," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 86 (1982) 1–31. Solmsen divides the *Theogony* into multiple strata, from an ur-*Theogony* by way of "Hesiod's additions and revisions" to several levels of "expansions and other changes produced by the rhapsodes." His vast experience of the text of Hesiod guarantees the usefulness of the distinctions he makes, but the entire model is, finally, circular and the conclusions without objective criteria.

first age of Greek culture that included a large reading public and literary scholars in our sense. What went before is unknowable. The literature of archaic Greece as known to us is exclusively a function of the taste and critical acumen of Hellenistic Greece.

Before we turn to the important testimony of Plutarch, a problem that has bothered Hesiod scholars since antiquity deserves attention—that of the *prooimia* to the two poems. Both were suspect in antiquity. The Pergamene scholar Crates athetized both; Aristarchus obelized that of the *Works and Days* (texts of which without *prooimion* are attested).

Any epic poem could have a prologue. The collection called the *Homeric Hymns* consists of prologues of various lengths that might be prefaced to recitations of longer poems. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* come down without prologues, or with very short, closely adapted ones, certainly not usable with any other poem. Still, there is reason to believe that ancient performances of these epics included *prooimia*. But how organic is the relationship between the body of an archaic Greek poem and its *prooimion*? The small size of the sample does not allow any meaningful conclusions, but this is the sort of situation where the taste and perceptions of a later age might be expected to influence the text, to make the decision whether a given archaic poem was separable from its *prooimion*, or integrally and necessarily bound to it.

The comment of the scholiast on Dionysius Periegetes concerning Crates' rejection of the Hesiodic *prooimia* raises a number of problems: "The [*prooimia*] of the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony* might be prefixed to any poem, and therefore Crates rejected them quite rightly [or perhaps: 'in accordance with his principle'].²⁸

That is one opinion, and a very respectable one—but it was *not* that of the bulk of the Hellenistic reading public, since the *prooimia* survived to become part of the text known to the Middle Ages. Why, then, did they survive? It is useful here to look at the question backwards, and ask what would be lost from the text of Hesiod and from the content of the two poems by losing the prologues.

First, Hesiod's name would be lost—mentioned only once, in the prologue of the *Theogony* (22)—and along with Hesiod's name would be lost every Boeotian toponym *except* Ascra and Helicon, which occur together in the lines quoted above (p. 4). Gone are the eddying Permessos (identified with the Arkhontitsa), gone is very holy Olmeios, and along with them, Hippocrene and the altar of Zeus on top of Helicon. The Hesiodic landscape is left impoverished and nearly anonymous, and the poet himself without a name. Without the prologues, Hesiod approaches the condition of Homer.

²⁸ F. Rühl, "Dionysios Periegetes," *Rheinisches Museum* 29 (1874) 83 (Dionysius comments, 64–65): τὸ δὲ τῶν ἔργων καὶ ἡμερῶν Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς θεογονίας πάσης ἐστὶ προτάξαι ποιήσεως· διὸ καὶ ὁ Κράτης αὐτὰ κατὰ λόγον ἡθέτει.

Last and most significant of all, without the prologues the Heliconian Muses fade into insignificance. Outside the prologues, Hesiod mentions the Muses only five times in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*. Their descent from Mnemosyne is noted in the *Theogony* (915–17), and they are invoked to aid in the performance of the catalogue of goddesses who bore children to mortals (963–68)—a purely Homeric convention, by which the narrative voice asks for help with an exceptional task of recall of traditional material. The last verse of the *Theogony* (1022), the bridge to the *Catalogue of Women*, makes a similar request.

The two other references to the Muses outside the *prooimia* are in the passage in the *Works and Days* to which I would like finally to turn. It is the digression (if that is the correct term) in the problematic passage on seafaring—*Works and Days* 646–62.

- Εὖτ' ἂν ἐπ' ἐμπορίην τρέψας ἀεσίφρονα θυμόν
 βούλῃται χρέα τε προφυγεῖν καὶ λιμὸν ἀτερπέα,
 δείξω δὴ τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης,
 οὔτε τι ναυτιλίας σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν·
 650 οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε νηί γ' ἐπέπλων εὐρέα πόντον,
 εἰ μὴ ἐς Εὐβοίαν ἐξ Αὐλίδος, ἧ ποτ' Ἀχαιοὶ
 μέιναντες χειμῶνα πολὺν σὺν λαὸν ἄγειραν
 Ἑλλάδος ἐξ ἱερῆς Τροίην ἐς καλλιγύναικα.
 ἔνθα δ' ἐγὼν ἐπ' ἄεθλα δαΐφρονος Ἀμφιδάμαντος
 655 Χαλκίδα τ' εἷς ἐπέρησα· τὰ δὲ προπεφραδμένα πολλὰ
 ἄθλ' ἔθεσαν παῖδες μεγαλήτορος· ἔνθα μέ φημι
 ὕμνῳ νικήσαντα φέρειν τρίποδ' ὠτῶντα,
 τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ Μούσης Ἑλικωνιάδεσσ' ἀνέθηκα,
 ἔνθα με τὸ πρῶτον λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν αἰοδῆς.
 660 τόσσόν τοι νηῶν γε πεπειρημαὶ πολυγόμφων·
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο·
 Μοῦσαι γάρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον αἰεΐειν.

This amusing passage was clearly part of the poem as known in the Hellenistic period, but there is a voice of exceptional authority raised against it in antiquity—that of Plutarch.

A scholion on the passage, traceable to the commentary on the *Works and Days* of the Neoplatonist Proclus, reads,²⁹

²⁹ Fr. 84, Sandbach. There is disagreement about which lines Plutarch branded as an interpolation (ἐμβεβλήσθαι φησιν). Bernardakis (fr. 62, with notes) believed Plutarch considered 13 lines, from 650 through 662, spurious. Sandbach reads the opening phrase more cautiously and retains 650–53, down to the last major syntactic break before mention of Khalkis. Given the oddly self-undercutting tone of the introductory sentence (646–49), along with Plutarch's lack of patience with the playful ironies of the Hesiodic speaker, and the fact that no other Plutarchan comments relating to those lines are preserved, I suspect that the excision went from 646 to 662. Whichever of these conjectures is correct, however, the scholion is explicit that for Plutarch the "real" *Works and Days* started again at 663, and so the references to the Muses remain unavoidably within the "interpolation."

Ταῦτα πάντα περὶ τῆς Χαλκίδος (καὶ) τοῦ Ἀμφιδά- 10
 μαντος καὶ τοῦ ἄθλου καὶ τοῦ τρίποδος ἐμβεβλήσθαι φησιν
 ὁ Πλούταρχος οὐδὲν ἔχοντα χρηστὸν. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀμφι-
 δάμαντα ναυμαχοῦντα πρὸς Ἑρετριέας ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ληλάντου
 ἀποθανεῖν· ἄθλα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἀγῶνας θεῖναι τελευ- 15
 τήσαντι τοὺς παῖδας· νικῆσαι δ' ἀγωνιζόμενον τὸν Ἡσίο-
 δον καὶ ἄθλον μουσικὸν τρίποδα λαβεῖν καὶ ἀναθεῖναι
 τοῦτον ἐν τῷ Ἑλικῶνι, ὅπου καὶ κάτοχος ἐγεγόνει ταῖς
 Μούσαις, καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπὶ τούτῳ θρυλοῦσι. πάντα οὖν
 ταῦτα ληρώδη λέγων ἐκείνος ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἄρχεται τῶν εἰς
 τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ πλοῦ συντεινόντων, "ἥματα πεντήκοντα." 20

In his discussion of the scholion, M. L. West focused his attention on the problem raised by a phrase, inserted in one version of it,³⁰ that seems to indicate that the Alexandrians rejected the ten-line passage from 651 to 660. This, then, would be a reasonable attempt to clean up and "restore" the text, based on the perception that the contest of Homer and Hesiod was a "late" invention. These may have been the motives of the Alexandrian scholars, but two facts remain to be explained. First, the survival of the condemned lines,³¹ and second, their rejection by Plutarch. One further bit of testimony may explain both.

It is unlikely to have been more than 50 years after Plutarch expressed his contempt for these "frivolous" lines of the received text of Hesiod, that Pausanias visited the valley of the Muses.³² He reports the usual trivia—Helicon is free of poisonous plants, and hence its poisonous snakes are not as poisonous as those found elsewhere, and so forth. The locals, he tells us, say that Otus and Ephialtes established the cult of the Heliconian Muses—clearly a founding myth fabricated to advertise the antiquity of the shrine. A few verses from a poem already lost in Pausanias's time are cited from a local historian to support the account. And Ascrea? As was previously noted, Pausanias saw only the ruined tower visible today—*Pyrgaki*. He walks on up the valley, admiring the statues in the grove of the Muses and recording the names of the sculptors—his catalogue quite likely includes the statues that stood on the great curved stone base that survives.³³ After various statues of mythical figures and Hellenistic rulers, he arrives at the collection of bronze tripods, and the jewel of the collection is, of course, the

³⁰ West (1978) 319. The text discussed is Pertusi's (*Scholia vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies* [Pubbl. dell'Università Cattolica del S. Cuore, n. s. 13, 1955] 205–06), where the phrase ἀθετοῦνται δέκα στίχοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας νεώτερον interrupts the citation from Proclus. The phrase occurs in only one of the 7 manuscripts that have the scholion in one form or another, and probably has nothing to do with Plutarch or even with Proclus.

³¹ The lines both of Homer and of Hesiod condemned by the Hellenistic scholars seem generally to have survived in the later manuscript tradition (often with explicit indication of such editorial condemnation).

³² Pausanias 9. 29–31.

³³ Werner Peek, "Die Musen von Thespiæ" (n. 8, above).

tripod Hesiod himself won in Khalkis. Pausanias does not record the inscription, but if the *Contest* can be believed, it read:

Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἐλικωνίσι τόνδ' ἀνέθηκεν
ὕμνῳ νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον.

Pausanias closes his account of the valley of the Muses with a climb up to Hippocrene, where he is shown a lead tablet with the *Works and Days* inscribed on it, *minus* the ten-line *prooimion*. The locals at the spring did not serve their own interests when they said Hesiod wrote that poem, and no other. What better testimony to support the idea that for once Pausanias was shown a genuine heirloom, displayed without ulterior motive? The locals in the valley of the Muses knew that the *oeuvre* of the poet who by Pausanias's time had been associated with their valley for at least 400 years had been expanded and inflated in every possible way. They seem to have clung to a purist position at their own expense—who knows?—it may even have contained some shred of historical truth.

To return now to Plutarch: he and Pausanias were alive at the same time, though Plutarch was much older than Pausanias. Was Plutarch's rejection of the passage on Hesiod's victory at Khalkis and the tripod simply an echo of the Hellenistic scholars' perception that the *Contest* was fabricated after the time of Homer and Hesiod? On the map of western Boeotia, Plutarch's home town, Chaironeia, lies less than 40 kilometers northwest of the valley of the Muses. He could not fail to know, firsthand, the tripod in the collection there, to which the lines in question were said to refer. Plutarch actually portrays himself against the background of the shrine, in the dialogue called the *Erotikos* (749b).³⁴

The obvious conclusion seems to be that Plutarch *knew* that the tripod on display in the grove of the Muses was not what it was claimed to be—that it was in fact an attempt on the part of the attendants of a Hellenistic shrine to fabricate archaic roots. By condemning the passage that described it as an "interpolation," he was pulling the rug from under the prized exhibit, but still more important, he was tacitly indicating his own knowledge that the Hesiodic poems had been tampered with at some stage in their history, in order to accommodate them to the shrine and its artifacts. Without the slightest intention to undermine the personal, historic Hesiod, he was indicating how one element of that persona, one bit of pseudo-autobiographical information, entered the canon, in the service of the festival of the Muses.

³⁴ The setting of the dialogue can be understood in terms of literary conventions and echoes, and need not be historically accurate. The passages that establish the setting of Plutarch's conversation in the valley of the Arkhontitsa (a conversation fictionally recreated within the *Erotikos* through the mouth of Plutarch's son) do, however, provide sufficient evidence of a knowledge of the topography of the area and the distance from Thespiai to the valley to leave little doubt that Plutarch had firsthand experience of the shrine of the Muses.

There are various reasons to believe that this sort of fabrication of an archaic past was a widespread phenomenon among Hellenistic institutions. In Samothrace, in the initiatory sanctuary, there is a Hellenistic building with a conspicuous Mycenaean architectural feature—a relieving triangle.³⁵ The comparison may be carried further. The building in question, and the whole of the Hellenistic embellishment of the shrine of Samothrace, belong to the time of Apollonius's *Argonautica*, which advertised the importance of the Samothracian mysteries in the Bronze Age—Jason and his crew stopped there to be initiated. Literature and architecture are both called into service to enhance the prestige of the institution. There are examples of archaism in the inscriptions of the valley of the Muses, but if the priests of the Heliconian Muses did not need to represent the archaic roots of their shrine architecturally, the answer may lie in the power of the much more malleable, expressive material at their disposal—the Hesiodic corpus.

Stripped of the passages discussed here—the *prooimia* and the seafaring passage³⁶—the Hesiodic corpus has little local color and no Muses—or rather, it has Muses only as Homer has Muses. With the prologues and the passage on the tripod, the Hesiodic corpus becomes first and foremost a celebration of the Muses, and the daughters of memory move to center stage.

To summarize what has been suggested here: Proclus, when relaying Plutarch's remarks on the seafaring passage, reports that Plutarch believed *Works and Days* 650–62 was an interpolation. The whole story of the contest on Euboea is lost and along with it something of the (oddly undercut) legitimation of Hesiod's seafaring lore. And along with the story goes the legitimation of the prized artifact displayed in Plutarch's time in the valley of the Muses. A century before Proclus's time, the precinct of the Muses on the slopes of Helicon had been looted for the beautification of Constantinople, and the once-important festival there was a thing of the remote past. But Pausanias was shown the tripod in question, and there can be little doubt that Plutarch was shown it as well. This has not been sufficiently appreciated. Pausanias's visit, in the middle of the second century, was only a few decades after the death of Plutarch. Plutarch lived much of his life near the spot, and even portrays himself there, albeit in a highly conventional manner. It is impossible that Plutarch, a half-century before Pausanias, was not shown the same prized artifact. When he

³⁵ J. R. McCredie, "A Samothracian Enigma," *Hesperia* 43 (1974) 454–59.

³⁶ Plutarch does not condemn the entire seafaring passage, and the "interpolation" he points to was not intended to include the passage (633–40) on Hesiod's father's seafaring ventures, which resulted in his settling in wretched Ascra. This represents the core of Hesiodic autobiography that the tradition has generally accepted until recently (Nagy, "Hesiod," 50). The seafaring passage stands out strikingly from the rest of the *Works and Days* for its seeming irrelevance to concerns that could be localized in the dusty little valley far from the sea that is claimed as Hesiod's home, and it is striking that the speaker chooses just this material as the occasion to remind us that he is really speaking to us from the valley of the Muses.

considered the entire passage an interpolation, he was not reacting simply to its lack of seriousness, its failure to live up to the austere standard of edificatory value he set for the text. He was saying with characteristic tact that the priests' prized artifact was a hoax—and he was saying that a 12-line passage of the *Works and Days* was an *aition*, inserted sometime, by someone, to explain that hoax.

The further implications of this interpolation are suggestive. Along with the *prooimia* (themselves questioned in antiquity), the passage lost here is unique in the Hesiodic corpus in suggesting a special relationship between Hesiod and the Heliconian Muses. It is also juxtaposed with and closely related to the passage on Hesiod's father's seafaring activities, which contain the only references to Ascra and to Hesiod's family (beyond Perses, whose name occurs repeatedly in formulas of address).³⁷

Plutarch, as an exceptionally educated and sophisticated local informant, may be providing the keys to an understanding of how the diverse body of wisdom poetry we know as the Hesiodic corpus came to be associated with a specific shepherd in a specific landscape in a remote valley of his own native Boeotia.

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³⁷ The best analogy is the Kymos of the Theognidean corpus, probably to be understood as a conventional mute persona rather than a reflection of a historical individual. Cf. A. Ford, "The Seal of Theognis: The Politics of Authorship in Ancient Greece," in *Theognis of Megara*, ed. T. J. Figuera and G. Nagy (1985).

Der Höhepunkt der deutschen Plutarchrezeption: Plutarch bei Nietzsche

HEINZ GERD INGENKAMP

I

Anfang 1872 erschien die "Geburt der Tragödie." Ein Jahr zuvor hatte Nietzsche eine Anzahl von Seiten zum Thema dieser Schrift zu Papier gebracht, die er dann aber nicht so, wie konzipiert, mitveröffentlichte. Darin heißt es:

"Selbst noch jener abgeblaßte Epigone Plutarch hat so viel griechischen Instinkt in sich, daß er uns sagen kann, kein edelgeborener Jüngling würde, wenn er den Zeus in Pisa schaue, das Verlangen haben, selbst ein Phidias, oder wenn er Hera in Argos sieht, selbst ein Polyklet zu werden . . . Das künstlerische Schaffen fällt für den Griechen eben so sehr unter den unehrwürdigen Begriff der Arbeit, wie jedes banausische Handwerk."¹

Plutarch also der Vertreter dieser Einschätzung des Kunstschaffens, aber *sogar noch* Plutarch. Selbst in einem so abgeblaßten Epigonen hat sich das Griechentum noch so sehr durchgehalten, daß . . .

Weihnachten 1872 schickte Nietzsche "Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern" an Cosima Wagner. Sie sind erst mit dem Nachlaß veröffentlicht worden. Hier verwendet Nietzsche die Zeilen aus dem inzwischen fast zweijährigen Manuskript, allerdings mit einer bezeichnenden Kürzung. Er schreibt:

Die von Nietzsche selbst veröffentlichten Werke werden mit Titelsigle und Paragraphen- bzw. Aphorismennummer zitiert. Die verwendeten Siglen sind: GT = Die Geburt der Tragödie, UB = Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, MA = Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, M = Morgenröte, FWi = Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, Z = Also sprach Zarathustra, J = Jenseits von Gut und Böse, GM = Zur Genealogie der Moral, FWa = Der Fall Wagner, GD = Götzen-Dämmerung, A = Der Antichrist. Weniger übersichtliche Kapitel und Paragraphen werden zusätzlich mit Band- und Seitenzahl der kritischen Gesamtausgabe der Werke Nietzsches von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Berlin und New York 1967 ff. (Sigle: KGW), zitiert. Ebenfalls nach dieser Ausgabe werden alle nachgelassenen Schriften und Fragmente zitiert. Die Zitate aus Nietzsches Briefen richten sich nach der kritischen Gesamtausgabe der Briefe (Sigle: KGBr) von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Berlin und New York 1975 ff.

¹ KGW III, 352.

“Plutarch sagt einmal mit altgriechischem Instinkte, kein edelgeborner Jüngling werde . . .” usw.²

Hat er den Ausdruck “abgeblaßter Epigone” nur weggelassen, weil er den Gedanken jetzt aus der Hand gab, oder hatte sich sein Plutarchbild geändert? Es spricht einiges dafür, daß dies letztere der Fall war. Der Philologe hatte Plutarch tüchtig verwendet—als Steinbruch, wie in seiner Zeit üblich. Um das unbeschwert tun zu können, ist ein Urteil wie “abgeblaßter Epigone” günstig. Aber aus dem Philologen Nietzsche war über der Arbeit an der “Geburt der Tragödie” ein Philosoph geworden. Das hatte seine Folgen wohl auch für das, was uns hier interessiert.

II 1

In der Jahresmitte 1872³ tobt der Kampf um die “Geburt der Tragödie”: Wilamowitz hat seine Gegenschrift veröffentlicht, Rohde antwortet. Im Wintersemester bleiben die Studenten aus; Nietzsche steht vor leeren Bänken.

In dieser aufregenden Zeit sammeln sich bereits die Gedanken zur späteren “Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung” mit dem Titel “Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben”; wenigstens als Teil des größeren Ganzen “Historie” kommt hier auch die Philologie in die Ziellinie seiner Kritik, und dieser nicht-historistische, nicht-philologische Standpunkt wirkt sich, wie bereits zu erwarten, positiv für das Urteil über Plutarch aus. Unter den Notizen aus dieser Zeit findet sich auch die folgende:⁴

“Meine Aufgabe: den *inneren Zusammenhang und die Nothwendigkeit jeder wahren Kultur* zu begreifen. Die Schutz- und Heilmittel einer Kultur, das Verhältniß derselben zum Volksgenius. Die Consequenz jeder großen Kunstwelt ist eine Kultur: aber oft kommt es, durch feindliche Gegenströmungen, nicht zu diesem Ausklingen eines Kunstwerks.

Die Philosophie soll den *geistigen Höhenzug* durch die Jahrhunderte festhalten: damit die ewige Fruchtbarkeit alles Großen.

Für die Wissenschaft giebt es kein Groß und Klein—aber für die Philosophie! An jenem Satze mißt sich der Werth der Wissenschaft.

Das Festhalten des Erhabenen!

Welcher außerordentlicher *Mangel* an Büchern in unserer Zeit, die eine heroische Kraft athmen!—Selbst Plutarch wird nicht mehr gelesen!”

Was Nietzsche meint, wird deutlicher werden durch den Kommentar zum nächsten Stück. Hier mag der Versuch einer ausführlichen Paraphrase reichen.

² KGW III 2, 260.

³ Zu einer Notiz von 1871 s. unten S. 31.

⁴ KGW III 4, 14.

Nietzsche notiert, was er als seine Aufgabe ansieht. Zunächst besteht diese darin, die Einheit, das Wesen, den Kern einer jeden "wahren" Kultur (dazu werden u.a. die indische, griechische, römische,⁵ französische gehören) zu "begreifen," d.h. wohl: zu einer sie charakterisierenden Formulierung zu kommen. Die beiden folgenden Aufgaben sind spezieller: Es geht ihm um das Mittel, einer Kultur in Gefahr beizustehen (was er meint, wird er sogleich sagen); es geht ihm darum, wie die Kultur sich zum "Volksgenius" verhält, einer etwas mystischen Entität, die wohl z.B. die Möglichkeit der Mythen eines Volkes ist, ein "Abgrund," aus dem in Deutschland z.B. die Reformation geflossen ist ". . . in deren Choral die Zukunftsweise der deutschen Musik zuerst erklang."⁶

Der nächste Satz ist eine gedankliche Einheit; sein Gewicht liegt auf dem zweiten Teil. Im Ohr liegt noch die Aufgabe, sich mit den Heil- und Schutzmitteln einer Kultur zu befassen: Das ist nötig, da feindliche Gegenströmungen (in erster Linie "Wissenschaftlichkeit") verhindern, daß eine "große Kunstwelt" (wie etwa die Möglichkeit Indiens, Griechenlands, Roms) ihre Konsequenz, eben ihre Kultur findet (im Fall Griechenlands also die tragische Kultur). Ist diese Kultur erreicht, so ist es zum "Ausklingen" des "Kunstwerks" gekommen—aber eben dies wird nicht immer erreicht. Bis hierhin sieht Nietzsche seine Aufgabe im "Begreifen" einer Kultur (sowie in der Einsicht in ihre Heilmittel). Es ist nicht leicht zu sagen, wie das folgende mit dem ersten Abschnitt zusammenhängt. Das zitierte Stück ist ja eine unabhängige Nachlaßnotiz, somit ohne unmittelbaren Kontext, und zunächst für sich allein zu betrachten. Zweifellos hängen die beiden nächsten Abschnitte untereinander zusammen. Aber ist die Philosophie noch als "Aufgabe" angesehen? Will Nietzsche eine solche Philosophie in Angriff nehmen? Will er das, was er zuvor als seine Aufgabe beschrieben hat, (u.a.) in einer solchen Philosophie konkret verwirklichen? Jedenfalls tritt jetzt die Geschichte ins Bild, und zwar auf der einen Seite eine wenig werthafte: die wissenschaftliche Historiographie, für die es kein Klein oder Groß gibt, und, auf der anderen Seite, die werthafte Philosophie, die den "geistigen Höhenzug"—den Höhenzug, der von den großen Gedanken gebildet wird—"festhält," und zwar "durch die Jahrhunderte." Hierin liegt der Bezug zur Geschichte: die Philosophie ist eine Art Geschichtsschreibung, aber auf andere Art; sie sucht die geistigen Gipfel auf und macht deren Zwiegespräch vernehmlich—"die ewige Fruchtbarkeit alles Großen" besteht ja in diesem Zwiegespräch der Gipfel.

Wieder ist die Verbindung zum folgenden nicht einfach. Der Ausdruck "das Festhalten" erinnert an den Ausdruck, die Philosophie solle den geistigen Höhenzug "festhalten"; aber "das Erhabene" lenkt auf andere, mindestens *zusätzlich* auf andere Höhenzüge: das folgende dürfte das

⁵ GT 21, KGW III 1, 129.

⁶ GT 23, ib. 143.

“Erhabene” als “Heroisches” erläutern.⁷ Liegt darin, im Festhalten des so verstandenen “Erhabenen,” die im ersten Absatz allgemein formulierte Aufgabe Nietzsches?

Die 2. Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung kann den Gedanken nahelegen. Dann ist Plutarch Nietzsches Vorgänger—er hat das Erhabene festgehalten. Es gibt in Nietzsches Zeit nichts dergleichen, selbst Plutarchs Biographien, die ja vorliegen, werden vernachlässigt. Oder sind die beiden Arten des Festhaltens, das Festhalten des “geistigen Höhenzugs” und das Festhalten des Erhabenen eher nötige Vorarbeiten zu jener Ideenschau und Medizin der Kultur, die Nietzsche als Aufgabe vorschwebt? Dann ist Plutarch jedenfalls seinem Anliegen im höchsten Maße dienlich. Es gibt ja kaum Vergleichbares—wer hält Erhabenes fest, wenn nicht Plutarch?

Wie dem auch sei: Plutarch gerät in große Nähe zu Nietzsches Aufgabe. Er müßte ein zentraler Autor des Philosophen werden. Man wird sehen.

In der 2. Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung wird Plutarch wie folgt erwähnt:

“Und wenn ihr nach Biographien verlangt, dann nicht nach jenen mit dem Refrain ‘Herr So und So und seine Zeit,’ sondern nach solchen, auf deren Titelblatte es heissen müßte ‘ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit.’ Sättigt eure Seelen an Plutarch und wagt es an euch selbst zu glauben, indem ihr an seine Helden glaubt. Mit einem Hundert solcher unmodern erzogener, das heisst reif gewordener und an das Heroische gewöhnter Menschen ist jetzt die ganze lärmende Afterbildung dieser Zeit zum ewigen Schweigen zu bringen.”

Damit endet der 6. der insgesamt 10 Paragraphen der Schrift.⁸ Die Sätze sind in den vorhergehenden Abschnitten nur sehr allgemein vorbereitet: man versteht sie erst voll, wenn man *weitergelesen* hat. Erst später wird nämlich erst klar, was die beiden den Gedanken tragenden Ideen bedeuten: die Idee des Kämpfers gegen die eigene Zeit und die Idee der Reife.

Der von Nietzsche gemeinte Kämpfer kann dies nicht oder wenigstens nicht hauptsächlich als politischer Kämpfer sein. Denn einmal hat Nietzsche in seiner Schrift einen, wie er wohl meint, unpolitischen Standpunkt eingenommen—er fragt nach Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für eine Kultur, die er als eine geschlossene Welt des Großen, Erhabenen, Heroischen versteht, nicht aber nach Nutzen und Nachteil geschichtlicher Forschung für die Erledigung ökonomischer, diplomatischer oder machtpolitischer Tagesfragen oder für Programme zum Zweck der Beibehaltung oder Veränderung gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse. Sodann ist Plutarch kein Autor, der uns lauter Kämpfer vorstellte, die politisch gegen ihre Zeit standen. Mag man dies mit einiger Großzügigkeit z. B. von Solon und den Gracchen sagen, so ist es völlig unmöglich, die Viten Caesars, des

⁷ Vgl. unten S. 512 mit UB II 5, KGW III 1, 276.

⁸ KGW III 1, 291.

jüngeren Cato, des Pompeius, Crassus, Brutus, Ciceros und Marc Antons als Biographien von Kämpfern gegen ihre eigene Zeit im politischen Sinn zu lesen: denn welche Politik soll für "die Zeit" dieser Männer noch übriggeblieben sein, da sie ja allesamt in dieser oder jener Weise gegeneinander oder aneinander vorbei agierten und in ihrer Gesamtheit andeutungsweise das politische Spektrum der Epoche repräsentieren?

Der Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit, der Nietzsche vorschwebt, ist am Ende des 8. Paragraphen definiert. "Denn rede man," heißt es dort, "von welcher Tugend man wolle, von der Gerechtigkeit, Grossmuth, Tapferkeit, von der Weisheit und dem Mitleid des Menschen—überall ist er dadurch tugendhaft, dass er sich gegen jene blinde Macht der Facta, gegen die Tyrannei des Wirklichen empört und sich Gesetzen unterwirft, die nicht die Gesetze jener Geschichtsfluctuationen sind. Er schwimmt immer gegen die geschichtlichen Wellen, sei es dass er seine Leidenschaften als die nächste dumme Thatsächlichkeit seiner Existenz bekämpft oder dass er sich zur Ehrlichkeit verpflichtet, während die Lüge rings um ihn herum ihre glitzernden Netze spinnt. . . . Glücklicher Weise bewahrt sie (sc. die Geschichte) . . . das Gedächtniss an die großen Kämpfer *gegen die Geschichte*, das heisst gegen die blinde Macht des Wirklichen und stellt sich dadurch selbst an den Pranger, dass sie Jene gerade als die eigentlichen historischen Naturen heraushebt, die sich um das 'So ist es' wenig kümmern, um vielmehr mit heiterem Stolze einem 'So soll es sein' zu folgen."⁹

In der Tat: solche Kämpfer "gegen die geschichtlichen Wellen," die die jeweils eigene Epoche an sie heranbringt, kann man in Plutarchs Helden finden: Kämpfer gegen das Alltägliche der Leidenschaften, gegen das, was schon deshalb etwas wert sein will, weil es wirklich ist, und für das "So soll es sein."

Der heitere Stolz, die Bereitschaft zur Arbeit an sich selbst und an der "Zeit" trennt solche Gestalten, wie sie Nietzsche vorschweben und wie er sie bei Plutarch gestaltet findet, von einem Typus, der in Nietzsches Epoche an Boden gewonnen hatte: den Hegelianer, wie Nietzsche ihn sieht. Der steht in einem *Weltprozeß*, und die eigene Zeit ist dessen notwendiges Resultat. Die Zeit *nach* Hegel ist, da ja "Höhepunkt und Endpunkt" des Weltprozesses "in seiner (sc. Hegels) eigenen Berliner Existenz zusammenfielen,"¹⁰ ohnehin nur noch eine Appendix—im Grunde überflüssig. Man bekennt sich zum Epigonentum, hat mit der Geschichte nichts mehr vor und macht vor ihr einen krummen Rücken.¹¹ Gerade gegen diese moderne Mythologie bringt Nietzsche seine "veralteten Gedanken"¹² an über die Kämpfer gegen die eigene Zeit und ihr "So soll es sein." Nietzsche, kaum indirekt also, mit

⁹ ib. 307.

¹⁰ ib. 304.

¹¹ ib. 305.

¹² ib. 306.

Plutarch gegen Hegel. Hier der Höhenzug des Großen, der zur Gestaltung einer großen Zukunft aufruft, dort der Abgesang auf die Zukunft und der krumme Rücken vor der Geschichte.

Soweit unser Kommentar zum "Kämpfer gegen die eigene Zeit." "Sättigt eure Seelen an Plutarch," heißt es weiter, "und wagt es an euch selbst zu glauben, indem ihr an seine Helden glaubt." Den Sinn dieses Satzes wird die Interpretation dessen, was folgt, deutlich machen. Wenden wir uns also diesem folgenden zu.

Hat man sich auf diese Weise—indem man sich an Plutarch gesättigt hat usw.—unmodern erzogen, ist man durch diese Erziehung *reif* geworden, so wird, wenn es zu einer Gruppe von einem Hundert solcher Menschen kommt, der zukunftsfeindliche Ungeist des historischen Wissens um seiner selbst willen zum Schweigen gebracht werden. Inwiefern die Erziehung zur Haltung der plutarchischen Helden "unmodern" ist, hat Nietzsche in den Kapiteln vorher dargelegt, vor allem im vierten, und er wird damit fortfahren, z. B. im achten, wo er ja der allgemeinen Hegelei die eigenen "veralteten Gedanken" gegenüberstellt. Interessant und entscheidend für sein Kulturkonzept ist aber der Begriff der Reife. Was er darunter versteht, erläutert er erst im folgenden, siebenten Paragraphen. "Alles Lebendige," sagt er da, "braucht um sich eine Atmosphäre, einen geheimnisvollen Dunstkreis; wenn man ihm diese Hülle nimmt, wenn man eine Religion, eine Kunst, ein Genie verurtheilt, als Gestirn ohne Atmosphäre zu kreisen: so soll man sich über das schnelle Verdorren, Hart- und Unfruchtbar-werden nicht mehr wundern. So ist es nun einmal bei allen grossen Dingen,

'die nie ohn' ein'gen Wahn gelingen,'

wie Hans Sachs in den Meistersingern sagt.

Aber selbst jedes Volk, ja jeder Mensch, der *reif* werden will, braucht einen solchen umhüllenden Wahn, eine solche schützende und umschleiernde Wolke; jetzt aber hasst man das Reifwerden überhaupt, weil man die Historie mehr als das Leben ehrt."¹³ Wenn Nietzsche vom "Lebendigen" spricht, das nur innerhalb eines "geheimnisvollen Dunstkreises" gedeihen könne, so hat er, wie die folgenden Beispiele zeigen, ausschließlich das *Kulturell-Lebendige* im Auge: Religion, Kunst, Genie sind ja Beispiele, die den Begriff "Lebendiges" erläutern. Er gibt *nicht* etwa dem Überdauern und Wachsen des *Kulturell-Lebendigen* einen naturgesetzlichen Hintergrund, indem er allgemeine Bestimmungen dafür der Biologie entnehme. Nietzsche meint also, daß, wie er sich ein paar Zeilen später ausdrückt, "Instincte und kräftige Wahnbilder" das bedingen, was er in seiner Schrift "Leben" nennt. Eine Kultur, der das Attribut "reif" gebührt, ebenso wie ein reifer Mensch, befindet sich, heißt das, in dem Gehäuse von *nicht* der Kritik unterzogenen, ungeprüften Anschauungen; ihre Prüfung verhinderte gerade die Reife oder

¹³ UB II 7, KGW III 1, 294.

höbe sie auf. "Sättigt eure Seelen an Plutarch heißt also: Schafft euch "leben" fördernde "Wahn" bilder mit Hilfe Plutarchs.

Nun zum Schlußsatz des Abschnitts. "Mit einem Hundert solcher unmodern erzogener, das heisst reif gewordener und an das Heroische gewöhnter Menschen ist jetzt die ganze lärmende Afterbildung dieser Zeit zum ewigen Schweigen zu bringen." Einen ganz ähnlichen Satz kennt des Leser noch aus dem. 2. Paragraphen:

"Nehme man an, dass Jemand glaube, es gehörten nicht mehr als hundert productive, in einem neuen Geiste erzogene und wirkende Menschen dazu, um der in Deutschland gerade jetzt modisch gewordenen Gebildetheit den Garaus zu machen, wie müsste es ihn bestärken wahrzunehmen, dass die Cultur der Renaissance sich auf den Schultern einer solchen Hundert-Männer-Schaar erhob." ¹⁴

Daß hier und dort im Wesentlichen dasselbe gesagt ist, ist offenkundig: schließlich impliziert ja der Begriff "Renaissance," daß der neue Geist, von dem die Rede ist, unmodern, veraltet ist. Hundert Männer also, die sich Plutarch zueigen machen, werden—wie es im Prinzip schon einmal geschehen ist—eine Kultur gegen ihre Zeit schaffen können. Im Zusammenhang seiner Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen hätte Nietzsche kaum Lobenswerteres über Plutarch sagen können.

Aus der Zeit, in der Nietzsche an der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen arbeitete, haben wir eine weitere Notiz, in der Plutarch erwähnt ist. Der Gedanke dieser Notiz ist in den Zusammenhang der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen zu stellen. Nietzsche schreibt:

"Unbekanntschaft mit Plutarch. Montaigne über ihn. Der wirksamste Autor (bei Smiles). Ob ein neuer Plutarch auch nur möglich wäre? Wir leben ja alle in einer stillen naturalistischen Sittlichkeit; wir halten die antiken Gestalten leicht für deklamatorisch." ¹⁵

Wer kennt Plutarch nicht? Wer lebt in einer stillen naturalistischen Sittlichkeit? Nietzsche spricht von "wir." Damit kann er seine ganze Epoche meinen. Es ist möglich, daß man der Anklage diese allgemeine Richtung nicht absprechen kann—mehr spricht dafür, daß Nietzsche speziell von den Deutschen redet.

Das ist noch nicht bewiesen, wenn denen, die Plutarch nicht kennen, der große Plutarcheer Montaigne entgegengehalten wird—schließlich lebte Montaigne drei Jahrhunderte vor Nietzsche und könnte der Jetztzeit als Vorbild vorgehalten werden. Samuel Smiles ¹⁶ hingegen ist Zeitgenosse—könnte aber der Mitwelt als Ausnahme vorgehalten werden. Mir scheint

¹⁴ KGW III 1, 256 f.

¹⁵ KGW III 4, 353. Vgl. auch unten, Kap. II 2.

¹⁶ Nietzsche bezieht sich auf Samuel Smiles, *Character*. ¹1871, ²1876: dort S. 272–76 ausführliche Würdigung Plutarchs.

aber die Klage speziell über die "stillose naturalistische Sittlichkeit" darauf hinzudeuten, daß, jedenfalls vor allem, die Deutschen gemeint sind.

Im 4. Kapitel der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen rügt Nietzsche, daß die "Deutschen der Gegenwart . . . mehr als ein anderes Volk an jener Schwäche der Persönlichkeit und an dem Widerspruche von Inhalt und Form zu leiden haben."¹⁷ Was Nietzsche damit tadelt, ist die Erscheinung, daß der moderne Deutsche so voll ist von Bildung, daß er unfähig geworden ist zur erhabenen Tat. "Es scheint fast unmöglich, dass ein starker und voller Ton selbst durch das mächtigste Hineingreifen in die Saiten erzeugt werde: sofort verhallt er wieder, im nächsten Augenblicke bereits klingt er historisch zart verflüchtigt und kraftlos ab. Moralisch ausgedrückt: es gelingt euch nicht mehr das Erhabene fest zu halten."¹⁸ Das ist die Skizze der "schwachen Persönlichkeit."¹⁹ Dem Widerspruch von Inhalt (dem Übermaß an Bildung) und Form (der Nachlässigkeit, dem Fehlen an Stil in der Lebensführung) liegt die Irrmeinung der Deutschen zugrunde, Form sei nur "Konvention," "Verkleidung" und "Verstellung." So habe sich der Deutsche aus der "Schule der Franzosen" gelöst: ". . . denn er wollte natürlicher und dadurch deutscher werden." Nietzsche fährt fort: "Nun scheint er (sc. der Deutsche) sich aber in diesem "Dadurch" verrechnet zu haben: aus der Schule der Convention entlaufen, liess er sich nun gehen, wie und wohin er eben Lust hatte und machte im Grunde schlottericht und beliebig in halber Vergesslichkeit nach, was er früher peinlich und oft mit Glück nachmachte." Nietzsche spricht hier nur vom äußeren Sich-Geben, also sehr konkret von "all unser(em) Gehen, Stehen, Unterhalten, Kleiden und Wohnen,"²⁰ aber was er hier vorträgt, ist nur das auffällige Äußere eines tieferliegenden Fehlverhaltens. Es geht Nietzsche um die Kultur im ganzen, und seine Bemerkungen über die deutsche Scheu vor der Konvention sind nur, eben weil sie besonders Zutageliegendes betreffen, der nächstliegende Beweis dafür, daß die Deutschen keine Kultur haben. Die Bemerkungen stehen unter der kurz zuvor gegebenen Definition, die Kultur eines Volkes sei die "Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäußerungen eines Volkes." Nietzsche erklärt: ". . . diese Bezeichnung darf nicht dahin missverstanden werden, als ob es sich um den Gegensatz von Barbarei und *schönem* Stil handele; das Volk, dem man eine Cultur zuspricht, soll nur in aller Wirklichkeit etwas lebendig Eines sein und nicht so elend in Inneres und Aeusseres, in Inhalt und Form auseinanderfallen."²¹ War "Nachlässigkeit"—im Gegensatz zu "Konvention" gesehen—enger als das, was mit "stillose naturalistische Sittlichkeit" gemeint ist, so ist das "Auseinanderfallen in Inhalt und Form" nun weiter. Aber den Rahmen,

¹⁷ KGW III 1, 271.

¹⁸ ib. 275 f.

¹⁹ ib. 275-77.

²⁰ ib. 271.

²¹ ib. 270.

innerhalb dessen die Bedeutung jenes Ausdrucks verstanden werden muß, stecken die beiden anderen Ausdrücke ab.

Es ist nun auch klar, was Nietzsche meint, wenn er sagt, "wir" hielten "die antiken Gestalten leicht für deklamatorisch." Die antiken Gestalten nehmen in der Notiz den Platz ein, den im § 4 der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen die Franzosen einnehmen: man meint, weil sie Stil repräsentieren, seien sie hohl—und dabei ist man nur selbst ein Tölpel und ein Schwächling dazu. Unter den "antiken Gestalten" wird der Leser hier am ehesten die Helden Plutarchs verstehen, die hiermit also indirekt als Vertreter einer echten Kultur figurieren, als Vertreter einer Lebensform, die "als Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäußerungen" zu erkennen ist. Indem Plutarch hier gegen Deutschland steht, kommt er in eine zentrale Position des nietzscheschen Frühdenkens hinein. Denn das kulturelle Schicksal Deutschlands ist nicht nur das Anliegen der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen—bereits die Geburt der Tragödie war im Hinblick auf die deutsche Kultur geschrieben, wie das Vorwort an Richard Wagner zeigt; weitere, nicht veröffentlichte Schriften aus dieser Zeit, die sich im Nachlaß fanden, bestätigen die Zentralität dieser Aufgabenstellung für den jungen Nietzsche.

"Ob ein neuer Plutarch auch nur möglich wäre," fragt er in der Notiz, die wir besprechen, und gibt dem Griechen somit andeutungsweise die Position eines Kulturschöpfers, eines Mannes also, der die Theorie der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen in Erziehungspraxis umsetzen könnte. Leider aber kennt man ihn nicht.

Wie Montaigne Plutarch einschätzte, wird Nietzsche in seiner Dritten Unzeitgemäßen mitteilen; wir werden sofort darauf eingehen. Fassen wir aber zuvor zusammen, wofür und wogegen die Idee "Plutarch" im Frühwerk Nietzsches steht.

Plutarch steht im Frühwerk *für* eine gegen die Tyrannei des Faktischen gerichtete, auf einem Glauben (Wahn) an das Heldische und einem Entschluß zum Heldischen gegründete Kultur, die sich zudem in einer gewollten, kontrollierten Sittlichkeit ausprägt, und *gegen* den Geist wissenschaftlicher, speziell historischer Analyse sowie gegen den Geist "naturalistischer Sittlichkeit"—Tendenzen, die Nietzsche im Deutschland seiner Zeit als verhängnisvoll empfindet.

II 2

"Unbekanntschaft mit Plutarch. Montaigne über ihn . . .," begann die zuletzt besprochene Notiz. Durch die Verbindung mit Montaigne tritt für einen Moment Plutarch als Autor der *Moralia* ins Bild—aber das Interesse wendet sich sofort wieder dem Biographen zu: dies sieht man bereits an dem Verweis auf Smiles.

Erneut mit Montaigne zusammen, nun aber in einem Kontext, der mit Biographien nichts zu schaffen hat, erscheint Plutarch in der Dritten Unzeitgemäßen. Diese, publiziert im Herbst 1874, betrifft den

Philosophen, der die Epoche beherrscht, den Nietzsche früh trifft, mit dem er sich durchgehend auseinandersetzt, und von dem er nur schwer und sicher nicht in jeder Hinsicht loskommt.

„Ich weiss nur noch einen Schriftsteller,“ sagt er, „den ich in Betreff der Ehrlichkeit Schopenhauer gleich, ja noch höher stelle: das ist Montaigne. Dass ein solcher Mensch geschrieben hat, dadurch ist wahrlich die Lust auf dieser Erde zu leben vermehrt worden. Mir wenigstens geht es seit dem Bekanntwerden mit dieser freiesten und kräftigsten Seele so, dass ich sagen muss, was er von Plutarch sagt: 'kaum habe ich einen Blick auf ihn geworfen, so ist mir ein Bein oder ein Flügel gewachsen.' Mit ihm würde ich es halten, wenn die Aufgabe gestellt wäre, es sich auf der Erde heimisch zu machen.“²²

Das indirekte Lob Plutarchs ergibt sich zufällig; was gesagt ist, auch über Plutarch, gilt Montaigne. Interessant ist die Stelle für uns, weil Plutarch, wie gesagt, somit kurz als Verfasser der *Moralia* auftritt. 1873 hatte Nietzsche sich 10 Kapitelthemen zu einer Schrift „Der Philosoph“ notiert; davon lautet die vierte: „Die Popularphilosophie (Plutarch, Montaigne).“²³ Im Mittelwerk treten noch zwei allgemeine Bemerkungen zu Plutarch als Verfasser der *Moralia* hinzu—das ist dann alles zu diesem Thema. Die beiden Bemerkungen sind: „Aber eingestehen muss man es sich, dass unsere Zeit arm ist an grossen Moralisten, dass Pascal, Epictet, Seneca, Plutarch wenig noch gelesen werden . . .“,²⁴ und ein Hinweis auf das Bild vom Abergläubischen in Plutarchs diesem Typus gewidmeter Schrift.²⁵

II 3

Bereits im Frühwerk hat Nietzsche sich von dem Vorurteil, sogar ein „abgeblaster Epigone“ wie Plutarch habe noch griechische Instinkte, gelöst; Plutarch—er selbst, ohne kommentierende Erläuterung—erscheint in der Folge gelegentlich dort, wo es um Leitbilder von Kulturschöpfern geht. Dies aber, die Schaffung einer Kultur, d.h. einer „Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes“ ist ein zentrales Thema des Frühwerks seit der „Geburt der Tragödie.“ Obwohl die mit Plutarch verbundene Idee für den frühen Nietzsche zentral ist, gelingt es Plutarch aber nicht, über den Rang eines bloßen Beispiels hinauszukommen. Er wird bei Wege erwähnt, er ist, wo es Nietzsche ernst ist, nicht vergessen: das ist es, was sich gezeigt hat. Immerhin ist bereits das eine in der deutschen Kultur einmalige Position für Plutarch.

Mit der Schrift „Menschliches, Allzumenschliches“ beginnt eine neue Phase im Denken Nietzsches. Von jetzt an schreibt er aphoristisch, wenn

²² UB III 2, KGW III 1, 344.

²³ KGW III 4, 331.

²⁴ MA I 282; vgl. die Vorstufen KGW IV 4, 211.

²⁵ M 77.

auch der Erörterungsstil immer noch durchbricht. Aus dem Rufer nach einer neuen Kultur ist ein Denker geworden, der einer Kultur, wie sie zuvor gedacht war, eher schaden muß: u.a. ein Nierenprüfer, ein Psychologe also, und Nietzsche weiß um die Gefahr. Die Passagen, wo er von Plutarch spricht, weisen auf dies sein Wissen hin und führen so wiederum in das Herz seines im Umbruch befindlichen Denkens; Plutarch ist auch hier nicht vergessen—und das ist auch hier wieder alles.

Wie weit liegt die Schrift über Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben zurück, wenn Nietzsche das zweite Hauptstück seines neuen Buches "Zur Geschichte der moralischen Empfindungen" nennen kann! Im zweiten Aphorismus dieses zweiten Hauptstücks,²⁶ das die Überschrift "Einwand" trägt, schreibt Nietzsche:

"... Oder sollte es gegen jenen Satz, dass die psychologische Beobachtung zu den Reiz-, Heil- und Erleichterungsmitteln des Daseins gehöre, eine Gegenrechnung geben? Sollte man sich genug von den unangenehmen Folgen dieser Kunst überzeugt haben, um jetzt mit Absichtlichkeit den Blick der sich Bildenden von ihr abzulenken? In der That, ein gewisser blinder Glaube an die Güte der menschlichen Natur, ein eingepflanzter Widerwille vor der Zerlegung menschlicher Handlungen, eine Art Schamhaftigkeit in Hinsicht auf die Nacktheit der Seele mögen wirklich für das gesammte Glück eines Menschen wünschenswerthere Dinge sein, als jene, in einzelnen Fällen hilfreiche Eigenschaft der psychologischen Scharfsichtigkeit; und vielleicht hat der Glaube an das Gute, an tugendhafte Menschen und Handlungen, an eine Fülle des unpersönlichen Wohlwollens in der Welt die Menschen besser gemacht, insofern er dieselben weniger misstrauisch machte. Wenn man die Helden Plutarch's mit Begeisterung nachahmt, und eine Abscheu davor empfindet, den Motiven ihres Handelns anzweifelnd nachzuspüren, so hat zwar nicht die Wahrheit, aber die Wohlfahrt der menschlichen Gesellschaft ihren Nutzen dabei: der psychologische Irrthum und überhaupt die Dumpfsheit auf diesem Gebiete hilft der Menschheit vorwärts, während die Erkenntniss der Wahrheit vielleicht durch die anregende Kraft einer Hypothese mehr gewinnt, wie sie La Rochefoucauld der ersten Ausgabe seiner 'Sentences et maximes morales' vorangestellt hat: 'Ce que le monde nomme vertu n'est d'ordinaire qu'un fantôme formé par nos passions, à qui on donne un nom honnête pour faire impunément ce qu'on veut.' La Rochefoucauld und jene anderen französischen Meister der Seelenprüfung (denen sich neuerdings auch ein Deutscher, der Verfasser der 'Psychologischen Beobachtungen' zugesellt hat) gleichen scharf zielenden Schützen, welche immer und immer wieder in's Schwarze treffen,—aber in's Schwarze der menschlichen Natur. Ihr Geschick erregt Staunen, aber endlich verwünscht ein Zuschauer, der nicht vom Geiste der Wissenschaft, sondern der Menschenfreundlichkeit geleitet wird, eine Kunst, welche den Sinn der Verkleinerung und Verdächtigung in die Seelen der Menschen zu pflanzen scheint."

²⁶ MA I 36.

Nietzsches Fragestellung hat sich also seit der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen sehr gewandelt, seine Wertung ist wenigstens offener geworden; auch Plutarch steht anders da.

Wenden wir uns zunächst dem Unterschied der Fragestellung hier und in der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen zu. Dort ging es um die in Ernst und Strenge zu vollziehende Formung des Großen; Gegner war die Bildung oder genauer die historisch-analytische Überbildung. In "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" blickt Nietzsche dagegen eben aus der Perspektive des Gebildeten, und er empfiehlt ihm eine Wissenschaft, die im Sinne der Ziele der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen als noch weit zersetzender angesehen werden muß als die mit viel größerem Material umgehende Historie: die Psychologie. Die Psychologie wird aber empfohlen, weil man sich durch sie "die Last des Lebens erleichtern könne," weil sie die Chance bietet, daß man sich, wenn man sich ihr widmet, "ein Wenig wohler fühlt."²⁷ Wen besser als den Verfasser der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen beschreibt Nietzsche mit dem Satz "Sollte man sich genug von den unangenehmen Folgen dieser Kunst (sc. der Psychologie) überzeugt haben, um jetzt mit Absichtlichkeit den Blick der sich Bildenden von ihr abzulenken?"

Dann der Unterschied der Werte. Die psychologische Blindheit, a fortiori in der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen in der Idee des die Kultur bedingenden Wahns mitgemeint, ist in "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" durchaus kein Gut an sich mehr, sondern muß sich mit einer hypothetischen und relativen Wertschätzung begnügen—: sie mag *wünschenswerter* sein *im Hinblick auf das Glück des Menschen*, sie hat *vielleicht die Menschen besser gemacht*. Es gibt also Perspektiven, die die psychologische Blindheit empfehlen können—das ist der Tenor hier. Wahrheit hingegen ist der anerkannte Wert, von ihm geht Nietzsche aus. Er argumentiert ja etwa so: Nehme man als Ziel einmal nicht die Wahrheit, sondern die Wohlfahrt der menschlichen Gesellschaft an, lasse man es einmal darum gehen, die Menschlichkeit, nicht die Wissenschaftlichkeit vorwärtszubringen: dann, unter dieser Konzession, hat die "Dumpfheit" auf psychologischem Gebiet ihre Bedeutung. Gegen Ende scheint die Wertung wieder der der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen ähnlicher; die Psychologie könne unter einer gewissen Bedingung verwünscht werden, heißt es, aber diese Bedingung ist sehr speziell: derjenige, der die Psychologie verwünscht, muß vom Geist der Menschenfreundlichkeit, nicht von dem der Wissenschaft gelenkt sein—und auch dann läßt der Philosoph sich im Hinblick auf die Psychologie nur herbei zu sagen, daß sie, die der Menschenfreund verwünscht, den "Sinn der Verkleinerung und Verdächtigung in die Seelen der Menschen zu pflanzen scheint." Als sei aber bereits das ein zu großes Entgegenkommen, lautet die Überschrift des nächsten Aphorismus "Trotzdem"—und Nietzsche schreibt: "Wie es sich nun mit Rechnung und Gegenrechnung verhalte: in dem

²⁷ MA I 35.

gegenwärtigen Zustande einer bestimmten einzelnen Wissenschaft ist die Auferweckung der moralischen Beobachtung nöthig geworden, und der grausame Anblick des psychologischen Secirtisches und seiner Messer und Zangen kann der Menschheit nicht erspart bleiben."²⁸

Plutarch steht in dem Aphorismus als Biograph, der seine Helden *nicht* analysiert; diese nicht-analysierten Helden mit Begeisterung nachzuahmen, sagt Nietzsche, habe gewisse Auswirkungen.²⁹ Damit ist Plutarch also der Repräsentant der "Schamhaftigkeit in Hinsicht auf die Nacktheit der Seele"; Nietzsche hätte die Einleitung der *Kimonvita* erwähnen können, obwohl sie natürlich nicht direkt auf seine Frage eingeht und das aus geistesgeschichtlichen Gründen auch noch nicht kann (es gab in der Antike ja keine Wissenschaft der Psychologie im modernen Sinne dieses Terminus, wie Nietzsche selbst in MA I 37 sagt); nichtsdestoweniger ist ihre Aussage ähnlich. Die Vertreter der Gegenseite, des Wertes "Wahrheit," sind La Rochefoucauld und Nietzsches Freund Paul Rée, der nicht namentlich genannte Verfasser der "Psychologischen Beobachtungen."

Die Helden Plutarchs werden sodann von Nietzsche, wenn auch indirekt, so doch nicht undeutlich, für das Seziermesser der Psychologen freigegeben, vor allem nach dem "Trotzdem" der Nr. 37. Kurzgefaßt sagt Nietzsche nämlich, "die Wohlfahrt der menschlichen Gesellschaft" profitiere davon, daß man—u.a.—Plutarchs Helden nicht "anzweifelnd" analysiert—aber wie dem auch sei: es müsse analysiert werden. Vom hedonischen Satz MA I 35, wonach es Spaß macht zu psychologisieren, ist Nietzsche nun zu dem ernsteren Satz gekommen, daß die Psychologie, die Analyse der moralischen Empfindungen insbesondere, "nöthig geworden" sei, "der Menschheit nicht erspart bleiben" könne.

Auf dem Wege zu der jetzt erreichten Position in der Frage "Wissenschaft oder Atmosphäre?" ist eine Notiz aus der Zeit von Ende 1876 bis Sommer 1877 ("Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" erscheint April/Mai 1878). Trotz aller Kongruenz im Wortlaut ist ihr Geist noch anders, d.h. näher an der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen. Plutarchs Position ist indessen schon dieselbe wie an der späteren Stelle. Nietzsche schreibt:

"Nicht nur der Glaube an Gott, auch der Glaube an tugendhafte Menschen, Handlungen, die Schätzung 'unegoistischer' Triebe, also auch Irrthümer auf psychologischem Gebiet haben der Menschheit vorwärts geholfen. Es ist ein großer Unterschied, ob einer die Helden Plutarchs mit Begeisterung nachahmt oder anzweifelnd analysirt. Der Glaube an das Gute hat die Menschen besser gemacht: wie eine Überzeugung vom Gegentheil die Menschen schwächer mißtrauischer usw. macht. Dies ist die Wirkung von La Rochefoucauld und vom Verfasser der psychologischen Beobachtungen: diese scharfzielenden Schützen treffen immer ins Schwarze, aber im

²⁸ MA I 37.

²⁹ Vgl. dazu die Notiz von 1871, unten S. 31.

Interesse der menschlichen Wohlfahrt möchte man wünschen, daß sie nicht diesen Sinn der Verkleinerung und Verdächtigung hätten."³⁰

Nietzsche zeigt sich, wie gesagt, der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen gegenüber noch nicht in dem Maße gewandelt, wie er in "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" auftritt. Er spricht vom Nutzen des bloßen, nicht-analysierenden Glaubens und vom Nutzen des Irrtums auf psychologischem Gebiet. Dieser Irrtum steht dem anzweifelnden Analysieren gegenüber, das aber durchaus noch nicht empfohlen wird. Glaube und Irrtum haben der Menschheit vorwärts geholfen, sie besser gemacht—der ganze Abschnitt ist ausschließlich an dem Wert der "menschlichen Wohlfahrt" orientiert. Das ist allerdings nicht mehr der Wert "Kultur"—hier spricht nicht mehr der künstlerische Weltenbauer, sondern der pragmatische Mediziner, aber nach wie vor der praktische Besserer, noch nicht der Anwalt der Wissenschaft sans phrase. Der Wert "Wahrheit," "Wissenschaft" fehlt völlig; entsprechend findet sich keine Relativierung der Werte "Vorwärtshelfen," "Wohlfahrt"—kein "vielleicht," das die Leistung des Irrtums zur Erreichung dieser Ziele dem Zweifel anheimgäbe. Im Gegenteil: Wo in "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" der Wert "Wahrheit," "Wissenschaft" steht, lesen wir hier noch, daß "eine Überzeugung vom Gegenteil (sc. davon, daß der Mensch so gut nicht sei) die Menschen schwächer, mißtrauischer usw." macht. Gerade das Wort "schwächer" verbindet unseren Text mit der Zweiten Unzeitgemäßen. "Mißtrauisch" ist—als Ausdruck für die Wirkung von (wissenschaftlicher) Analyse—hier gesagt, um zur Ablehnung von Wissenschaft zu führen: man vergleiche die harmlose Verwendung des Wortes im späteren Text!

Wie in "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" ist Plutarch in der Nachlaßnotiz Antipode La Rochefoucaulds und Paul Rées; wie dort haben Plutarchs Biographien ihren Wert unter der Perspektive der "Wohlfahrt der menschlichen Gesellschaft," eines Zieles, das hier aber noch nicht relativiert ist. Und wird Plutarch in "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" dem wissenschaftlichen Sezieren anempfohlen, so ist die anzweifelnde Analyse seiner Helden in der Nachlaßnotiz noch verdächtig gemacht: die Psychologen sind zwar treffsichere Schützen, "aber im Sinne der (hier als Wert nicht hinterfragten) menschlichen Wohlfahrt möchte *man* wünschen, daß sie nicht diesen Sinn der Verkleinerung und Verdächtigung hätten" (Hervorhebung von mir)—sie haben ihn aber, und damit gerät auch das treffsichere Schießen in Mißkredit.—

Plutarch wird ein weiteres Mal in der Schrift "Der Wanderer und sein Schatten" erwähnt, die zuerst 1879/80 als Nachtrag zu "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" gesondert erschien und später, 1886, als 2. Teil des 2. Bandes dem bereits veröffentlichten, zum ersten Band gewordenen Buch

³⁰ KGW IV 2, 514.

angefügt wurde. Im Aphorismus Nr. 20 von "Der Wanderer und sein Schatten" heißt es:

"*Nicht zu verwechseln.*—Die Moralisten, welche die grossartige, mächtige, aufopfernde Denkweise, etwa bei den Helden Plutarch's, oder den reinen, erleuchteten, wärmeleitenden Seelenzustand der eigentlich guten Männer und Frauen, als schwere Probleme der Erkenntniss behandeln und der Herkunft derselben nachspüren, indem sie das Complicirte in der anscheinenden Einfachheit aufzeigen und das Auge auf die Verflechtung der Motive, auf die eingewobenen zarten Begriffs—Täuschungen und die von Alters her vererbten, langsam gesteigerten Einzel- und Gruppenempfindungen richten,—diese Moralisten sind am meisten gerade von denen *verschieden*, mit denen sie doch am meisten *verwechselt* werden: von den kleinlichen Geistern, die an jene Denkwiese und Seelenzustände überhaupt nicht glauben und ihre eigne Armseligkeit hinter dem Glanze von Grösse und Reinheit versteckt wännen. Die Moralisten sagen: 'hier sind Probleme,' und die Erbärmlichen sagen: 'hier sind Betrüger und Betrügereien'; sie *leugnen* also die *Existenz* gerade dessen, was jene zu *erklären* beflissen sind."³¹

Die Psychologie sei ein "Kunst, welche den Sinn der Verkleinerung und Verdächtigung in die Seelen der Menschen zu pflanzen scheint," hatte Nietzsche im ersten Buch noch gesagt. Jetzt erfährt der Leser, daß der Schein trügt. Die gemeinten Psychologen—nun "Moralisten" genannt—wollen *erklären*: man *verwechselt* sie mit den Verkleinerern, Menschen, die an erhabene Charaktere nicht glauben können, Erbärmlichen. Unmöglich, daß so von La Rochefoucauld und Paul Rée gesprochen wird.

Dem älteren Aphorismus gegenüber hat sich geändert, daß Plutarchs Biographien nun selbstverständlich (ohne ein mutiges "Trotzdem") Feld psychologischer Analyse geworden sind. Es ist nicht gesagt, daß man Plutarch nicht auch anders lesen darf; aber der Leser findet nun auf der einen Seite die wissenschaftliche Analyse, auf der anderen Seite das böswillige Verkleinern des Großen, und so bleibt es nicht aus, daß er sich auf die Seite der Analytiker stelle, ohne sich jetzt noch an jenen dritten, den nichtwissenschaftlichen Zugang zu den Helden Plutarchs zu erinnern. Wenn die Denkweise u.a. dieser Helden als "großartig," "mächtig" und "aufopfernd" bezeichnet ist, so ist das zwar erstmalig so gesagt, aber neu ist es doch nicht, denn daß die Helden so denken, schwang bisher stets mit, wenn von ihnen die Rede war, oder besser: diese allgemeine Charakterisierung ist alles andere als überraschend.³² Plutarch tritt im übrigen noch weiter zurück als in dem älteren Stück: Er erscheint gerade noch als Verfasser von Heldenbiographien, vorher durch "etwa" als in der Art eines *Aperçus* eingeführtes Beispiel gekennzeichnet, nachher durch das mit "oder" angefügte weitere Beispiel noch mehr relativiert. Er ist hier nicht in irgendeiner Weise

³¹ KGW IV 3, 192.

³² Vgl. die Notiz von 1871, unten S. 31.

als geistesgeschichtlich bedeutsam ins Auge gefaßt, nicht einmal wie zuvor—als nicht-analyisierender Biograph.

Im Mittelwerk verflüchtigt sich das Bild von Plutarch als einem Mann der Partei, der auch Nietzsche angehört. Das frühe, nicht veröffentlichte Stück ist in dieser Hinsicht noch dem Frühwerk verwandt; aber wo das dort notierte Material für die Publikation zubereitet wird, wird Plutarchs Biographiensammlung zu einem Werk, das man so oder so lesen kann, je nach dem Ziel (Wohlfahrt oder Wahrheit), an dem dem Leser liegt. Plutarch ist also nicht mehr Kampfgefährte, sondern jetzt literarischer Fall, dem Zugriff von verschiedenen Seiten und mit verschiedenen Methoden offen, und Nietzsche selbst hat klare Präferenzen.

II 4

In einer Nachlaßnotiz vom Herbst 1887 tritt Plutarch wieder als Kampfgefährte Nietzsches auf; allerdings ist der Gegner jetzt ein anderer—und somit steht Plutarch auch für etwas anderes. Die Notiz lautet:

“Krieg gegen das *christliche Ideal*, gegen die Lehre von der ‘Seligkeit’ und dem Heil als Ziel des Lebens, gegen die Suprematie der Einfältigen, der reinen Herzen, der Leidenden und Mißglückten usw. (—was geht uns Gott, der Glaube an Gott noch an! ‘Gott’ heute bloß ein verblichenes Wort, nicht einmal mehr ein Begriff!) Aber, wie Voltaire auf dem Sterbebette sagen: ‘reden Sie mir nicht von *dem Menschen* da!’

Wann und wo hat je ein Mensch, der in Betracht kommt, jenem christlichen Ideal *ähnlich* gesehen? Wenigstens für solche Augen, wie sie ein Psycholog und Nierenprüfer haben muß!—man blättere alle Helden eines Plutarch durch.”³³

In dem Herbst, in dem Nietzsche diese Notiz zu Papier bringt, erscheint sein Werk “Zur Genealogie der Moral.” Im darauffolgenden Jahr wird er die Schrift “Der Antichrist. Fluch auf das Christentum” fertigstellen. Die Erstveröffentlichung erfolgte erst 1895.

Es bietet sich eine große Zahl von “Parallelstellen” zu den Sätzen des ersten Teils der Notiz an, führen sie doch direkt zum Hauptanliegen des späten Nietzsche, der “Umwertung aller Werte.” Um diese enge Verbindung der Notiz zum Kern von Nietzsches spätem Denken zu dokumentieren, sollen die Gedanken und typischen Ausdrücke in Nietzsches Spätwerk kurz “belegt” werden.

³³ KGW VIII 2, 10. Viel früher eine Notiz, die dies und bereits Behandeltes verbindet. In einem Brief von 1880 (KGBr III 1, 50) empfiehlt Nietzsche dem Adressaten (F. Overbeck) als Heilmittel gegen ein beigelegtes “echt-idealistisches Büchlein,” geschrieben aus dem “jetzigen ‘deutschen Geiste,’” die Lektüre von “Plutarchs Leben des Brutus und des Dion.” Es geht Nietzsche hier wohl um die Idee “Brutus”; in einer Notiz vom Herbst 1881, KGW V 2, 540 sowie mit Emphase FWi 98 (erschienen 1882) wird diese Idee vorgetragen.

Vom Krieg gegen das Christentum, das seinerseits einen "Todkrieg gegen diesen *höheren* Typus Mensch gemacht (hat)," ³⁴ spricht Nietzsche in dieser oder jener Form auch sonst; so macht er dem "Theologen-Instinkte . . . Krieg . . . er ist die verbreitetste, die eigentlich *unterirdische* Form der Falschheit, die es auf Erden giebt." ³⁵ Nietzsches Erläuterung zum Ausdruck "christliches Ideal" gilt exempli gratia: sie fällt kurz aus und konzentriert sich auf einen Aspekt des "Sklavenaufstands der Moral," dessen Wesen darin besteht, daß das "*Ressentiment* selbst schöpferisch wird und Werthe gebiert." ³⁶ "Seligkeit" und "Heil" sind Unwerte, weil sie ein "passivisches" Glück repräsentieren ³⁷ (während der Starke und Wohlgeratene "das Thätigsein . . . mit Nothwendigkeit in's Glück hineinrechnet"). ³⁸ Zur "Suprematie der Einfältigen, der reinen Herzen" gibt es eine ähnliche Nachlaßnotiz aus etwa der Zeit, der auch unser Stück entstammt: "Ehren wir dergestalt die Blinden, die Vertrauenden, die Einfachen, die Friedlichen, die Esel, schützen wir und vertheidigen wir sie vor uns selbst alle diese arglosen fraglosen kuhwarmen Milchherzen . . ."; ³⁹ vorher, nur durch eine weitere Notiz getrennt, hatte Nietzsche sich die Kritik des "*christlichen Ideals* der Armuth, der Keuschheit, der Demuth . . ." vorgenommen; ⁴⁰ in der Notiz davor begann Nietzsche mit einer Bemerkung über Wagners Parsifal. ⁴¹ Seine Gedanken über den "reinen Thor" Parsifal—von dessen Eigenschaften ihn am meisten die Keuschheit beschäftigt, die aber von Einfältigkeit und "reinem Herzen" auch nicht ganz zu trennen ist—und über die Verwandtschaft Jesu mit dem Dostojewskijschen Typ des Idioten gehören im weiteren Sinne noch hierhin. ⁴² "Die Leidenden und Mißglückten" sind sonst auch "die Schlechtweggekommenen," "die Ohnmächtigen," "Sclaven" usw. genannt; ⁴³ zu ihrer Suprematie im Christentum äußert Nietzsche sich oft. ⁴⁴

Die Verbindung der Aussage über die christlichen Ideale und der folgenden über Gott wird sich aus dem Kommentar zu dritten Bemerkung Nietzsches, derjenigen über Voltaire, ergeben. Zunächst aber zu der Parenthese über Gott.

Sie ist so locker angefügt, daß ihr Zusammenhang mit dem Vorhergehenden an sich kaum einleuchtet. Der Leser, der nur diese Notiz vor Augen hat und in seiner Lektüre bis hierhin gekommen ist, dürfte statt

³⁴ A 5. Zum Thema "Krieg" vgl. W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche. (Princeton ⁴1974). Deutsch von J. Salaquarda (Darmstadt 1982) 450 ff.

³⁵ A 9.

³⁶ J 195, vgl. GM 7 ff.

³⁷ GM 10, KGW VI 2, 284.

³⁸ ib. 286.

³⁹ KGW VIII 1, 204.

⁴⁰ ib. 203.

⁴¹ ib. 202.

⁴² KGW VIII 3, 203 mit A 5, auch FWa 5, A 45.

⁴³ J 9. Hauptstück, passim; GM passim; A passim.

⁴⁴ z.B. A 5.

einer Aussage über Gott im allgemeinen, wie er sie vorfindet, eher etwas über den Christengott im besonderen erwarten, z.B. "Wenn man uns diesen Gott der Christen (d. h. den Repräsentanten, Garanten und Schützer jenes von Nietzsche abgelehnten Ideals) *beweise*, wir würden ihn noch weniger zu glauben wissen,"⁴⁵ eben weil er, als der Gott, der er ist, als Gott dieses Ideals, so "erbarmungswürdig," "absurd," "schädlich" ist.⁴⁶ Aber so steht es nicht in unserer Notiz. Nietzsche geht von seiner Attacke auf das speziell-christliche Ideal auf den allgemeinen Gottesbegriff über. Vielleicht, so mag sich der Leser denken, hat er ein a-fortiori-Argument im Sinn: Krieg gegen das christliche Ideal, denn schließlich ist Gott überhaupt weggefallen und damit implizit der christliche Gott als Repräsentant, Garant und Schützer dieses besonderen Ideals. Daß Nietzsche in Verbindung mit einem Gedanken an Ideale und Ziele vom Wegfall Gottes spricht, erinnert den Leser auch an ein Stück der Götzen-Dämmerung, zu deren Gedankenkreis auch der Inhalt der Parenthese gehören könnte. Nietzsche rechnet dort nämlich am Ende seines Abschnitts "Die vier großen Irrthümer" mit der Vorstellung von Zwecken, Idealen, Zielen ab:

"(Der Mensch) ist *nicht* die Folge einer eignen Absicht, eines Willens, eines Zwecks, mit ihm wird *nicht* der Versuch gemacht, ein 'Ideal von Mensch' oder ein 'Ideal von Glück' oder ein 'Ideal von Moralität' zu erreichen (. . .) Wir haben den Begriff 'Zweck' erfunden: in der Realität *fehlt* der Zweck . . . Man ist nothwendig, man ist ein Stück Verhängniss, man gehört zum Ganzen, man *ist* im Ganzen (. . .) *Aber es giebt Nichts ausser dem Ganzen!*—Dass Niemand mehr verantwortlich gemacht wird, dass die Art des Seins nicht auf eine causa prima zurückgeführt werden darf (. . .)—damit erst ist die *Unschuld* des Werdens wieder hergestellt . . . Der Begriff 'Gott' war bisher der grösste *Einwand* gegen das Dasein . . . Wir leugnen Gott, wir leugnen die Verantwortlichkeit in Gott: *damit* erst erlösen wir die Welt."⁴⁷

Die plausibelste Assoziationsfolge ergibt sich aber, wie gesagt, im Zusammenhang mit der Kommentierung der Anekdote über Voltaire. Wenden wir uns jedoch zuerst dem *Inhalt* der Parenthese zu.

"Was geht uns Gott, der Glaube an Gott noch an!" Natürlich nichts, denn Gott ist tot.⁴⁸ "'Gott' heute bloß ein verblichenes Wort, nicht einmal mehr ein Begriff": Ein Theologenbegriff, ein Begriff für Philosophen ist "Gott" sicherlich noch; aber die freien Geister sind mit dieser Theologie und mit dieser Philosophie fertig geworden—Theologen und Philosophen, so hat sich gezeigt, sind der Sprache aufgesessen, der Grammatik, also einer Volksmetaphysik,⁴⁹ und wenn wir, d. h. die Menschen unseres

⁴⁵ A 47.

⁴⁶ ib.

⁴⁷ KGW VI 3, 90 f.

⁴⁸ FWi 125 u.ö.

⁴⁹ FWi 354, KGW V 2, 275; vgl. J 20 u.ö.

Kulturniveaus, Gott noch nicht definitiv losgeworden sind, so liegt das bloß daran, "weil wir noch an die 'Grammatik' glauben."⁵⁰ Wer das nicht mehr tut, dem ist Gott nur noch ein Wort aus einer vergangenen Periode des Denkens, wie "Wille," "Ich," "That" usw.⁵¹ Aber auch die "Naturgeschichte der Moral" und die Kritik der Kausalität⁵² haben Gott als Schemen erwiesen.

Die Voltaireanekdote, um die es uns jetzt gehen soll, steht anderswo im Nachlaß ausführlicher. Nietzsche schreibt:

"Man belästigte, wie bekannt, Voltaire noch in seinen letzten Augenblicken: 'glauben Sie an die Gottheit Christi?' fragte ihn sein Curé; und nicht zufrieden damit, daß Voltaire ihn bedeutete, er wolle in Ruhe gelassen werden, wiederholte er seine Frage. Da überkam den Sterbenden sein letzter Ingrim: wüthend stieß er den unbefugten Frager zurück: 'au nom du dieu!—rief er ihm ins Gesicht—ne me parlez pas de cet-homme-là!'—unsterbliche letzte Worte, in denen alles zusammengefaßt ist, wogegen dieser tapferste Geist gekämpft hatte.—

Voltaire urtheilte: 'es ist nichts Göttliches an diesem Juden von Nazareth': so urtheilte aus ihm der *klassische Geschmack*.

Der klassische Geschmack und der christliche Geschmack setzen den Begriff 'göttlich' grundverschieden an; und wer den ersten im Leibe hat, der kann nicht anders als das Christenthum als foeda <superstitio> und das christliche Ideal als eine Carikatur und Herabwürdigung des Göttlichen zu empfinden."⁵³

Die inhaltliche Verwandtschaft der Voltaireanekdote mit der uns beschäftigenden Notiz fällt auf. Die Anekdote ist allerdings schlichter, und sie ist geschlossener aufgebaut. Mit den zwei Worten "Gottheit Christi" sind die beiden antithetisch einander gegenübergestellten Themen genannt: Hier "Göttlichkeit" im für Nietzsche und Voltaire einzig geltenden "klassischen Geschmack," dort die in Jesus von Nazareth verkörperte christliche Vorstellung von Göttlichkeit, die Nietzsche und Voltaire mit Verachtung zurückweisen. In der uns beschäftigenden Nachlaßnotiz von 1887 treten das christliche Ideal und das klassische So-Sein in der Weise einander gegenüber wie in der Voltaireanekdote die klassische und die christliche Vorstellung von Göttlichkeit einander gegenüberreten: der zitierte Satz Voltaires denunziert Jesus dort ja nicht als Schein- und Nichtgott, sondern zunächst als *das* Paradigma des christlichen Ideals. An seine Gottheit ist hier, so kann es scheinen, nicht gedacht. Vielleicht ist aber doch daran gedacht. Die Parenthese über das Wort "Gott" hat ja in der Voltaireanekdote überhaupt keine Parallele; immerhin aber war das Thema dort "Gottheit" und "Göttlichkeit" Christi—und so verbietet sich wohl die Vermutung nicht, daß die Assoziationsfolge unserer Notiz von der vielleicht

⁵⁰ GD: Die Vernunft in der Philosophie 5, KGW VI 3, 72.

⁵¹ J 17, 19 u.ö.

⁵² A 47, GD: Die vier großen Irrthümer 4–8, KGW VI 3, 86–89.

⁵³ VIII 2, 286.

zwar erst später notierten, aber Nietzsche doch wohl schon längst bekannten Voltaireanekdote abhängt, d.h. daß der zitierte Satz Voltaires der Schlüssel zur *gesamten* Assoziationsfolge der Notiz sein könnte. Ist das richtig, wäre die auffallend allgemeine und somit den Zusammenhang scheinbar sprengende Parenthese etwas leichter in dem Gedankengang unterzubringen.

Dem beschriebenen christlichen Ideal, so Nietzsche, sieht kein Mensch ähnlich, "der in Betracht kommt." (Jesus, der das christliche Ideal direkt verkörpert, kommt also nicht in Betracht.)

An einer anderen Stelle hat Nietzsche die Zensur ". . . kommt in Betracht" in weiterem Sinn verwendet. "Schopenhauer, der letzte Deutsche, der in Betracht kommt . . .," beginnt ein Aphorismus der Götzen-Dämmerung⁵⁴—aber Schopenhauer ist, wie er hier erscheint, ausdrücklich als Erbe des Christentums bezeichnet und attackiert. Schopenhauer habe "die Kunst, den Heroismus, das Genie, die Schönheit, das grosse Mitgefühl, die Erkenntniss, den Willen zur Wahrheit, die Tragödie" als Formen der Verneinung des Willens zum Leben verstanden. Insofern sei er wie das Christentum der psychologischen Falschmünzerei schuldig; er heiße zwar all jene "Cultur-Thatsachen," die das Christentum ablehne, gut, aber in einem "christlichen . . . Sinne . . . (nämlich als Wege zur Erlösung . . .)." Zu Anfang des Abschnitts scheint die Wertung "der in Betracht kommt" geradezu durch eine andere erklärt zu werden: Nietzsche fügt ihr nämlich in Klammern hinzu "—der ein *europäisches* Ereigniss gleich Goethe, gleich Hegel, gleich Heinrich Heine ist, und *nicht bloss* ein lokales, ein 'nationales.'"

In der Nachlaßnotiz ist der qualifizierende Ausdruck "der in Betracht kommt" enger gebraucht. Wer in Betracht kommt, sieht dem christlichen Ideal *nicht* ähnlich, jedenfalls nicht für Forscher, die wie ein "Psycholog und Nierenprüfer" (was Nietzsche seit "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches" ist) der *Herkunft* der zum Problem gewordenen "Denkweisen" und "Seelenzustände" großer Menschen "nachspüren," indem sie "das Complicirte in der anscheinenden Einfachheit aufzeigen und das Auge auf die Verflechtung der Motive, auf die eingewobenen zarten Begriffs-Täuschungen und die von Alters her vererbten, langsam gesteigerten Einzel- und Gruppen-Empfindungen richten . . ."⁵⁵ Als Beleg für seine These, daß kein In-Betracht-Kommender dem beschriebenen christlichen Ideal ähnlich gesehen habe, nennt Nietzsche die Vitensammlung Plutarchs ("man blättere alle Helden eines Plutarch durch").

Diese Helden sind also Nietzsches Ideal näher als der auch in Betracht kommende "Falschmünzer" Schopenhauer. Bezog sich der wertende Ausdruck in der Götzen-Dämmerung nur auf Schopenhauers *Größe* (auf das, wofür Schopenhauers Idealtypen stehen, kann er sich ja nicht beziehen), so bezieht er sich hier also auch auf die positiven *Wertinhalte*, für die die

⁵⁴ Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemüßen 21, KGW VI 3, 21.

⁵⁵ S. o. S. 518.

Helden stehen. "Ein Mensch, der in Betracht kommt" dürfte somit in einem engen Zusammenhang mit den Ausdrücken stehen, mit denen Nietzsche *seinen* Idealtyp bezeichnet, also "höchste Exemplare der Menschheit"⁵⁶ oder "Übermensch."⁵⁷ Nietzsche wird aber nicht direkt den Übermenschen meinen, sondern eben jenen Menschen, der sich auf den Übermenschen zubewegt—den "höheren Menschen," von denen Zarathustra spricht.

"Ihr höheren Menschen,—so blinzelt der Pöbel—es giebt keine höheren Menschen, wir sind Alle gleich, Mensch ist Mensch, vor Gott—sind wir Alle gleich!"

Vor Gott!—Nun aber starb dieser Gott . . .

Diese Herrn von Heute überwindet mir, oh meine Brüder,—diese kleinen Leute: *die* sind des Übermenschen grösste Gefahr!

Überwindet mir, ihr höheren Menschen, die kleinen Tugenden, die kleinen Klugheiten, die Sandkorn-Rücksichten, den Ameisen-Kribbelkram, das erbärmliche Behagen, das 'Glück der Meisten!'"⁵⁸

Nietzsche meint die, die, wie Zarathustra selbst, eine *Brücke zum Übermenschen* sind.

Über Übermenschen selbst spricht Nietzsche in dieser oder jener Weise an einer Reihe von Stellen vor allem des Spätwerks; besonders einprägsam sind seine Worte über Goethe, über dessen Einordnung unter "die höchsten Exemplare der Menschheit" für Nietzsche kein Zweifel besteht. Nietzsche sagt von Goethe: ". . . er disciplinierte sich zur Ganzheit, er *schuf* sich."⁵⁹ Davon muß der etwas haben, der als Repräsentant eines *Wertinhaltes* "in Betracht kommen" will. Und davon haben Plutarchs Helden in der Tat etwas an sich: und zwar nach Plutarchs Willen. Dies wird u. a. deutlich dadurch, daß er eine Syzygie über *schlechte* Charaktere schreibt: Demetrius und Antonius. Beide sind nicht unsympathisch, haben sogar viele Vorzüge, aber sie sind, wie es platonisch heißen würde, ἥττους ἐαυτῶν—man findet in ihrem Handeln keinen Anhaltspunkt für das Urteil, daß sie wüßten, was es heißt, sich "zur Ganzheit zu disziplinieren," "sich zu schaffen." Irgendwie sind aber die anderen Helden auf dem Weg dorthin. Es kommt auf die Statur, das Format, den Stil des Helden wesentlich an. Der Inhalt, der sich in diesem Stil darzustellen hat, ist zwar nicht beliebig, aber er kann stark variieren (man denke an Caesar und Brutus, Demosthenes und Phokion, Nikias und Coriolan). Dies gilt für Nietzsche⁶⁰ wie für Plutarch.

Unter Plutarchs Helden ist einer, der offenbar fest zur Gruppe der den Typ des Übermenschen illustrierenden Beispiele gehört: Caesar. Wie auch im Fall Napoleons war es nicht der erfolgreiche Feldherr, den der Philosoph

⁵⁶ UB II 9, KGW III 1, 313.

⁵⁷ Seit "Zarathustra" (1883 ff.).

⁵⁸ Z IV, Vom höheren Menschen 1 und 3, KGW VI 1, 352 und 354.

⁵⁹ GD: Streifzüge 49, KGW VI 3, 145.

⁶⁰ Man denke an das Paradigma Cesare Borgia, z.B. GD: Streifzüge 37, KGW VI 3, 130.

in Caesar schätzt, sondern der, der unter Mühen aus sich etwas gemacht hat.⁶¹

“Den höchsten Typus freier Menschen hätte man dort zu suchen, wo beständig der höchste Widerstand überwunden wird: fünf Schritte weit von der Tyrannei, dicht an der Schwelle der Gefahr der Knechtschaft. Dies ist psychologisch wahr, wenn man hier unter den ‘Tyranen’ unerbittliche und furchtbare Instinkte begreift, die das Maximum von Autorität und Zucht gegen sich herausfordern—schönster Typus Julius Caesar— . . . ”⁶²

Nur scheinbar mit Harmlosigkeiten hat es die folgende Notiz zu tun:

“*Noch ein Problem der Diät.*—Die Mittel, mit denen Julius Caesar sich gegen Kränklichkeiten und Kopfschmerz vertheidigte: ungeheure Märsche, einfachste Lebensweise, ununterbrochener Aufenthalt im Freien, beständige Strapazen—das sind, in's Grosse gerechnet, die Erhaltungs- und Schutz-Maassregeln überhaupt gegen die extreme Verletzlichkeit jener subtilen und unter höchstem Druck arbeitenden Maschine, welche Genie heisst.—”⁶³

Hier gibt Nietzsche die Quelle nicht an, aus der er schöpft. Das tut er aber in einem Brief an den ihn verehrenden Heinrich Köselitz (Pseudonym: Peter Gast) vom 13. 2. 1888: “Ich fand bei Plutarch, mit welchen Mitteln sich Cäsar gegen Kränklichkeit und Kopfschmerz vertheidigte: ungeheure Märsche, einfache Lebensweise, ununterbrochener Aufenthalt im Freien, Strapazen . . . ”⁶⁴

Plutarch ist für Nietzsche ein Lieferant von Beispielen höheren Menschentums, von Menschen, die sich selbst schaffen—und in dem Moment, wo er die Nachlaßnotiz schrieb, die wir hier interpretieren, spürte er wohl auch, was Plutarch für ihn eigentlich war: er sagt: “. . . Man blättere alle Helden eines Plutarch durch,” wobei die Verwendung des unbestimmten Artikels amplifizierende Wirkung hat. Plutarch ist eine Art Vorläufer Zarathustras, ein Prediger, der, wie indirekt auch immer, auf den Übermenschen verweist, ein Mahner zu höherem Menschentum, und zwar einem solchen, das mit dem Menschentum (oder einem Teil davon) verwandt ist, das Nietzsche “züchten”⁶⁵ will.

Plutarch ist für den Schriftsteller Nietzsche bei weitem nicht das geworden, was er für den Gedanken Nietzsches—jedenfalls nach dieser Stelle zu urteilen—war. Nirgendwo sonst könnte Plutarch für einen deutschen Denker so zentral stehen, nirgendwo sonst könnte er derart als Vorläufer fungieren—aber er wird nur erwähnt, um sofort wieder aus dem Rüstzeug von Ideen und Formulierungen, mit denen Nietzsche zu hantieren pflegte, zu verschwinden. Ähnlich war es im Frühwerk.

⁶¹ Kaufmann (s. Anm. 34) 369 f.

⁶² GD: Streifzüge 38, KGW VI 3, 134.

⁶³ ib. 31, KGW VI 3, 124.

⁶⁴ KGBr III 5, 251.

⁶⁵ Dazu Kaufmann (Anm. 34) 355 ff.

III

Nun soll von Plutarch her gefragt werden: in welchem Maße darf er sich rezipiert fühlen?

1. Plutarch ist bei Nietzsche (*nur*) ein Autor, der uns lehrt, was große Menschen sind. Dies Motiv tritt in zwei Formen auf, je nach dem ins Auge gefaßten Gegenbild. Das eine Unterthema stellt das schlichte, einfache Großsein der (Über-)Bildung und der Haltung analytischer Wissenschaftlichkeit gegenüber (wir sahen, wie Nietzsches Urteil sich hier in Bewegung befand), das andere stellt die Moral des Heroischen anderen Moralen gegenüber: der "stilllosen naturalistischen Sittlichkeit," dem Streben (der Zukurzgekommenen) nach Glück und Heil speziell in der Form des "christlichen Ideals."

Ist dies wenig genug als Rezeption eines—auch wenn man nur an den Biographen Plutarch denkt—überaus vielschichtigen Autors, so wird das Wenige im Rang noch gemindert durch die Vermutung, daß (das Haupt- und) die Unterthemen von Nietzsche bereits als Klischees übernommen waren. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, weil beide Unterthemen auch bei Schiller begegnen, dem einzigen deutschen Autor aus dem Bereich der neueren Literatur vor Nietzsche, bei dem Plutarch nicht so gut wie völlig vergessen ist. In Schillers Werken begegnen diese Unterthemen überdies auch als *einzige* Themen, unter denen ihm Plutarch als Idee erscheint. Damit kann nicht als bewiesen gelten, daß Nietzsche direkt von Schiller abhängt. Aber Schillers Wirkung auf Gymnasiallehrer, überhaupt auf das geistige Umfeld, von dem sich der Pfarrerssohn, Pfortaschüler und Altphilologe Nietzsche bilden ließ, kann eine Art oberflächliche Redeweise dieser Form über Plutarch inauguriert haben. Schiller muß aber nicht einmal in diesem allgemeinen Sinn Nietzsches Quelle gewesen sein. Es reicht, ihn als Indiz dafür zu nehmen, daß *man* so über Plutarch denken konnte, um die allgemeinen Lemmata, unter denen Plutarch bei Nietzsche erscheint, als Klischees verdächtig zu machen.

Das erste Motiv, das Plutarch als den Gestalter von Bildern großer Menschen der (Über-)Bildung der eigenen Epoche gegenüberstellt, findet sich an einer gut bekannten Stelle aus Schillers "Räubern" (1781): wenigstens sie hat Nietzsche, und zwar auswendig, gekannt—das darf man mit Sicherheit annehmen.⁶⁶

Wenn der Zuschauer Karl Moor zum ersten mal sieht, liest der gerade Plutarch. Karl Moor legt seinen Plutarch beiseite und sagt: "Mir ekelt vor diesem tintenklecksenden Säkulum, wenn ich in meinem Plutarch lese von großen Menschen."⁶⁷

Bereits 1871 schrieb Nietzsche folgende Zeilen:

⁶⁶ Vgl. KGW III 3, 311; die Stelle wird sofort zitiert werden.

⁶⁷ 1. Akt, 2. Szene.

“Die *heroische Oper* (v. Klein, Bd. 6) d.h. vor allem die historische. Der pastorale Charakter wird abgestreift. Die *ausgezeichnet edeln* Menschen: idyllische Tugendschwärmerei. —Die französische Tragödie und Schiller sind mit einem solchen moralischen Gefühl als Analoga der heroischen Oper zu messen. —Also Flucht aus dem Paradies der Menschen in die großartigen Tugendmomente der Geschichte: *in's Paradies der Menschengüte*.

Die *Räuber* (Karl Moor, Plutarch, die großen Menschen).⁶⁸

Plutarch selbst ist hier Idee Karl Moors aus Schillers Räubern, eben Erzieher zum großen Menschen; der Inhalt der Klammer ruft dem Leser das zitierte Wort Karl Moors in Erinnerung. (Eher nebenbei rückt Plutarch so im Nachhinein *in* jene Linie, in der auch Schiller steht, vor. Damit ist auch er “als Analogon der heroischen Oper zu messen,” seine Biographien moralische Idyllen, ein “Paradies der Menschengüte.” Diese Vorstellung weist auf “Menschliches, Allzumenschliches” voraus, wo Plutarch auf differenziertere Weise, nämlich wenn er auf eine bestimmte Art gelesen wird, als Beförderer dieser “Menschengüte” gesehen ist.)

Das zweite Motiv, Plutarchs Moral des Heroismus im Gegensatz zu anderen Handlungsprinzipien, findet sich im 12. der “Briefe über Don Carlos” (1788). Schiller schreibt: “Wer entdeckt nicht in dem ganzen Zusammenhang seines (Marquis Posas) Lebens, daß . . . die Helden des Plutarch in seiner Seele leben und daß sich also unter zwei Auswegen immer *der heroische* zuerst und zunächst ihm darbieten muß.” Der an Plutarch gewachsene Held wählt den heroischen Weg und läßt einen möglichen anderen außer acht—hier lassen sich viele mögliche Wege denken—Nietzsche dachte an besondere, gegen die *er* eben Plutarch ins Feld führte. Die Schillemotiv gibt ein Muster für seine entsprechenden Bemerkungen.

2. Was Schiller selbst angeht, so gilt er in Nietzsches Frühwerk noch mehr als Plutarch als Kulturbildner. Seit “Menschliches, Allzumenschliches” verliert er diese Rolle; Nietzsches Worte über ihn sind dann oft ironisch, herabsetzend—Schiller wird Gegner. Er zählt zu Nietzsches “Unmöglichen” (“Schiller: oder der Moral-Trompeter von Säckingen.—” Und auch: “Das Andre, was ich nicht hören mag, ist ein berühmtes ‘und’: die Deutschen sagen Goethe *und* Schiller,—ich fürchte, sie sagen ‘Schiller und Goethe’ . . . *Kennt* man noch nicht diesen Schiller? —Es giebt noch schlimmere ‘und’ . . .”).⁶⁹

Im Frühwerk ist das also noch anders. Schiller steht für dasselbe, wofür auch Plutarch steht. In der im Frühjahr 1872 verfaßten Vorrede zu den öffentlichen Vorlesungen “Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten” klingt dies schon deutlich an, wenn Schiller als der “Kämpfende” gesehen ist, der sich abmüht “. . . Damit der Tag dem Edlen endlich komme,” wie

⁶⁸ S. Anm. 66.

⁶⁹ GD: Streifzüge 1 und 16, KGW VI 3, 105 und 115 f.

die Schlußworte eines Zitats aus Goethes "Epilog zu Schillers Glocke" lauten. Dergleichen öfter.

Wenn Plutarch die Herabsetzung, die Schiller in Nietzsches späterem Werk erfuhr, erspart blieb, so kann das viele Ursachen haben; sicher jedenfalls nicht die, daß Nietzsche ihm seine Achtung bei genauerem Hinsehen hätte erhalten *müssen*. Ein Grund dafür, daß Plutarch, anders als Schiller, vor der Verdammnis bewahrt blieb, mag der gewesen sein, daß Schiller im allgemeinen Bewußtsein war und somit jedes Wort, das über ihn gesagt wurde, kontrolliert zu werden Gefahr lief; Plutarch aber war, und das wußte auch Nietzsche, für Nietzsches deutschen Leser mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit nur ein Name, an den sehr allgemeine Vorstellungen geknüpft waren. Es war also zweifellos auch eine gewisse—Nietzsche nicht anzulastende, sondern allgemeine—Unwissenheit über Plutarch daran beteiligt, daß Plutarch bei Nietzsche eine Art Idee wurde und blieb, die er—im übrigen selten genug—dem Leser, oder, in seinen Notizen, zunächst einmal sich selbst, vielleicht auch in erster Linie nach gewissermaßen kulinarischen Gesichtspunkten servierte.

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